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4. a. 4

OF THE

ORIGIN AND PROGRESS

OF

LANGUAGE.

—— verba, quibus voces sensusque notarent,
Nominaque invenêre. HOR.

VOL. II.

TO WHICH ARE ANNEXED,

THREE DISSERTATIONS,

VIZ.

1. Of the Formation of the Greek Language.
2. Of the Sound of the Greek Language.
3. Of the Composition of the Ancients; and particularly of that of Demosthenes.

AND ALSO AN APPENDIX, CONTAINING THE AUTHOR'S LAST ADDITIONS.

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

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OF THE

ORIGIN AND PROGRESS

OF

LANGUAGE.

PART II.

OF THE ART OF LANGUAGE.

INTRODUCTION.

ALL the subjects of human knowledge, how many and various soever, are either the works of nature, and of the great author of nature himself, so far as he can be comprehended by our faculties, or the works of art. The author of nature is undoubtedly the highest subject of the Intr.

Intr. contemplation of the human mind; and the works of nature are likewise far more noble and excellent than the works of art, being the production of divine wisdom; whereas the other are produced by human intelligence, working in imitation of divine wisdom, and upon that model forming a kind of new creation: for not only are the materials of this creation furnished by nature, but every idea which we have of order, regularity, beauty, and symmetry of design, are all taken from the great archetype of divine creation: In this way does man form a little world of his own, of which he is the sovereign, and which may be called the world of *Art*, in contradistinction to the great world of *Nature*. This creative power we have by degrees extended to every subject of nature within our reach; but we have chiefly exercised it upon ourselves, being the subject of all others the most in our power, and which we have, from nature, the capacity of moulding and fashioning to our own conceit, more than any other animal that we have yet discovered. The greatest work of art therefore is man himself, as we see him; for we have made ourselves, as

I have endeavoured to shew, both a rational and *political* animal; and also have acquired that great instrument of the rational and political life, the faculty of speech. The subject of this art is both the body and mind of man. The first furnishes what I call the *material part* of language; for of the breath, modified by the organs of the mouth, is produced articulations: and the mind furnishes the ideas, which make the *form* of language.

We have, in the preceding part of this work, endeavoured to shew how men became first possessed of this faculty of speech; which, for being common, is not the less wonderful in the eyes of the philosopher. We have also shewn, not only from theory, but from fact, how imperfect this first language must have been, both in sound and expression. We are now to explain how from those rude essays, which may be called rather attempts towards speaking than speech, an *art* of language was at last formed. And what I chiefly propose, in this part of the work, is to shew wherein this art consists, and how great the difficulty must have been, even from the rude materials furnished by the first savages who articulated, to form

Intr. a regular system of a language. This is a view in which language has not hitherto, so far as I know, been considered; and I hope it will serve the purpose of vindicating from obscurity a learned profession, held in high esteem among the antients, but which, in modern times, has become almost a name of contempt, I mean the profession of the *grammarian*. For I think I shall be able to shew, that it is a matter of great difficulty to explain well the principles of this most wonderful art, even after it is invented; and as the grammarian professes to teach us the practice of an art which distinguishes us chiefly from the brute creation, and not the *practice* only, which children have, and the most illiterate of the vulgar, and even some brutes in a certain degree, but likewise the *science*, so that we may speak as becomes rational creatures, it ought to be accounted an art of no less dignity, than use.

BOOK

BOOK I.

OF THE ANALYSIS OF THE FORMAL PART OF LANGUAGE.

CHAPTER I.

That there must have been, in the progress of language, two kinds of it; the one rude and barbarous, the other succeeding to it a language of art.—The requisites of a language of art.

THAT a regular and formed language, such as is used by every civilized nation, is a work of art, no man who knows any thing of language, or of art, will deny. It is equally clear, both from reason, and from the facts mentioned in the preceding volume, that the first attempts to speak must have been very rude and imperfect; and that the first languages among men, though they may have served the purposes of communication in a very narrow sphere of life, with few wants, and as few arts to supply those wants, must have been almost entirely *artless*.

Ch. I. *less.* If therefore language was invented, there must have been a first and a second language; the one altogether rude and artless, the other formed by rules of art, and the work of men of art; for that it could not have grown out of popular use merely, I will endeavour, in the sequel, to make evident. But, in the first place, it will be proper to shew wherein the art of language consists, which is what I propose to do in this second part of the work. When that is done, it is hoped very little argument will be necessary to prove that it could not have been produced by the mere *people*, but must have been the work of *artists*, and men of superior abilities.

The art of language appears to consist in *four* things. 1. In expressing accurately and distinctly all the conceptions of the human mind. 2. In doing this by as few words as possible. 3. In marking the connection that those words have with one another. And, *lastly*, The sound of the language must be agreeable to the ear, and of sufficient variety. Before I enter more particularly into my subject, I will make some general reflections on these four requisites; and what I am to say, will be the better

better understood by what I have already said of the imperfections of barbarous languages, of which a language of art is almost in every particular the just reverse. Ch. I.

And, *first*, with respect to the conceptions to be expressed by the words of the language, I have already observed, that a few words are sufficient for the purposes of barbarous life, in which there are but few wants, and consequently few arts necessary to supply those wants; but in civilized life, the number required is prodigious; especially if, in such a life, not only necessary arts, but those of pleasure and refinement, and likewise sciences of pure curiosity and speculation, are cultivated. To be convinced of this, we need only consider, 1*mo*, That the number of individuals, not only of all the several kinds, but of any one kind, is considered as infinite: not that it is truly so, and strictly speaking; for in a finite space, such as this our earth, or what of the heavens we see, it is impossible there can be an infinite number of any thing; but it is so with respect to our capacity of comprehension, and to the use of language; and it is for this reason that, as I have

more

Ch. 1. more than once said, there can be no language expressing individual things only. The first part therefore of the art of language, and the foundation of all the rest, is reducing this infinity of things to certain classes, called by the logicians *genus* and *species*, according as they are more or less comprehensive. But even this, without some further art, is not sufficient to prevent such a multiplication of words, as would make any language unfit for use: For though the number of specieses is, strictly speaking, farther from infinity than the number of individuals; yet with respect to our capacity, they also may be considered as infinite. In proportion as our knowledge advances in the several arts and sciences, we are daily discovering new specieses of things. Nor does the most learned man in the world know one hundredth part of those which nature has produced; but if even such as he knows were to be expressed all by separate words, entirely different one from another, so that the one could not suggest the other, it is evident, that the memory would be greatly overburdened, and consequently the language unfit for use; and yet it is necessary

for clear and distinct expression, that every species of thing should be denoted by a separate word; and not only must the specieses of substances be so denoted, but those of qualities, actions, and energies. The barbarous languages, as we have seen, by expressing several things by one word, have run into very great confusion; and instead of saving the multiplication of words, have greatly increased it. Some other way therefore was to be devised to prevent words from increasing to an unwieldly number: and this was done in a way, which, now it is invented, appears very natural and obvious, though, from what has been said of the barbarous languages, it is evident it was not of so easy invention; and that was by expressing things which in their nature are connected together, by words which have also a connection with one another. Ch. 1.

As this is one of the chief artifices of language, it merits to be explained at some length; and I do not know any example more fit to explain it than the names of numbers. It is necessary for the purpose of an enlarged sphere of life, that every individual number, at least to a very great

Ch. 1. extent, should have a particular name. For with respect to numbers, it would not be sufficient for the use of life to divide them into classes or specieses, as we do other things, such as even and odd, primary and composed, square and cube, &c.; but the particular numbers must be expressed. Now these are really infinite, at least *in possibility*; and if such of them only as we have occasion to use, were to be expressed each by a different word, that alone would make a language much too bulky for use. The way therefore that has been contrived, is to give different names to particular numbers, to a certain extent, as, *e. g.* to the extent of *ten*, as is practised by the European nations, and also by some of the barbarous*; and then to turn back again

* This is the case of the Hurons, as we have seen, vol. 1. p. 375.; of the Algonkins, Hontan, vol. 2. p. 217.; of the inhabitants of the new discovered island of Otahitee, vol. 1 p. 376. But all the barbarous nations have not so perfect an arithmetic. The Cyclops, in Homer, counted his flock by fives, which Homer calls πεμπαζειν. The Caribbs count in the same way, likewise the Blacks of the coast of Guinea. Aristotle, if I am not mistaken, speaks of a barbarous nation of his time, whose arithmetic went no farther than four: and that of certain savages upon the banks of the river Amazons, according to Monf. de la Condamine,

g'n as it were, and reckon ten and one, Ch. I.
ten and two, &c. giv g na es t) the new
numbers compounded o' he names of the
old. In this way we go on, reckoning
till we come to twice ten; which may be
expressed, and I believe is expressed in
most languages, by a word analogous to the
names of two and ten; and in like manner
we count three tens, four tens, &c. till we
come to ten tens: but that, in all languages
that I know, is expressed by a word quite
different. Then he reckoning goes on till
it comes to ten hundred, and then another
new

Condamine, went no farther than the number three; by which I do not underſtand that they counted no farther than three, but that after they had come to three, they turned back, as we do when we come to ten, and ſaid, Three and one, &c. as we ſay, Ten and one. It may ſeem ſurpriſing, that a nation, after they had gone ſo far as to ſeparate from the maſs of multitude three units, and put them together, ſhould not have gone a little farther, before they turned back, at leaſt as far as the number of their five fingers; but we know, from many other facts, how ſlow the progreſs of invention has been. However obvious therefore a thing may appear to us, nurſed in the boſom, as it were, of arts and ſciences, we ought not from thence to conclude that it was ſo to the firſt men, who had every thing to invent: and to one who conſiders this matter rightly, it will rather appear ſurpriſing, that thoſe other nations ſhould have come the length of the decimal arithmetic practiſed by us, and have

Ch. 1. new name is devised to express that number; and so the reckoning goes on again till it comes to ten thousand, to which the Greeks have given a particular name, viz. *a myriad*. But further in this nomenclature they have not gone; whereas we have gone further, and given a name to ten hundred thousand, viz. *a million*; and in this way we go on as far as we can conceive, without any new names to numbers.

This example will serve at least to illustrate one method that has been devised by the

have been so far as complete arithmeticians as we. Perhaps it was the number of the ten fingers that first led men to this method of calculation. But I rather think it was science and philosophy: for the number ten is the completion of number, in so far as it contains numbers of all different kinds, even and odd, primary and composed, perfect and imperfect, square and cube; and from thence it is said to have had its name of δεκα in Greek, which is supposed to be derived from δεχομαι, signifying to contain. It was therefore very proper to make this number the *cardinal* number, upon which, as upon a *hinge*, all the other numbers should turn. See *Jamblichi Comm. in Nicom. Arithmetic.*——If this be so, it is evident that no barbarous nation could have fixed this boundary of the infinity of numbers, but must have got the invention from some other nation, considerably advanced in arts and sciences, in the same manner, as I suppose, that those barbarous nations who speak a language of art, have not invented it, but borrowed it from other more civilized nations.

the artificers of language to save the multiplication of words, namely, composition; which is used when the idea to be expressed is composed of two other ideas, to which names have been already given. This is so common in all the languages of art, that it is needless to give examples of it. I shall therefore only add, that I am persuaded there are many more compositions of words than are commonly known; and that such etymologies given by grammarians, however fantastical or far-fetched they may sometimes seem, are many of them very well founded. Ch. 1.

But suppose the idea for which a name is sought, is not compounded of two ideas, but is connected with or related to another idea, what is to be done in that case? And the method is not to invent a new word, as is done in the barbarous languages; but with some addition to or change of the word already invented, to express the idea connected with that of the old word: and this method is what is called *derivation*, which is of sovereign use in all the languages of art*.

But

* These derivative words, in the language of Aristotle's philosophy, are called παρωνυμα; and he says they differ

Ch. 1. But suppose that the idea continues the very same, but some addition made to it, such as that of *time*, *person*, *relation* to any thing else, or any other necessary adjunct,

differ from the original words τῇ πτωσει, *Ariſtotle's Categories in the beginning*; which, as his commentator Ammonius Hermeias has very well explained it, means the change of the word in the laſt ſyllable. The inſtances which Ariſtotle gives of ſuch *paronymies*, is that of γραμματικος from γραμματικη and ἀνδρειος from ἀνδρεια. But although, in theſe inſtances, the adjective may be derived from the ſubſtantive, it more frequently happens that the *abſtract noun*, as it is called, that is, the noun expreſſing the quality abſtractedly, is derived from the adjective, which is the word that expreſſes the quality in concrete, that is, conjoined with the ſubſtance. Thus from *bonus*, is derived *bonitas*, from *good*, *goodneſs*, &c. although ſuch derivation be contrary to the order of nature; for, in the order of nature, the abſtract quality is prior to the quality joined with any ſubſtance. And it was perhaps for this reaſon that Ariſtotle choſe the two inſtances above mentioned, where the derivation appears to be according to the order of nature. But in other paſſages, without regarding the grammatical etymology at all, he derives words according to the order of things in nature. Thus from λευκος, he derives λευκος, and from δικαιοσυνη, δικαιος, (ſee *Categor.* & *Ammon. Comment. fol.* 136.), though the grammatical etymology be directly contrary. And his commentator has carried this philoſophical etymology ſo far, as to derive ἐστι, the third perſon of the preſent of the indicative of the verb εἰμι from ὀν; that is, that he derives the word affirming that any thing exiſts, from a word denoting the abſtract idea of exiſtence. *De Interpret. fol.* 45.

junct, what is to be done in that case? And there likewise the artificers of language have devised a way of saving the multiplication of words, which is of kin to the method last mentioned, but is different both as to the form of the variation, and the meaning of the word when varied. It is commonly known by the name of *flection* or *inflection*, and is used for the purpose of forming the cases of nouns and tenses of verbs in the learned languages. Ch. 1.

By these three great artifices, the two first things which I require in a language of art may be performed, and all the several specieses of things, so far at least as we know them, and all their different qualities and properties, may be distinctly expressed, in so few words as not to make the language cumbersome and unwieldy, like the Chinese written language, which consists of so many characters, no less it is said than eighty thousand, that no man living perfectly understands it. But even after this is done, the business of language is not completed: for there remains still the third thing that I require in a language of art, which is perhaps more difficult than any thing I have mentioned; and therefore,

Ch. 1. therefore, as I have shewn, was of latest invention; I mean, marking the connection and relation that words have to one another, or, as it is commonly called, *syntax*. For it is evident, that any number of words, expressing in the most clear and accurate manner the several things they stand for, would convey no meaning at all, if they were not some one way or another connected together. For though the bare utterance of the words would let us know that the speaker had the ideas affixed to the words; yet without some connection of those words, there would be no *speech*, because there would be neither affirmation nor denial, prayer or command expressed, nor any other operation of the mind; and therefore, as the business of language is to communicate to one another the operations of our minds, it is evident that, unless the words are connected, the purpose of language could not be answered. Here then is a new class of words to be invented; and a numerous class too, if we consider that substances must be connected with substances, qualities with substances, and with one another, and both with *verbs*, or words expressing

acting or *suffering*. These relations, it is evident, must be very various and numerous; and they must be expressed either by separate words, or by some change of one or other, or both, of the words betwixt which the connection is to be expressed. Ch. 1.

The last requisite of language I mentioned, respects the sound: as to which three things may be observed, 1*st*, That the words, in order to express such a prodigious variety of things, should be very much varied in the sound. It is therefore necessary that they should not consist of vowels only, or a few consonants, like the words of the barbarous languages, but be distinguished and articulated by as many consonants as possible, but so as not to render the sound harsh and disagreeable. For, 2*do*, A language such as we are speaking of, must be of easy pronunciation; and not only the facility of the operation of the speaker must be studied, but also the pleasure of the ear of the hearer. 3*tio*, The words must be of a moderate length, not, like those of the barbarous languages, enormously long; and particularly the radical words must be short, otherwise there can-

Ch. 1. not be either composition or derivation without enlarging the words immoderately. The declinable words also, in order to admit a sufficient variety of inflection, should be of a moderate length; and not only for these reasons, but for the sake of the easy pronunciation of the language, the words ought not to be excessively long.

Having premised these general observations, which will serve to explain what is to follow, I will proceed to consider the several parts of which language is composed.

CHAP. II.

The works of art prior to the art itself.—The analytical method followed in this inquiry.—The formal part of language to be first analysed.—Both the form and matter must have been analysed before the writing art was invented.—The nature of that discovery.

Ch. 2. ALL the works, both of nature and of art, are compounds, which the sense presents to the mind. These it is the business of science to analyse, and resolve into their

their principles, or constituent parts. But not only the works of nature existed long before any such analysis was made, but even those of art, at least to a certain degree. For we are not to imagine, that arts were invented *a priori*, by discovering the principles first, and from thence deducing the consequences; on the contrary, men began by practising; very rudely and imperfectly no doubt at first; but as they improved the practice, they began to discover the principles, and at last acquired science enough to analyse the art, and deduce it from its principles. In this manner all arts have been invented, and among others the art of language. But the progress was very slow from practice to principles; and accordingly men had the use of language long before they knew any thing of the grammatical art, by which language is analysed; and like in manner men sung, and played on instruments, while yet no scale of music was known, nor any art invented by which a tune could be resolved into the several notes of which it is composed. And in many nations of the earth at this day, these and many other operations of art are performed without the knowledge

Ch. 2. ledge of the art itself; that is, of its principles. As therefore the compound is first in order of time, at least with respect to us and our perceptions; so composition in the several arts, and particularly in language, is much easier than the analysis: for by imitation merely we can compose, or by natural sagacity without imitation, which was the case of the first inventors of arts; but we cannot analyse without science. Accordingly, who many people do we see, that have not only the ready use of language, but speak very properly, without the least knowledge of the grammatical art? But though composition be so much easier and more obvious than analysis; yet this last is the method of science, being that which constitutes the very nature and essence of science; for nothing is scientifically treated of, that is not resolved into its elements, or first principles. So that science does not follow the order of our perceptions, which begin with the compound, but the order of nature, according to which the elements or principles of all things are first. As therefore we profess to treat of language scientifically, we shall begin with analysing it, and then we shall proceed to the composition

composition of it; and this method we think the most proper, because the compound, in this matter of language, is well known to every one, as the composition is practised by every one; whereas, if the compound were not sufficiently known, it might be proper to proceed in a different method, and begin with it. Ch. 2.

All the works of art, as they are composed by man, so they can be analysed by him*. And the best method of attaining a

* Every analysis is a division, but every division is not an analysis; that is to say, in logical language, division is the genus, and analysis the species. Any whole may be divided into the parts which compose it, as a body may be divided into its different members; but such a division is not that which we call analysis, because the members of a body are parts of the body, when it is constituted or formed, but they are not the principles which constitute or form it, or, in other words, they are not the principles or elements of the body. Now it is the division into these last that I call *analysis*; which therefore differs from the other division in this, that it divides the subjects into parts more minute and subtile, not obvious to sense or common apprehension; but which, being discovered, shew the nature of the subject, because they shew the principles which constitute it. And it is for this reason that analysis is the method of science. The method of division, or diæretic method, and the analytical method, being two ways of investigating the idea or definition

Ch. 2. a perfect knowledge of them is, first to take them down, as it were, in this way, and then to put them up again. Thus if a man would perfectly understand the nature of a watch, or any other machine, he should begin with taking it down, and considering by itself every wheel and spring of it, and then he should learn to put them all together again: and in this matter of language, the method in which we teach children to read is, first to make them analyse words into letters, or elemental sounds, and then we teach them to combine those letters into syllables, and the syllables into words; and it is evident, that if we taught them in any other way, they would be

finition of any thing, are different from the analyſis and diviſion of which we are ſpeaking; but wherein the difference conſiſts, does not belong to our ſubject to explain. I ſhall only add, that the beſt example of the diæretic method to be found in Engliſh, and among the beſt in any language, is what Mr Harris has given us in his dialogue concerning *Art*, of which he has moſt accurately inveſtigated the nature according to this method, in the manner that is practiſed by Plato in the *Sophiſta* and *Politicus*. The analytical alſo and ſynthetical methods of reaſoning, are different from the analyſis and ſyntheſis which I am here treating: but to explain wherein that difference conſiſts, would be alſo foreign to our preſent purpoſe.

be imperfectly taught. In this manner therefore we propose to treat of language; beginning with that first and principal analysis of it, and of every compound, whether of art or nature, I mean into *matter* and *form*. With this division of language we set out in this work, and we must never lose sight of it. Ch. 2.

But this analysis is too general to explain any thing particularly; it will therefore be necessary to analyse each of those parts separately by itself: and I will begin with the *form*, that is, the sounds of language, not considered as sounds merely, but as sounds significant. In treating of the barbarous languages, I considered the material part first; but, in examining the languages of art, I think it better to follow a contrary method, and begin with the principal part, that is, the form, which the artificers of language appear to me to have chiefly considered, as no doubt they ought to have done, in framing the sounds of the language. Which of these two parts was, in order of time, first analysed, and made the subject of art, may be questioned; but my opinion is, that no language, complete both in sound and sense, could have been

Ch. 2. been framed, without knowing the principles and elements of both the matter and the form; for though such a language, when formed, may be used without the knowledge of either, yet it could not, I think, have been formed without the knowledge of both. If this be true, the writing-art, which in order of time was certainly posterior to the art of language, was not so great a discovery as is commonly imagined. For the great difficulty of that discovery, was the analysis of the sound of a language into its elements; so that upon the supposition that this had been done before, when the art of language was formed, there remained nothing to be done, but to find out characters to mark the elemental sounds already discovered. And that the invention of writing was no more than this, appears to me from the Egyptian story which Plato has preserved to us*, of that King of Egypt, who, when he was told by Theuth, the inventor of letters, that he had found out an art of memory, said, after the invention was explained to him, that it was not an art of *memory*,

* *In Phædro, Pag.* 1240. edit. Ficini.

memory, but of *reminiscence*. Now reminiscence supposes forgetfulness, which your art, said that wise king, encourages; because men trusting to it, will not exercise their memories, nor study to record their knowledge in their own minds, where it is best preserved. This story seems plainly to suppose, that what this Egyptian Mercury had discovered, was not the analysis of language into its elemental sounds, which was a great and a useful discovery, tending much to the improvement of language, and which certainly would not have been disapproved by the Egyptian king; but only a method of recording those sounds, of which indeed it may be justly questioned, whether it has upon the whole contributed to the improvement of knowledge. And perhaps the Druids were in the right, who, as Julius Cæsar tells us, did not make use of letters to record their philosophy and theology, though they knew the Greek letters, because they thought the use of them impaired the memory. Ch. 2.

CHAP. III.

General plan of this second part of the work —Analysis of the formal part of language into words.—Division of words into two kinds, nouns and verbs.—Subdivision of verbs into words expressing the accidents of substances, and those expressing the affections of the mind.

Ch. 3. THE method therefore in which I propose to treat this subject of a language of art is, first, to analyse the *formal* part of it, which will be the subject of this first book; then to analyse the *material* part of it, which will be done in the second; and the third book will treat of the *composition* of each: and in this way it is hoped the reader will have a complete view of the whole theory of language. For it is not the design of this work to explain minutely every part of the grammatical art; but to give a general view of the whole, and to explain the philosophical principles upon which it is founded. If therefore we any where enter into minute discussions, it will

will be of such particulars as we think have not been sufficiently explained by other writers upon grammar. Ch. 3.

To begin then with the analysis of the formal part of a language of art, or of the sounds of it considered as significant: This analysis is very simple; because all language, considered in this way, is ultimately resolvable into *words*. For, as Aristotle has defined a *word*, it is a sound significant, of which no part is by itself significant*; what is less therefore than a word, such as a syllable, or a letter, does not belong to this analysis, but to the a-

-nalysis

* Φωνη σημαντικη, ης μερος ουδεν εστι καθ' αυτο σημαντικον. *Poetic.* cap. 20. Opposed to this is the definition of the compound λογος, which, according to the same philosopher, is φωνη συνθετη, ης ενια μερη καθ' αυτα σημαινει τι. This composition of words, making a complete sense by itself, is what we call in English a *sentence*; of which I shall say more when I come to speak of the composition of language. In the mean time, we may observe, that λογος, as defined here by Aristotle, is used only in one sense of the word, namely, to signify the matter and form of language joined, or, as we express it in English without ambiguity, *speech*. But it signifies also the formal part by itself, and which is distinguished from the other by the epithet of ενδιαθετος; whereas, *speech* is λογος προφορικος. See the note on chap. 1. book 1. of part 1.

Ch. 3. nalysis of the material part, or sound, of a language.

Words then being the least parts of language considered as significant, or *speech*, as I shall chuse to call it in one word; the next question to be considered is, Of how many kinds words are? or, as it is commonly expressed, how many parts of speech there are? The common division is into eight parts; noun, pronoun, verb, participle, adverb, preposition, conjunction; to which the Greeks add for an eighth, the article; but the Latins, wanting the article, complete the number by the interjection. But though this division may serve the purpose of ordinary grammar, it will not be sufficient for a philosophical inquiry, such as this, into the nature of language, which requires that every thing of speech should be considered relatively to the nature of the things expressed by it. And therefore I prefer that division of the parts of speech that has been given both by Plato and Aristotle*, into *noun* and *verb*; and I will endeavour to

* Ariſtotle has given this diviſion in his book of Interpretation, and Plato in the Sophiſta. It is true, that Ariſtotle, in his Exoteric, or popular work upon Poetry, cap. 20.

to shew, that all the other parts of speech above mentioned, may be fitly referred to one or other of these two. My reason for preferring this division is, that it refers, as I understand it, to that grand division of things contained in the Categories, or Predicaments, (the doctrine of which I hold to be the foundation of all philosophy,) into *substance* and *accident*; for although the categories are ten in number, the nine last are all accidents*, that is, things which have no separate Ch. 3.

cap. 20. has given us another division, more suited to the capacity of those for whom he wrote that book, viz. into *noun*, *verb*, *article*, and *conjunction*: But I prefer that which he has given in his philosophical work, such as his book of Interpretation undoubtedly is; especially as it is supported by the authority of Plato, who certainly meant to give a general division of the parts of speech, without reference to any particular art or science, such as logic or dialectic.

* The Greek word for *accidents*, viz. συμβεβηκοτα, denotes this their nature better than the Latin word which we have adopted. It is to be observed, that I use *accident* here in its most general signification, denoting every quality or property of any thing, whether *essential*, or what is commonly called *accidental*, that is contingent; in short, whatever is inherent in another thing, without which it cannot exist; and in this large sense the Greek word συμβεβηκος is also used.

Ch. 3. parate existence by themselves, but exist in other things; whereas substance, the first of the Categories, has such a pre-eminence of existence, that it exists by itself, independent of other things. Now a noun is a word expressive of the thing existing in this last manner, such as, a man, or a horse, or what the mind considers as existing in this manner, though it really do not so exist, as shall be afterwards explained. The verb, on the other hand, I understand to denote every accident of any kind belonging to substance; whatever, in short, can be predicated of any substance as a property or accident, whether it be quality, quantity, action, or suffering, relation, or connection with any thing else.

This division, I think, must be allowed to be sufficiently comprehensive, and to exhaust the subject. For every thing in nature is either *substance*, or some quality, energy, passion, or relation of substance, that is, in one word, *accident* of substance; or, if any one dislike that word, on account of its ambiguity, he may call it, with Mr Harris, *attribute* of substance. It comprehends also mind, and all its energies and affections of whatever kind*.

* This description of the noun and verb, appears to be different from that which is given by Plato in the *Sophista*, p. 183.

This description of the verb may appear too general; but if we want to make it more particular, we may consult Aristotle's book of Categories, where we find all the several kinds of *accidents*, being ranged, as I said, into nine classes, such as quantity, quality, relation, Ch. 3.

p. 183. edit. Ficini, where he says, That a *verb* is a word expressing *action*, and a *noun* a word denoting the *actor*. And this is no doubt the common notion of those two grammatical terms; and it will coincide with my notion, if by *action* is understood, not only actual energy, but the quality, faculty, or power, by which any thing energises; and if by agent we understand the subject in which that faculty or power resides. That in this way Ammonius understood Plato, is evident from his commentary upon Aristotle's book of Interpretation, fol. 33.; and as it so perfectly coincides with my notion upon this subject, I will give the words of it. Εκεινος γαρ (meaning Socrates in the Cratylus) το ονομα μιμημα φησιν ειναι της ἑκαστου ουσιας δια φωνης εναρθρου, (ταυτον δε ειπειν, εκ στοιχειων και συλλαβων κατεσκευασμενον) ὡσπερ τα ρηματα των επακολουθουντων, τουτ' εστι, των ὑπαρχοντων ταις ουσιαις, μιμηματα ειναι. Λογον δε, τον εξ αμφοιν, τουτε ονοματος και του ρηματος, συγκειμενον· ὡς αν και αυτος δια τε τουτων, και των εν τῷ Σοφιστῃ ρηθεντων, προ του Αριςοτελους, μονα του λογου κυριως μερη το ονομα και το ρημα ειναι, τιθεμενος. Thus, according to the opinion of this excellent commentator, it was the doctrine both of Plato and Aristotle, that the parts of speech were two, the *noun* and the *verb*; the first denoting substances, the other the properties of substances: and indeed there can nothing exist in nature, but *things*, and their *qualities*.

Ch. 3. relation, doing, suffering, &c. accurately described and explained. Among these, the two last I mentioned, viz. doing and suffering, or, as they may be expressed, action and passion, so far as they relate to the mind of the speaker, are to be particularly attended to in the matter of language; because all speech whatever, besides what it may express concerning the nature of things, does of necessity express some energy, passion, disposition, or, as I would chuse to call it by one word, *affection*, of the mind of the speaker: for it denotes his joy, grief, surprise, or some other passion; or it communicates his prayers, wishes, commands, or volition of any kind; or it simply declares the judgement of his mind concerning any thing, that is, affirms or denies. As therefore the expression of these accidents or attributes of the mind of the speaker are essential to speech, I would chuse

qualities. So that whatever more parts of ſpeech we make, they can only be ſubdiviſions of the members of this grand diviſion; and accordingly I have endeavoured to bring under one or other of theſe two heads, all the other ſix parts of ſpeech that are commonly reckoned, and I hope I have done it without any ſtraining or difficulty.

chuse to separate them from other accidents, which may be expressed or not by speech, and to consider them by themselves, calling them *the affections of the speaker's mind*, and leaving to the accidents of substance the common name of *accidents*. We may therefore say, that every word expresses substance, or accident, or the affections of the mind of the speaker. The first is what I call a *noun*, the other two are *verbs*. Ch. 3.

These three are sometimes expressed separately by distinct words, sometimes two of them together, sometimes all three. When the substance is expressed separately, it makes, what is commonly called a substantive noun; when the accident is expressed separately, it is a preposition, adjective, or conjunction, which, according to my notion, are to be ranked under the verb; and if any affection of the mind of the speaker be separately expressed, it is either an interjection, or a species of verb known by the name of the substantive verb, such as *esse* in Latin, or *to be* in English, which denotes no more than the affection of the mind of the speaker, either *affirming*, that is, asserting that the thing *is*,

Ch. 3. or *commanding*, *praying*, or *wishing*, that it *should* be. But of this verb more hereafter.

In these instances, the three things I mentioned are expressed separately: but as, in nature, all things are mixed with all; so, in speech, the expression of them is often also mixed. Thus the substance and accident are frequently expressed by the same word; as *senex* in Latin, and *child* in English; the first of which denotes an animal of our species, with the quality of being old; the other expresses the same substance, but with the opposite quality of being young. They participate therefore of the nature both of the noun and verb; but as substance is by its nature more excellent than any quality or attribute, it predominates in the appellation, and they are both called *nouns*. That part of speech too commonly called an *adjective*, joins the accident with the substance, such as the words *good*, *ill*, and the like; but with this difference, that in such words the expression of the substance is indefinite or unascertained, so that it may be applied to any substance whatsoever; whereas, in the first-mentioned instances, the substance is definite

definite or determined. The quality there fore predominates in the adjective. For this reason I think it is improperly ranged under the noun, and ought to be ascribed to the verb; as shall be afterwards more particularly explained: and I say the same of the *participle*. Accident, and the affection of the mind of the speaker, are joined together in those parts of speech that are commonly called *verbs*; as in the expression, *I run*, where the word *run* expresses not only the action of running, but the energy of the mind of the speaker affirming that action to exist. This is, I believe, the expression of the verb in all languages. But in the learned languages all the three are expressed, as in the Latin word *curro*, by which the substance is expressed that runs, the action of that substance, and the energy of the mind affirming it to exist*. Ch. 3.

Thus we see that these three things are expressed

* The expreſſion of the energy of the mind in verbs, is much fuller and more accurate in Greek. Thus τρεχω affirms the action, τρεχε commands it, τρεχοιμι wiſhes it, and the ſubjunctive mood expreſſes that the action is not ſimply and abſolutely affirmed, but in dependence upon ſomething elſe.

Ch. 3. expressed either separately or together; and if together, either in pairs, as substance and accident together, or accident and the affection of the speaker's mind; or all three together, as in the instances last mentioned.

CHAP. IV.

Of the noun, and its threefold division; and the subdivision of the last kind of it.

Ch. 4. HAVING thus given a general account of this division of the parts of speech into noun and verb, I come now to explain each of them more particularly, beginning with the *noun*. And as I have taken this division from the Categories; so, in explaining it, I will follow the doctrine of those highest genera, as laid down by Aristotle; and in this way I hope to be able to give a satisfactory philosophical account of this part of language, by referring it to the nature of things, of which it ought to be the representation.

A noun, as I have said, is a name for a substance;

stance: that is, as Aristotle has defined it, a thing which exists by itself, and not in any thing else. Of substance, he distinguishes two kinds. One is the particular or individual substance; such as Peter, John, this or that horse, and all such natural substances; and likewise all artificial substances, such as this or that house or ship; in short all substances of whatever kind, immaterial as well as material. This kind of substance neither exists in any subject (which is common to all substances), nor is predicated of any subject; and it is, in his language, called the *first* or *primary substance**; because, in the order of our perceptions, such substances are first, and the ideas of all other substances are derived from them. The name which expresses this substance is called, in the common language of grammarians, a *proper name*; but if we have a mind to speak more philosophically, and according to the doctrine of Aristotle, we may call it a *primary name* or *noun*†. The second kind of substances, according Ch. 4.

* Ariſtot. *Categ. cap.* 5.

† Quintilian tells us, *lib.* 1. *cap.* 4. that ſome Latin grammarians gave the name of *nomen* only to proper names;

Ch. 4. according to Aristotle, are *ideas* of substances, which we form by abstraction from individual substances, such as the idea of a man, a horse, or the like; and of this kind are not only the lowest specieses, such as the two instances mentioned, but also the higher genera, such as animal, body, and the like. The words by which this kind of substance is denoted, are commonly called *appellative* nouns; but, if we have a mind to adopt Aristotle's language, may be called *secondary* nouns.

Thus far, and no farther, the nature of things goes, in the division of substances. But the human mind, for the purposes of life, as well as for the use of science, has created artificial substances, to which it has given names; and these make a third kind of nouns, commonly called *abstract nouns*. The things denoted by such nouns are accidents, which the mind abstracts from the substances

names; distinguishing the appellatives by the name of *vocabulum*, or *appellatio*. And in this manner likewise Dionysius the Halicarnassian, in his treatise of composition, *sect.* 2. informs us, that some Greek grammarians spoke, distinguishing ὀνόματα, that is a proper name, from προσηγορίαι, an appellative noun.

substances in which they are inherent; and by making them a separate object of its contemplation, bestows upon them a kind of separate existence, which they have not from nature. Of this kind are the words *blackness*, *whiteness*, *goodness*, *wisdom*, and the like, which, standing for ideas that are considered by the mind as substances, have not only all the form of substantive nouns, but are made the subjects of propositions, and of predication, as much as real substances. Thus we say whiteness is a colour, just as we say man is an animal; and we say goodness is amiable, in the same manner that we say that any individual is so. This will be further evident, if we compare this kind of noun with the adjective or verb, from which, according to the common use of language, it is derived; for the adjective or verb necessarily implies the idea of some substance in which it is inherent, nor does the mind conceive it without such substance. Thus, when *good* simply is named, we are not satisfied, but we ask, what is it that is good? but we speak and argue about *goodness*, without inquiring, or so much as thinking, about any substance to which it belongs. Ch. 4.

This

Ch. 4. This noun, as I have said, is commonly known by the name of an *abstract noun*, though the second kind of noun is likewise the name of an abstract idea; but as it appears to be, and truly is, a greater power of abstraction to separate the quality from the substance, than the general substance from the particular, it is therefore called, by way of pre-eminence, an *abstract noun*.

Of this third kind of noun there are some speciefes which deserve particular notice. And, first, there is one of them made by joining the article to the infinitive of a verb; for the nature of this mood being to denote the action of the verb simply, with the addition only of time, but without any expression, either of person, or of the affection of the mind of the speaker, by the article being prefixed it becomes a noun, having all the variety of cases which nouns have, and being like them made the subject of predication. For τὸ πρᾶττειν in Greek, is as much a noun as πρᾶξις, (though the last only be called a verbal noun), with this difference, that πρᾶξις expresses the action of the verb, without

the circumstance of time; whereas τὸ πρᾶττειν Ch. 4.
expresses that the action now exists, as
τὸ πρᾶξαι that it did exist in some former
time. And this appears to me to be the
great advantage of this kind of expression,
that by it we can denote, not only the
simple action, which is done by the verbal
noun, but also the time of the action*. In
English we do this, not by the infinitive
only, but by the participle also; for we say,
both, *To do good* is commendable, and, *The
doing good is* commendable; we say, *The
having done good* gives pleasure upon reflec-
tion, and, *To have done good*, &c.

Another species of this noun is formed
by joining the article to the adjective in the
neuter gender; as when they say in Greek,
τὸ καλὸν, or τὸ ἀγαθὸν. By this manner of
expression the adjective no longer denotes a
quality *concrete*, or inherent in a subject,
but a quality *abstract*; with some difference
however betwixt it and the abstract noun;
for καλλὸς is not precisely the same with

* It is on account of this kind of noun that I have not put into my definition of noun, what Aristole has added, ἄνευ χρόνου, *without time.*

Ch. 4. the τὸ καλον, as shall be shewn afterwards. This idiom too we have in English; for we say *the good* and *the fair*. In the same way the Greeks form nouns of their participles, as the τὸ τρεχον, and the τὸ ποιεῖν. We have the same form of a noun in English; for we say, *the running*, and *the doing*: but the meaning is different; for in English it denotes, as I have already observed, the *action* of the verb; whereas, in Greek, it signifies the *agent*.

All these three kinds of nouns I call by the common name of *substantives*, distinguishing the first and second by the names of *primary* and *secondary* substantives, according to the nature of the substances they express. The last may be called *ideal* or *fictitious* substantives, being entirely of the mind's own creation; but I chuse to call them by their common name of *abstract nouns*.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Of pronouns.—The necessity of inventing them.—The nature and different kinds of them.

ALL the objects of human knowledge, and consequently of discourse, are either *generals* or *particulars*. The knowledge of generals, as I have already had occasion to observe, is by far the more valuable knowledge, as by it we know even individuals; for we know nothing of Peter, James, or John, by hearing them named, or even by seeing them, unless we know the species to which they belong. But the knowledge of individuals is also absolutely necessary for human life, and in common life the greatest part of our conversation is concerning individuals. Now the number of individuals is infinite, at least with respect to our capacities; yet the purposes of life require, that in the use of speech they should be singled out, and distinguished one from another. Here is one of the great difficulties Ch. 5.

Ch. 5. difficulties that the inventors of language had to struggle with: let us see how they got over it.

It may be thought that proper names for the several individuals, will serve to distinguish them. But, in the *first* place, it is impossible that all the individuals which may be the subject of discourse, should have particular names, at least such as are known to the speakers and hearers; even the persons who have occasion to converse together may not know one another's names. *2dly*, Suppose that the subjects of the conversation have all names, and that those names are known to the parties, the same name may be common to several individuals, and indeed it is impossible that every individual should have a different name; there must therefore be some way of marking, that the name used by the speaker is the name of the individual whom the hearer knows, and of no other. And, *lastly*, Suppose this difficulty got over, and that the parties were agreed about the name, as applicable to the same individual known to them both, it would be tedious, and a great incumbrance to the discourse, if the name was to be repeated as often as the object was mentioned;

mentioned; and accordingly we observe it as a defect in the language of children, that instead of using the pronoun *I*, they name themselves*. Ch 5.

Names therefore will not solve the difficulty, and some other way must be devised. The only way that seems possible is, to divide the subjects of conversation into certain classes. But into what classes? The common division into specieses, by which the infinity of things is limited and circumscribed, will not serve the purpose; for the thing here to be done, is to distinguish the individuals of the several specieses, not the specieses themselves. We must therefore try some other way of classing the subjects of discourse; and suppose we should divide them into such as are present during the discourse, and such as are not. The division is sufficiently comprehensive; for every subject of conversation must either be present or not present. But I doubt it will not serve the purpose neither. The objects present indeed might be pointed out by the speaker to the hearer; but we are inquiring at present how they are to be distinguished by

* This is an obſervation of Dr Smith in his diſſertation on the formation of Languages.

Ch. 5. by words, not by signs or gestures. Now though the distinction in general, might, no doubt, be marked by words betwixt objects present and objects not present, how are the several particular objects present or absent, to be distinguished from one another? For there may be many objects present during the conversation, and the number of those that are not present is without bounds.

But this division, though it do not solve the difficulty, leads to another distinction that may perhaps do the business: for of the subjects of conversation present, there are two which must necessarily be present, and which, by their natures, are limited and determined; I mean the speaker, and the hearer, or the person to whom the discourse is addressed. And every subject of discourse must of necessity be either the speaker, the hearer, or some third object different from both. Here then is another division, equally comprehensive as the former; let us try whether it will not answer the purpose better.

If either the speaker or hearer be the subject of the discourse, there is no more ado but to invent two words to design and distinguish them from one another. And these words

words are called *pronouns*. The one standing for the speaker is called a pronoun of the *first person*; and the other, which stands for the hearer, or person addressed, is said to be a pronoun of the *second person*. But what shall we do with the third subjects of conversation, such as are neither the one nor the other? How are they to be marked by words? Here again a difficulty meets us: let us try what can be done to get over it. Ch. 5.

The objects of this third kind are either present, or they are not present. If present, and that there is but one of them, the business is easy; for we have no more ado but to invent a word, as in the former case, to denote this third subject of conversation, which is present, and then we have three pronouns, one of the first person, one of the second, and one of the third. And accordingly, in all the regular languages, there is a pronoun of this third order, which is commonly known by the name of the *demonstrative* pronoun; such as *hic* in Latin, ὅδε in Greek, and *this* in English: and if there be more of those objects present, which are made the subjects of discourse, they are expressed

Ch. 5. expressed by the plural of this last pronoun, in the same manner as when there are more speakers or more hearers, they are expressed by the plural of the two pronouns of the first and second person. But if it be further necessary, among the several subjects of discourse present of the third kind, to distinguish and separate one from the rest, that can be done in words by the name only, or by description. And thus much with respect to the subjects of discourse present.

But what shall we say to the infinite number of objects not present, which may be the subjects of discourse? How are they to be singled out, and the knowledge of them conveyed to the hearer? And if we reflect a little, we must be convinced, that this cannot be done, without reference to some previous knowledge which the hearer has of this object; for if we suppose him to know nothing at all of it, neither the name, nor the species to which it belongs, nor any circumstance at all concerning it, by which it may be known and distinguished from other objects, it is impossible that any knowledge at all can be conveyed of it to such a man, otherwise than by his senses, that

that is, by producing the object to him. Ch. 5.
But suppose the object had been mentioned before in the discourse, and that in this way he has come to the knowledge of it, any word marking a reference to the object before mentioned, and denoting that it is the same with the object now mentioned, will be sufficient to single out and distinguish that object from others. And here we have another pronoun of the third person, which serves to distinguish subjects of the conversation that are not present. Of this kind are *is* and *ille* in Latin, αὐτος and ἐκεινος in Greek, *it*, *he*, *she*, or *that*, in English.

The business of pronouns, as I have observed, is chiefly to distinguish individuals. Priscian has gone so far as to make it their only business*; and certainly the pronouns of the first and second person are only applicable to individuals, as likewise that of the third person, if the object be present; but if it be not present, the pronoun may apply either to individuals or generals, according as the one or other happens to be the subject of discourse.

* Pronomen est pars orationis quæ pro nomine proprio uniuscujusque accipitur. *Priscian, lib.* 12.

Ch. 5. The pronoun is undoubtedly to be ranked under the noun; for it stands for the noun, as the name imports, and always denotes a substance of one kind or another: but it expresses something more; for the pronouns of the first and second person mark a reference to the speaker and hearer. When I use the pronoun *I*, it is the same as if I said, *This man here who speaks to you*; and when I use *thou*, it is the same thing as if I said, *This man here to whom I speak*. The demonstrative pronoun of the third person, refers also to an object present, but different from either speaker or hearer; and when I use it, it is the same thing as if I said, *This object which is here present*: for all those three kinds of pronouns agree in this, that they all refer to an object present*. But the other pronouns of the third person always

* This I hold to be the reaſon why one of them is ſometimes uſed for the other: for, in the Greek tragedies, the demonſtrative pronoun ὅτος or ὅδι of the third perſon is often uſed for the pronoun of the firſt; and then the ſpeaker talks of himſelf in the third perſon, in the manner above mentioned, as is if he ſaid, *This perſon here who ſpeaks to you.* Mr Harris has given an example of

always refer, not to objects then known, for the first time, but to such as the hearer had been informed of by the preceding part of the conversation; so that they always denote objects *recognised*, or known the second time*. All nouns whatsoever, and indeed all words, suppose in the hearer a previous knowledge of the thing denoted by them, otherwise they would not be intelligible. But the difference betwixt pronouns and other nouns is that the pronouns suppose the knowledge of the object, either from its being present, or from its having been before mentioned, but not any other kind of previous knowledge. Ch. 5.

As my intention is not to write a grammar, but only to observe what is curious, philosophical, and of most difficult invention in language, I will not enter into any more particulars on the subject of pronouns, nor explain all the different kinds of

of the Latins using their *hic* in the same way, from that line of Tibullus,

Quod si militibus parces, erit HIC quoque miles.

Hermes, *pag.* 36.

* Τῆς διντιξεως γνωσεως. See *Hermes*, *pag.* 63.

Ch. 5. of them. Mr Harris has very properly divided them into praepositive and subjunctive, according to their order in the sentence; and he has, with his usual accuracy and elegance, explained the nature of that subjunctive pronoun commonly called the *relative*, such as *qui* in Latin, *who* or *which* in English. And I think it is not improperly called the *relative* by way of eminence, because it marks not only that relation which all the pronouns of the third person, except the demonstrative, have to the object mentioned before, but also the relation that it has with the syntax or construction of the speech, which it joins together, and as Mr Harris expresses it, renders more compact*.

From this account of the pronoun, the following definition of it may be extracted: *A pronoun is a word denoting a substance, not directly, but by reference either to something present, or something mentioned in the preceding part of the discourse.*

Before I conclude this chapter, I must observe, that this part of speech is so necessary, that the most barbarous languages

* Hermes, pag. 79.

ges have it, even the Huron, as I have observed. Those savages indeed have not the power of abstraction so much as to form a separate idea of it, and express it by a distinct word; but they always throw it in with the signification of other words, particularly of the verb: and yet even so expressed, it shows that they have been so far philosophers, as to make in some sort the analysis above mentioned of the subjects of discourse, into the speaker, the hearer, and some third person or thing. But necessity will make philosophers even of savages. Ch. 5.

CHAP. VI.

Of the article, and the various uses of it.

THIS part of speech very well deserves a chapter by itself; for, if I mistake not, it is of as subtle speculation as perhaps any thing belonging to language, particularly as it is used in Greek. It is not a necessary part of speech, for it is very seldom used by Homer; Ch. 6.

Ch. 6. Homer*; and it is not at all used in the most ancient dialect of Greek that is preserved to us, I mean the Latin. And in the Ionic dialect it is used indiscriminately, either as an article or a relative pronoun. The appropriating of it, therefore, for the purpose of an article, as is done by all the Attic writers, appears to be a refinement of the language in later times. But wherein this refinement consists, has not, I think, hitherto been sufficiently explained, nor any satisfying account given of certain uses of it.

The Stoics, as we are informed by Priscian†, reckoned the article among the pronouns; and both Appollonius and Theodorus Gaza speak of it as a relative pronoun, distinguished only from the common relative by its position in the discourse; and therefore they call the one the *praepositive article*, and the other the *subjunctive*‡. But I hope to be able to shew, that its office is different from that of a pronoun of any kind,

* ὁ, ἡ, τὸ, is frequently used by Homer, in place of the relative ὅς, ἥ, ὅ, but very seldom as an article.

† Lib. 1. pag. 574. See also *Hermes, pag.* 74.

‡ Ὑποτακτικὸν καὶ προτακτικὸν ἄρθρον. See *Hermes, pag.* 78.

kind, and that it deserves very well to be ranked by itself among the parts of speech. Ch. 6.

All the words of a language are either the names of individual things, or general terms; that is, in the language of grammarians, either proper names or appellatives. The article in Greek is appplied to both; for they say ὁ Σωκρατης, as well as ὁ ἀνθρωπος. But they must be both the name of substances of one kind or another; for the use of the article, as well as of the pronoun, is to single out and distinguish substances from one another, though it does it, as I shall shew, in a different manner. We will begin with considering it as applied to proper names.

The application of it in this way may appear, at first sight, altogether unnecessary; for a thing seems to be sufficiently defined and distinguished by being marked by a name. And, accordingly, Mr Harris thinks, that the article added to the name of Socrates is a mere pleonasm, or that it can be of no use, unless pethaps to distinguish sexes*. And it would be so, if

* *Hermes, pag.* 226.

Ch. 6. if there had never been but one Socrates in the world: for then it would have been as unnecessary, and as insignificant a pleonasm, to add the article to Socrates, as to add it to the pronouns of the first and second person, which point out particular persons that cannot possibly be confounded with any other. But we all know, that among the Greeks, as well as among us, the same name was common to many individuals; nor indeed is it possible, by the nature of things, that there should be a separate name for every individual. And, in this very instance, there have been more of the name of Socrates than one; and particularly, as I remember, there is an ecclesiastical historian of that name; and, even while Socrates lived, there was another Socrates, who is introduced in one of Plato's dialogues, and distinguished by the name of *Socrates younger*. How then is this Socrates to be distinguished from any other? It is, I say, by the addition of the article; and that in two different ways.

In the first place, if the name was mentioned before in the discourse or writing, the article denotes a reference to that former

mer mention; and it is the same as if we said, *the before-mentioned Socrates* *; so that the article used in this way, denotes an object of second or repeated knowledge †. And in this use of it, it comes very near to the relative pronoun, or *subjunctive article*, as it is called by the Greek grammarians. And there are only two differences betwixt them: *first*, The position in the discourse, the article being always prefixed to the noun, from whence it is called the *præpositive article*, but the other subjoined to it. *2dly*, The relative connects the discourse, and makes one sentence of two, which the article does not. Ch. 6.

But, secondly, The article is applied to Socrates, even though he be mentioned for the first time. What is the meaning of it

* This is the ſtyle of our deeds, in which the greateſt accuracy of expreſſion is obſerved; for though the name be ever ſo often mentioned, it is always with the addition, *the ſaid*, *the foreſaid*, or the *above-mentioned*. This tedious repetition, which clogs and incumbers the ſtyle of our writs ſo much, would be ſaved, if we uſed the article in the way the Greeks do, and the ſtyle would be as well connected as it is, without ſuch *gouty joints*, to uſe an expreſſion of my Lord Shaftſbury's.

† Της δευτερας γνωσεως.

Ch. 6. in such a case? Is it not *there* at least a mere pleonasm? I say not; and that it has still a reference to the previous knowledge of the hearer or reader; not that indeed which he has learned from the preceding discourse, but that which he is supposed to have had before; for who knows not Socrates the great philosopher? The article therefore is added to Socrates, to mark his being generally known; and in this way, added even to a general name, it will point out a particular person. Thus, ὁ ποιητης denotes Homer, ὁ ῥητωρ Demosthenes; and added to a much more general name than any of these, viz. ανθρωπος, it denotes the public executioner in Athens*.

But suppose the name never mentioned before, and suppose it likewise not to be the name of any famous person generally known, then I say the addition of the article would be altogether improper: and accordingly it is never used; for they say, in such a case, Σοσικλης (for example) τις καλλιμαχος, or Σοσικλης τις ονομα.

By this use of the article it is clearly distinguished from the relative, which it seems otherwise

* *See Hermes, pag.* 222.

otherwise so much to resemble; for the relative is never used in that sense. But it would seem at first sight, that when it refers only to the former mention of the person or thing, it might be supplied by such pronouns as ὁτος and ουτος in Greek, *hic* and *ille* in Latin, *this* and *that* in English. But all these express something different; for with respect to the demonstrative pronouns, ὁτος, *hic*, and *this*, they express the thing with particular emphasis, and point it out as it were with the finger. It is in this way that Virgil mentions Augustus Cæsar, in that fine compliment he pays him in the 6th *Æneid*, Ch. 6.

Hic *vir*, hic *est*, *tibi quem promitti sæpius audis*,
Augustus Cæsar, *Divûm genus*.——

And in the same way we say in English, *This* is the man who is destined to save a state, or to do any other great thing. As to the other pronouns above mentioned, εκεινος, *ille*, and *that*, they mark reference indeed; but in contradistinction to the demonstrative pronouns just now mentioned, ὁτος and *hic*; for they denote that the object is not considered as present, or under the eye of the hearer,

Ch. 6. hearer, as it is represented when the other pronouns are used. As to αυτος in Greek, *is* in Latin, and *he* in English, they are used by themselves, without being joined to any name, which the article never is*; and they refer only to an object formerly mentioned, but never to any knowledge of the hearer, other than what he has got from the discourse. As to αυτος, when it is used in the sense of the Latin *ipse*, the difference betwixt it and the article is manifest.

It sometimes happens that a person is more distinguished by his country, his profession, or any other quality, than by his name. In that case the article is added to the adjective denoting the quality, and not to the name; as Απολλοδωρος ὁ Κυζηνικος, Τευφων ὁ γραμματικος, Φανοκριτος ὁ τρις ὑπατευσας †, where it

* The article indeed is not always prefixed to the name, but sometimes follows it, but never at any great distance: whereas the pronouns I have mentioned, αυτος, *is*, and *he*, may be at a very great distance from the name to which they refer.

† Mr Harris, pag. 231. very properly observes the difference that there is betwixt adding the article to the proper name, and to the adjective or participle subjoined, in the instance which he gives, ὁ Πτολεμαιος γυμνασιαρχησας τιμηθη, and ὁ γυμνασιαρχησας Πτολεμαιος τιμηθη, or rather Πτολεμαιος ὁ γυμνασιαρχησας τιμηθη.

it may seem that the article is joined to the adjective or participle, contrary to the rule we have laid down. But it is truly joined to the noun, only with the addition of an epithet. And so much for the use of the article when it is joined with a proper name. Ch. 6.

The article, when prefixed to general names, such as ἄνθρωπος, is of more various use, and therefore must be more accurately considered. For that purpose let us examine what ἄνθρωπος by itself, without the article, signifies. And I say it denotes any single individual of the species, without distinction or discrimination; and therefore the logicians tell us, that in propositions it is the same with τις ἄνθρωπος. Thus ἄνθρωπος λευκὸς is the same as τις ἄνθρωπος λευκὸς, being both particular propositions, not universal*. In like manner the plural of the word, without the article, denotes several individuals of the species, but likewise without any distinction or discrimination; so that as ἄνθρωποι is the same with τινὲς ἄνθρωποι, ἄνθρωποι is the same with τινὲς ἄνθρωποι.

We

* See Aristotle περὶ ἑρμηνείας, and his commentator Ammonius, pag. 70. and 89. See also Philoponus's commentary upon the *First Analytics*, Pag. 7.

Ch. 6. We are next to consider the alteration that the addition of the article makes. What do I mean when I say ὁ ἄνθρωπος, or in English *the man*? My answer is, that it is in this use likewise of the nature of a relative. And first, it refers to the foreknowledge which the hearer had by the person being mentioned before; so that ὁ ἄνθρωπος, or *the man*, is the aforesaid man; and οἱ ἄνθρωποι or *the men*, are the aforesaid men. And in this way we talk of a man or men without naming them; and even though they have not been named in the preceding part of the discourse, but only so described as that it may be known what man or men are meant. Or, secondly, in this expression the article may have the same reference to common knowledge or notoriety as when it is applied to a proper name, as in the instance above given of ὁ ἄνθρωπος for the common executioner in Athens; and in our ordinary way of speaking we say, *the city*, *the river*, that is, the city or river well known to the hearer; for that is what is chiefly designed by this kind of expression, not the dignity or excellence of the object: for we speak so of the city we live in or the river near us, however inconsiderable

siderable that city or river may be. It is true indeed that the notoriety may, in many cases, arise from the dignity or excellence, as in the instances above mentioned, of *the poet* and *the orator;* but it is the knowledge of the hearer, from whatever cause it proceeds, that makes this use of the article proper. Ch. 6.

Thus it appears, that the article being prefixed to the general term ἄνθρωπος, makes a particular term of it, denoting an individual of the species. But suppose I have a mind to preserve the generality of the word, and to denote by it the species itself, what am I to do? The use of the word by itself, without the article, expresses only, as we have seen, some indefinite individual of the species; and with the article it expresses still an individual, but definite. Is there then no other way of denoting the species, but by a circumlocution, such as τὸ εἶδος τῦ ἀνθρώπε, *the species of man?* There is in the Greek language; and it is by the use of the article, for ὁ ἄνθρωπος, in Greek, denotes the species as well as the individual, as in this proposition, ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστι ζῶον. And this will hold though

Ch. 6. though the species be mentioned for the first time.

That such is the fact cannot be denied; but how is it to be reconciled with my notion of the article's being a relative word, referring to some previous knowledge of the subject? My answer is, that it is as much relative in this instance, as when it is prefixed to Socrates, or any other individual well known; for it refers to a knowledge which must be much more general than that of any individual of the species, I mean the knowledge of the species itself, which every body is supposed to know; whereas there are but few individuals of any species that are generally known.

But how can the same article denote both the species and the individual of the species? My answer is, that there is an ambiguity no doubt in the expression, considered simply by itself; but it must be apparent from the context, whether the person is speaking historically of an individual man, or philosophically of the species. But there is no impropriety at all that the same expression of individuality should be applied both to the species and

the individual of the species. On the contrary, it would have been an impropriety, if the species had been joined with any word denoting *number* or *many:* for the species itself is truly an individual of the kind, as much as any particular under it, and is so called by Aristotle*. And it is not only one itself, but it makes one of the things under it; for things are said to be one and the same, because they are of the same species. Ch. 6.

This philosophical use, as it may be

* Aristotle calls it the ατομον τῳ εἰδει; in Plato's language it is said to be *one* of the *many*; and Aristotle carries it so far as to say, that when πας is added to a general term such as ανθρωπος, υ το καθολυ σημαινει, αλλ ὁτι καθολυ. The meaning of which is, that any word such as πας, implying division into parts, though it express that all those parts are comprehended, and therefore σημαινει ὁτι καθολυ, yet does not denote the *general* simply, or the *idea* of the thing, υ σημαινει το καθολυ. See *Ammon.* περι ἑρμηνειας, *fol.* 81. Now if πας ανθρωπος, does not express this *one* idea, and if ανθρωπος simply does not express it neither, as is evident from this very passage of Aristotle, it remains, that the only proper expression for it, is the general term, with the article in the singular number, which, by its nature, denotes singleness or individuality, and therefore is applied, not only to the individuals of species, as we have seen, but to *monadic* things, such as the ancients supposed the sun to be. And accordingly they say in Greek ὁ ἡλιος. See *Amm. fol.* 78. *ubi supra.*

Ch. 6. called, of the article, serves to explain another use of it, which has been observed, but not accounted for, so far as I know; which is, to mark the subject of a proposition, and thereby distinguish it from the predicate or attribute. In the *first* place, it is to be observed, that the subject is not always marked by the article, but by other definitives*, such as πας, *all* or *every one*, and others to be afterwards mentioned. And sometimes the subject is altogether without any definitive, as in the proposition above mentioned, ανθρωπος εστι λευκος, where ανθρωπος is the subject, but no wise limited or defined.

2dly, As the subject has not always the article, so neither is the predicate always without it; for Aristotle mentions a proposition, where both the subject and the predicate have the article, viz. η ηδονη εστι το αγαθον †. This makes a good deal of puzzle in the case, for clearing which it is necessary

* I use this word of Mr Harris's, to translate the Greek logical term προσδιορισμος, which signifies an addition to the subject of a proposition, by which the latitude or extent in which it is to be taken is determined.

† Aristot. *Analyt. prior. lib.* 1. *et* Philopon. *comm. fol.* 85.

sary to explain a little of the doctrine of propositions. Ch. 6.

In the most simple proposition there must necessarily be something *affirmed* or *denied*, and something *of which* it is affirmed or denied. The first is called *the predicate*, or *what is predicated*, in Greek το κατηγορούμενον; the other is called *the subject*, το ὑποκείμενον. Now this predication can only be in two ways: for either it must be as the genus of the species, as when we say, *man is an animal*, where *animal*, the more general idea, is predicated of the less general idea comprehended under it; or, *2dly*, The accident is predicated of the subject, in which it is inherent, as when we say, *man is white*, where *white* is the accident predicated of man the substance*. This is the

* Ammonius, in his commentary upon the *predicaments*, pag. 59. mentions two other ways of predicating, which he calls παρὰ φύσιν and κατὰ συμβεβηκός; but they may be eaſily reduced to one or other of the two I have mentioned. There are ſome propoſitions wherein an accident ſeems to be predicated of an accident, as when we ſay, *goodneſs is amiable, wiſdom is profitable*. But the caſe is, that *wiſdom* and *goodneſs*, in ſuch propoſitions, as they have the form of nouns, ſo they are conſidered as expreſſing ſubſtances, in which the accidents *amiable* and *profitable* are inherent.

Ch. 6. the nature of the predicate. As to the subject, it is either an individual or a general; and if a general, it has one or other of the following four definitives, or προσδιορισμοι, two universal, and two particular. The universal is either affirmative, which is expressed by the word πας, or negative, denoted by the word ουδεις. The particular definitives are in like manner either affirmative or negative; the affirmative is τις the negative is ου πας. Or, if it has none of these definitives, it has the article. Or, lastly, it has no limitation or definition whatever. And this is all the variety that the nature of the thing will admit. If the last is the case, we have seen already that it does not denote the species but some undetermined individual of the species. We have also seen, that πας ανθρωπος denotes all the individuals comprehended under the species, that is, *the many*; but not the *one*, or the species itself. As to the other definitives τις, ουδεις, and ου πας, it is impossible that they can denote the species. It therefore remains, that when the species considered as *one*, is the subject of the proposition, it can only be marked by the article, according to the philosophical meaning which I have given to it when prefix-

ed to a general term. And accordingly, Philoponus has observed, in the passage above quoted*, that we can say, ἄνθρωπος ἐστι λευκος, or ἄνθρωπος ἐστι γραμματικος: But we cannot say, ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστι λευκος, or ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστι γραμματικος; because such properties belong only to certain individuals of the species, not to the species itself. Ch. 6.

And thus it is shewn in what cases, and for what reason, the subject of a proposition is marked by the article. But it remains to be inquired how this comes to be a distinguishing mark, and why the predicate of a proposition has it not as well as the subject; why, *e. g.* do we only say, ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστι ζωον, but not, ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστι το ζωον.

The only one of the definitives above mentioned, that has the least resemblance to the article, is πας. Now let us inquire, whether it could be said, πας ἄνθρωπος ἐστι πας ζωον; but it is evident that this cannot be said, and so Aristole has told us†. And the reason is plain, namely, that this would be affirming that every man is every animal. Now although πας ἄνθρωπος differs, as I have said, from ὁ ἄνθρωπος in this that the one expresses

* *Comm. in Analyt. prior. fol.* 7.

† Περι ἑρμηνειας, and *Ammon. Comm. pag.* 82.

Ch. 6. expresses all the individuals of the species, whereas the other denotes the species itself considered as one: yet it would be as absurd to say, that the species man is all animals, as that every man is all animals*.

We cannot therefore say that ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστι πᾶν ζῶον, because we cannot say that πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ἐστι πᾶν ζῶον; and for the same reason we cannot say that ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστι τὸ ζῶον, because we cannot say that the species man is the species animal; or, in other words, that the general idea of man and animal are the same: for when we say that animal is predicated of man, we mean that it is predicated in the first sense I mentioned

* Ammonius, in his commentary upon the book of Interpretation, obſerves, that the article has the power of the univerſal definitive πᾶς, only with this difference, that the article expreſſes the whole as one, but πᾶς all the parts. I will give the whole paſſage: Καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῶον καὶ εἷς ἐστι, καὶ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῶον· τὸ γὰρ ἄρθρον τὴν δύναμιν ἔχει τῆς καθόλου προσδιορισμοῦ, ὡς μαθησόμεθα πρὸς τῷ πέρατι τῆς Ἑρμηνείας, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄρθρον τῇ ἑνώσει πρόσκειται τοῦ καθόλου ὑποκειμένου. Διὸ καὶ τῶν μεθοδικῶν ἕκαστον, καὶ τῶν ἀτόμων, συντάττεται· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἁλὸς λέγομεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης. Ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὑπερέχοντος λέγονται τῶν ὁμοσταχῶν· ὡς ὅταν ὁ ποιητὴς εἴπωμεν, ἢ ὁ ῥητωρ. Τὸ δὲ πᾶς τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὸ ἀναφερόμενον. Fromwhich paſſage it is evident, that Ammonius's opinion, concerning the uſe of the article in propoſitions, is the ſame with that of Philoponus; and indeed it appears to be the doctrine of the whole Peripatetic ſchool.

ed as the genus of the species; and the meaning of the proposition is, that man participates of the general idea of animal. The idea therefore of animal, is more general than that of man, which is comprehended under it; so that it is impossible we can affirm the whole genus animal of man, any more than we can affirm the whole species man of any individual. For though we can say, Σωκρατης εστιν ανθρωπος, we cannot say, Σωκρατης εστιν ὁ ανθρωπος; and for the same reason we cannot say, ὁ ανθρωπος ἐστι το ζωον. For in the one case ἀνθρωπος is the predicate, and ζωον in the other; and therefore if ανθρωπος cannot admit the article, it is clear that ζωον cannot admit it neither. And the reason is the same for both, namely, that as one individual does not contain the whole species, so neither does one species contain the whole genus. In short, to express it in that way, would be to confound genus and species, species and individual, and to make no distinction betwixt what contains and what is contained. And thus I have shewn, that the article is properly applied to the subject of a proposition when it denotes the species, but cannot Ch. 6.

not

Ch. 6. not be applied to the predicate in such propositions as the one I have mentioned.

But what shall we say of the proposition mentioned by Aristotle, ἡ ἡδονη ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθον? This proposition he says is different from the following, ἡ ἡδονη ἐστιν ἀγαθον; so that, according to Aristotle, the addition of the article makes a difference of the sense, and therefore ὁ ἀνθρωπος ἐστι τὸ ζωον is a different proposition from ὁ ἀνθρωπος ἐστι ζωον. Thus much then established by the authority of Aristotle. But what is the meaning of this proposition concerning pleasure? for Aristotle has not told us, but has left us to guess. Philoponus his commentator, in the passage above quoted*, thinks that it is a predication of the first kind above mentioned, by which the general is predicated of the particular under it; and he makes ἡδονη to be the genus, and ἀγαθον the species, so that the proposition is, that good is a species of pleasure, as man is a species of animal. But by what rule does he so determine? why may not ἀγαθον be the genus, as well as ἡδονη? I think there is nothing either in the sense, or the expression, to make us determine otherwise.

But

* *Comm. in Analyt. prior. pag.* 85.

But my opinion is, that it is not a proposition of that kind; but that the meaning is, that the idea of pleasure, that is, the ἡ ἡδονὴ, is the same with the idea of good, or the τὸ ἀγαθὸν; so that they are only two names for the same thing. Ch. 6.

Besides these uses of the article, there is another that I have already mentioned when I was treating of nouns, viz. that of making substantives of adjectives, and of certain parts of verbs. But of this it is needless to say more, as the only use of the article, in such cases, is to mark, that the word to which it is joined is used as a noun, though it have not the form of a noun; so that it is truly not an article, but an indication of a noun.

From what is here said of the article, the following definition of it may be collected. "It is the prefix of a noun, denoting simply "that the noun to which it is prefixed, is "the same with that which was before men- "tioned, or is otherwise well known*."

The

* I rank it, as well as the pronoun, under the noun; becauſe it cannot be without the noun, and is truly a certain modification of the noun, though it do not ſtand

Ch. 6. The great use of it appears from what has been said. And the want of it must be acknowledged a great defect in the Latin tongue, especially in philosophical writing; for the Latin, by reason of this want, cannot distinguish the unity of the species from the multitude of individuals under it, nor the species itself from any undetermined individual of it.—It cannot distinguish among individuals, those that are indefinite and unknown, from those that are definite and known.—It cannot distinguish betwixt the subject and the predicate of a proposition.—It cannot simply refer to any object, without some particular emphasis.—And, lastly, It cannot connect together the subjects of the discourse, by referring them one to another, but

for the noun, as the pronoun does. It expreſſes alſo the accident of relation; ſo that it is of thoſe words that have a mixed ſignification, and participate both of noun and verb. I have ſaid *prefixed to a noun*; and this is always the caſe, though the following noun be ſometimes not expreſſed, but underſtood, as in this expreſſion, Ἕκτωρ καὶ Σαρπηδὼν ἀνῃρέθησαν, ὁ μὲν ὑπ' Ἀχιλλέως ὁ δὲ ὑπὸ Πατροκλέους, where Ἕκτωρ is underſtood as following the firſt article, and Sarpedon the ſecond. I have ſaid that it *ſimply* refers to what is previouſly known, becauſe in that way it is diſtinguiſhed, as I have obſerved, from certain pronouns which refer alſo, but with a particular indication, or μετὰ δείξεως, as the Greek grammarians expreſs it.

but leaves the reader or hearer to guess, whether they be the same that were mentioned before or not. Ch. 7.

CHAP. VII.

Of the use of the article in French and English.

THE learned grammarian, if any such shall deign to read my work, may perhaps find fault that I should, in this inquiry into the nature of a language of art, spend any time upon languages that have not been formed according to the rules of art, by grammarians and philosophers, as the Greek language undoubtedly was, but have grown out of vulgar use, being mongrel dialects, and the corruption of better languages, from which they derive any thing good that is in them. But we ought to consider, that such as they are, they are now almost the only languages in which even the learned write, since the writing in Greek, which was never much practised in the western world, is now entirely given over, and the

Ch. 7. the writing in Latin very much disused, or so used that it were better altogether laid aside likewise. In such circumstances, it is of importance that the several languages of Europe, now almost the only languages in which science is delivered, should be cultivated and improved, as much as their stinted genius, and original faulty constitution, will admit. And our English is, among those dialects, one that I think more capable of improvement than any other. Besides, the perfection of such a language as the Greek, is never better seen than when contrasted by the defects of less perfect languages. Having said thus much by way of apology for this chapter, I proceed.

The use of the article is, no doubt, a great advantage which both the French and English have over the Latin: An advantage which they derive from their northern ancestors; for the French, though it be for the greater part corrupted Latin, has a great mixture in it of the Teutonic and Celtic; and the English, we know, is a dialect of the Teutonic or German, the parent of which is the Gothic, a language, as I have had occasion

casion already to observe, much more perfect than the present English; and which, among other things belonging to a perfect language, has an article. But we are not to imagine that the French and English languages have an advantage over the Greek, by having two articles in place of one: on the contrary, the use of the particles, *a* and *an* in English, and *un* in French, commonly called *articles*, is really a defect in those languages; for they are truly numerical words, denoting *one*, for which the French have no other word than this that they call an article. Now what occasion is there for a term of number to denote an indefinite individual of any species? This is properly done in Greek by the simple noun. Now suppose any foreigner, learning to speak Greek, should think proper to add the numeral εἷς, and instead of ἄνθρωπος should say, εἷς ἄνθρωπος, would not that be reckoned a solecism, and a corruption of the language? Now this article, in French and English, has, I am persuaded, arisen from such ignorance and corruption of a better language.

But should not this article, if it is to be used at all, have a plural? For, as we express

Ch. 7. press ἀνθρωπος by "*a* man," why have we not a plural for that article, to express ἀνθρωποι, but are obliged to say simply *men* in the plural, and that with no very determined signification? For we know not exactly whether it mean *some* men, *many* men, or *most* men; whereas the Greek ἀνθρωποι denotes the simple plurality of indefinite individuals of that species. In this particular I think the French language is more uniform and consistent: for they have a plural for this article, viz. *des*; and *des hommes* in French, is precisely ἀνθρωποι in Greek.

As to the proper article *the* in English, and *le* in French, let us first, according to the order in which we proceeded with respect to the Greek article, consider the application of them to proper names. And the rule is, both in French and English, that they are not applied to proper names, unless it be when two or more of the same name are mentioned: then we say, in order to distinguish the one from the other, *the Peter*, *e. g.* that you saw, *the Howard* that did such a thing; though this is not properly an exception to the rule, because the article is not added to the proper name so much

much as to the person so and so described, just as we add it to an appellative noun, as when we say, *the man* who did so or so. Neither is it an exception to the rule in French that they use it in proper names, as *La Fontaine*; for there it is a part of the name, not the article added to the name. But it is an exception to the rule, and a whimsical one too, that when we give a plural to those proper names, we then add the article. Thus we say, *the Howards*, or *the Stewarts*; and the French in like manner. It will be said, that this is to distinguish families from one another. But why not distinguish, in the same manner, individuals, when there are more than one of the same name? why, for example, speaking of a particular Howard, do not we say, *the* Howard, (as the Greeks say ὁ Κυρος), meaning either the Howard before mentioned, or a Howard so famous that every body knows him. Ch. 7.

Another exception to the rule, both in French and English, is, when we speak of certain great natural objects, such as great rivers, or great mountains; for we say, *the Thames*, *the Severn*, *the Alps*, *the Appennines*, &c.; and the French do the same: and

Ch. 7 and also when we speak either in French or English of nations, we add the article; for we say, *the French*, *the English*, *les François*, *les Anglois*. But by a strange caprice of the English language, when we speak of the country those nations inhabit, we drop the article, and say, *France*, *Spain*, &c.: but the French, in this, as well as in many other things, is more regular than our language; for they say, *la France*, *l'Espagne*, &c. And the Greek must be allowed to be more uniform and consistent than either, as it prefixes the article to all proper names, of every kind, except when they are first mentioned, and are not of things or persons generally known. And so much for the use of the article in French and English, when applied to proper names.

When applied to a general word, it distinguishes the individuals of the species, as in Greek, by referring either to the former mention of them in the discourse, or to the previous knowledge of the party to whom the discourse is addressed. Thus we say *the* man, when we speak of a man before mentioned; we say also *the poet*, and *the orator*, referring to some famous poet or orator, well known to the hearer, though

not before mentioned; and we say also, as I observed before, *the river*, and *the mountain*, though neither of them be considerable or famous, but only in the neighbourhood of the parties, and so well known to them. Ch. 7.

With respect to the philosophical use, as I call it, of the article, for denoting the species, the French are regular and uniform; for they apply it to all substances, natural or artificial, and even to abstract nouns. Thus with respect to animals, they say, *l'homme*, *le cheval*, *l'ours*, &c.; with respect to vegetables, *le bled*, *l'olive*, *la vigne*, &c.; as to minerals, they say, *l'or*, *le plombe*, *le saltpetre*; and speaking of the elements, *la terre*, *l'eau*, *l'air*, *le feu*; and as to artificial substances, they say, *le chariot*, *la charrue*, *la boussole*; and as to abstract nouns, they say, *la vertue*, *la sagesse*, &c.

In English there is a strange variety in this matter. And in the first place, with respect to animals, we say, speaking of the species, *the lion*, *the horse*, *the bear*, &c. but with respect to our own species, we always say *man* simply; as to vegetables, we say, *the olive*, *the vine*, *the pomegranate*,

Ch. 7. &c. But we commonly say *corn* simply, and its different specieses, such as *wheat*, *barley*, and *oats*. I say *commonly*, for it is the misfortune of our language, that the use of it is not so much fixed as of the French; and whoever will try to reduce it to rules, will find very near as many exceptions from as instances of the rule. As to minerals, I think we always express them without the article; for we say, *gold is the heaviest of metals*, *silver is more difficult to be refined than gold*, and the like. As to the elements, we always say *earth* simply; for when we say *the earth*, we mean the globe of the earth. But as to the words denoting the other three elements, we use them indiscriminately, either with or without the article; for we say *air*, or *the air*, *fire*, or *the fire*, *water*, or *the water*. As to artificial substances, we say, *the plough*, *the compass*, *the quadrant*, speaking of the species; but we do not commonly say *the house*, *the coat*, unless speaking of a particular house or coat. But when we express the species, we commonly use the particle *a*; for we say *a house* is a great convenience, *a coat* keeps one warm. And lastly, as to abstract nouns, we never use

use it at all: for, though we say *the goodness*, *the wisdom* of God; yet when we speak of those qualities abstractedly, without reference to any subject in which they are inherent, we say *goodness*, *wisdom*, and the like; although the analogy of language require, that as such words denote substances of the mind's creation, and have in every respect the form of substantive nouns, they should likewise have the article prefixed; and accordingly it is so uniformly in Greek. Ch. 7.

Another philosophical use of the article is, to distinguish the subject of a proposition from the predicate, in the manner I have explained. This obtains both in French and English. In our translation of the New Testament, we have a remarkable instance of it, upon which a very important article of faith depends. It is in the beginning of the gospel of St John, where it is said that Θεος ην ὁ Λογος. Here, according to the idiom of the Greek language, Λογος is undoubtedly the subject, and Θεος the predicate; and accordingly we have translated it, *the Word was God*. There is another instance of the same correctness of translation in the beginning of the book of *Genesis*, where

Ch. 7. where it is said that God called *the light day, and the darkness night.* Here the article added to *light* and *darkness*, denotes that they are the subjects of the two propositions*. But though this be according to

* Our translators of the Bible certainly understood their own language very well, though they may have mistaken the sense of the original, as I see they have often done in translating the New Testament. As to their errors in translating the Old, I must refer to those who are learned in the Hebrew; but I will venture to say, that if they had taken the sense of the Hebrew from the Septuagint translation, they would not have erred so often. I will give but one instance, where, by not following the Septuagint, they have made unintelligible a passage in the books of Moſes, containing a most sublime doctrine of theology. It is in the book of *Exodus*, *ch.* iii. where God appeared to Moſes in the burning bush, and being asked by Moſes what his name was, "God said unto Moses, I "AM THAT I AM; and he said, Thus shalt thou ſay "unto the children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto "you." These words have to me no meaning. But in the translation of the Septuagint, the passage runs thus. Καὶ ἔπιν ὁ Θεὸς πρὸς Μωυσῆν λέγων—Ἐγὼ εἰμι Ὁ ΩΝ καὶ ἔπιν, Οὕτως ἐρεῖς τοῖς υἱοῖς Ισραὴλ, Ὁ ΩΝ ἀπέσαλκέ με πρὸς ὑμᾶς. This way rendered, the passage is not only sense, but contains a most sublime philoſophical truth, viz. that God is the only Being who can be said properly to *exist*, since he only exists *independently*, and all other things have their existence *in him; for in him we live, move, and have our being.* In this sense the passage is understood by Eusebius, *Praep. Evangel. lib.* 7. *cap.* 11. And so interpreted it agrees exactly with the famous inscription above

to rule, I dare not aver that it is the constant use in English; for our great poet Milton, who at the same time was a great master of language, in putting this passage into verse, has transposed the article in one of the propositions, and omitted it altogether in the other. For he has said, Ch. 7.

"——Light *the* day, and Darkness night
he named;"

by which, according to the rule I have laid down, we are to understand that he called the day *Light*; and as to the other proposition, it is not easy to say what to make of it. For it is not the order of the words in English, any more than in Greek, that should determine the subject of the proposition; for we may say either that *the light* he called *Day*, or *Day* he called *the light*. In order therefore to save the credit of Milton, I am very much inclined to agree with Dr Bentley, and to suppose it an error of

bove the portal of the temple at Delphi. This inscription was a single letter, namely, the letter E, the name of which in Greek was εἶ, which is the second person of the present of the indicative of the verb εἰμί, and signifies *thou art*, being, as Plutarch has interpreted it, the salutation of the God by those who entered the temple. See *Plutarch. de εἶ apud Delph.*

Ch. 7. of his amanuensis, or after transcriber, and that he truly gave it,

" And *Day the light, the darkness Night* he named."

CHAP. VIII.

Of the genders and numbers of nouns.

Ch. 8. HAVING thus treated of the different kinds of nouns, according to my division of the parts of speech, viz. the substantive noun, the pronoun, and the article, I will now proceed to consider three accidents common to all nouns, and which deserve a particular consideration; I mean, *numbers*, *genders*, and *cases*.

And to begin with *number*, it is one of the most general affections of being; for things being stripped of all their accidents, and all the qualities that difference them one from another, still retain the distinction of one, two, or many*. It was therefore

* This thought is very elegantly expreſſed in the third book of the Hermes, chap. 4. pag. 367. in theſe words.

fore fit that this so universal property of things should be marked by some variation of the word expressing the thing, and not by a new word. And I think there is nothing more bungling in the barbarous languages, than their having recourse to a new word to express the difference betwixt the singular and plural of any thing. Even the modern languages of Europe, however imperfect in other respects, do all express that distinction by a variation of the same word. Ch. 8.

To express in that way all the different numbers of things, is by nature impossible; and if it should be attempted, even to the length of *ten*, which may be said to be the hinge upon which our arithmetic turns, the word would immediately appear to be greatly incumbered and overloaded. Is there then no medium betwixt *unity* and *multitude*? and nothing else to be expressed by the numbers of nouns, but singular and plural? There is by nature a medium, and that is the

words. "By separating from the infinite individuals "with which we are surrounded, those infinite acci- "dents by which they are all diversified, we leave no- "thing but those simple and perfectly similiar units, "which being combined make number, and are the sub- "ject of arithmetic."

Ch. 8. the *duad*, for that is the passage from unity to number. *Unity* confessedly is not number; neither is the duad number, (for number is defined to be a multitude of monads*), but it is a step towards number; for there is a progress in the principles of things, and every thing does not arise from a single principle. Thus the principles of body are the *point*, the *line*, and the *surface*; and of number the principles are the *monad* and the *duad*. This was the philosophy of the school of Pythagoras†. And it appears to me to have been known to the artists who formed the Greek language; and if there were nothing else to convince me that this language was the work of philosophers as well as grammarians, their use of the dual number would be sufficient. It is true that the Gothic has this number likewise, and we cannot believe that the Goths were philosophers. But there are many other things in that language, which make it impossible, in my opinion, that it should

* Πληθος μονάδων. *Euclid. lib.* 7.

† See Jamblichus's Comm. on The Arithmetic of Nicomachus.

should have been the invention of a barbarous nation. And therefore we must suppose that they have learned to speak from some nation more advanced in arts and sciences; and that this nation was the same with that from which the Greeks got their language, and all their other arts and sciences, namely Egypt, we have endeavoured to shew, in the first part of this work, p. 442. Ch. 8.

As to *gender*, it is founded upon the distinction of sexes; a distinction not common to all things, like number, but peculiar to animals; or if we have a mind to carry it the greatest length, and take in the vegetable, to animated substances: all other things have no sex: and therefore genders are naturally divided into *masculine*, *feminine*, and *neuter*; which last, as Dr Smith has very well observed, is truly a negation of sex*.

According to this distinction, all words denoting substances inanimate, should be of the neuter gender. But the artificers of language have been pleased to give the variety of masculine and feminine even to substantives denoting inanimate things, from certain

 analogies

* Dissert. on the formation of languages, pag. 444.

Ch. 8. analogies and similitudes, very ingeniously explained in the Hermes, to which I refer the reader.

I shall only add further, on this subject, that the want of genders must be accounted a very great disadvantage in any language. For, in the *first* place, it makes the creation of a new word, or at least an addition to the old word, necessary to express the difference betwixt the male and the female of the species. Thus in English, to denote the female of the wolf and bear kind, we are obliged to say a *she-wolf* and a *she-bear*, instead of the Latin *lupa* and *ursa*; and in order to denote the female of the horse kind, we have been obliged to invent a word quite different, viz. *mare*, instead of the Latin *equa* from *equus*. *2dly*, The genders of substantives, and their correspondent adjectives, are of singular advantage in syntax, allowing a variety of arrangement and composition which languages without genders cannot possibly admit. And, *lastly*, They give a variety to the termination of those parts of speech, which is very agreeable to the ear, and contributes not a little to the harmony of the learned languages.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Cases of Nouns.

THE cases of nouns are a matter of very great art; and, as I have taken occasion to observe, were probably the last thing invented in the art of language, and therefore may be presumed to have been of most difficult invention. And I think they are still of more difficult explanation than perhaps any other thing in language. I own I am not satisfied with any thing I have seen on the subject; and it is not unlikely that the reader will be as little satisfied with the account I am now to give of them, though he will certainly approve of my attempt to explain them from principles of philosophy, which, though perhaps they may not apply to the use of language, are such as I apprehend cannot be controverted. Ch. 9.

I have already observed, that if any number of nouns or verbs, of the clearest and most determined signification, were to be set down

Ch. 9. down together, but without any connection among them, they would not constitute speech, because they would not make sense, nor convey any sentiment of the mind of the speaker. Connection therefore is absolutely necessary for the purpose of speech. But how is this connection to be marked? I think only in one of three ways; either by words invented for that purpose; or by some change and variation of the words that are to be connected together; or, lastly, by the position or arrangement of the words. The modern languages of Europe connect their speech chiefly by the first and last method; for they either make the connection by separate words, such as prepositions; or by placing the words together they mark that they are to be referred to one another. But the learned languages use chiefly the second method; and by certain variations of the word, commonly known by the name of *inflection*, mark its connection with other words in the sentence. And when in this way the connection betwixt noun and noun, or noun and verb, or noun and preposition, is marked by a certain inflection

inflection of the noun, that is what is commonly called a *case*. Ch. 9.

But from what is this variation or inflection? I say, it is from the noun itself, or that form of it which is commonly called the *nominative*; which I hold to be no case, because it is not inflected; and in this I am supported by the authority of Aristotle, who every where speaks of the *noun*, and the *case* of the noun, as quite distinct things*. The nominative therefore, according to this opinion, expresses the thing simply and absolutely in itself, without marking any connection or relation to any thing else. For although it cannot stand that way in the sentence, but must be connected one way or another with some other word; that connection is not marked by the nominative, but by that other word, which, besides its own meaning, expresses that connection. Thus *homo*, in a Latin sentence, signifies just *man*; but it depends upon the form of some other word in the sentence, whether it is to be the agent or

* See Aristotle's book περὶ ἑρμηνείας. This too is the opinion of Sanctius in his Minerva, who, in support of it, quotes the authority of Aristotle.

Ch. 9. or patient of some action expressed by a verb, or whether it be in one way or another connected with another noun.

All cases have this in common, that they express a connection of one kind or another, with some other word in the sentence, besides the principal thing denoted by the noun. They are therefore *consignificant* of connection*, if I may be allowed the word, just as the *verb* is of *time*, and are among the number of those words that have a mixed signification. But what is the connection they express? for it is impossible they can express all the manifold connections and dependencies that words, or the things expressed by them, have with respect to one another. And if the artificers of language had attempted that, they would have run into very great confusion, and overloaded the expression of their words, as well as enlarged them to an enormous size. It was therefore only the most common and necessary connections that could be expressed in that way, and these only the artists who formed language have expressed.

But what are these connections? If they are

* Προσσημαινόν.

all to be comprehended under one general head, I say they belong to the category of *relation*; for I must have recourse again to the Categories, in which, according to my notion, the first principles of all arts and sciences, and among others of the grammatical art, are contained. It is the most general of all the categories; for it runs through them all, and is, as the name given it by Aristotle imports, the respect which things have to one another*; for it is not, properly speaking, in the things themselves, but in the mind, which considers them together, and from that consideration forms the idea we call *relation*. It cannot therefore subsist, without two things at least, so that if any one of them ceases to exist, the relation is at an end. This makes it necessary to distinguish carefully betwixt the things themselves and the relation; for the things may subsist without one another. Thus Sophroniscus and Socrates, considered as substances, may subsist one without the other; but the relation Ch. 9.

* Τὸ πρός τι, is the name which Aristotle gives this category

Ch. 9. relation betwixt them of father and son cannot subsist without the existence of both.

But to say in general, that the cases denote relation, is not sufficient; for there are many different kinds of relation. And Ammonius Hermeias, in his Commentary upon Aristotle's Categories, reckons up to the number of eight of them*. But I will take a division of them from the Categories themselves, through which, as I have said, this category of relation runs, that will I think serve my purpose better. And I take it from the general division of all the categories into *substance* and *accident*; for every thing existing, is either substance, or the accident of substance. Now, according to this way of considering relations, they are either of substance to substance, of substance to accident, or of accident to accident.

Let us next apply this division to the particular cases, beginning with the genitive, which, according to the opinion of the Peripatetic school, is the first case. The expression of relation by it, appears to me to be very various, and to run through all the three members of the division.

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* Εις τας κατηγοριας, pag. 96.

vision just now given. For it expresses the relation of substance to substance, of substance to accident, and of accident to accident. Ch. 9.

To begin with the first: The relation of substance to substance expressed by the genitive, seems to me to be of three kinds. For, first, It expresses the connection of *whole* and *part*, so that the word in the genitive case denotes the *whole*, of which the other word signifies *a part*. I will take my examples from our English idiom, which uses the preposition *of* for the mark of the genitive. In this sense of the case, we say, *a tree of a forest, a regiment of an army, a man of a country*. Or, *vice versa*, the word in the genitive denotes the *parts*, while the other word signifies the *whole* which is composed of those parts; as when we say, *a forest of oak-trees, an army of so many regiments, a country of so many districts or provinces*. And in general we say in English, *the parts of the whole*, and *the whole of the parts**. What the reason

* In Greek the case is varied. For they say, μερη or μερος του ὁλου; but they say, ὁλον των μερων. See *Aristot. Categor.* under the category of *relation*.

Ch. 9. is of this seemingly opposite relation being expressed by the same case, shall be immediately explained.

The second relation, betwixt substance and substance, expressed by the genitive, is when the substance in that case has any *possession*, *property*, or *power* of any kind over the other substance. Thus we say, the *land* or *house of John*, *the subjects of the king*, the *tenants of the landlord*, the *servant of the master*, &c.

The third relation expressed by this case, betwixt substance and substance, is when the substance in the genitive is the *cause efficient* of the other substance, or that from which it proceeds. Thus we say, the *son of the father*, the *picture of such a painter*, or, in general, *the work of either art or nature**. I say, *the cause efficient*; for if it is the *cause material*, then the expression is quite different, and the matter is in the governing case, while the thing produced of the matter is in the genitive. Thus we say, the *wood of the door*, the *stones of the wall*,

* This use of the genitive, to signify the cause productive of any thing, is reckoned by the grammarians so principal an use of this case, that it has got its name from it both in Greek and Latin.

wall, and in general *the matter of any thing*. And the expression is the same if the cause be the *formal cause*. Thus we say, the *idea* or *exemplar of a thing*, the *shape* or *frame of a thing*, and in general, the *form of any thing*. This expression of the formal and material cause, by the genitive, falls under the first head of the relation of substances to one another, namely, that of the *part* to the *whole*. For the matter or form of a substance is part of that substance, every substance being composed of *matter* and *form*; and therefore the expression reciprocates, or is convertible, as in the case of the *whole of the parts*, and the *parts of the whole*, and of the particular examples given above; for we say, *a door of wood*, *a wall of stones*, *a thing of such a shape or form*. Ch. 9.

I am now to give the reason of this reciprocation, which I take to be this. When two things are related, the relation must be mutual: if A is related to B, B must be related to A; for A is to B as B is to A in the correspondent relation. If therefore the relation of A to B, is expressed by B being in the genitive case, there is no reason why the correspondent relation of

Ch. 9. B to A should not likewise be expressed by A being in the genitive. For as the relation is mutual, there is no reason why one of the terms should be the leading or governing word more than the other. We say therefore, *the father* of *the son*, and *the son* of *the father*, *the king* of *the subjects*, or *the subjects* of *the king*. But in all such convertible expressions, each of the terms must express the relation, otherwise they will not reciprocate. Thus we say, *the son* of *the father*, or *the father* of *the son*, because both the terms *father* and *son* express the relation. But let us suppose that one of the terms does not express the relation: let us take, for example, the term *man* instead of *son*, I can say *the father* of *the man*; but I cannot convert the expression, and say *the man* of *the father*, because the terms in that expression are not correlatives*; the term *man* being much more

* Theſe correlatives are, in the language of Ariſtotle, called ἀντιστρεφοντα, which very well expreſſes their quality of being *convertible*. They are fully explained by Ariſtotle in the Categories, more fully I think than he commonly explains any thing, in thoſe books of abſtruſe philoſophy, which he did not intend for publication; and if any thing is wanting, it is ſupplied by his commentator Ammonius.

more general than *father*, and expressing no relation at all. Ch. 9.

It may be asked, why we can say the *father of a man*, but not *the man of a father?* And I think a reason too can be given for this. When I say *father*, I express a relation, namely that of cause; and as the correspondent relation of effect, is, as we have seen, denoted by the genitive case, therefore the genitive which follows, is naturally applied to express this correspondent relation; whereas, when I use the general term *man*, I denote no relation at all, and therefore the genitive that follows is altogether ambiguous; for it cannot express a correspondent relation, as in the other case, and therefore it may express any relation signified by the genitive, such as that of power or property; so that it may mean that the man is the property of the father, and then it will be understood just as if we said, *the ox of the father.* The like reason may be given why we can say, *the son of a man*, but not *the man of a son.*

And to shew that it is the correlation of terms, and nothing else, that makes the expression convertible, let us take an instance

Ch. 9. stance mentioned before, viz. *the house of John*. This expression is not convertible, because the terms are not correlatives, that is, do not express correspondent relations; for *John* expresses no relation at all. But let John be changed for a term that has a relation to *house*, or any other subject of property, and let us say *proprietor* in place of it; then we can say *the house of the proprietor*, or *the proprietor of the house*.

Here it may be objected, That *house* is a general term, expressing no relation. But the answer is, That the article *the* determines it to be a particular house, which is the subject of property. And it makes the expression the same as if we said *the property of the proprietor*, or *the proprietor of the property*.

It is the force of the same article that makes it proper to say *the wood of the door*, as well as *the door of the wood*: for though wood be a general term, not expressing relation, yet by the addition of the article, and by the genitive which follows, it is made to signify a particular piece of wood, which is the matter of the door; and the expression comes to the same thing as if we said, *the matter of the form*, or *the form*

of

of the matter; for the word *door*, with the addition of the article, necessarily implies a particular form, as well as *wood*, with the same addition, implies a particular matter. Ch. 9.

And to be convinced of the force of the article in this case, let us leave it out, and say *wood of door*; I deny that such expression would be proper to express what is denoted by the other, or indeed to express any thing.

The general rule therefore in all such cases is that the leading or governing word must denote the relation, otherwise the expression is improper or ambiguous; and if the phrase is convertible, then the correspondent relation must be expressed by the other term*.

The next relation expressed by the genitive, is that of *accident* and *substance*; and this relation is the natural relation betwixt accident and substance, by which the one is inherent in the other as its subject; and it

* I hope what is here said, will solve the difficulties started by Dr Smith, in his ingenious treatise above quoted, on the Formation of Language, concerning the expression of the genitive; and shew, that the relation expressed by it is not altogether vague and undefineable, as he seems to suppose.

Ch. 9. it is the substance that is marked by the genitive. Thus we say, *the whiteness of a swan*, *the bravery of a man*, *the fierceness of a lion*. Such expressions do likewise in the use of language reciprocate; for we say, a *man of bravery*, a *lion of fierceness*: and the reason is, that man being a subject in which qualities are inherent, and bravery being a quality which must necessarily be inherent in some substance, *man* and *bravery* are considered as correlatives as much as subject and accident, of which we say, the *subject of the accident*, as well as the *accident of the subject*.

The third and last expression by the genitive, is the relation of accident to accident, which is the same relation as that just now mentioned, namely, the relation of accident to substance. For the accident in the genitive case is considered as a substance in which the other is inherent as an accident, such abstract nouns denoting substances of the mind's creation, and being therefore accounted substantive nouns. Thus we say, *the beauty of holiness*, *the happiness of virtue*.

In this manner I have endeavoured to account for the construction of the genitive with

with a noun. It appears sometimes to be governed by an adjective, as in the expressions, *plenus vini*, *cupidus gloriæ*. But in such a case the adjective ought to be analysed into the parts of which it is composed. These are a quality, and some substance in which that quality is inherent: for an adjective expresses the quality concrete; whereas the noun that is formed from it denotes it abstract. The expression, resolved in this way, signifies *plenitudo vini*, or *cupido gloriæ*, belonging to some subject. The genitive therefore, in such cases, is truly governed by a noun, and expresses the subject, of which the noun is the accident: for it is an accident of glory to be desired, and of wine to fill any thing. Ch. 9.

And this will account for some expressions which have very much puzzled grammarians, such as that of Lucretius, *nec sum animi dubius*; for when it is analysed in the manner just now mentioned, it is nothing else than *dubietas animi* inherent in some substance.

This case is also commonly thought by the grammarians to be governed by a verb; but I am of opinion, that in such instances

Ch. 9. there is either an ellipsis of a substantive, as when they say in Greek πινω του οινου or in English, *to drink of the wine*, the word μερος, or *part*, is understood; or else there is an ellipsis of a preposition, which I see is the opinion of Sanctius in his Minerva, as when it is said in Greek πεποιηται λιθου, or in English, *it is made of stone*, the preposition εκ is understood in the Greek phrase, and in the English it is expressed*.

As to the genitive case, when it is joined with a preposition, it denotes no more than its connection with the preposition; for the relation then is not expressed by the case, but by the preposition.

The expression of the *dative* is *motion*. This is none of the categories; because all the categories have a fixed and determined existence; whereas motion is nothing but transition or passage from one state to another

* The Latins imitate this way of speaking of the Greeks, as in the verse of Virgil quoted by Mr Harris,

Implentur veteris Bacchi, pinguisque farinæ;

which is a pure Grecism; for in Greek it is πιμπλανται παλαιου οινου, where the preposition εκ or απο is to be understood. If the expression had been Latin, it would have been *implentur vino*, where the preposition *ex* or *de* governing the ablative is understood.

other, so that it is only the *road*, if I may so speak, to a category, not a category itself. It is however nearly allied to the categories, and runs through four of them, viz. *substance*, *quantity*, *quality*, *where*; and therefore is treated of by Aristotle in his book of Categories, by way of supplement or appendix to the doctrine of those higher genera*. Ch. 9.

The motion expressed by this case is not motion in general, but motion to the thing, which is in the dative case. And accordingly in English it is expressed by the preposition *to*; as when we say, *give* to *him*, *go* to *him*, *come* to *him*, and the like. As to motion from the thing, it is not expressed by this case, but by a preposition. It is indeed expressed by the Latin ablative, which is a variation that the Latins have made upon the Greek dative; but even then it is commonly supposed by grammarians to be by virtue of a preposition, either expressed in the composition of the verb, or understood. In English it is denoted by the preposition *from*, and sometimes by two prepositions, *out* and *of*, as when we say, I came *out of* the city.

Motion

* Ammon. in Categor. fol. 170.

Ch. 9. Motion therefore to a thing, is the primary idea of the dative case. But there is a secondary idea which results from this, and that is the idea of *approximation*, *contiguity*, *application*, *juxtaposition*, and *junction*. It is in this sense, that the dative is joined to the word *like* in English, *similis* in Latin, and ὁμοιος in Greek, and to many other words denoting comparison, such as *comparo*, *confero*, *æquiparo*, &c. For all such comparisons are made by placing the things as it were together; and when a thing is said to be *like* another thing, the meaning is, that it approximates or comes near to that thing, so as to be nearly the same. It is in a sense analogous to this, that the dative in Greek, and the ablative in Latin, is used to signify the instrument with which any thing is done, as ξιφει σφαξε, *gladio interfecit*; for there must be an application of the sword to the body, or of the body to the sword, before that operation can be performed. In English we express it in the Latin form, by the mark of the ablative, and say he was killed *with* or *by* a sword.

The accusative also relates to motion, expressing the relation that there is betwixt the

the *action* and the *subject*, or the *effect* of the action: for it denotes either the mere passive subject of the action, as when I say, *Petrus interfecit* JOHANNEM; or it denotes the result of the action, and the effect produced by it, as when I say, *faber fecit* CATHEDRAM. This is the account which Mr Harris has given of this case*; and as I agree with him perfectly in it, I will add no more upon the subject, except to observe, that as this case necessarily relates to action, it cannot be construed, except with a verb, unless where there is an ellipsis of a preposition; as when Virgil says, Ch. 9.

Os humerosque deo similis.

As to the vocative case, the expression of it is very simple; for it has nothing to do with the nature of things, but denotes only the operation of the human mind addressing itself to, or calling upon, any person or thing.

These are the connections and relations of things which I understand to be expressed by cases. And it may be observed, that they

* Book 2. ch. 4. pag. 232. of the Hermes.

Ch. I. they are common and ordinary connections, such as we have occasion to express every moment in discourse. For nothing is more common than the connection of *part* with *whole*, of *property* or *possession* with the *proprietor* or *possessor*, of *cause* and *effect*, or of *accident* and *substance*. These are the connections expressed by the genitive.—And as to motion, expressed by the dative, it is that by which every cause is connected with its effect.—And as there must necessarily be a subject of every action, the connection expressed by the accusative is such as must occur every time we mention any action.—And that connection betwixt the person who calls upon another, and him who is called upon, expressed by the vocative, is of daily use in the common intercourse of life.—But besides these ordinary connections, there are numberless connections, dependencies, and relations, which, as I have said, it is impossible to express by any variation of the word; and therefore the artificers of language have denoted them by prepositions, conjunctions, and adverbs*.

The

* See Dr Smith upon this subject.

The modern languages of Europe supply the want of cases by prepositions, except with respect to the accusative, which they mark only by its position next to the verb that governs it. How imperfect this manner of expression is, compared with the antient, may appear from the following considerations. In the *first* place, our composition is clogged and incumbered, and our ear fatigued by the constant repetition of such harsh monosyllables, as *of, to, with, from, by*. *2dly*, It cramps us extremely in the arrangement of the words, and denies us that freedom of composition, which gives even the beauty of numbers to the antient prose*. *3dly*, The different termination of the cases gives a variety to the sound of the Greek and Latin, and prevents that tedious repetition of the same sound, which is unavoidable in the modern languages, let us take what pains we will upon the composition. Ch. 9.

It

* See what Dr Smith has very ingeniously said upon this subject, in the end of his treatise upon the Formation of Languages, where he has shewn the defects of our English composition, from a fruitless attempt of Milton's to imitate the beauty of the antient. There could not have been a more happy instance chosen for the purpose.

Ch. 9. It may be thought that the expression of the relation, by the inflection of the word, is not so clear as when it is expressed by a separate word. But I can perceive no difference; for *domus* PETRI is just as clear an expression as *the house* of *Peter*, or PETER's *house*; where, by the way, we may observe, that we have endeavoured to enlarge a little the stinted idiom of our language, by forming this kind of genitive, by the addition of the letter *s* to the termination of the nominative; and I think the Greek dative, or Latin ablative, expresses, with equal clearness, all that we express by four prepositions *to*, *with*, *from*, and *by*.

There are some moderns, who think that the formation of cases by the inflection of the noun, so far from being a matter of art, proceeds from the want of art, and is truly a defect in those antient languages: for, say they, the persons who framed those languages, not having the faculty of abstraction to such a degree as to separate those relations from the several things to which they belong, were obliged to throw them into the lump, as it were, with the signification of the noun, and to express

all by one word, with some variation in- Ch. 9.
deed, in order to prevent ambiguity and confusion. In this way, we say, the barbarous nations at this day continue to express diffrent things by the same word, which is allowed by every body to be a defect in their language; whereas the moderns, being more philosophers than those antient masters of language, and having acquired a greater faculty of abstraction, have formed the ideas of those relation separated from the subjects to which they belong, and have invented words to express those ideas, by which they have given a beautiful simplicity to the structure of their languages, that is not to be found in Greek or Latin.

To this so plausible plea in favour of the moderns, I answer, That whatever other defect there may have been in the formers of the learned languages, we cannot accuse them of wanting the power of abstraction; for that they had abstract ideas of relations is evident from the words that they have invented to express them separately by themselves, I mean the prepositions, some of which in Greek express relations, very near as hard to define as those expressed

Ch. 9. by the cases. Nor do I know any thing in the Greek language more difficult to be understood than the exact meaning of their prepositions either by themselves or in composition. They have carried this operation of the mind so far, as to abstract accidents from substances in which they are necessarily inherent, and make a kind of substances of them by themselves, known by the name of *abstract* nouns. In like manner, they have distinguished in actions three things that are always joined in nature, the *action* itself, the *actor*, and the *subject* of the action, and have expressed each of them by distinct words, contrary to the custom of barbarous languages, which express all three together, as they exist in nature. We must not therefore imagine, that because they chose to express the relations of the cases, not by a new word, but by a variation of the same, they had not any separate idea of those relations. We might as well conclude, that because they chose to express *persons* and *times*, as well as *action*, by the inflections of the verb, that therefore they had no distinct idea of persons, and the different modifications of time; which however

ever is is certain they had, as they have expressed them by distinct words. The fact appears truly to have been, that they had as distinct ideas as we, of all the several relations, accidents, and circumstances of things; but in forming the language, they had the skill to distinguish betwixt such of them as might be expressed by inflection, without overloading the word, and such as could not be so expressed; and these last they denoted by separate words, such as prepositions and adverbs. This masterly skill the first barbarians who spoke had not, nor could not be expected to have; and therefore they, without distinction, express many different things, and sometimes whole sentences, by the same word, which has produced those inconveniencies that I have elsewhere taken notice of. As to the much boasted simplicity of the modern languages, the ancient are so far simpler than they, as they express the same things by fewer words. This indeed is the effect of great art, and an art not easily understood or practised; but we should remember the Greek proverb, *Fine things are difficult**. Ch. 2.

Nor

* Χαλεπα τα καλα.

Ch. 9. Nor is there any thing fine in any of the arts, that is not of difficult practice. As to the moderns who formed the present languages of Europe being philosophers, or men of science of any kind, the pretence is ridiculous, since it is well known that they were formed by barbarians out of better languages, which they corrupted for want of knowledge of the grammatical art, and of the beauties and excellencies of the languages they wanted to learn.

I think therefore I may conclude this chapter, with the words of Chancellor Bacon, in a passage quoted from him by Mr Harris, where, speaking of this very subject, viz. of the declensions and conjugations of the ancient languages, and the want of them in the modern, he adds, "Sane facile "quis conjiciat (utcunque nobis ipsi pla-"ceamus) ingenia priorum seculorum nos-"tris fuisse multo acutiora et subtiliora*."

CHAP.

* Bacon de augmentis scient. VI. I.

CHAP. X.

Of the verb commonly so called.—Its nature, and the things expressed by it.

THE verb, in the large sense in which I understand it, I divide into declinable and indeclinable; under the first, comprehending the verb commonly so called, the participle and the adjective; and under the last, the adverb and the conjunction. In this chapter I propose to treat of the verb commonly so called. C. 10.

This part of speech is the most artificial and complex of any, and is justly esteemed the glory of the grammatical art. It therefore deserves to be accurately explained; for which purpose it will be necessary to recollect what was before said, that whatever is expressed by any word, is either substance, accident, or an energy of the mind of the speaker. It was also said, that this last was expressed by the species of verb we are now speaking of; and that it was either assertion, (that is, affirming or denying), or volition; and the volition expressed

C. 10. pressed by the form of the verb was two-fold, wishing or commanding; for there is no verb of this kind, which does not either assert, wish, or command*. It was also observed, that the thing which is affirmed, wished, or commanded, or as it may be expressed in one word, the *action* of the verb, is necessarily implied in the signification of the verb; for if we were to affirm, that we do affirm, or did affirm, the energy itself, in such a case, would be the thing affirmed.

The expression therefore of these two things, the energy of the mind of the speaker, and the action of the verb, is essential to every verb in every language. There is also the expression of the person or thing, of which the action of the verb is affirmed, or which is commanded to perform or suffer that action, or which is the agent or sufferer of the action prayed or wished for; and these

* This necessary implication of the affection or disposition of the mind of the speaker, in the signification of the verb, could not escape the observation of so accurate a grammarian as Apollonius. And accordingly he makes it a principal and distinguished part of the verb, Τοις ῥήμασι ἐξαιρετως πάρακειται ἡ ψυχικη διαθεσις. *De syntaxi, lib.* 3. *cap.* 13.

It may be observed here, that under *wishing* I include *interrogating*; for every man that interrogates, wishes or desires to be informed.

these persons, according to the distinctions of first, second, and third, which I have explained under the article of pronoun, are distinctly expressed, together with their numbers, by the inflection of the verb in the learned languages. Thus τυπτω, in Greek, expresses that the person, who performs the action of beating, is the speaker; τυπτεις, that it is the person spoken to; τυπτει, that it is some third person. Again, τυπτε, in the imperative, expresses that it is the person, to whom the discourse is addressed, that is commanded to beat; τυπτετω, that it is some third person who is so commanded. Lastly, τυπτοιμι, expresses that it is the speaker who is the object of the wish; that is to say, it is wished that the speaker may perform the action of beating; τυπτοις wishes that the person who is spoken to may perform that action; and τυπτοι that some third person may do it. C. 10.

These three things, therefore, the energy of the mind of the speaker, asserting, commanding, or wishing; the thing asserted, commanded, or wished, or in one word the *action* of the verb; and, lastly, the person or thing to which that action relates in one or other of the manners just now mentioned;

are

C. 10. are three things expressed in this species of verb. And there is a fourth thing signified by all verbs of this kind, and that is, the *existence* of the action of the verb; for when we affirm any thing, we assert that it *does* exist; when we command it, we desire that it *should* exist; and when we wish for it, it is that it *may* exist. This general idea therefore of being or existence is implied in every verb, whatever the action of it may be. But there is one kind of verb which expresses nothing else for its action but simple existence, such as the verb *esse* in Latin, and *to be* in English. It is called by the Latin grammarians the *substantive* verb; but in Greek it is denominated, as Mr Harris has observed, by a much more proper name, signifying *existence**. This may be called the fundamental or radical verb, being the simplest of all verbs; for it only expresses two of the four things above mentioned, viz. *existence*, and the energy or affection of the mind, which are both essential to the expression of every verb commonly so called; and therefore this verb is implied in all other verbs, every verb being resolveable into

* Τὸ ὑπάρχειν.

into it and the participle. Thus *amo* is *sum amans*, τύπτω is εἰμὶ τύπτων and so on through all the tenses. In English we make use of this form of expression, and I think it is a beauty of our language, particularly in the expression of the future; as when we say, *I am to do* such a thing; which I hold to be a *paulo post futurum*, much more than the Greek tense which bears that name. C. 10.

Besides those four things principally expressed by the verb, there is an adjunct, which is necessarily implied in every verb of this kind, and therefore is made part of the definition of a verb by Aristotle *, I mean *time*. The reason of which is, that in the expression of every verb the idea of existence, as we have seen, is necessarily implied: now all things here below exist in time, and all the distinctions of time are applicable to them; for they *are*, *were*, and *will be*. And if the curious reader further desires to know the reason of this, it is because all sublunary things, being generated and corrupted, are in a constant flux or motion, betwixt generation and corruption.

* Ῥῆμα δέ ἐστι τὸ προσσημαῖνον χρόνον. *Aristot. de Interpret. cap.* 3.

C. 10. Now where-ever there is motion, there must be time; for time is nothing else but the interval which the mind perceives betwixt what is prior and subsequent in motion *. But besides simple existence, all other verbs, except the substantive, denote some kind of action or operation; and hence it is that a verb is commonly said to be a word denoting action †.

The

* Ὅτι ἅμα γίγνεται χρόνος, ὅταν τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν τῇ κινήσει αἰσθώμεθα. *Natural. auscult. lib.* 4. *cap.* 16. See the whole passage transcribed, and most elegantly and correctly translated, by Mr Harris, in the *Hermes*, pag. 107.

† This is not a complete definition, as it leaves out the energy of the mind of the speaker, which, as we have seen, is essential to this kind of the verb. It is also an incomplete definition, by which a verb is said to be a word of affirmation: *First*, Because it takes in only the energy of the mind; and, *2dly*, Because it does not express the three several kinds of this energy, but mentions only one of them, viz. affirmation.

It may be observed, that there are things in nature that are eternal and immutable, and have nothing to do with change or motion, nor by consequence with time; and the verbs which we use in speaking of them, ought therefore to have no tenses: but there are no such verbs in any language that I know; for even the substantive verb, which denotes existence merely, has tenses like other verbs. These eternal and immutable things, though they do not exist in *time*, yet have *duration*, which

The reason why no other part of speech implies the signification of time is, that no other part of speech implies any energy of the mind, asserting or willing the thing expressed. Thus when we use a word denoting a substance, or any quality of a substance, such as *black* or *white*, there is nothing in the terms we use, expressing or implying that the mind asserts those things do exist, or wills that they should exist. C. 10.

In the learned languages, the different distinctions

which is a more general idea than time, and is expressed in the Greek philosophy by the word αιων, and in Latin by the same word in the Eolic dialect *æviim*; but as there is no motion in such beings, so that the mind cannot distinguish what is first and last in them, therefore time does not apply to them.

Aristotle, in his books, *De Naturali Auscultatione*, has very properly observed, that if there were no circular, that is, motion revolving into itself, there would be no certain or determined measure of time; not but the mind would distinguish what is first from what is last in motion, and consequently have the perception of the interval betwixt, as we have when we distinguish betwixt the different thoughts or motions of our own minds; but if it were not for the circular motion of the celestial bodies, we should have no standard whereby to measure that interval, and should only have a confused idea of it, such as we have of any space or interval of which we have no measure.

C. 10. distinctions of time are marked by different inflections of the verb. But the modern languages of Europe have not many tenses of that kind, and none at all in the passive voice. Their tenses therefore are mostly formed by the assistance of other verbs, which they call *auxiliary verbs*, but which themselves have but few tenses. Of this kind in English are *have*, *am*, *shall*, and *will*; and in French *avoir* and *être*.

From this account of the kind of verb we are now speaking of, I think the following definition of it may be drawn. "It "is a word principally significant of acci- "dent, of the energy of the mind of the "speaker relative to that accident, of the "substance to which the accident belongs, "and it is consignificant of time*."

This

* In this definition, I have included nothing but what is essential to the verb, and which is expressed in it, either directly, or by implication. The expression of accident, under which I comprehend both action and existence, is absolutely necessary in every verb;—so is also the energy of the mind of the speaker;—and therefore they are both directly expressed even in the verbs of modern languages, otherwise they would not deserve the name of verbs.

This adjunct of time to the verb, making what we commonly call *tenses*, is of such importance in language, that it well deserves a chapter by itself. C. 10.

CHAP. XI.

Of Tenses.

NOTHING can be more accurate than the philosophy of *time* given us by Mr Harris in his Hermes; and his application of it to the tenses of verbs is new, and very ingenious. But as his system, however perfect in speculation, does not appear to me adapted to the use of any language, I will give another that I think is more practical, leaving it to the reader to chuse that which he likes best. C. 11.

I think all grammarians are agreed, that whatever

verbs. As to the other two, viz. the substance to which the accident belongs, that is, the person of the verb, and likewise that necessary adjunct of all verbs, viz. time, they are implied in the verbs of all modern languages, but only directly expressed in some of them; whereas they are both so expressed in the learned languages.

C. 11. whatever variations or modifications there may be of tenses, there are but three simple and original tenses, viz. the *past*, the *present*, and the *future*. But the purpose of language could not be served by this simple division of time; there are therefore various modifications of the simple times expressed by the verb; and of these I am now to speak.

In the first place, it is to be observed, that there is one part of the expression of the verb which is always of the present time, I mean the energy of the mind of the speaker; for he always affirms, wishes, or commands, at the time when he speaks; and which, it is to be observed, is what is called the *present time* in grammatical language. It is therefore only to the action of the verb that the variety of times is applicable.

The first division of those simple times which I shall observe is, that the action is denoted to be either perfect or imperfect, or indefinite; the meaning of which last is, that it is not determined by the expression, whether it be perfect or imperfect, that is, completed or not completed,

pleted, at the time that is mentioned by the speaker *. C. 11.

In applying this division to the several tenses, we will begin with the present: for though the past be first in the order of nature, the present is the immediate perception of the mind; and it is with respect to it that the past and future are denominated. And the first thing to be considered is, whether or not this division does at all apply to the present. And I hold it does not, properly speaking; for the present is by its nature always imperfect: and I agree entirely with Scaliger, in the passage above quoted, that the expression *praesens-perfectum* cannot be borne, if it be examined with accuracy. For Priscian has very properly defined the present time to be that of which part is past, and part to come; and therefore, says he, it is called by the Stoics an *imperfect*

* This division of the simple tenses into *perfect* and *imperfect*, appears, from a passage quoted in the Hermes, to have been discovered by one Grocin in England; only he has not added the third member of the division, which expresses neither the one nor the other. This division Scaliger, *De causis ling. Lat.* justly commends as very acute and ingenious, and approves of it entirely, except with respect to the *present-perfect*, of which I shall speak by and by.

C. 11. *imperfect* time *. But out of this imperfect time, as the same Priscian has very well observed, there grows a perfect time †. Thus, to use the instance that Priscian gives, if I have written but a part of the verse or line, and am still continuing to write, I say, *scribo versum, I write*, or *am writing the verse*; but if I have just finished it, so that the work is completed, then I say, *scripsi versum*, or as it is expressed without ambiguity in English, *I have written the verse*. This tense is called the *praeterite-perfect*, or shortly the *praeter-perfect*; and, as the name implies, denotes a past action, but which is considered as completed and perfected at the time it is mentioned by the speaker, as will be more fully explained afterwards. This tense therefore I think ought not to be ranked under the present, or considered as any species of it, but should be held rather to belong to the past, though connected with the present. Neither does the distinction

* See the passage quoted at large in the *Hermes*.

† *Ex eodem igitur praesenti nascitur etiam perfectum; si enim ad finem perveniat inceptum, statim utimur praeterito-perfecto.*

distinction of indefinite, in my opinion apply to the present tense, as the expression of it necessarily denotes an imperfect action. I cannot therefore make the distinction that is made in the Hermes, betwixt γραφω and συγχαιω γραφων, as if the first denoted an indefinite or aoristical present, and the other an imperfect or continued present. I think there is no more difference betwixt these two, then there is betwixt γραφον and συγχαιον γραφων, which Mr Harris acknowledges are the same; or than there is betwixt *scribo* and *scribens sum*, which Mr Harris has also set down, as signifying the same thing; or if there be any difference betwixt γραφω and συγχαιω γραφων, or γραφον and συγχαιον γραφων, it must be this, that the one expression imports, that the action of *writing* is contingent or accidental; whereas γραφω simply denotes the action, without the addition of that circumstance. C. 11.

With respect to the *past* tense, I think it admits this distinction, of perfect, imperfect, and indefinite. And first, I think γραψα, *I wrote*, or *did write**, is clearly an

 aorist,

* This I hold to be the true aorist in English, though it be set down in our common grammars as the imperfect past tense; for they translate *scribebam*, *I wrote* or *did write*,

C. 11. aorist, as it is called by all the grammarians, expressing simply that the action is past, without expressing whether it was or was not a perfect or complete action at that time. The praeter-perfect γεγραπται denotes, as I have already said, not only that the action is past, but that the action was completed, and is considered as a complete action at this present time. The plusquam-perfect ἐγεγραφειν, *I had written*, also denotes that the action was completed, but at some past time; and ἐγραφον, *I was writing*, denotes that the action is past, but was not then completed, but still going on, and therefore it is called the *imperfect*.

As to the future, it appears to me to have likewise all those three distinctions that I have observed in the past. For I agree with Mr Harris, that γραψω, or *scribam*, expresses the future action indefinitely, without determining whether it be perfect or not. And it is certain, that γεγραφως εσομαι, or as the Latins very happily express it by one word, *scripsero*, denotes the future action perfect, though there be something more in the expression

write, whereas it should be translated, *I was writing*.— For we have not in English, as they have in French, a flection of the verb to express it, but must use the auxiliary with the participle.

pression of it, as I shall observe afterwards*; and I think that γραφων εσομαι may be made a tense of, to denote an imperfect future, such as is expressed by the English phrase, *I shall be writing*, though there be not in any language, so far as I know, any flection of the verb expressing such a tense. C. 11.

Thus far therefore we have gone in the explanation of the tenses; but I think not far

* The *paulo post futurum*, as it is commonly called, is in my opinion a tense which expresses the future-perfect, and no more. For proof of this, I appeal to the following passage in Plato.—Εαν γαρ αρα εμοι δοξῃ τινα τυτῳνι τνω ανθρωπων, ὡν συ ὁρᾳς, αυτικα μαλα δειν τεθναναι, τεθνηξεται ὑτος ὁν αν δοξῃ· καῃ τινα δοξῃ της κεφαλης αυτων κατεαγηναι δειν, κατεαγως εσται αυτικα μαλα· καν θοιματιον διεσχισθαι, διεσχισμενον εσται. ὑτω μεγα εγω δυναμαι εν τῃ πολει. GORG. *p.* 469. *edit. Serrani.* Here it is evident, that τεθνηξεται answers exactly to κατεαγως εσται, and διεσχισμενον εσται, which are clearly perfect futures. There is another example that I recollect from the Alcestis of Euripides, where Admetus, speaking to his wife, says,

Εσται ταδ' εσται, μη τρεσης· επει σ' 'εγω
Και ζωσαν ειχον και θανυσ' εμη γυνη
Μονη κεκλησῃ, κυτις αντι συ ποτε
Τονδε ανδρα νυμφη Θεσσαλις προσφθεγξεται.

Here κεκλησῃ can signify nothing, but κεκλημενη εσῃ; for, so far as I know, this tense is always used in a passive signification, and we may observe, that the perfect signification of it is fitly marked by the reduplication prefixed, which in Greek is the mark of the perfect.

This account of the tense, I know, is different from the common, by which it is made to signify, as the name given it imports, an *immediate* future: but for this signification of it I can find no good authority.

C. 11. far enough to explain fully and distinctly the nature and use of them. For I think something more is wanting, to give a clear notion of the praeter-perfect for example, or of the plu-perfect, than just to say, that the one denotes an action perfected at the present time, and the other an action that was perfected at some past time; and particularly the use of the praeter-perfect, and the distinction betwixt it and the aorist, has not been sufficiently explained in any book that I have seen: for further explanation of it, I think it will be necessary to make a division of the tenses not hitherto mentioned, and which was suggested to me by the use of the modern languages. The division I mean is into simple and compounded. The simple are the three I first mentioned, viz. the past, present, and future, with the threefold distinction of perfect, imperfect, and indefinite; but of these simple tenses, there are various combinations, which are now to be explained.

To find out all the different combinations of these three tenses, is a problem of arithmetic, the solution of which would be of very little use in the present inquiry: for I am persuaded there is no language that by

any

any form of the verb expresses all those several combinations; *e. g.* there is no one tense of any verb, that expresses that the action of the verb *is*, *was*, and *will be*; neither is there any, so far as I know, that denotes, that the action *is* and *will be*, or *was* and *will be**. But there are three of them which are to be found in several, viz. the past with the present,—the past with the past,—and the past with the future. C. 11.

The first combination makes the tense I have already mentioned, viz. the praeterperfect. It is expressed in Greek by one word, γεγραφα; but in English and French, it is expressed by the assistance of the auxiliary, *I have written*, *J'ai ecrit*; which makes the composition of it apparent; for the

* Homer, *Iliad*, b. 2. v. 11. speaking of Jupiter, says,

Ὃς δὴ πολλαων πολιων κατελυσε καρηνα,
Ἠδ' ετι καὶ λυσει.———

Now there is no language, so far as I know, that expresses by any one flection of the verb, or even by the assistance of auxiliaries, both the ελυσε and λυσει, that is, the past with respect to the time of the speech, and the future. I say, *with respect to the time of the speech*; for there is a compounded tense, as we shall presently see, which expresses a future and a past action; but then the past action is likewise future with respect to the time of the speech.

C. 11. the auxiliary being in the present tense, and the participle in the past tense, shews plainly that it is mixed of both tenses. I have already observed, that this tense denotes an action past, and also an action perfect. I have likewise said, that this action is nevertheless considered as some way present. It now remains to be explained, how an action, perfectly past, can in any way be said to be present: and the difficulty seems to be the greater, that this tense applies, not only to actions that admit of continuance and repetition, as when I say, *I have loved, I have resolved;* but to actions that do not admit either, as when I say, *I have built a house, I have killed a man.*

In order to explain this matter, we must consider that the *present* of grammarians is different from the *now* or instant of philosophers. For this admits of no extension or division any more than a point, and is no part of time, but the boundary of it, as a point is of a line; whereas the present of the grammarian has a certain extension. If it be asked, what that extension is? I answer, It depends upon the speaker to make it greater or less as he chuses; he may make

make it an hour, a day, a month, &c. C. 11.
When he does so, all the parts of the day or month, as well as the instant when he speaks, make altogether the present *now*. A portion therefore of past time is taken into such a present, and in this way an action that happened in that past time, is considered as present.

If therefore the speaker expresses what portion of past time he takes into the present *now*, there seems to be little difficulty in the matter. Thus if I say, *I have built my house this year*, *This day I have written a letter*, it is plain, that I make in the one case the year, in the other the day, the present time; and therefore the action, though past, is fitly expressed by a form of the verb that denotes the present, as well as the past.

But suppose I make no such circumscription of time, nor set any bounds to the *now*, still I can say, I have built a house, I have written a letter, I have resolved to do such or such a thing. In what sense then are these past actions present? My answer is, In their *effects*, which in such expressions are always considered as present, though the action be past.

In

C. 11. In order to explain this further, it is to be considered, that the effect of some actions is a work which remains after the action or energy is over. Thus, when a mason builds a house, or I write a letter, the house and the letter remain after the energy of building or writing is past. While therefore the house or letter exists, I use this tense properly, and say, that *I have built the house* or *written the letter*; but suppose them both destroyed, I cannot say properly, *I have built the one* or *written the other.*

But further, there are actions which end in energy, and produce no work that remains after them*. What shall we say of such actions? Cannot we say, *we have danced a dance, played a tune, taken a walk,* and the like; and yet how can such actions, so perfectly past that no traces of them remain, be said in any sense to be present? My answer is, That the consequences of such actions, respecting either the speaker, or some other person or thing, are present; and what these consequences are, appears from the tenor of the discourse.

* This last kind of action, is in Greek called πραξις, the other ποιησις.

course. Thus I say, *I have taken a walk, and am much the better for it; I have played the tune, and am much pleased with it; I have danced one dance, and incline to dance no more.* In these instances the action is passed, and no work left behind it; but the consequences remain, and are present, and therefore the double time is properly used. I may also say, *I have taken a walk, and am going to dress;* but such an expression falls under the first use I have mentioned of this tense, when the bounds of the *now* are extended, so as to take in a portion of the past; for in this expression I comprehend both actions in the same portion of time. C. 11.

It may be observed, that the præter-perfect used in this last way, of denoting the consequences of a past action as present, may be applied even to actions that produce works, but which are destroyed? for I may say, *I have built a house, which has cost me much money*, though the house be burnt; but if I mention only the building the house, without any consequences, I cannot use that tense, after the house is destroyed.

Thus it appears, that the præter-perfect

C. 11. is properly used, either when the past action is comprehended in the present *now*, or when the effects of it, viz. either the work produced by it, or the consequences of it, are still existing. In such cases the expression of the tense denotes, that the action, though past, is considered as present. But suppose a certain portion of time is expressed, that is cut off and separated by some known boundary from the present *now*, I cannot, in such a case, use a tense that involves any consideration of the present, nor does the use of language consider that action as any wise present. Thus I cannot say, *I have built a house last year*, *I have played a tune yesterday*; but I must use the aorist, and say, *I built the house last year*, and *played the tune yesterday*; which shews, that the first and capital use of this tense is, to express an action comprehended in the present *now*; so that if there be a circumscription, which separates it from the *now*, and throws it into a portion of past time, this tense cannot be used.

And here we may observe a propriety in our English idiom, which is not in the French. Both the French and we say, *I have done a thing to-day*; but they say, in the evening,

evening, *J'* ai *le* fait *ce matin*; whereas we say, *I* did *it this morning*, if the morning be passed. C. II.

As to the aorist of the past, I have already observed, that it does not determine whether the action be perfected or not; but it is also indefinite in another respect that it does not determine whether the *now* is to be taken into that past time, or whether the action is, in any of the respects above mentioned, to be considered as present. In short, it does not determine whether the tense be compounded, or a simple past tense; and it is in this sense, as I apprehend, that it is called an *aorist* by the antient grammarians. It is on account of this simple signification of the past that it is so much used in history, which commonly speaks of events only as past, without any relation to the present; whereas the orator very often mentions past events with a view to the present time, and therefore frequently uses the præter-perfect.

From this account of these two tenses, it is evident that they may be both properly enough applied to the same event: for if I consider the event simply as past, without

taking

C. 11. taking into my consideration the present, I use the aorist; whereas, if I any wise refer to the present, the compounded tense, which expresses both the past and present, is the proper tense. Thus I say, *He killed a man, and was hanged.* Here the aorist is the proper tense, because the expression has no relation to the present; but if I say, *he is to be hanged*, then the proper tense of the verb *kill* is the præter-perfect, and I should say, *He has killed a man, and is to be hanged.*

The use of these tenses is, according to my observation, the same in Greek that it is in English, particularly as to what I last mentioned, of both being applied to the same event in different respects. In Demosthenes's oration against Aristocrates, whom he accuses of transgressing a decree, he uses the præter-perfect παραβέβηκε, *he has transgressed*, or the aorist παρῆλθε, *he transgressed*, just as he considers the transgression of the decree, either as present by its effects and consequences, or simply as past.

The examples I have given, I hope, are sufficient to explain my meaning concerning the use of these two tenses. I will however give two more; one from the translation of

of our Bible, and the other from Aristotle's philosophical works. The translators of our Bible, though, as I observed before, they may not have perfectly understood the original, did certainly understand their own language very well; and accordingly I hold the English Bible to be the best standard of the English language we have at this day. In translating that pious sentence of Job, after every thing was taken from him, they make him say, *The Lord* gave, *and the Lord* hath taken *away; blessed be the name of the Lord:* where we have both tenses most properly used. If in place of *gave*, the aorist, they had used the compound tense *hath given*, it would have been improper, because what the Lord gave was at that time taken away, so that the action of *giving* could not in any way be said to be present; whereas the next verb *take*, is most properly in the compound tense, because his wealth then continued to be taken away. But if he had said so after he had got back his wealth, it would not have been proper, and he must have said, the *Lord gave, and the Lord took away*, because the action of *taking* was then altogether passed, C. 11.

C. 11. ed, without any consequences of it remaining.

The other example is from Aristotle's Physics, where, speaking of the power that makes bodies descend, he says*, κινει, και κεκινηκε, *It moves it, and has moved it*; by which he means, that while the body gets continually fresh impulses, from gravity, it retains the former impulses, so that the power is always accumulating, and the motion consequently always accelerating; and our modern discoveries have ascertained that the velocity is as the square of the times. Here therefore the præter-perfect tense is most properly used to denote that the consequences of the former impulses still continue.

I must further observe, that there is an use of this tense in the imperative mood, very frequent in Euclid, who, when he desires you to make a diagram, uses the word γεγραφθω; which imports, first, that it shall be described, and then being described, shall continue to serve for the demonstration.

The Latin language, among its other defects, has but one tense to express both the

* *Phys. Auscult. lib. 7. cap. 6. p. 406.*

the aorist and the præter-perfect; for *scripsi* with them stands for both γεγραφα and γραψαι*. C. 11.

I do not think, as some grammarians seem to do, that the Latin is a coruption of the Greek, as the French or Italian are of the Latin; but I think it is a dialect of the Greek, which came off from the parent-language, and was brought to Italy by Œnotrus or Evander before the Greek was perfectly formed, and particularly before their grammarians had learned to distinguish betwixt the simple past, and the past which takes in the present.

There is one very peculiar use which the Latins make of their preterite, observed by Mr Harris, by which they not only do not include the present, but exclude it; so that the tense is neither an aorist, which does not exclude the present, nor is it a præter-perfect, which does include the present, but something betwixt the two. In this sense Virgil says,

* In the expression *perii*, so common in the Latin comedy, the perfect has undoubtedly the meaning of the præter-perfect in Greek. Also in that passage of Virgil, where Dido says, *Vixi, et quam dederat cursum fortuna peregi, vixi* undoubtedly signifies *vixeram*. I believe however it is more commonly used in an aoristical sense; and accordingly it is always the historical tense in Latin.

C. 11. says, FUIMUS *Troes*, FUIT *Ilium, et ingens gloria Dardanidum.* In like manner Tibullus, *Vivite felices, memores et vivite nostri, sive* ERIMUS *sive nos fata* FUISSE *volent.* And in the same sense Cicero says of the conspirators whom he had put to death, *Vixerunt*; in all which instances it is evident, that the tense excludes the present.

But there is a sense in which both the Greeks and Latins use the aorist, which I have not yet mentioned, and which I think is not commonly observed: it is to express, that the action is of a nature to happen frequently, and not at any determined time, either past, present, or to come. Thus Isocrates says, Ὀλίγος χρόνος διλύει τὰς τῶν φαύλων συμβάσεις, And Horace, speaking of the exercises and labours that it was necessary to undergo in order to gain a prize in the games, says, *Qui cupit optatam cursu contingere metam, multa* TULIT FECIT-*que puer*, SUDAVIT *et* ALSIT, ABSTINUIT *venere et vino*, &c. Again Virgil says, *Non aliter quam qui adverso vix flumine lembum remigiis subigit: si brachia forte* REMISIT, *atque illum in præceps prono rapit alveus amni**; where it may be observed, that the perfect *remisit* is joined with the present

2

* *Georgic.* I. v. 201.

sent *subigit* and *rapit*; so that it appears the Latins expressed this frequency of action at indetermined times by the present, (as we do commonly in English), as well as by the perfect. There are many more passages to be met with, both in Greek and Latin writers, in which this tense occurs, and which are not to be explained unless we give to the tense the sense I have mentioned. And so much for the first compounded tense. C. 11.

The next is called the *plusquam-perfect*; and is a composition of the past with the past, which is denoted by the English expression, *I had written*, where we have both the preterite of the auxiliary verb, and the past participle of the principal verb. It expresses, that the action of the verb is passed, not only with respect to the present *now*, but also with respect to another action likewise past; so that there is a second past action plainly *implied* in the tense, and which is always *expressed* either in what follows or goes before in the discourse. Thus when I say simply, *I had written my letter*, it is evident I refer to some other past action; and I express it, if I add, *when you came in*. And I hold, that the times of

C. 11. those two past actions are joined together, so as to make only one past time; and the only difference I know betwixt this tense and the preter-perfect is, that in the place of the present being joined to the past, so as to make of the two but one present time, the last past here is joined to the first past, so as to make together but one past time. The first action therefore must be present, in one of the ways above described, when the last action happened, in order to make the use of this tense proper. And as those two tenses have so great an affinity, we see, that in the learned languages, the plusquam-perfect is formed from the preter-perfect, as γεγραφειν from γεγραφα, and *scripseram* from *scripsi*.

The last combination I mentioned, was that of the past with the future, where we are to understand, that the action is likewise future with respect to the time of the speech, and only past with respect to another event, likewise future; so that with respect to the present time, that is, the time of the speech, it may be said to be a combination of *future* with *future*. This tense is expressed by composition in Greek as well

well as English: for in Greek the say, γεγραφως εσομαι, and in English, *I shall have written*, where the junction of the future and past is manifest from the expression; but the Latins have been so lucky as to hit upon one form of the verb to express it, *scripsero*. The tense plainly expresses a future action, and it implies another future action, with respect to which the first future action is past, and which other future action is always expressed in some part of the discourse. Thus when I say, *I shall have written the letter*, it plainly expresses a future action, and also that it is passed with respect to some other future action; and if I add, *when he will come in*, then I express likewise that second future action. C. 11.

This is the best account I am able to give of the tenses of verbs; in which I have taken no notice of the second future and second aorist of the Greek verbs; because I agree with those grammarians who think that they have no signification different from the first futures, and first aorists, and are no more than the obsolete presents and imperfects of the old theme of the verb, which were still retained after the new theme

C. 11. theme came into use, but were used as different forms of the future and aorist; so that they only serve to enrich the analogy, and make the sounds of this so various part of speech, still more various. Neither can I admit that there is any such tense in the Greek or any other language that I know, as what is called in the Hermes the *inceptive*, such as μελλω γραφειν, or rather γραψειν (for that is more commonly used), which is said to be the *inceptive-present*. I know there are inceptive verbs in Latin, as there are desiderative verbs in Greek; but there is no form of any other verb that expresses either the one or the other. For as to μελλω γραψειν, it is plainly a future, as much as *scripturus sum*; and the only difference that I know betwixt it and γραψω is that μελλω not only expresses futurity, and therefore is joined with the future infinitive, but also very often implies deliberation, especially in the Attic use of the word.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

Continuation of the same subject.—Authorities in support of the doctrine of the tenses laid down in the preceding chapter.—Dr Clarke's system upon this subject examined.

I Should be sorry if the reader thought that I gave the doctrine of the Greek tenses, laid down in the preceding chapter, for a discovery of my own. All I pretend is, to have explained more fully, I think, than has hitherto been done, what the ancients have delivered upon this subject; and particularly Theodorus Gaza, whom I reckon among the ancients, though he lived as late as the fifteenth century, on account of his learning, and the elegance and accuracy of his Greek style. He has left us a Greek grammar in that language, wherein he has explained some things belonging to the art, in so masterly a manner, that while I am reading him, I am sometimes disposed to forget the refugee Greek, and think that it C. 12.

is

C. 12. is Aristotle I am studying. He is short upon the tenses, as upon every thing else, and has given us little more than definitions of them, but such definitions as agree perfectly with my notion of them.

The present he defines το ατελες; from which it appears, that *being imperfect*, was, according to his notion, of the essence of the present time. Nor does he seem to have any idea of a present that was aoristical, that is, did not determine whether the action was perfect or imperfect, any more than of a present which was only inceptive.

His definition of the praeter-perfect is, το παρειληλυθος αρτι και ατελως το ενεστως. Here is plainly laid down the composition which I suppose in this tense, of the present and the past; but with this restriction and limitation, that it must have been lately past; that is, it must have happened in a portion of time past which connects with the present *now*, not being divided from it by any boundary or limit, which I have made to be an essential part of the signification of this tense. He further says, that it must be present as well as past; but then it must not be

be going on, which is the case of an action expressed by the present tense, but it must be completed; so that it is past, perfect, and present. C. 12.

That the meaning of this expression, *the perfect of the present*, is no other than that the action, though present, must not be imperfect or going on, but perfect and complete, is evident from the same author's definition of the imperfect tense, viz. τὸ παρατατικὸν καὶ ἀτελὲς τοῦ παρῳχημένου; by which this tense is distinguished, first, from the present, which is ἀτελὲς, or imperfect likewise, but then it is τὸ ἐνεστηκὸς, and not τὸ παρῳχημένον, that is to say, of the present, not the past; and secondly, it is distinguished from the preter-perfect, by its going on, and not being present.

And the names given to those two tenses, agree with the definitions of them: for in Greek the preter-perfect tense is called παρακείμενος, which signifies *lying beside*, denoting that the action, though past, is beside or contiguous to the present; and the imperfect is called παρατατικὸς, that is, *extended*, or going on, by which it is essentially distinguished from the preter-perfect.

Dr Clarke, in his edition of Homer, has

C. 12. has given us, in one of his notes upon the beginning of the Iliad, a perfect system, as he seems to think, of the tenses of the Greek language, not without a good deal of ostentation, and reprehension of other grammarians. He divides all time, as I do, into *past*, *present*, and *future*. He also makes the distinction of the action being *perfect* or *imperfect*; but then he applies this distinction to the present, which I have shewn is by its nature, and according to the definition of Theodorus Gaza, always imperfect. And the examples that he gives of a present action being perfect, will apply only to an action that is past, but is considered as present, in the manner above explained.

I cannot agree with him neither, that *cænabo*, in Latin, or δειπνησω in Greek, is an imperfect future. For I think they are clearly aoristical, not determining whether the future action be perfect or imperfect. And as to the account he gives of *cænavero*, *I shall have supped*, that it is *a perfect future*, it is an improper description of the tense, because it does not fully express its nature; for the future action expressed by that tense, is not only perfect and com-

pleted, but it is past with respect to another action; so that it is truly a compounded time, such as I have explained it, of the future and the past; by which we are to understand, as I have already observed, that both the times are future with respect to the *now*, when I speak, but the one is passed with respect to the other. And I have also observed, that this is a compounded tense that the Greeks have not in one word, nor can they express it otherwise than as we do, by a circumlocution, such as δεδειπνηκως εσομαι in which the composition is just as visible as in our English expression. C. 12.

Dr Clarke's account also of the plusquamperfect is very incomplete; for all he says of it is, that it is the perfect of the past. But that definition does not distinguish it sufficiently from the aorist εφιλησα, which may be used to express an action as perfectly past as that expressed by the plu-perfect επεφιληκειν. But the true notion of that tense is what I have given, namely, that it is a composition of the past with the past, both past with respect to the time when I speak, and the one past with respect to the other. And there is this further, as I have ob-

C. 12. served in the Greek plu-perfect, that the action it expresses is not only past, with respect to another time likewise past, but it is to be considered as present in one or other of the senses above-mentioned at that other past time. In short it is the preter-perfect applied to a past time, instead of being applied to the present. And in this way many uses of this plu-perfect tense in Greek that seem extraordinary, may, if I am not much mistaken, be easily explained. It will not however explain the use of this tense in some passages of Homer, if it be true that the tense there is really the plu-perfect; but this I hold not to be the case*.

Thus

* The passages in Homer I allude to, are the following. In the first Iliad, speaking of Jupiter, he says,

Αλλ' ακεων δην ἡστο· Θετις ὡς ἡψατο γουνων. v. 512.

Now ἡστο here is supposed by all grammarians, so far as I know, to be the plu-perfect of the verb, ἡμαι, and therefore, according to my notion of the meaning of that tense, should signify, that Jupiter *had been sitting, and was then sitting silent*; a sense which the passage will not bear. But I say, that ἡστο is not there the plu-perfect, but the first aorist middle, which is ἡσατο, in the 3d pers. sing. and by a syncope ἡστο, in the same manner as ἁλτο is the 3d pers. sing. of the 1st aor. middle, from ἁλλομαι,

Thus it appears, that the general principles of the Doctor's system are erroneous: and his explanation of the particular tenses is to me not at all satisfactory; for he does not so much as attempt to explain, otherwise than by giving examples, the difference betwixt the aorist and the præter-perfect. And he makes a difference betwixt the first and second future in Greek, which he does not explain even by examples; nor indeed is C. 12.

ἀλλομαι, according to Eustathius. By a like mistake they make εληλατο and ηρηρειστο, to be plu-perfects in the following passage.

Δια μεν αρα ζωστηρος εληλατο δαιδαλεοιο,
Και δια θωρηκος πολυδαιδαλου ηρηρειστο·
Μιτρης θ', ἡν εφορει, ερυμα χροος ἑρκος ακοντων,
Ἡ οἱ πλειστον ερυτο δια προ δε εισατο και της·
Ακροτατον δ' αρ οἴςος επεγραψε χροα φωτος.

Il. 4. *v.* 135—6.

Where it is plain that the plu-perfect will make no sense. But the truth is, that εληλατο is the 2d aor. middle, formed from the verb ελημι, in the same manner as ἑσταμην is from the verb ἱςημι. And ηρηρειστο is the first aorist middle of the verb ερειδω; the word being ηρεισατο, and by syncope, ηρειστο, or ερηρειστο, or ηρηρειστο. And with this account of these two tenses agrees the tense that just goes before, viz. επεσε, and the two that follow after, εισατο and επεγραψε; and so the whole passage is uniform and plain. And it may be observed, that there is a particular propriety in making ηρηρειστο the middle voice, so that it denotes that the arrow *fixed itself*, or lodged, in the breastplate.

C. 12. is it possible to explain it, as there is truly no difference betwixt them. Then, in order to adjust his *ratio temporum*, as he calls it, to certain passages in Homer, he gives a meaning to the plu-perfect, such as I am persuaded it has not in any language of the world; for he makes it to signify the *quick performance* of the action. Thus, says he, ἔβη, the aorist, signifies no more but simply *he went*; but ἐβέβηκει, the plu-perfect, denotes that he went quickly and suddenly, or, as we express it in English, *was gone in an instant*. But this appears to me to be a mere imagination of the Doctor, founded upon a misapprehension of the tense of the verb, or rather of the verb itself*.

Though

* The Doctor seems not to have known, or not to have attended to it, that the Greeks were in use to form new verbs from almost every tense of the old verb, and particularly from the præter-perfect, both active and middle. Thus from the præter-perfect middle, πεπλυγμαι, of the verb πλυνω, they formed a new verb, which we have in Homer, πεπλυγω; and of the same kind are τετρηχω, δεδηω, both likewise Homeric verbs. From πεφαται, the perfect middle of the obsolete verb φαω, *occido*, they formed the verb πεφαω, or by syncope πεφνω, which occurs so often in Homer; and from the same tense of the old verb

Though I have thus animadverted a little severely upon the errors and defects of the Doctor's system, I must allow him the merit of being the first of the moderns, so far as I know, that has attempted to form any thing like a rational system upon this subject. And I must confess likewise, that he was the first who set me a-thinking upon it. He was a man of acute parts, and a good metaphysician: but that was the occasion of his error: for it made him imagine that he could, without other assistance, form a system of grammar, or of any particular part of it; whereas, if he had been a man less ingenious, he would have taken, it is likely, the assistance of the ancient grammarians, whose footsteps we cannot quit in such inquiries without the greatest hazard of going wrong; and then he would have avoided the errors he has fallen into upon

C. 12.

verb φεβω, *terreo*, which is found in Homer, they formed the verb commonly in use, φοβεω. And according to the same analogy, from the præter-perfect βεβηκα, of the verb βαω, or, as it is now used, βαινω, they formed a new verb, βεβηκω, of which βεβηκει is the 3d pers. of the present; and therefore the Doctor might as well have made a pluperfect of πεπληγει, τετρηχει, δεδηει, which, by all grammarians, are allowed to be in the present.

C. 12. on this subject of the tenses; and if he had studied more diligently the antient commentaries upon Homer, he would have corrected several blundering translations, which he has given of different passages of the Iliad*.

* As this censure of so celebrated a Greek scholar, may appear to many not a little rash, I will justify it by two instances taken from the same page of his translation of the first Iliad. Nestor says, speaking to Agamemnon,

> Ατρειδη, συ δε παυε τεον, μενος· αυτας εγωγε
> Λισσομ' Αχιληϊ μεθεμεν χολον, ος μεγα πασιν
> Ἑρκος Αχαιοισι πελεται πολεμοιο κακοιο.

which Dr Clarke has translated thus,

> *Atride, tu autem compesce tuam iram: verum ego*
> *Precabor Achillem deponere iram, qui magnum omnibus*
> *Propugnaculum Achivis est belli mali.*

Every intelligent reader, though he do not understand Greek, may perceive that Nestor uses a very improper argument, to persuade Achilles to lay aside his anger, when he mentions that he was *the bulwark of the Greeks in war*. If this were Homer's meaning he would not, in this passage at least, deserve the commendation which Aristotle gives him, of excelling all other poets in sense and argument, as well as diction, λεξει και διανοια παντας ὑπερβαλλει. *Poetic.* It is not therefore easily to be believed, that such was Homer's meaning. But further, I say, that the words will not bear this meaning, and that the Doctor has construed them improperly, when he has made λισσομαι to govern Αχιληϊ, and translated them *precabor Achillem*; for I deny that λισσομαι, either in the use of Homer, or of any other Greek writer, governs the dative,

dative, but always the accusative. And if this be so, it is impossible that the Doctor can be right in his translation of the passage. C. 12.

But what then is the meaning of it? A learned Greek professor, of my acquaintance, construes χόλον with Ἀχιλῆι, and understands it to be a request to Agamemnon *to lay aside his anger against Achilles*. And I observe, that it is in this sense that Eustathius understands the passage. But there are two objections to this meaning of it, one arising from the sense, and the other from the words. For, in the first place, it is saying the same thing twice, Nestor having, just in the preceding verse, exhorted Agamemnon to appease his anger; and accordingly Eustathius acknowledges that it is διττολογια. But a repetition of the very same thing, in the very next line, is not agreeable to the manner of Homer, nor of any sensible writer. 2*dly*, I say, that χόλον Ἀχιλῆι for χόλον κατ' Ἀχιλῆος is not Greek, and cannot be justified by any good authority. Rejecting therefore this interpretation likewise, I embrace one suggested to me by an ingenious gentleman of Glasgow, Mr John Young, who is yet no professor, but very well deserves to be one. He construes Ἀχιλῆι with μεθῆμεν, and understands the meaning of the passage to be, requesting Agamemnon *to forgive Achilles for his passion*. That the words Ἀχιλλῆϊ μεθῆμεν χόλον will bear this meaning, (and indeed I think they can bear no other), is evident from a passage of Herodotus, whom I hold to be the best interpreter of Homer's language. It is where Mardonius sends a message to the Athenians, in the name of his master Xerxes, making him speak to them thus, ΑΘΗΝΑΙΟΙΣΙ ΤΑΣ ΑΜΑΡΤΑΔΑΣ, τὰς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐς ἐμὲ γενομένας, ΠΑΣΑΣ ΜΕΤΙΗΜΙ. *lib.* 8. *cap.* 140. And the sense of the passage, thus understood, is worthy of Homer: for Nestor first desires Agamemnon to appease his own anger, (for I understand there is an emphasis in the word σὸν joined with μένος,) and then he beseeches him to forgive Achilles *his* passion; and to persuade Agamemnon to do so, he uses a very proper argument, viz. that Achilles

was

C. 12. was of so great use to the Greeks. And in this sense the *Brevia scholia*, ascribed to *Mycellus*, seem to understand the passage, for they render μεθεμεν by συγχωρησαι.

The other passage, in which the Doctor mistakes the sense of his original, just follows, in the answer which Agamemnon makes to Nestor.

Αλλ' ὁδ' ανηρ εθελει περι παντων εμμεναι αλλων·
Παντων μεν κρατεειν εθελει, παντεσσι δ' ανασσειν,
Πασι δε σημαινειν' ἁτιν' ου πεισεσθαι οἴω.

Where the Doctor has translated the last words in this manner,

——*Quæ minimè persuasurum puto.*

Here there is a double error. For, in the *first* place, the Doctor supposes the person to be changed from the first to the third; for he understands it to be, *Ego Agamemnon puto eum* [i. e. *Achillem*] *minimè persuasurum.* Now in Greek there never is a change, understood, of the person of the verb governing the infinitive; but if there be a change, it must be expressed; so that if the words were to be explained as the Doctor explains them, the pronoun of the third person should have been expressed, and they should have run thus, ἁτιν' ου αυτον πεισεσθαι οἴω. 2*dly*, The verb πειθω, in the middle voice, never signifies *to persuade*, but *to obey*, which is agreeable to the reflective signification of the middle voice, as if it were *to persuade one's self to do any thing.* The meaning therefore of the passage is, *I do not think that I shall obey him in these things*, or, *that I shall be persuaded by him to do these things.* And I am the more surprised, that the Doctor has mistaken the sense of the word πεισεσθαι here, as he has rendered it rightly a few lines after, *v.* 296. where Achilles says to Agamemnon,

——ου γαρ εγωγ' ετι σοι πεισεσθαι οἴω.

which the Doctor has translated

——*Non enim ego amplius me tibi obtemperaturum puto.*

But the pronoun σοι, it would seem, in this passage, directed him to the true meaning.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the modes, persons, numbers, and voices, of verbs.—Enumeration of the several things expressed by the verb.

THE *modes* or *moods* of verbs, as they are commonly called, are no other than those energies of the mind of the speaker, which I have said are essential to the verb, expressed by different forms or inflections of it. Of these I have only mentioned three; *affirmation*, expressed by the mood called the *indicative*; *wishing*, or *praying*, expressed by the *optative*; and *command*, expressed by the *imperative*. The *interrogative* is reckoned by some among the moods; but as it is not expressed by any different form of the verb, but only by particles, or by a certain arrangement of the words, I do not chuse to call it a mood: and for the same reason I do not reckon a *potential* mood; which even in Greek is denoted by no inflection of the verb, but by the potential or C. 13.

C. 13. contingent particle ἄν; and in Latin it is not expressed at all, (otherwise than by a circumlocution), as they have no such particle. The subjunctive I rank under affirmation; for it expresses an affirmation qualified. The indicative affirms absolutely; but the affirmation of the subjunctive is connected with, or dependent upon some other affirmation. I therefore divide affirmation into two moods; the indicative, affirming absolutely; the subjunctive, affirming relatively or conditionally*.

As to the infinitive, I hold it to be no mood, though it be commonly called so; because it expresses no energy of the mind of the speaker, but simply the action of the verb, with the addition of time. It is therefore either used as a noun, or it serves to connect the verb, with another

* When this conditional or relative affirmation is a contingency dependent upon will or inclination, the optative mood is commonly used in place of the subjunctive, especially by the Attic writers. But it is remarkable, that the optative mood is never once used by Euclid, though the subjunctive be frequently used by him: the reason of which is, that in mathematics nothing is contingent or dependent upon human will, but every thing necessary.

other verb or a noun, and so is useful in syntax. C. 13.

It is said, that in English we have no moods, at least none expressed by the form of the verb: and it is true, that in the present use of the language we make but little distinction of moods; but in the older English writers, particularly Milton, I observe a subjunctive mood constantly used in the present tense; but it is no other than the first person of the present of the indicative, without any variation of number or person. Thus Milton says, "Although I "love; Though thou love; Though he "love;" and many writers still preserve that use, at least in the third person.

The French have a regular subjunctive mood, which I think is a great beauty in their language; but the use of it is a matter of some nicety, which very few foreigners who speak the language attend to.

Of numbers and persons I have spoken under the article of the noun. In the learned languages the numbers in verbs are marked in the same way as in nouns, viz. by inflection; and the three persons are distinguished likewise in that way.

This

C. 13. This shortens the expression in those languages, by making the use of the pronoun not necessary, besides the advantage it gives them in the variety of composition and arrangement which it allows. In English, as we have but very little variation of our verbs, they must always be accompanied by their nouns or pronouns; and not at a great distance neither, for fear of mistake or ambiguity.

As the French have the numbers and persons of their verbs regularly marked by inflection, it appears to me surprising that they do not avail themselves more of such an advantage, but have their composition rather more stinted and uniform than ours; and this too by way of improvement of their style; for, in their ancient writings, there is a much greater variety of structure and freedom of composition, particularly in their old poetry; and therefore I prefer what has been of late written in what they call *stile de Marott*, (the name they give to the style of their old poetry), such as Fontaine's tales and fables, to their poetry of a more modern cast.

All things in this sublunary world suffer as well as act, and therefore the agent of

of every action of a verb may suffer in its turn that very action. According therefore as the person of the verb acts or suffers, the verb assumes a different form, which we call *a voice*. When the person *acts*, it is the *active* voice; when he *suffers*, it is the *passive*. Most languages have no other; but the Greek has a third, called the *middle voice*, denoting that the person both *acts* and *suffers*, that is to say, is the subject of his own action; so that the verb, in this form, very much resembles the reflected verbs of the French*. Those who have studied the beauties of the Greek language, must know very well, that this voice gives not only a beautiful variety to the inflections of their verbs, but a great conciseness and emphasis to the expression. C. 13.

From this account of the verb, we may collect the several things expressed by it under one view, which may serve for a full description of it, in place of the short definition I gave before. And it denotes, 1*mo*, some kind of action, under which

* This form of the verb in Greek has not always this reflected signification; but is sometimes nothing more than an active verb, resembling the deponent verbs in Latin. See *Kuster. de voce media.*

C. 13. I include existence: for the idea of the action expressed by a verb, always implies, as I have observed, the idea of existence; and there is one verb which denotes nothing else for its action but existence. *2do*, The energy of the mind of the speaker concerning that action, affirming it, wishing it, or commanding it. *3tio*, The agent, or person acting, and whether one or more. *4to*, The time of the action, and whether it be a completed action or not. *5to*, The subject of the action is also expressed, if it be the same with the agent. All these things are denoted by the single Greek word τετυφα, signifying *I did beat myself*, as was the custom of the antients upon occasion of any great affliction. And, *lastly*, if the person suffers the action of the verb, instead of being the agent, that also is expressed by a form of the verb.

Though the expression of the Greek verb be so various and manifold; yet, as I observed before, there are only two things that must necessarily be expressed by the verb. The first is the energy or affection of the mind; the second is some action, or at least existence. To be convinced that these two are essential to the nature

nature of the verb, we may take the case of a verbal noun, such as *cursus* in Latin, and ask, why it is not a verb as well as *curro*, from which it is derived? and the answer is plain, that it expresses no energy of the mind of the speaker who pronounces this word; nor does it affirm that the thing exists or does not exist; nor does it command that it should or should not exist; nor does it wish that it may or may not exist, but simply gives us the conception of the mind of the speaker. All the other things above mentioned may be expressed by other words, as in English our moods, and the greatest part of our tenses are. And in the same manner, numbers, persons, and voices may be expressed: and they are so expressed, for the greater part, in most of the modern languages of Europe; but if the word wants the expression of the energy of the mind, and of action or existence, it ceases to be a verb, I mean in the common acceptation of the word, and becomes some other part of speech. C. 18.

There is another observation, that I likewise made before, and which is a consequence of the preceding one, namely, that the

C. 13. the simplest of all verbs is the substantive verb, expressing nothing but the energy or affection of the mind, joined with the simple idea of existence, the most metaphysical and abstract of all ideas, of which time and place, and other universals, are but adjuncts. It may therefore be called the *metaphysical verb*; and if it were divested of tenses, moods, and persons, as it is of voices, it would be the philosophical verb that I mentioned before, fit to express universal truths, which have nothing to do with time, persons, or the disposition of the mind.——But to return to the Greek verb:

To express all those several things above mentioned, without any ambiguity or confusion, and thereby to save the unnecessary multiplication of words, instead of increasing it, which we have shown to be the case of the barbarous languages, when they express several things by one word, must be esteemed by every man who attentively considers it, a most exquisite piece of art; and it is plain that it must have been the contrivance of men who had studied the nature of things, and could make the proper distinction betwixt

those things that could commodiously be expressed by one word, and what could not. C. 13.

But it may be said, that this Greek verb is too artificial a thing; and that our verb being more simple, and yet doing the business as well, is therefore preferable. This objection I have already in a great measure answered; and I shall only add here, that πεπληγμην is in one sense simpler than the English expression, *I did beat myself*, because it is shorter. It is true indeed, that to learn the use of a Greek verb, is a matter of more pains and trouble than to learn the use of an English verb, as it may be much easier to use a clumsy, ill-contrived machine, than one complete and perfect in all its parts; but if this last machine, when the use of it is once learned, can be employed with as little or less trouble, it is certainly preferable. Now that is the case of the Greek verb; for no body will deny that it expresses, in fewer words, and without tedious repetitions of the same word, every thing that can be expressed by the English verb: and that the use of it is not so very difficult to be learned, but may be acquired without rule or teaching, by practice merely, we

C. 13. are very sure; because we know that the women and children in Athens spoke the Attic, as our women and children speak English; and the people in general were noted for elegant speakers, though very few of them learned grammar, which was a piece of education bestowed upon the children only of people of the first rank. But further, I deny that the English verb, any more than the Latin, answers all the purposes of the Greek. For, in the first place, we have no tense that answers to the present passive of the indicative among the Greeks. For example, we cannot express τυπτεται by any tense; for though we say, *he is beaten*, that is rather the preter-perfect τετυπται, denoting that the action is finished, not going on, which is the meaning of τυπτεται nor can we express it otherwise than by circumlocution, such as, *they are beating him*. And in the same manner, the French must say, *on le bat*, which is not only multiplying words, but changing the form of the verb from passive to active. Neither have we a participle present of the passive voice, such as τυπτομενος, any more than the Latins; for our participle *beaten*

is

is a past participle, as much as the Latin *verberatus*.——And this leads me to speak of the part of speech next in order after the verb, viz. the *participle*. C. 13.

But before I quit this so curious subject of the verb, I hope I shall be permitted, even by the greatest admirers of the Greek language, to observe that something more perfect of the kind might be perhaps contrived, than even the Greek verb. And it does not appear to me to exceed the power of human art, to form a plan of a language more complete in every part than the Greek; and such they say the language of the philosophers of India, called the *Sanscrit*, actually is, of which I shall have occasion to say more in the sequel. As to the verb, I have already observed that several more compound tenses might be imagined; but whether they would not imbarrass the language too much, and make it too complicated and difficult for common use, is what I cannot certainly say. But I will mention one or two things, which I think may be added to the Greek verb, without any such consequence. And, in the *first* place, it might not only express numbers and persons, but like

C. 13. the adjective, it might also have genders, which is the case of the Hebrew and Arabic verb; and, as I am told by the learned in those languages, occasions no confusion or imbarrassment in them. *2dly*, The verbs have more moods as well as tenses; and to make the structure of the language complete, they should have at least one more. In order to explain what I mean, it is necessary to premise, that every language that is in the least degree perfect, must have, besides the indicative, the imperative, and infinitive moods, a subjunctive mood, which is, as I have observed, a form of the verb, denoting that what is signified by it is not affirmed absolutely by itself, but relatively to some other verb to which it is subjoined, and upon which it is dependent. And it is a very great defect in our present English, (for it was not always so), that this mood is very little used, or used indiscriminately with the indicative. In Latin they have but one mood of that kind; but in Greek they have two, viz. the subjunctive, properly so called, and the optative, which, as I have observed, is likewise used as a subjunctive. If the preceding, or principal

cipal verb, is in the present tense, the proper mood of the depending verb is the subjunctive; or if it be in the preter-perfect, it is the same on account of the present time, which is involved in it, as I have explained above: but if the principal verb be in any other past time, the proper mood of the depending verb is the optative. So far is very well. But suppose the time of the principal verb is future, ought there not to be a third subjunctive mood for the depending verb? But this even the Greek language has not, but uses, in place of it, the subjunctive mood properly so called. C. 13.

CHAP. XIV.

Of participles, adjectives, prepositions, conjunctions, and interjections.

THE participle, though in our common grammars it be set down in the conjugation of every verb as a part of it, yet is truly a separate part of speech; for it does not express any energy of the mind of the speaker, which as I have said, is essential C. 14.

C. 14. essential to the verb; but it denotes the action of the verb, not abstractedly as a verbal noun does, but inherent in, or belonging to some indefinite substance; and therefore I have ranked it under verbs, in my large sense of the word, and not under nouns. It has however so much of the noun, as to have numbers and cases; and as it necessarily refers to a noun, and may be construed with a noun of any of the three genders, it has likewise all those genders. It has also so much of the verb, commonly so called, that it is consignificant of time. Although therefore in my division of the parts of speech, it is ranked under the verb; yet, in the common division, it ought to be reckoned a part of speech by itself, separate both from verb and noun.

The adjective, in the common grammars, is very improperly classed with the noun; for it is not a noun, for the same reason that the participle is not a noun, viz. because it denotes primarily a quality or accident inherent in some indefinite substance. It is therefore joined to any substance, with which it agrees, as well as the participle, in gender, number, and case; nor is there any difference betwixt the two,

two, except that the participle is consignifi- C. 14.
cant of time, which the adjective is not.

There are some adjectives formed by the Greeks from verbs, which deserve a particular notice, as they shew perhaps as much as any thing in the language, the accurate and philosophical genius of the formers of this language. But of these I will speak in the next chapter, under the article of derivatives.

Prepositions I likewise class under verbs, as they denote relations of things; not abstractedly, for then they would be nouns, but inherent in their subjects, so that they are qualities which are not considered as having a separate existence. The chief use of them, as appears to me, is to express relations, which could not be conveniently expressed by the cases of nouns, such as place, situation, order, and many other connections of things, which are observed by grammarians, in the significations they give to the several prepositions. They are of very great use in syntax, and govern a case, whereby we know the word to which they refer.

To know the precise meaning of the prepositions in the Greek language, and to be able to distinguish the proper from the

C. 14. the figurative signification of them, is a matter of great nicety. There is something begun upon this subject, by an author very eminent for his knowledge of the language*; but which I regret is not finished. The use of them in composition, gives a particular beauty and accuracy of expression to the Greek language. They use commonly enough two of them, and sometimes three, in composition with their verbs, by which they describe so minutely the action of the verb, that it is really a kind of painting. Thus, Homer, in describing water coming out of the foot of a rock, uses the word ὑπ-ε-κ-προ-ρεειν by which is described, first its coming from *below*, then its coming *out*, or *gushing*, and lastly its running *forward*†.

* Dr Moor, Professor of Greek in the University of Glasgow.

† The preposition, though compounded with the verb, is often separated from it in the arrangement, particularly by the poets; and this has sometimes led into mistakes. Thus those famous lines of Homer, describing Jupiter's nod,

Η, και κυανεησι σ' οφρυσι νευσε Κρονιων,
Αμβροσιαι δ' αρα χαιται υπερρωσαντο ανακτος.

are, in a late translation, rendered thus. "He said; "and with his dark shaggy brows the son of Sa- "turn nodded above," &c. where it appears, that the

The adverb, as the name imports, is a sort of adjunct of the verb, and appears to me to be such a supplement to the verb, as the preposition is to the noun; for it expresses circumstances of time, place, manner of C. 14.

translator supposed the preposition ἐπὶ was to be understood by itself, and accordingly has rendered it by the English preposition, *above*. What sense this makes, the reader will judge. But to me it is evident that the preposition here, as in many other instances, is disjoined from the verb νεῦσε; so that we should understand it as if it had been written ἐπένευσε; and then it will signify, *upon that he nodded*, or *in consequence of what he said he nodded*. And according to this sense, Virgil renders it by the verb compounded with the preposition *ad*, viz. *annuit*; where he says, speaking likewise of Jupiter, *Annuit, et totum nutu tremefecit Olympum*. And we may observe, that in the next line of Homer, we have the same preposition compounded with the verb, in the word ἐπερρώσατο, describing the strong motion of Jupiter's hair. There is another error in the translation of this passage, viz. in making Jupiter nod *with his brows*, which I think is hardly to be understood in English; whereas it should have been *with his head*: for the brows being so remarkable a feature, particularly in a face of great dignity, are here put for the whole head, (as Eustathius has observed,) by a figure common enough, and well known by the name of *synecdoche*, or a part for the whole. Neither is κυανέῃσι exactly translated by *dark shaggy*; for it does not at all denote *shaggy*, but only the colour of *dark gray*, such as that of the eye-brows of a dark complexioned man, well advanced in years.

C. 14. action, and the like, that cannot conveniently be expressed by the verb.

As single words are connected together by the means of cases and prepositions, it is fit also that sentences, and members of sentences, should be connected together; and for that purpose, a set of words have been invented, called *conjunctions*, which though they may seem often only to connect words, yet it is truly sentences that they connect. Thus when I say, *Peter* and *James did so* or so, it may seem that the copulative *and* only joins the two words *Peter* and *James*; but it really joins the sentences, *Peter did so* and *James did so*. The grammarians divide them into several classes, which, as it is not my intention to write a grammar, I will not go over. I shall only observe, that though they all go by the name of *conjunctions*, some of them *connect*, by *disjoining*, not by joining.

The Greek language abounds more in conjunctions than any language I know; and particularly it has two that no other language, which I know, has, I mean, μεν and δε. They are commonly reckoned of that species of conjunctions, call *adversative*.

tive. But it is only *difference* they mark, C. 14.
not *opposition*; and the μεν that precedes, as it always does, does no more than let you know that something different is to follow, but which has a connection with what went before. The Greeks too have many particles, which appear to a person not well acquainted with the language to be mere expletives. But they are not so; for many of them not only connect the speech, but also give an emphasis and significancy to it, which it would not otherwise have. Of this kind are δη and γε, of which last it is very difficult to ascertain the precise meaning: but it certainly has a meaning; and a man much conversant in the Attic writers will desiderate it, if it be any where wanting. And accordingly H. Stephen has often supplied it, where, in the MS. it has fallen out.

This abundance of conjunctions and particles is, in my opinion, one of the greatest beauties of the Greek language; for they make what goes before refer to what follows, as well as what follows, to what goes before, and so make the sentence perfectly close and compact, giving to the words the same connection that there is in the thought,

C. 14. thought, and making the style to flow like a stream in one continued tenor, without any stop or interruption. For I am so far from thinking that that disjointed composition, and short cut of style, which is so much in fashion at present, and of which Tacitus, among the ancients, is the great model, is a beauty, that I am of opinion it the affectation of a deformity; nor is there, in my apprehension, any thing that more disfigures a style, or makes it more offensive to a man of true taste and judgment in writing. The ancients knew it as well as we do, and practised it when it was proper; but there is no example of any writer in a good age, or indeed of any writer at all, composing a whole work in that style before Tacitus: but of this I shall speak more hereafter. I shall only add at present, that one of the greatest difficulties of composing in English appears to me to be the want of such connecting particles as the Greeks have. We see however that the older writers in English, such as Milton and Lord Clarendon, have pretty well supplied that defect, and, with such copulatives as they had, have made a style flowing enough, and agreeable both to the ear and the understanding.

derstanding. Nor do I know any thing in which they deserve more to be imitated by the later writers. C. 14.

The only part of speech that remains to be treated of is, what the Latin grammarians have added, in place of the Greek article, viz. the interjection; as to which I shall only make an observation or two. And in the *first* place, it may be observed, that it expresses one of the two things which I have said are essential to the verb, namely, the energy or affection of the mind of him who uses it: but it differs from the affection expressed by the verb in this, that it expresses only *passion*; for it is the expression of joy, grief, surprise, or such like passion.

2dly, The interjections may be considered as remains of the most ancient language among men, that by which they expressed their feelings, not their ideas. They are therefore the *verba* that Horace speaks of, as used by the first men who spoke.

Quibus voces sensusque notarent,

and were prior to *names*, which could only come after ideas were formed of things. And the indeclinable words in every language may be considered as remains of the ancient

C. 14. ancient languages without art; for the declension of words is a thing of art, which was not practised by the first men who spoke.——And so much for the division of words into parts of speech.

CHAP. XV.

Division of words into primitive and derivative.—Defect of our modern languages in point of etymology.—Excellency of the Greek in that point.—The whole Greek language derived from five combinations of vowels in duads.

C. 15. ANOTHER division of words considered as significant, is into *original* and *derivative*. What derivation, composition, and flection are, I have defined in the first chapter of this book, and I have there shewn that they are the three great artifices of language. Of flection I have already treated at pretty great length, under the article of the noun and the verb; and I am now to speak of derivation and composition, both which I shall include under the name of derivation;

derivation; the only difference betwixt the two being, that the derivative word has only one parent, whereas the compounded word has two. C. 15.

A language that has no roots or derivation at all, which is the case, as has been shewn, of the barbarous languages, must be allowed to be very imperfect. And on the other hand a language that has not only derivation, but all its roots within itself, and of its own growth, is undoubtedly, in that respect at least, a most perfect language. Now of all the languages that I know, the Greek is in this, as well as in other respects, the most complete.

The reader may perhaps be surprised that in a work such as this, upon universal grammar, I should refer so often to the use of any particular language. But he should consider, that my chief purpose in this grammatical part of my work, is to observe what is most perfect in the art, and what consequently was of most difficult invention. Now, as I am not able from theory merely, and *a priori*, to form the idea of a perfect language, I have been obliged to seek for it in the study of the Greek. What men of superior genius may do in such specula-

tions,

C. 15. tions, I cannot tell; but I know well, that ordinary men, without the study of some model of the kind, would be as unable to conceive the idea of a perfect language, as to form a high taste in other arts, such as sculpture and painting, without having seen the best works of those kinds that are to be found. It would be doing injustice to those superior minds, who have in themselves the standard of perfection in all the arts, to judge of them by myself; but I am confident that my idea of perfection in language would have been ridiculously imperfect, if I had known no other language than the modern languages of Europe. It therefore deserves to be considered, whether it were not worth the while of a curious man, and a lover of knowledge, but who like me is obliged to look abroad for patterns of perfection, to make a study of the Greek language, if it were for no other reason but to discover what is most perfect in the most curious, as well as most useful, art among men.

There is nothing in which the modern languages, and particularly our English, is more defective than in this matter of e-

tymology, of which we are now treating; C. 15.
for in English we have the roots of our words scattered through different languages, being either in the old Teutonic or Gothic, which we do not understand, or in other languages of Europe, such as the French or Italian, or lastly in Greek and Latin; whereas the Greek, as I will endeavour to show, is complete in itself, and has all its words of its own growth.

That there is a wonderful generation of words in Greek, no body who knows any thing of the language can deny. The verb is among them the most prolific part of speech; for verbs not only beget verbs, of which I have given some specimens in a preceding note, but also nouns and adjectives without number, which are produced not only from different tenses of the verb, but from different persons of the same tense. Thus from the preter-perfect passive πεποιημαι, of the verb ποιεω, are derived three nouns; one from the first person, ποιημα; another from the second, viz. ποιησις; and a third from the third person, viz. ποιητης. And in like manner we have from πεπραγα, πραγμα, πραξις, and πρακτης, and many such, all formed by

C. 15. the same rule, and with the same signification, according to the different persons of the tense from whence they are derived: For what is derived from the first person, denotes the effect of the action, or the work performed by it; what comes from the second, the act itself, or the operation of the agent; and what comes from the third, the actor or agent. And not only do verbal nouns come from this tense, but also verbal adjectives. Thus from the third person of the perfect passive of the two verbs above mentioned, come ποιητος and πρακτος, denoting something that may be done, or may be the subject of action; and with the addition of another termination, viz. -ικος, they denote that which by its nature is fit to act; for such is the meaning of the verbals ποιητικος and πρακτικος*. And from the second person of this tense, in some verbs, is derived another adjective

* Aristotle, in his use of these two verbs, has made a nice philosophical distinction betwixt them; for ποιεω he uses to denote an action which produces works that remain after the action is past; whereas πρασσω denotes an action that ends in the energy, and leaves nothing behind it. This distinction I mentioned before in explaining the use of the preter-perfect tense.

adjective of different signification; as, *e.* C. 15.
g. from βεβιωται, the second person of the perfect passive of βιαω, is derived βιωτος, which signifies having in itself the principle of life *actu, non potentia*, whereas the verbals in τος denote only that the principle is in the the thing *potentia, non actu.* So that we have derived from one tense of this verb βιαω; first the participle βεβιωμενος, signifying what has been lived; then βιωτος, signifying what may be lived, or what falls under the category of being lived; 3dly, βιωτικος, what may live, or has the principle of life in it potentially; and lastly βιωσιμος, that which has actually life in it: and there is, besides all these, the present participle of the passive voice βιωμενος, signifying what we can hardly express in English, even by a circumlocution; for it denotes that which is in the act of being lived at the time we speak. And thus these several participles and verbals, derived regularly from the same part of the verb, express this principle of life, considered either actively or passively, and each of these either *actu* or *potentia.* So fruitful is the verb in Greek, and such is the philosophical accurracy of expression in that language.

This

C. 15. This so copious derivation from the verb in Greek, naturally leads one to suspect that it is the parent word of the whole language; and indeed I believe that to be the fact. For I do not know that it can be certainly shewn that there is any one word that is undoubtedly a primitive, which is not a verb, I mean a verb in the stricter sense, and common acceptation of the word. By this the candid reader will not understand that I mean to say, that prepositions, conjunctions, and such like words, which are rather the pegs and nails that fasten the several parts of the language together, than the language itself, are derived from verbs, or are derivatives of any kind; but he will understand, that I mean the names of things, which are properly the words of a language. One thing is certain, that many nouns, in our common dictionaries, are set down as primitives, which are undoubtedly derived from verbs*. And not only are words of two or more syllables so derived,

* Thus φοβος, *metus*, is set down in H. Stephen's Lexicon as a primitive; whereas most certainly it is a derivative,

derived, but even monosyllables of two or three letters, which one should think would be primitives, if there were any such in the language*. C. 15.

And not only does the fact appear to be so, but there is good reason why it should be so; for unless we believe that names were imposed upon things arbitrarily and capriciously,

tive, as I had occasion to observe before, from the old Homeric word φοβω or φοβομαι, the perfect middle of which is πεφοβα. In like manner δρομος, *cursus*, is commonly accounted a primitive, and yet it is most certainly derived from the old word δρεμω, *curro*. The word πολος, *sors*, is also from πελλω, *quatio*, the way in which lotes were antiently drawn, as we learn from Homer, Iliad, 3. v. 316. In the same way οσσος, *occulus*, as Eustathius tells us, is from οσσω, *video*; σως, *salvus*, from σαω, *conservo*, or *salvum facio*. And for the same reason φιλος, *amicus*, is from φιλω, *amo*. And it is most certain, that the number of verbal nouns is very much greater than is commonly imagined.

* Thus ψ, a name for an *eating worm*, is derived from ιπτω, *lædo* or *consumo*; οψ, *vultus*, from οπτω or οπτομαι, *video*; φως, *lux* from φαω, *luceo*; πτωξ, *a hare*, from πτωσσω, *paveo*; λοξ, an adverb, denoting what is done or suffered by the heel, from λαγω, *desino*; and πους, *pes*, is for the same reason derived from πανω, a word of like signification; and γη, *terra*, a shorter word than any of them, is from γαω, *gigno*, an old verb preserved to us in Homer, from whence γαια, and by contraction γη.

C. 15. capriciously, which cannot have been the case if the language was the work of art, we must suppose that they were framed with some view to the nature of the things. Now how do we know the nature of any thing, but from what it acts or what it suffers; for action and passion are obvious to the sense, whereas powers and faculties, and what constitutes the essence of things, are hidden qualities, which are no otherwise manifested, but by those outward effects. It was therefore very natural, and indeed it was necessary, that men, if they followed a rule at all in the imposition of names, should denominate things from what they saw of their operations. Perceiving, for example, an animal very timorous, and that was apt to crouch and squat, and in that way to hide itself, was it not very natural to denominate such an animal, from a verb which signified the action of crouching or hiding? and this is the etymology, as I have observed, of the old Greek word for a *hare*. In like manner, observing a little insect that consumed wood, it was very natural that they should denominate this insect from the verb signifying *to consume*, which is the etymology of the Greek

Greek word above mentioned, denoting such an eating worm: And the name of our own species is derived from the action of *looking upwards**. In like manner, the names of the elements are derived from verbs that denote their operations, and the effects they produce†. C. 15.

And by this way of giving names to things, the artificers of language appear to me to have followed the order of nature, and of the invention of language; for the first words that men used, when they began to speak, were certainly words denoting actions and feelings,

——*Quibus voces sensusque notarent.*

For to communicate to one another their feelings, or their operations, was the first use they had for language; and what in all probability give birth to the invention, as I have shewn in the proper place.

This system will no doubt appear extraordinary to the young scholar, who knows no

* Ἀνω ὀψεις.

† Thus ἀηρ is from ἀω, ὑδωρ from ὑω, γαια from γαω. As to πυρ, it is, as Plato informs us, not a Greek but a Phrygian word.

C. 15. no more of the Greek than what is contained in the common grammars and dictionaries; but it will not surprise those who have studied universal grammar, and have a more general knowledge of languages: and particularly those who are acquainted with the Hebrew, and other oriental languages, will think this scheme of derivation not at all extraordinary; for it seems now to be a point agreed among all the learned in the Hebrew, that the roots of it are all verbs; and if it be true that there is such a connection, as I suppose, betwixt the Hebrew and the Greek, it is natural to believe that the systems of the two languages should agree in this fundamental point, however much they may differ in other particulars.

But how far is this etymology to be carried? We have seen that verbs, as well as nouns, are derived from verbs. Where then shall we stop, and by what rule shall we determine that such a verb is the radical verb, and that the etymology goes no further? This is a matter of most curious speculation; and I have formed a system upon this subject, by which I derive the whole Greek lan-

guage from combinations in duads of the C. 15.
ω with the other five vowels α, ε, ι, ο, υ, the
ω always being last; so that αω, εω, ιω, οω, υω,
are the radical sounds from which the whole
Greek language, various and copious as it is,
may be deduced. These duads are them-
selves roots properly so called, that is, words
significant; and with the addition of other
vowels prefixed, and of consonants, each in
its order, form all the roots of the language.
But as the explaining this hypothesis, and
answering the objections which naturally
occur to it, would lead me into a greater
detail of the structure of a particular lan-
guage, than is suitable to a work upon uni-
versal grammar, I have thrown what I have
to say upon the subject into a dissertation
by itself*, annexed to this volume, which
the reader learned in the Greek language
may read if he think proper. I will there-
fore proceed to a more noble, as well as
more curious speculation, of which I gave
a hint in the beginning of this work,
namely, to inquire whether words can in
any sense be said to be *natural* expressions

* See Dissertation I.

C. 15. of ideas, or whether they be not merely *artificial* signs, and from institution, not from nature.

CHAP. XVI.

Whether words are by nature significant, or only by institution.—The argument stated upon both sides.—Conclusion, That the primitive words of a language have not any natural resemblance to the things expressed by them, but in perfect languages were framed with a view to derivation and inflection.

C. 16. IN all languages of art, there is a certain number of words, for the signification of which we can account, I mean derivatives; and the more perfect a language is, the greater number there is of these, and the fewer roots. In the preceding chapter I have said, that the Greek language is so perfect in this respect, that its etymology may be carried back to five duads of vowels, which are roots themselves, and by composition

position with other vowels, and with single consonants, form all the roots of the language. With respect therefore to far the greater part of this language, we are able to give a rational account of the signification of the words; but the question now before us is, Whether the etymology can be carried any further back, and whether any satisfying account can be given, why those roots signify the things they are used to denote, and no other; or whether they are not to be considered as signs of arbitrary institution? C. 1.

Upon this so curious subject, there is nothing to be found in any antient author, so far as I know, except what Plato has left us in the *Cratylus*, and what we have from an author not so well known, viz. *Ammonius Hermeias*, a philosopher of later times, in his commentary upon Aristotle's book of Interpretation. But this last author has done little more than to state the question, and explain the terms of it*. There is a modern author that has enlarged a great deal more upon the subject, I mean the French author of the Mechanism of Language, but from whom

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* *Fol.* 28.

C. 16. I confess I have not received much instruction. It is therefore from Plato only that I have got any lights upon this subject, who has certainly said a great many ingenious things upon it; and as the Halicarnassian informs us*, has the merit of being the first that treated the subject of etymology.

In this dialogue he introduces two personages, *Cratylus*, from whom the dialogue has its name, and *Hermogenes*, who differed very much in their opinions; Cratylus maintaining, that the names of things are all from nature, (and this we are told by Ammonius, in the above-quoted passage, and by Proclus in the commentary which is ascribed to him upon this dialogue†, was the opinion of Heraclitus the philosopher);

* Περι συνθεσεως.

† This commentary is not printed; but I had the use of a manuscript of it from the College of Glasgow. It is one of those manuscripts that was brought not long ago from a religious house upon Mount Athos, by Mr Asquieu, an English gentleman of learning and curiosity. It is not written by Proclus himself, but appears to have been taken down, either from his mouth, or rather, I think, composed from memory, by one of his scholars, who seems to have been a Christian. It is, I think, a piece

pher); Hermogenes, on the other hand, C. 16.
maintaining, that the names of things were all from custom and arbitrary institution, and that men might agree to give what names to things they pleased. Betwixt these two Socrates is chosen umpire; and it is from his mouth, as it commonly happens in those dialogues, that Plato delivers his own sentiments. The dialogue is wrought up with wonderful art, and all the beauty possible of style and composition. The character of Socrates, who pretended to know nothing, is finely kept up in it; for when he becomes etymologist, and gives the origin of the names of so many things divine and human, he says he had catched inspiration from Euthyphron, an enthusiast of those times, with whom he had conversed that morning. But notwithstanding this inspiration, the dialogue concludes sceptically as to the

piece of very little value, if the MS. were more perfect, or more correct, than it appears to be from the copy of it which I have used; for it is full of the mysticism of the Platonic philosophy; upon which his followers of those times improved so much, that they appear to me to have made it little more intelligible than the writings of Jacob Behmen, or any other modern mystic.

C. 16. the question in dispute betwixt the parties; for Socrates first refutes Hermogenes, and then Cratylus. Nor does he seem to aver any thing positively, except that the nature of things was not to be learned from names, as Cratylus asserted, but from the things themselves, nor these again but from ideas. So that Plato here, and almost every where else through his works, contrives to introduce his favourite doctrine of ideas, with which he concludes this dialogue. The later Platonists however, such as Proclus, maintained it to be the opinion of Plato, that the names of things were from nature; and upon this subject they disputed with the followers of Aristotle, who, in his book of Interpretation, says very shortly, but very positively, that names were given to things by convention or agreement, and that none of them is from nature, but that they are mere symbols, and not natural signs. Ammonius endeavours in this, as well as in many other things, to reconcile these two philosophers. For I observe, that at that time, and long before that time, as far back as the days of Ammonius Saccas of Alexandria, the master of Plotinus, the fashionable opinion

opinion among philosophers was, that the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle was the same. But in later times and after the days of Proclus, the breach betwixt these two schools was very much widened; and as far down as the taking of Constantinople by the Turks, we have Gemistius Pletho, and Georgius Trapezuntius, fiercely disputing with one another, the one in behalf of Plato against Aristotle, and the other in behalf of Aristotle against Plato. As to my own opinion, I think it is evident, that though in many things they agreed, for which reason I think the study of their two philosophies should never be separated, yet they differed in some things, particularly on the subject of *ideas*; and on this subject too, if it be true, that Plato really believed that the names of things were from nature, not from institution. C. 16.

The first thing to be done, before we proceed farther in this question, is to state it fairly, and to explain what is meant, by saying that the names of things are from nature.

And, in the *first* place, it is evident that names are not the workmanship of nature; for though we should suppose, contrary

C. 16. contrary to what I have endeavoured to prove, that men have from nature the faculty of speech, still the names would be imposed by men, and not the operation of nature. Nor is this the meaning of Cratylus in Plato; though I perceive that Ammonius ascribes this meaning to him*. But what he maintains is, that men, in imposing those names, had a regard to the nature of things signified by them, and framed them so as by their sound to express it. The state therefore of the question, as treated by Plato, is, Whether the nature of the things is any way expressed by the names given to them, and whether that was the rule followed by men in imposing such names?

But there appears to be a question previous

* *Ammon.* Περι ἑρμηνειας, *fol.* 29, where he makes Cratylus say, that names are the workmanship of nature, δημιουργηματα της φυσεως; that every name is by nature appointed for every thing, in the same manner as each sense is fitted for its proper object; and that names are not artificial likenesses of things, but natural, such as shadows, and the appearances of things in water. This mistake of so excellent a commentator, and who was the instructor of two other very good commentators, viz. *Simplicius* and *Johan. Philoponus*, shews that nothing can be trusted to in those matters, but the original authors themselves.

vious to this, namely, Whether any rule at all was followed in the imposition of names; or whether it was not an act of mere fancy and arbitrary will, according to the opinion of Hermogenes? And if it can be shewn that men did follow a rule in this matter, and were not guided by mere chance and caprice, it will then be time enough to enquire what rule they followed, whether that supposed by Cratylus, or any other. C. 16.

And here it may be observed, that this inquiry belongs only to the languages of art; for it is evident, from what has been said in the preceding part of this work, that Barbarians follow no rule at all in their languages, not even the most common rules of grammar, far less can we suppose them capable of such a refinement as to think of adapting their words to the nature of things. Their languages are so artless, that they have not, as we have seen, either composition or derivation; and therefore, whatever connection or relation there may be betwixt the things, there is none at all betwixt the words expressing them, so little regard had they to the nature of things in the imposing of names. And accordingly, in fact, I be-

C. 16. lieve it is absolutely impossible to give any reason, even the most whimsical or capricious, why any of their long vocal words should denote one thing more than another: Why, *e. g.* should not the long word which I mentioned in the Esquimaux language, signifying *little*, denote *much*, or *vice versâ*?

Secondly, It may be also observed, That even with respect to the languages of art, there is a great number of the words, of which we can give a very satisfactory account, I mean derivative and compound words. The more perfect a language is, as I observed before, the greater number of these words there will be in it, and the fewer roots. As to the Greek, I have endeavoured to shew that there is a very small number of roots. In other languages of less art, the number no doubt will be greater. But whether the number be great or small, it is plain that the present question only relates to the roots of every language. And accordingly, to that issue the dispute betwixt Cratylus and Hermogenes is at last brought by Plato *.

* *Ibid. pag.* 289.

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The precise question therefore is, Whether etymology can be carried any farther than to the radical words of a language; and whether it will go the length of the elements of which those words are composed? Whether, in short, any reason can be given why such and such elemental sounds, combined together in such or such an order, should denote such and such things, and no other? Or, is it not more probable, that the artificers of language, after having carried the art so far as to derive from a few words all the other words of a language, gave themselves no further trouble, but abandoned the rest to fancy and caprice? C. 16.

It may be argued in support of this last opinion, That there are certainly many things among men of arbitrary institution; and it is impossible to maintain, that all the signs of things which we use, are natural signs, and not *symbols*, that is, marks or indications of things by convention. Of this kind are signals at sea or land, letters in ciphers, and other ways that men have devised of communicating their thoughts to one another when at a distance.—That even the common letters of the alphabet can be accounted

C. 16. counted no more than symbols for such or such elemental sounds, as it seems impossible to give any rational account of the forms of the several letters, or to render a reason why *a*, (*e. g.*) should not stand for the elemental sound expressed by *b*, or *vice versâ*. And with respect to an alphabet of another kind, which stands for ideas, and not the sounds expressing those ideas, I mean the Chinese alphabet, Mons. Freret, a most learned French academician, has maintained, that the whole Chinese characters, amounting, as it is said, to no less than eighty thousand, are nothing more than mere symbols or signs of arbitrary institution, without any natural resemblance to the things they express *; and the same may be said of the Arabian or rather Indian ciphers, (for from that country they came originally.) Then as to the names of the letters, it is observed by Plato, that all the Greek alphabet have names, such as *alpha*, *beta*, *gamma*, &c. except four, viz. ε, υ, ο, and ω, which are expressed only by the

* See his discourse on the principles of the writing art, contained in the 12th volume of the Memoirs of the Academy of Belles Lettres, *edit. Amstelod.*

the sounds of the letters *. Now, why not these as well as the rest? or why is α called by that name, and not by any other? or why is not α called *beta*, or β *alpha*? Why have not the Latin letters, or our letters, names as well as the Greek? and why do we sound all the names of the consonants in English with an *e*, and no other vowel, except the *r*, which we sound with an *a*? And to say no more of the marks of language in writing; with respect to the words themselves, it is admitted, that no account can be given of the names of numbers, nor of prepositions and conjunctions. And if every thing must be accounted for in language, Why should not a reason be given for the different forms of inflection and derivation? Why is not the genitive put for the dative, or one tense of a verb for another? Why should not the derivative πομμα stand for ποιητης, or *vice versa*? In short, as it must be admitted that no account can be given of some original words in language, the best way seems to be to make the rule general, that every original word is of arbitrary institution. C. 16.

On

* Cratyl. pag. 271. edit. Ficini.

C. 16. On the other hand, it may be said, That there are undoubtedly many things among men altogether arbitrary, and governed by no rule or reason. But these are things that are not, nor cannot, by their nature, be comprehended in any art. Of this kind are signals at sea or land, letters in ciphers, or any such *indicia*, or marks of any thing which must be regulated by the private consent and agreement of parties, not by any general rule founded in the nature of things, like matters of art, otherwise they would not serve the purpose. Neither are the forms of the letters of the alphabet a proper subject of art. The analysis of language into its elemental sounds, was no doubt a work, and a great work of art; and after that was done, it was an ingenious thought to think of noting those elemental sounds by visible marks, and of speaking in that way to the eyes. But here the art ended; and Theuth the Egyptian, or whoever else it was that invented the writing art, was at liberty to make use of any marks he pleased to distinguish the different sounds. Nor indeed was this a matter that could, by its nature, be subjected to the rules of art. There might however have been some accidental

reason

reason (as it seldom happens that men act in any thing, without some kind of reason to determine the will to one thing rather than another) why such or such a figure was chosen to express such or such an elemental sound. And there is a learned man in France of my acquaintance, Mons. de Guignes, who was writing a book, some years ago, to prove, that the forms of the Phenician or Hebrew characters were derived from the Egyptian hieroglyphic, which expressed the idea denoted by the word that was formed of those characters; so that the characters were the dissection, as it were, of the hieroglyphic. And as to what Mons. Freret says of the Chinese characters, it is a mistake, which has been corrected by later information from that country; for by comparing the more ancient Chinese characters with the modern, we perceive, that the former were truly the signs, natural or allegorical, of the things they express; and that the modern are those ancient characters abridged, or altered in such a way, as every thing of that kind is in a long course of time. And as to the Arabian ciphers, that manner of notation

C. 16.

C. 16. tion of numbers, is no doubt a matter of great art, as well as great utility, and a most ingenious contrivance unknown to the Greeks and Romans. But the figures of the ciphers themselves were a matter entirely of fancy, though it is not unlikely that there may have been some reason, of one kind or another, that determined the inventors of this art to chuse one mark for a number rather than another. And what I have said of written language, may be said likewise of language that is spoken, namely, that though it be an art, and the greatest I think of all arts; yet there must necessarily belong to it things of arbitrary choice, that cannot be reduced to any art. Such are the names of ideas so abstract as those of numbers; and such must likewise be the names for those pegs or nails of discourse, that we call *prepositions*, *articles*, and *conjunctions*. But wherever any thing belonging to an art is capable of being subjected to rule, and governed by certain principles, it will undoubtedly be so, if the art is perfect, and will not be left to fancy or arbitrary will. If therefore it can be shewn why the roots of any language should be such

or such sounds, rather than others, it is C. 16.
evident, that if this language be a complete piece of art, the roots of it will be of that kind. There must have been, as we observed before, a progress in the art of language as well as in other arts; nor is it possible that it could have been invented all at once. We see, in the barbarous languages, the beginnings of art: some of them have some few words that seem to be derived from others of like signification; that would go on by degrees, till at last the greatest part of the language would become derivative or compounded words. Then the artists, we may presume, would proceed a little further, and try whether the system could not be completed by abridging still more the number of roots; and giving a certain form to them, such as appeared best suited to the nature of things, or the genius of the language, and such as would answer best all the purposes of the language. For if we see that upon any subject art has gone very far, we can hardly suppose that it will stop short till the whole is completed: *e g.* We have seen how far art has gone in the formation of the Greek language, particularly in that part of it respecting etymo-

C. 16. logy and derivation; we are informed also, that the art of the Sanscrit or Bramin language has gone so far as to make roots of sounds that are not words of the language, nor have any precise or determinate signification, but only denote a relation of one kind or another to some general idea *. Now, can we suppose that the artificers of such languages would give over, like men wearied, and abandon to mere fancy or whim the choice of the radical sounds, if any reason could be given why one kind of them is more proper than another? I therefore think it probable, that, if such reason can be assigned, it was followed and made the rule in languages so perfect as the Greek or Sanscrit.

The next inquiry is, what reason we can suppose would determine the artificers in this choice of roots. And first, is there any thing in the sound of the human voice, that can express the nature of the things denoted by words? This is averred by Cratylus in Plato; and it is his opinion we are now to examine, after having first refuted, according to Plato's method, the opinion

* See the Jesuit Dupon's account of this language in vol. xiv. of *Lettres edifiantes et curieuses*.

opinion of Hermogenes, who maintained, C. 16.
that words were altogether of arbitrary institution.

And, first, it may be observed, that my hypothesis of the roots of the Greek language being verbs, as those of the Hebrew certainly are, favours very much the argument of Cratylus. For as it is by certain actions of the organs of the mouth that articulation is performed, it is natural enough to suppose, that by one kind of action another may be imitated, or in some way expressed or represented. And upon this subject Plato has made some very ingenious observations, tending to shew, that by the powers of the letters, different kinds of motion may be expressed. Thus he says, that by the consonant *r* is expressed any quick or rough motion; on the contrary, by *l* is expressed a soft gliding motion. What is fixed and pressed is expressed by the consonants *d* and *t*; and on the other hand what is swoln, puffed up, or windy, is denoted by the hissing consonant *s*, or by the double or aspirated consonants, such as ζ, φ, ψ, which requiring a great deal of breath in the pronunciation, are fit for that expression; and all this he illustrates by many examples from his

C. 16. his own language *. And if the reader wants examples from other languages, he may consult the author of the *Mechanism of Language*, where he will find very many instances from different languages, particularly with respect to the expression of the letters *l* and *r*. And as to the vowels, Plato says, that by the position of the mouth in the pronunciation of them, the figure and magnitude of things may be expressed; as, *e. g.* by the form of the mouth, when *o* is enunciated, *roundness* may be denoted; and by the manner in which *a* is pronounced, what is *wide opened, or expanded*, or in general *great*, may be signified; what is long by *η*; and what is slender, sharp, and piercing, by *i* †.

These observations of Plato are certainly so far true, that there are, I am persuaded, in every language, many words which express the nature of the things signified by them; and of these I believe the Greek language affords as great a number as any. But it is to be observed, that all these words express sounds of different kinds, and therefore

* *Pag.* 292. *edit. Ficini.*

† *Ibid.* pag. 292. & 293.

fore are said by grammarians to be *verba ex sono facta*, and it is to such words only that the ὀνοματοποιία, so much talked of, relates. Now there can be no doubt but that sounds may be imitated by the human voice, especially when modified by articulation. But this kind of imitation can express nothing but sounds, and therefore will go very small length in expressing the almost infinite variety of the ideas of the human mind; and it is an expression, as Plato observes, that belongs rather to music than to language *. For, as to the expression of language, he requires, that by letters, syllables, and words, the nature and esssence of things should be expressed, even of this very thing *sound*. Now I must confess this appears to me very difficult to be done by the power of letters, however variously combined into syllables and words. Nor does Plato himself seem to be confident that it can be done; but, as I observed, concludes sceptically upon the point. For it is evident, that whoever formed a language upon this plan, must have known, or thought that he knew, wherein the essence of things consists; that is, in other C. 16.

* *Cratyl. pag.* 290.

C. 16. other words, he must have been a very great philosopher. And accordingly Socrates, in Plato, when he refutes Hermogenes, proceeds upon the supposition, that those lawgivers in language, as he calls them, were philosophers of the sect of Heraclitus, who maintained that every thing was in constant flux and motion. And upon this hypothesis he has given us a great number of derivations, some of them so whimsical and so much forced, that he himself, I am persuaded, did not believe there was any reality in them, but gives them only as a kind of *jeu d'esprit* *. And after having, in this way, explained the names of many things, both divine and human, when he comes to refute Cratylus in his turn, he shews that several words, which he had mentioned before, may be etymologised upon a system of philosophy directly opposite, namely, that every thing

* Some of them contradict all the rules of etymology and derivation; *e. g.* he says that *κακία* is derived from *κακὸς ἰέναι*. And with respect to *κακὸς*, from which it is plain that *κακία* comes according to the common way of forming noun substantives from adjectives, he can give no other account of it, except that it is a Barbaric word, such as *πῦρ* that he had mentioned before; *pag.* 285. *edit. Ficini.* In the same manner he might have derived *malitia*, in Latin, from *malè ire*.

things stands still and is at rest; that in this the essence of every thing consists; and that to perceive this stability and fixedness of things, is knowledge and science*. In short, he unsays every thing that he had said bebefore upon the subject of those philosophical etymologies, and very plainly shews, that from the names themselves we can infer nothing with respect to the opinion of those who imposed them concerning the nature and essence of things. C. 16.

Two things therefore in this matter appear to me to be sufficiently evident: first, that by combinations of letters in syllables, the nature of things, other than sounds, could not be expressed with any degree of distinctness and clearness; and, secondly, supposing they could, it does not appear to me probable, that the artificers of language had it at all in their view in forming the roots of the language.

For proof of this last, let us take for example the roots of the Greek language, in which I am persuaded, if in any, this resemblance betwixt the sound, and the thing expressed

* *Ibid. pag.* 299. And upon this hypothesis he explains the words επιστημη, βεβαιος, ιστορια, μνημη, &c.

C. 16. pressed by it, is to be found. And accordingly it is from this language that Plato takes his examples. It is certain, first, That four at least of the five duads are themselves roots. Secondly, that if all the other roots do not end in one or other of these duads, according to my hypothesis, a very great number of them does, so that those letters are essential parts of such roots. Now, if by letters the nature of things is expressed, I desire to know how it comes that so many things, so different in their nature, are expressed by the same letters. Thus αω signifies by itself *spiro*. With different consonants prefixed, it has significations quite different from this, and from one another. Thus with a ϛ prefixed, it signifies *to go*, as in ϛαω; with a γ prefixed, it signifies *to beget* or *produce*, which is the meaning of the root γαω; with a δ prefixed, it forms the word δαω, which signifies *to burn*, or *to divide*; with a ζ prefixed, it makes ζαω, signifying *to live*. In the same manner καω, κταω, μαω, ναω, &c. are formed, all having different significations. And also when it is compounded with vowels, such as ε and ι making the words εαω and ιαω, it appears to retain nothing of its original signification;

signification; and these words, though formed out of it, have no resemblance in their meaning. And supposing we should go so far in favour of Cratylus's hypothesis, as to admit that those duads, though making the greater part of the roots, had no meaning at all, and were to be considered only as terminations, it remains to be accounted for, how those single letters prefixed should denote things so different. Why should ϛ, for example, before αω, signify to *go*, while γ before the same duad, signifies to *beget*, and so on? and why should the same consonant ϛ, for example, prefixed to divers of these insignificant duads, denote different things, as in ϛαω, ϛιω, ϛοω, ϛυω? C. 16.

A third observation may be made, that supposing each letter of the alphabet was by nature appropriated for expressing such and such things, and that the artificers of language knew this, and made use of them accordingly; yet in order to fill up their words to a proper length and fullness of sound, they must have used other letters, not having the same significancy, perhaps a contrary one, but which, with the significant letters, made a pleasing sound, and filled up the

C. 16. word agreeably; so that they must soon have seen that their attempt to express, by those elemental sounds, the nature of things would, in the progress of language, come to nothing. For as Plato has observed, so many other letters are thrown in for the sake of the beauty or magnificence of the sound*, that the original significant letters are quite overwhelmed and lost.

Must

* καλλωπισμου και μεγαλοπρεπειας ἑνεκα. And he has given a very striking example of it in the word σκληροτης, where there is only one letter, viz. ρ, which expresses the idea of hardness or roughness; so that all the rest of the letters, and among others the λ, which, as he observes, has a quite different significancy, are thrown in merely to fill up the word. *Cratyl. pag.* 297. *Fic.* This study of the pomp and beauty of sound may be observed in the derivatives of the Greek language, which have many useless letters on that account, of which Plato gives one example in the word, κατοπτρον, where he says that the ρ is thrown in merely for the sake of the sound. I will give the passage at length, as it contains the substance of what I have said above, expressed with his usual elegance. Ω μακαριε, ουκ οισθ' ὁτι τα πρωτα ονοματα τεθεντα κατακεχωσται ηδη ὑπο των βουλομενων τραγῳδειν, αυτα, περιτιθεντων γραμματα και εξαιρουντων, ευςομιας ἑνεκα, και πανταχη στρεφοντων, και ὑπο καλλωπισμου και ὑπο χρονου· επει και εν τῳ κατοπτρῳ ου δοκει σοι ατοπον οιναι το εμβεβλησθαι τε ρω; αλλα τοιαυτα (οιμαι) ποιουσιν οἱ της μεν αληθειας ουδεν φροντιζοντες, το δε στομα πλαττοντες, ἡ δ' εισεμβαλλοντες πολλα επι τα πρωτα ονοματα, τελευτωντες ποιουσι μηδ' αν ἑνα ανθρωπων συνειναι, ὁ τι ποτε βουλεται το ονομα· ὡσπερ και την σφιγγα αντι σφιγος σφιγγα καλουσι, και αλλα πολλα. *Ibid.* 284.

Must we then retract what we endeavoured to prove, that the artificers of the Greek language did proceed upon some principles of art, when they formed the roots of that language? and must we in this case give up Leibnitz's maxim, that there is a sufficient reason for every thing? or may some other reason be given for the imposition of those *first* names, as Plato calls them, besides what Cratylus has given? And I think there may. And in the first place, suppose we should say that they were chosen for the beauty and sweetness of the sound, it is evident from what has been already said, that the Greek studied this very much in the formation of their language; and it shall be further made appear, when I come to treat of the material part or sound of languages of art. Would it therefore be thought incongruous, or repugnant to the genius of the language, if I should say, that those duads of vowels were chosen for roots, on account of their sweet and flowing sound; and that these, with the addition of consonants, and other vowels, furnished a sufficient number of stocks upon which to graft the whole language? C. 16.

But,

C. 16. But, secondly, it appears to me, that the Greeks had still a more substantial reason which led them to chuse those duads for the primitive sounds of their language; and that was for the sake of flection and derivation. It is evident, that they must have formed their system of flection and derivation at the same time that they fixed upon the radical works. For it is undoubtedly for the sake of derivation that there are roots in any language; and flection is nothing but a species of derivation taken in a larger sense. Now I have shown, in the dissertation annexed to this volume, that no termination of verbs, such as all the radical words in Greek are, could be so proper for all their variety of flection and derivation as those duads, and that from them, as from a plentiful fountain, the whole Greek language flows with an easy descent, and a most copious stream. And thus it appears to me, that it was not without art that those radical sounds of the Greek language were chosen rather than any other. And I am persuaded those who are learned in the Hebrew, if they will consider the roots of that language in the same view, will

will find that there is a like reason for chusing them rather than any other. C. 16.

And here I conclude the analysis of language considered as *significant*: And so far as I have gone, I have endeavoured to deduce the principles of grammar from the principles of philosophy, upon which all sciences ought to be founded, otherwise they never can be perfectly understood, nor truly deserve the name of science. In this view I have divided and explained the parts of speech; in a manner a good deal different from the common, and all along I have endeavoured to shew the great art that appears in the structure of a regular language. And particularly I have at considerable length explained those three great artifices of language, flection, derivation, and composition; and I have concluded, that no part of a complete language that is capable of art, is without art, not even the formation of the radical words of the language. I proceed, in the next book, to analyse the material part of language, or language considered as *sound merely*.

BOOK

BOOK II.

Analysis of the MATERIAL PART of LANGUAGE.

INTRODUCTION.

Intr. LANGUAGE is so commonly used, and of such facility in practice, that men who have not studied the art are apt to think that there is no art in it: on the other hand, men of curiosity, who are not satisfied with the practice, but want to know the reason of things, find great difficulty in explaining the nature of language, and giving a rational account even of the common parts of speech, and of their various uses; and they will be convinced, if they take the trouble to read the preceding book, of the truth of what I said in the beginning of this part of my work, that a man, in order to be a complete grammarian, must have made no inconsiderable progress in philosophy, even in the most

most abstruse parts of it. But there is one satisfaction from the study of the works of art, and which, to the lover of knowledge, is abundant recompence for the labour it costs him, that we can get to the bottom in such study, and discover the first principles of the art: whereas in the works of God and nature, there is a wisdom and contrivance of which we cannot see the end; and therefore I doubt whether, in such matters, the human faculties can ever attain to perfect science. Intr.

The art of language is so beautiful, and of such wonderful contrivance, that an ingenious man would think it well worth his while to study it for the sake of mere curiosity, and though his labours were to be recompensed by no profit. But the utility of the study is very great. For, in the first place, we learn by it to compare different languages, and to pronounce with certainty which of them is the most excellent. Then we can distinguish betwixt what is good and agreeable to rule in the use of every language, and what is the contrary; so that our judgement does not depend upon fashion or popular opinion, which is prevalent in

language

Intr. language as well as in every thing else belonging to man; and we are enabled to distinguish what is or ought to be subjected to rulein language, from that which by its nature must be governed by arbitrary use. Farther, the grammatical art is the foundation and ground-work of all style and composition of every kind, whether in verse or prose; for we cannot ornament language, nor pretend to invert the common idiom, or depart from the rules of plain speech, unless we know those rules, and how far they may be varied consistently with the nature of language in general, and the genius of the particular language in which we compose. An exact study therefore of grammar is indispensably necessary for the orator or public speaker*. Nor must the poet,

* To this purpose Cicero, speaking of Julius Cæsar's talent of oratory, says, *Solum quidem, et quasi fundamentum oratoris, vides locutionem emendatam et Latinam; cujus penes quos laus adhuc fuit, non fuit rationis aut scientiæ, sed quasi bonæ consuetudinis. De Claris Oratoribus, cap.* 74. And in the same passage, a little after, he says, That even in his time the Latin language began to be corrupted by the great confluence of strangers to Rome: *Quo magis expurgandus est sermo, et adhibenda, tanquam obrussa, ratio, quæ mutari non potest, nec uten-*

poet, inspired as he is by the muses, pretend to be exempted from the rules of this art. What other learning is required for excelling in poetry and rhetoric, I shall mention when I come to treat of those arts. Intr.

dum pravissimâ consuetudinis regulâ. And accordingly he says Cæsar followed this rule: *Cæser autem, rationem adhibens, consuetudinem vitiosam et corruptam purâ et incorruptâ consuetudine emendat. Itaque cum ad hanc elegantiam verborum Latinorum (quæ, etiam si orator non sis, et sis ingenuus civis Romanus, tamen necessaria est) adjungit illa oratoria ornamenta dicendi, tum videtur tanquam tabulas bene pictas collocare in bono lumine.* These passages evidently shew it to have been the opinion of Cicero, that not only we cannot excel in oratory without the grammatical art, but that we cannot be sure of speaking correctly or properly, if we have not a rule superior to common use, and by which we are able to correct that use, when it goes wrong.

CHAPTER I.

Division of the analysis of the sound of language into three heads, articulation, accent, and quantity.

Ch. 1. THE analysis of speech or language, considered as significant, is simple; for it can be resolved into words only, of which we have explained the nature and different kinds. But the analysis of language, considered as sound, is more various; for explaining of which it will be necessary to recollect what we said above, that the common matter of which both music and language are formed, is the *human voice*. But there is a higher genus, of which we must take notice, viz. *sound*; for voice is the sound produced by the breath of an animal, coming from his lungs, through the wind-pipe and larynx, and from thence through his mouth; and the efficient cause of it, is some movement of the mind, or inward principle of the animal.

mal*. This voice, variously modified by the different positions and actions of the several organs of the mouth, is what we call *articulate voice*, as was before explained: and as this is essential to language, the analysis of it, considered as articulate sound, is first to be explained: next we are to consider it as sound simply; and in this respect it has either different degrees of acuteness or gravity, which are called the *prosody* of language, or it has different lengths of sound, which make what we call *quantity*. Thus the analysis of language, considered as sound, is threefold; for it is either, of the articulation of it, of the prosody, or of the quantity†. We

Ch. 1.

* *Ammon.* εις το περι ἑρμηνειας. *fol.* 25. His words are, Φωνη δε ψοφος εξ εμψυχου γινομενος, ὁταν δια της συςολης ητου θωρακος εκθλιβομενος απο του πνευμονος ὁ εισπνευθεις αηρ προσπιπτῃ αθροως τῃ καλουμενῃ τραχειᾳ αρτηριᾳ, χαι τῃ ὑπερωᾳ ητοι τῳ γαργαρεωνι, και δια της πληγης αποτελῃ τινα ηχον αισθητον, κατα τινα ὁρμην της ψυχης.

† This threefold division of the sound of language, is made by Plutarch in his miscellaneous works, where he says, that three things at least must fall under the sense of hearing, in the pronunciation of language; the tone or note, (which is what I call the prosody); the time or quantity, as we commonly call it; and the articulation of the syllable or letter. His words are, Αιει γαρ αναγκαιοτρια ελαχιςα ειναι τα πιπτοντα εις την ακοην - φθογγον τε—ωα χρονον—και συλλαβην η γραμμα; where I am surprised to find

Ch. 1. We will begin with the analysis of articulate sound.

CHAP. II.

The analysis of articulate sounds into letters.—Where and when this discovery probably was made.—The nature of letters, and the several kinds of them.—Perfection of the Greek alphabet.—Defects of the English.

Ch. 2. ARTICULATE sounds are resolveable into *sentences, words, syllables, and letters.* Of these last only we propose here to treat, because

find that Mr Foster, in his learned essay upon accent and quantity, translates the beginning of the passage in this way, p. 16. "Three *very minute* things do necessarily "strike the ear at once." For this is neither the meaning of the words, nor the sense of Plutarch, who, in a passage which follows afterwards, speaks of the ear being able to perceive and distinguish these three things, each from the other, without which he adds that it is impossible to see what is faulty in each of them, and what is not. See *Plutarch. tom. 2. pag.* 1144. *Xyland.* And Mr Foster himself has made it evident, that no Greek or Roman, in those days, could have been at any loss to distinguish those three things in the pronunciation of their language.

because these are truly the *elements* into which language, considered as sound, is ultimately resolveable. The other three are composed out of them; and therefore, according to the method we have laid down, they are to be treated of when we come to speak of the composition of language. Ch. 2.

The analysis of language into letters, by which I mean the elementary sounds, (for I do not speak at present of the characters by which they are expressed), was certainly a great discovery; and I should have had no doubt, even if Plato had not told us so*, that it was first made, if not only made, in that parent-country of all arts and sciences, I mean Egypt; but not, I am persuaded, till after all the necessary arts of life were invented, government and religion established, and even some progress made in speculation and science. It must have been made, I think, much about the time that men began to reform the barbarous jargon they first spoke, and form a language of art; for which purpose, as I have said, I hold that the knowledge of the elemental sounds, and their powers,

* Plato *in Philebo, p.* 374. *edit. Ficini.*

Ch. 2. powers, was absolutely necessary. I think it is probable that it was not made all at once, but, like the discoveries in other sciences, by degrees; and it is not unlikely that there was a stop in the progress. They would begin, no doubt, with distinguishing words from the rest of the discourse: this would not be difficult. Then they would resolve words into syllables, which would not be so easy. But it is likely that they stopped there for some time, perhaps for ages, (so slow is the progress of human knowledge), before they came to the last resolution of syllables into letters, which however easy and obvious it may appear to us, was certainly a great work of art; for letters in syllables are so combined and incorporated together, that it requires a very accurate dissection to separate them. And what makes this conjecture the more probable, is the account that Kempfer gives us in his history of Japan, of the Japanese alphabet, which he says is syllabical. Now, if this be not only a short-hand way of writing, and if they really do not know the elemental sounds, then they, or whatever other nation

nation they got their alphabet from, must have stopped, as I suppose the Egyptians did, after carrying the analysis the length of syllables. But be that as it will, it would appear that the discovery was fully made, before a language of art came into Greece; at least there is no evidence that any one elemental sound was discovered by the Greeks, though they found out new characters for them, of which more hereafter. I hold therefore that the Greeks got this discovery from the same country from which they got the alphabet, that is so nearly connected with it. Ch. 2.

Whether this Greek or Egyptian alphabet contains all the articulate sounds the human voice is capable of uttering, may justly be doubted; for it is very difficult, if not impossible for us, to define and limit exactly the powers of so various and excellent an animal as man, and to say precisely that they can go so far, and no farther. One thing I believe is certain, that the Greek alphabet is the fullest and most complete of any known; so that in this respect, as well as in many others, the Greek language is the most perfect that we know. I incline however to believe, that there are sounds to be found

Ch. 2. found in other languages, that cannot be expressed by the Greek letters, or any combination of them, and I mentioned one sound that is pronounced in the island of Otaheite, which could not be pronounced by any of our people that were there.

I have already given a general account of the nature of articulation, and of the great division of the elemental sounds into vowels and consonants*. The vowels, as I have said, are absolutely necessary for articulation, being the vehicle, as it were, by which the other letters are enunciated; or, as Plato expresses it, the bond or tie by which they are bound together†. It is for this reason that I believe all languages, even the most barbarous, have all the five vowels, either sounded each by itself, or mixed with other vowels. They are not however the principal parts of articulation, as I have elsewhere observed, but are to be considered only as the cement that binds the consonants together,

* *Vol.* 1. *lib.* 3. *p.* 329. *et seqq.*

† *Plato in Sophista, pag.* 177. *edit. Ficini.*

gether, which therefore are the principal materials in the structure of language. Ch. 2.

The consonants are subdivided into *liquids*, *mutes*, and the *monadic* or solitary letter *s*. The liquids are distinguished from the rest of the consonants by this, that they make of themselves a kind of beating or chopping noise*: and it is perhaps for that reason, that in pronouncing their names, we prefix the vowel; whereas in the names of the other consonants we postpone it. They are four in number, *l*, *m*, *n*, *r*, to which some grammarians add the *s*: but I think it is better that it should stand by itself, both on account of the peculiarity of its sound, which is altogether different from that of the rest of the letters†, and because it unites in the same syllable with many other letters with which none of the liquids will join; for in Greek it goes before, in the same syl-

* *Aristot. Poet.*

† Dionysius the Halicarnassian says of this letter, that it makes a noise more brutal than human, therefore the ancients used it very sparingly; and he says there were whole odes composed without one *σ*, which he calls ᾠδὰς ἀσιγμους. Περὶ συνθ. sect. 14.

Ch. 2. lable, all the mutes, either aspirated or not aspirated, except γ and δ; whereas the liquids go before none of the mutes in the same syllable.

The mutes in the Greek alphabet are in number nine; and they are divided into three classes, according to the organs which chiefly co-operate with the breath in the pronunciation of them, three in each class:

The first are *labial*, viz. -	π, β, φ,
The second *palatine*, viz. -	κ, γ, χ,
The third *dental*, viz. -	τ, δ, θ.

And each of these classes is subdivided into three, which are said to be of different orders, the one being what is called *tenuis*,

viz. - - - - -	π, κ, τ,
The second *middle*, - -	β, γ, δ,
And the third *aspirated*, -	φ, χ, θ.

This division is taken from the different degrees of breath with which they are enunciated, and which breath is said to be the *spirit* of the letters. For if they are pronounced with a gentle breath, they are said to be *tenues*, or slender-sounding letters; if they are more strongly enunciated, then

then they are said to be middle letters; or if more strongly still, they are said to be *aspirated* or *thickened*, as I think it is better expressed by the Greek work δασυς*; for the aspiration is truly produced by thickening, and as it were condensing the breath, so as to make a very forcible enunciation. Ch. 2.

Thus it appears that the artists of language knew perfectly the power of the several elements; the organs that were employed in pronouncing them; and the difference which the different degrees of breath made in the enunciation of them. In short it appears, that the Greek language was formed by men who had thoroughly studied, and minutely dissected, the operation of the several organs of articulation. And it may be observed, that they did not employ only the soft and sweet-sounding letters, but also the strong and rough, in order to give strength and nerves to their language, as well as softness and beauty.

It

* The *tenues*, on the other hand, are called ψιλοι, which denotes that they are just simply sounded, without any addition of breath extraordinary. See the Halicarnassian's treatise of Composition, *sect.* 14. *in fine*.

Ch. 2. It may likewise be observed, that aspiration does not belong properly to consonants, but chiefly and principally to vowels, which, by being aspirated themselves, communicate it to the consonants that precede them; for the consonants are nothing but so many different ways of enunciating the vowel*. And it would appear, that the aspiration of consonants was not used among the Greeks at first; for in the oldest dialect of Greek, namely the Latin, though they aspirated vowels, yet, according to the antient use of the language, they did not aspirate consonants. Thus they said *pulcros*, not *pulchros*; *Cetegus*, not *Cethegus*; *triumpos*, not *triumphos*; *Cartaginem*, not *Carthaginem*†.

As to the pronounciation of each particular letter of the Greek alphabet, it is very well explained by the author I have so often mentioned, Dionysius the Halicarnassian‡, in his most accurate, as well as most elegant

*This is the opinion of Scaliger, *De causis Linguæ Latinæ*. See also Aristides, *lib.* 1. *pag.* 44. *Meibomii*.

† Cicero *Orator.* 48.

‡ As I have so often quoted this author, and shall still make more use of him in the sequel, I think it is proper here

elegant treatise of Composition, where he has mechanically described, with the utmost exactness, the pronounciation of each letter; and, Ch. 2.

here to give some account of him. He flourished in the time of Julius Cæsar, and was one of those learned Greeks that came to Rome to instruct the great men there, after that city had become the capital of the world, and begun to form a taste for learning and the fine arts; for it was the fate of Rome, both in more ancient and later times, to be taught by Greeks. He taught rhetoric, as appears from a passage in his treatise of Composition. And he seems to have been familiarly acquainted with some of the greatest men in Rome at that time, particularly with Pompey, betwixt whom and him there was an epistolary correspondence, some part of which is yet preserved to us He is best known by his Roman history, a work of great erudition, as well as elegance of composition. But his critical works are, in my judgment, the best extant, both for the matter and the style. As to the former, it is evident that he was thoroughly learned in the art; and accordingly he has treated every part of it that he has touched, as a matter of science, which is more than I can say of some of the ancient writings upon the subject, and of hardly any of the modern. And as to his style, I think it is undoubtedly the best that has been written, since fine speaking, and fine writing were *dead arts*, by which I mean performed only by imitation of dead authors. The period when those arts ceased to be living, I fix at the death of Alexander the Great; or, if we have a mind to bring it down a little further, the death of Demosthenes. Since his time, all writing of any value has been from the imitation of him, or of the great

Ch. 2. and, according to the best of my judgment, they were pronouced in the manner we pronounce them in Scotland, with some small differences which it would be thought trifling to mention; for though I myself think

great authors that lived before him, or at the same time. And among those writers by imitation, Greek or Latin, I give the first place to the Halicarnassian. The MSS. of him are very faulty; but his style is so perspicuous, as well as elegant, that it is not difficult to correct them, unless where the gap or the corruption is very great. The most finished and perfect of his critical works, are his Judgement of Thucydides, his treatise Περὶ τῆς δεινότητος τῶν Δημοσθένους, and his book Περὶ συνθέσεως ὀνομάτων, the most finished of all in my judgment, and which luckily has come down to us entire; whereas the others are mutilated. Of it I shall make very great use in what I shall say of the material part or sound of language; for what he calls σύνθεσις, relates only to that.

In general the reader will observe, that through the whole of this work, I make but little use of the Latin authors in matters of philosophy, grammar, or criticism; for though I have read such of them as are of any note, who have written upon those subjects, I must confess that I have not profited much by them, not even by Cicero, who is certainly, upon the whole, the best of them. But the best of them are little better than translators from the Greek; and some of them I think not good translators, because, instead of acknowledging fairly the poverty of their language, as Lucretius does, and using the Greek terms of art, they make words of their own to express them, which, for the greater part, are to me not intelligible. Cicero particularly had a great deal of that vanity concerning the language of his country, which he

is

think nothing trifling that belongs to so noble and useful an art, yet I know well that I do not live in an age such as that of Augustus Cæsar, when Messala, a noble Roman, and the first orator of his time, wrote a book upon each letter of the alphabet; and Julius Cæsar, as it is well known, employed himself in writing upon another part of grammar, when he had upon his hands the most dangerous war in which he Ch. 2.

is not ashamed to prefer even to the Greek; and, therefore, both in his rhetorical and philosophical works, he has used the Greek terms of art as little as possible. Quintilian had less of it, for which reason I am more edified by what he has written upon style and rhetoric, (though he is certainly not near so good a writer as Cicero), because he always makes himself intelligible, by giving us the Greek word, as well as the Latin translation of it. If he had not done so, I should not have understood that *appositum* signified an *epithet*, or that *contrapositum* or *contentio* denoted that common figure of rhetoric we call *antithesis*; and much less should I have known that *inversio* signified *an allegory*.

Nor is this my judgment only of the Latin learning, but it was the judgment of a very learned man, in a very learned age, I mean Chancellor Moore; who says, that the citizens of his Utopia made very little account of the Latin learning, but applied themselves almost wholly to the Greek. And a very learned man, though not in a learned age, is, I find, of the same opinion. See *Hermes*, *pag.* 411. *et seqq.*

Ch. 2. he was ever engaged. I will therefore say nothing more upon this subject of elemental sounds, except to observe, that the Latin was defective in them, by the confession of the Roman authors themselves. For Quintilian has observed, *lib.* 12. *cap.* 10. that they wanted two of the sweetest-sounding letters in the Greek, one of them a vowel, and the other a consonant; the vowel is *υ*, and the consonant *ζ*. These letters, says he, we borrow when we use any of their words, and by doing this he adds, we give a pleasant and chearful sound to the language; whereas, if we were to use our own letters, the sound would be barbarous and uncouth. He further says of the sound of their sixth letter, viz. *f*, what one would not have believed, if it had been said by any other than a Roman, namely, that it was not like a human voice, or rather like no voice at all, being breathed out through intervals of the teeth; which clearly shews the error of those who confound this letter either with the Greek *φ*, or the Eolic digamma, of which last Quintilian speaks in the same passage, as of a letter quite distinct from the *f*. Of it he does not commend

commend the sound neither; and though the Eollans retained it, from whom the Latins had it, it appears that the politer tribes of the Greeks laid it aside as a barbarous sound. Ch. 2.

As to our English, we need not be ashamed of our defects in elemental sounds, after what I have said of the Latin. We have not, any more than the Latins, the vocal sound of *υ*, which, as the Halicarnassian has described it, is pronounced as the French *u*; whereas our pronounciation of the *u*, is that of the diphthong *eu*, not of the simple sound. Then in England they do not pronounce the aspirated *κ* or *χ*, but sound it just as they do the simple *κ* which I observe has led the printers there into errors in their editions of Greek books, sometimes printing *κ* for *χ*, or *vice versa*.

CHAP. III.

Of alphabetical characters.—That they came originally from Egypt.—The additions made to them by the Greeks no improvement.—Defects of the Roman and English alphabet.

Ch. 3. ALthough the notation of language in writing do not, strictly speaking, belong to my subject; yet the characters of the alphabet are so much connected with the alphabet itself, that I cannot well avoid saying something of them.

This discovery, wherever it was made, was certainly not early made; and a nation must have been far removed from a state of barbarity, before they could have so much as thought of this invention. They must, I imagine, have first invented many other arts, besides the necessary arts of life; and as the art of language is, no doubt, among the first arts that men cultivate when they come out of the savage state, I think it is highly probable,

bable, that an art of language was formed before alphabetical characters were invented to express the sounds of it; and as there does not appear to have been any country, on this side of the globe, where arts were cultivated so early as in Egypt, I cannot refuse my assent to those authors who give to that country the glory of the invention. And particularly Plato the philosopher, who had been so long in Egypt, and was not free of partiality for his own country, but nowise prejudiced in favour of the Egyptians*, appears

Ch. 8.

* Plato, in his 12th book of Laws, page 990. *edit. Ficini*, accuses the Egyptians of inhospitality, even to such strangers as came among them for the sake of knowledge; and gives them, upon that occasion, the contemptible appellation of θρεμματα Νειλου, a word which, indeed, by its etymological signification, denotes every thing that is brought up or nourished, but is commonly applied only to the brute kind. The passage occurs where he is speaking of the manner in which those learned and curious strangers ought to be received in his city; after which he adds, Τουτοις δη τοις νομοις ὑποδεχεσθαι τε χρη παντας ξενους τε και ξενας εξ αλλης χωρας, και τους ἀυτων εκπεμποιν, τιμῶντας ξενιον δια· μη βρωμασι και θυμασι τας ξενηλασιας ποιουμενους (καθατερ ποιουσι νυν θρεμματα Νειλου) μηδε κηρυγμασι αγρεοις. What he means by those meats and sacrifices, and harsh ordinances, by which they drove away strangers, is explained by the writers of the lives of Pythagoras, Porphry, and Jamblichus, who tells us, that the Egyptian priests would not initiate

Ch. 8. pears to me to be a most unexceptionable authority in the case, to which I have nothing that I can oppose.

But if the invention of them was so late as I suppose, it is natural to believe, that the Egyptian nation was not all that time without some way conveying intelligence to the absent, and to posterity; and the question is, what that way was? Some think they used what is called

initiate Pythagoras into the mysteries of their theology and philosophy, though he was recommended to them by their King Amasis, till he had gone through a very severe novitiate, and submitted to very hard rules, προστεταγμενα σκληρα και κεχαραγμενα της Ἑλληνικης αγωγης, as Porphyry expresses it, *in vita Pythagorae, sect.* 8. among which, no doubt, were those strange meats and sacrifices mentioned by Plato. And Clemens Alexandrinus, *strom.* 1. further tells us, that circumcision was one part of the ceremony of his initiation. All which after he had gone through with great patience and fortitude, they taught him every thing he desired to. By these means he became the most learned Greek that ever existed, and I believe the most learned man that ever was at any time in Europe. It would appear from this passage of Plato, that the same probationary trial was required of him, to which it is likely he did not submit; and it was probably from this reason that, as Strabo tells us, *lib.* 17. *p.* 806. they did not teach Plato every thing they knew: and perhaps they had not so much to teach him at that time; for the Egyptians were then, and had been for many years, under the dominion of the Persians, and their priests had no doubt lost, with the splendor of their hierarchy, and their authority

ed *hieroglyphics*. But it is not proved to my satisfaction that hieroglyphics were at any time the written language of Egypt, in common use: for though there was no doubt a a great deal of sculpture upon the Egyptian obelisks, and the walls of their temples, representing various forms of things, and particularly of animals; and though there be no doubt that those representations had some allegorical Ch. 3.

authority in the state, a great deal of their philosophy and arts. It was still worse in the days of Strabo, who tells, *ibid.* that he saw, himself, at Hieropolis, where once resided the most learned college of priests in Egypt, the ruins of their houses; and there was nobody then to be found in that city of any knowledge, except some inferior ministers of the altar, who shewed the antiquities of the place, and performed to strangers much the same office that the Ciceronis in Rome do at present: whereas, when Pythagoras was in Egypt, it was an independent kingdom, the most civilized of any then in the world, and flourishing in philosophy and arts.

With respect to his own country, Plato does not praise it in the absurd manner that Diogenes Laërtius does, who says, that not only philosophy, but even the human race, began there. On the contrary he acknowledges, that the barbarians were more antient than the Greeks, and that they got from the barbarians many arts and sciencer, particularly astronomy. But he every where insists upon the distinction betwixt Greeks and barbarians, commending his own countrymen as of a nature more gentle, humane, and generous, and as improving, and carrying further every thing they had learned from the barbarians. See Plato's *Epinomis, page* 1012. *edit. Ficini.*

Ch. 3. allegorical or emblematical meaning, chiefly of the religious kind, as the name in Greek imports; I see no reason to believe that they ever supplied the place of writing, any more than our allegorical sculpture or painting, or that they were at any time used for recording events. One thing at least is certain, that they were not the sacred characters of the Egyptian priests; for those characters were undoubtedly letters, not hieroglyphics*: and if these

* This is evident from both Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus. Herodotus, speaking of the Egyptian manner of writing and computing, has these words, Γραμματα γραφουσι και λογιζονται ψηφοισι, Ἕλληνες μεν απο των αριστερων επι τα δεξια φερουτες την χειρα, Αιγυπτιοι δε απο των δεξιων επι τα αριστερα.—διφασιους δε γραμματι χρεωνται· και τα μεν ἱερα, τα δε δημοτικα, καλευται, *lib.* 2. *cap.* 36.; where he expressly says, that the Egyptians used two kinds of letters, the one *sacred*, and the other *popular*. And Diodorus makes the same distinction, where he tells us, that the priests taught their children two kinds of letters, the one called *sacred*, and the other of *common use*: Παιδευουσι δε τους υιους οι μεν ἱερεις γραμματα δυο, τα τε ἱερα καλουμενα, και τα κοινοτερα· εχοντα την μαθησιν. *lib.* 1. *cap.* 81. *edit. Wesseling.* And again, in the beginning of the third book, comparing the customs of the Egyptians and Ethiopians, he says, That among the Egyptians there were two kinds of letters; one called *vulgar* or *popular*, which every body learned; the other called *sacred*, which the priests only among the Egyptians understood, the son being secretly taught them by the father; but among the Ethiopians, these sacred letters

these could not be the invention of a barbarous age, there is much less reason to suppose, that Ch. 3.

were of common use: ἰδίων γὰρ Αἰγυπτίοις ὄντων γραμμάτων, τὰ μὲν δημώδη προσηγορευόμενα πάντας μανθάνειν, τὰ δὲ ἱερὰ καλούμενα παρὰ μὲν τοῖς Αἰγυπτίοις μόνους γινώσκειν τοὺς ἱερεῖς, παρὰ τῶν πατέρων ἐν ἀπορρήτοις μανθάνοντας, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Αἰθίοψιν ἅπαντας τούτοις χρῆσθαι τοῖς τύποις. It is true indeed, that both Herodotus and Diodorus, speaking of these letters, use the word γραμμα, which in Greek is a general word denoting every kind of drawing or delineation, whether in writing or painting. But it is to be observed, 1*mo*, That the word simply used, always signifies what we call a *letter*. 2*do*, When it is applied to the sacred characters, we cannot understand it in a sense different from that in which it is applied to the popular, otherwise the division into sacred and popular would be altogether absurd and unintelligible. Nor is it possible to suppose that two such writers as Herodotus and Diodorus would use the same word, in the same sentence, in two significations so different as that of elemental characters, or marks of sound, and that of symbolical representations of things. And, *lastly*, If there were any thing doubtful or equivocal in the matter, Diodorus has removed all doubt, by expressly distinguishing betwixt the γραμματα simply, or letters, and the γραμματα ἱερογλυφικα; for, in passage last quoted, after having explained the use of the γραμματα among the Egyptians and Ethiopians, he goes in the next chapter to the explication of the hieroglyphics, which he opposes to the letters, in this manner: Περὶ δὲ τῶν Αἰθιοπικῶν γραμμάτων, τῶν παρ' Αἰγυπτίοις καλουμένων ἱερογλυφικῶν, ῥητέον, ἵνα μηδὲν παραλειπώμεν τῶν ἀρχαιολογουμένων.

Thus it is evident, that those who confound the sacred characters of the Egyptians with hieroglyphics, are in a great mistake, into which even the learned Lipsius has fallen, as appears from his notes upon the 11th book of Tacitus's Annals, c. 14. But this error, both the very learned

Ch. 3. that those symbolical representations, containing, as is generally supposed, deep mysteries of religion

learned Dr Warburton, in his Divine Legation, and the Count de Caylus, in his Collection of Antiquities, have avoided; and the latter has given us a specimen from antient Egyptian monuments, of both the sacred and popular writing, as quite distinct from the hieroglyphical characters.

As to the nature of this sacred sculpture, it is agreed by all, that the characters used in it, stand not, like alphabetical characters, for the marks of sounds, but express the things themselves directly and immediately. *2do*, Whatever they may have been originally, yet, as they are described to us by antient authors, and are used upon obelisks, and other Egyptian monuments yet remaining, they are certainly symbolical or enigmatical representations of things. This account is given of them by Diodorus, in the passage last cited, where he says, that the figures used in hieroglyphics were those of animals of all kinds, the members of the human body, and likewise the organs or instruments of art, chiefly those belonging to carpentry. For, says he, this kind of written language does not express its meaning by composition of syllables, but by metaphorical or allegorical representations of things, which, by use and exercise, are fixed in the memory, and so become familiar. Συμβεβηκε τοινυν τους μεν τυπους αυτων (i e. των ιερογλυφικων γραμματων) ὁμοιους ζωοις παντοδαποις και ακρωτηριοις Ανθρωπων, ἑτι δε ὀργανοις, και μαλιςα τεκτονικοις. ου γαρ εκ της των συλλαβων συνθεσεως ἡ γραμματικη παρ' αυτοις τον ὑποκειμενον λογον αποδιδωσιν, αλλ' εξ ἐμφασεως των μεταγραφομενων και μεταφορας μνημῃ συνηθλημενης. He proceeds next to explain the nature of this kind of writing among the Ethiopians, and which he supposes to be the same among the Egyptians. "The symbols they use," says he, "are a

religion and morality, should have been the invention of such an age. Ch. 3.

What

" hawk, a crocodile, a serpent; and of the human bo-
" dy, the eye, the hand, the countenance, and of such
" like. And a hawk denotes every thing that is quickly
" done, because this animal is the swiftest of all birds,
" and therefore is used metaphorically, to denote every
" thing that is quick, or has any relation to quickness,
" in the same manner as we use metaphors in speaking.
" The crocodile signifies all kind of wickedness or evil;
" the eye, being the guard or keeper of the whole body,
" is the symbol of justice; the right hand, with the
" fingers spread, denotes the acquiring and collecting
" what is necessary for life; the left hand, clinched,
" denotes the custody and preservation of those things.
" The like may be said of all the other figures from the
" human body, from instruments of art, or other things.
" Of these representations, having made the meaning
" familiar to them by constant use, they easily read
" what is written in that way." *lib.* 3. *cap.* 4.

Thus far Diodorus Siculus. There are many other symbols of the same kind with those he mentions, which we find in other antient authors; such as, a serpent in a circle to denote eternity, an eye on a sceptre to represent a monarch, and the like; but these are sufficient for our purpose. And I think Diodorus, in the passage I have quoted, has given us, in a few words, a very clear idea of this kind of hieroglyphical writing. I shall not therefore trouble myself with explaining some other passages of antient authors upon the subject, particularly two quoted by Dr Warbourton, and much insisted on by him; one from Porphyry, in his life of Pythagoras, which I hold to be irretrievably corrupted, as well as many other things in that work; and one from Clemens Alexandri-

Ch. 3. What then was the method used by the Egyptians before the invention of letters to

nus, which I likewise think is not sound. Besides, the authority of Diodorus, who lived in so much an earlier age, and was at so great pains to inform himself concerning Egypt, having been in the country himself in order to collect materials for his history, is of much greater weight than that of either of those two authors.

The next thing to be considered is, When the use of this enigmatical language began among the Egyptians? a question not of easy solution. One thing appears to me certain, that it could not have been the invention of a barbarous age, and that the Egyptians must have been far advanced in arts and civility, and even in philosophy, before they could have thought of expressing their meaning by such symbols, some of which allude to properties of animals, and other natural things, not at all obvious. Another thing seems to be also certain, that the invention of letters was very early among the Egyptians; for they ascribe the invention to a god, viz. *Theuth*, who was their Mercury. If therefore hieroglyphical writing was used before the invention of letters, it must have been used before the reign of Menes, their first king, during the reigns of their gods; that is, while the Egyptians were learning arts and civility, which were taught them by those first kings, whom on that account they deified. That the remains of hieroglyphical writing, upon the obelisks still preserved, are so old, I believe no body believes; and Dr Warburton acknowledges, that hieroglyphics continued in use long after the invention of letters, *Divine Legat.* book 4. sect. 4. pag. 145. It appears therefore to be certain, that at least those hieroglyphical monuments still extant, are not so old as the invention of letters.

We

to perpetuate the memory of events, or communicate knowledge to the absent? Ch. 3.

I

We are next to inquire, for what purpose this enigmatical writing was employed? And that it was not used for recording historical events, which were intended to be published and made known to all the world, at least that it was not so used in later times, after the invention of letters, a method of recording so much more easy and obvious, I hold to be certain. Even the sacred books of the priests, in which the history of Egypt was contained, do not appear to me to have been written in that language. For otherwise Diodorus, who saw them, and made use of them in compiling his history, (lib. 1. c. 69. edit. Wessel.), would certainly have told us so. And as to their inscriptions, such as that upon the first pyramid built by Cheops, mentioned by Herodotus, expressing the sum that was expended upon the onions and garlick eaten by the workmen who built it, this historian has informed us, that it was written in Egyptian letters, γεγραμμενα Αιγυπτια (lib. 2. c. 125); as well as another inscription, which he mentions upon another pyramid, of which he has given us the very words translated into Greek, (*ibid. cap.* 136.). And if more authority upon this head were wanting, we have that of Tacitus, who tells us, that Germanicus, in his travels through Egypt, saw at Thebes, which was even then in ruins, an inscription still remaining, written in Egyptian letters, (*literæ Egyptiæ*; an expression which, in Latin, without any ambiguity, denotes only elemental characters), which being interpreted to Germanicus by one of the priests, was found to contain an account of the power and opulence of this great city, which, at the time of this inscription, contained seven hundred thousand men fit to bear arms, *Annal* 2. *cap.* 60. Now we can hardly

Ch. 3. I think it is highly probable, (and we can say no more of a thing so far beyond all

ly suppose the obelisks yet preserved to be older than this inscription, or the oldest pyramid; and as it appears that it was not the fashion at that time to record facts of history in this mysterious character, I think we may safely conclude, that the hieroglyphics upon the obelisks still to be seen, are not any historical record. I am therefore of opinion, that however Kircher, that learned Jesuit, may have erred in the explanations of the hieroglyphics upon the obelisks, he is right in the main doctrine upon which all his explanations are founded, namely, that the hieroglyphics contained mysteries of religion and philosophy, which the priests did not mean to publish to the whole world, but to keep εν απορρητοις among themselves. And indeed, if they were not used for historical record, as I think I have shewn they were not, it is difficult to conceive for what purpose they could have been used, other than that of mystery and concealment.

This account of the antient use of hieroglyphics, is perfectly agreeable to what we read concerning them in antient authors, particularly to the account which Pliny gives of two obelisks that he saw at Rome, of which he says, *Inscripti ambo rerum naturæ interpretationem philosophiâ Fgyptiorum continent; lib.* 36. *cap.* 14. *edit. Harduini.* Egypt we know was the land of mystery, and both her religion and philosophy were covered with that veil; from thence it spread all over the East, of which the wise men spoke in *parables.* It was imported into Greece by their earliest sages, who travelled in Egypt, such as Orpheus and Musæus; for in the *mysteries* which those sages brought from Egypt into Greece, were contained the sublimest truths of religion and philosophy, at first exhibited only in allegoric shew, but at last plainly revealed to those who were initiated into

all record or memory), that the method they used was that most natural and obvious Ch. 3.

into the greater mysteries, who were said to be αυτοπται, and to enjoy, as it were, the beatific vision of the universal nature, and the first principles of things. See *Clement. Alexand. strom.* 5.; *Strabo, lib.* 10.; and *Divine Legat. book* 2. *sect.* 4. *pag.* 163. The philosophy too, which Pythagoras in later times brought from Egypt, wore the disguise of allegory and symbol, and was plainly taught by him only to those who had approved themselves worthy by a long novitiate.

This, according to my notion, was the only use of hieroglyphics, after the invention of letters. But were they used at all before that invention? And if I saw any reason to believe that the Egyptians had lived as long in a state of civility and arts, without an alphabet, as the Chinese have done, I should have been of opinion, that they might have formed this mysterious philosophical language, though it does not appear that the characters of the Chinese are of that nature. But as it is certain that letters were invented very early in Egypt, I think the probability is, that before this discovery they were not so far advanced in philosophy, as to have any such mysterious language; and that their only way of recording things was by pictures or natural representations, either at full length or abridged. From this picture-writing, I think it is likely that the first forms of the Egyptian letters were derived. And hence comes the connection which learned men have observed betwixt their alphabetical writing and their hieroglyphics of later times; for it was natural enough, that with their hieroglyphics, they should mix those antient characters used before the invention of letters, which characters, like the hieroglyphics, stood for the marks of ideas, not of sounds.

And

Ch. 3. vious way of speaking to the eyes, I mean by painting or carving natural representations of the things they meant to express. This we know was practised by the Mexicans before the Spanish conquest, and is at this day used by the Indians of North America. But as this way of recording things would be very tedious, and take up a great deal of time; and as human invention proceeds but very slowly; it is likely, that before the discovery of letters, some way was contrived of abridging this picture-writing, and making it more fit for common use. The Indians of North America are not yet so far advanced; but the Chinese are. For it appears to me certain, from the best information that I can get concerning the Chinese characters, that they were originally no other than the natural representations of the things, which, in process of time, were abridged, and at last so much shortened

And perhaps they might be necessary for connecting together the emblematical figures, and marking the connection and dependence they had upon one another: for, no doubt, in the picture-writing, there would be such marks of connection, which probably were signs of arbitrary institution.

shortened and altered, that we can now hardly see in any of them the original picture. Ch. 3.

From these abridged pictures, I think it is a very probable conjecture, that after the analysis of articulation was discovered, the characters used to express the elemental sounds were formed. Thus far at least is certain, that many of those characters, which are found in antient monuments of Egyptian alphabetical writing, are likewise to be found on their obelisks *.

The great advantage which the use of letters has above any other kind of writing, is, that it connects together speaking and writing, so as to make but one art in effect of both. For letters stand for sounds, not for the ideas expressed by those sounds. And, therefore, when the sounds are once learned, we see how easily even our children learn the expression of them by alphabetical characters; whereas, if the written characters are expressive of the ideas, not of the sounds, then is the written language, and the language that is spoken, entirely

* See the *Count de Caylus's Collection of Antiquities, tom. 1. pag. 65. et seqq.* See also what Dr Warburton has said upon this subject, in his Divine Legation.

Ch. 3. entirely unconnected, and each of them requires a separate study; and that of the written language, which is so much easier to be learned among us than the language that is spoken, becomes a most intricate and difficult study. Accordingly, it is a fact well known, that the Chinese, after having learned the language they speak, as we do ours, consume their whole lives in learning their written language, that is, learning to read.

It no doubt shewed a great deal of ingeniousness, to think of making sounds visible, and the object of one sense, by that means, to fall under the perception of another; but still I am of opinion, that if we suppose, as I do, that the analysis of the sound of language was already made, it was no more than an ingenious thought, but not at all a great discovery, at least not to be compared to that of the analysis of the sound of language *. For it was no

* Plato gives us an account of the invention both of the analysis of the sound of language, and of alphabetical characters. The first is in the Philedus, *p.* 374 and the other in the Phædrus, *p.* 1240. *edit. Ficini.* And he ascribes both to some god or godlike man he calls Θεύτ, the same who in Greek was called Ἑρμῆς, and in Latin *Mercury*.

no more than finding out marks for what was known before. And if we suppose that the Egyptians, like other nations, used symbols, or representations of things, before they knew the use of letters, it would be no more than transferring that method of representation to the elements of sound. And accordingly, the learned academician whom I mentioned before, M. de Guignes, maintains, that the alphabetical characters were made out of such representations. If the notation of music had been invented before letters, which might have happened, and perhaps did actually happen, I should have thought the discovery just as great as that of letters, but not to be compared to that most wonderful analysis of musical sounds, for expressing which that notation is used. And therefore the only distinction I make betwixt the two discoveries, is, that the Ch. 3.

Mercury. But there are several who bore that name in Egypt; and Plato does not say that it was the same Θεὺθ who invented both, but rather the contrary: for though he mentions several other inventions of the Θεὺθ who invented letters, he does not speak of the analysis of articulate sounds as one of them; and I think it is more probable that it was a Mercury before him who made that greater discovery.

Ch. 3. one which was first, has the greatest merit. But I think the inventor even of that one, must be contented to share the praise with him who first devised a method of making the ideas of the mind visible; for there is really no difference betwixt making ideas visible, and sounds visible, if the ideas are of things not visible.

Whether there was a progress in the invention of alphabetical characters, or whether they were invented all at once, is a matter of conjecture. If, as I suppose, the analysis of articulation was not made at once, but that they stopt at syllables, it is not unlikely that a syllabical alphabet may have been first invented, such as that of the Japanese. If, on the other hand, we suppose that there were no alphabetical characters invented till the analysis of articulate sounds was completed, there is no reason I think to believe, but that the whole alphabet would be at once completed, and that a character would be invented for every element that had been discovered; for it is difficult to conceive why the inventor should have stopt short, and not gone through the whole elements.

As

Ch. 3.

As to the utility of letters, I have said already*, that the writing-art is not an art of *memory*, but an art of *reminiscence*. And it is a most certain fact, that the practice of writing, so far from strengthening the memory, weakens it; for this reason, that when we commit a thing to writing, we, as it were, discharge the memory of it. And accordingly, those who cannot, or do not write, have much more tenatious memories than those who trust nothing to memory. I have likewise said, that I doubted whether the use of letters had contributed to the improvement of knowledge; and if it be true that it weakens memory, as knowledge depends so much upon memory, it must be likewise true, that it retards our progress in knowledge. Besides, as nothing improves knowledge so much as mutual intercourse and communication of our thoughts to one another, such intercourse is better carried on by conversation, than by writing; and therefore, if the frequent use of writing has the effect of making conversation upon subjects of science less frequent, which

* Part 2. book 1. ch. 2. *in fine.*

Ch. 3. which I doubt is the case among us, instead of advancing learning, it will be a hindrance to it. And accordingly I am persuaded, that learning flourished most both in Greece and Egypt, when there was least written upon the subject. And particularly, in the Pythagorean school, the most learned school of philosophy that ever was in Greece, we are informed, that nothing was committed to writing while the school flourished, and not till, by the persecution of those philosophers in Italy, it was broken and dispersed. Then indeed some of them, for the sake of posterity, committed some part of their philosophy, but I believe no great part of it, to writing*; and to those writings we owe what is most valuable in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, the first of whom we know purchased some of those books at a very high price†.

It cannot however be denied, that in other respects, the invention of writing has many advantages. In the *first* place, it is a method of communication betwixt absent persons,

* *Jamblichus in vita Pythagoræ, sect.* 253.

† See Diogenes Laertius *in vita Platonis*.

persons, which, in many cases, is a matter of great utility, as well as pleasure and satisfaction. *2dly*, It is without doubt the best way of preserving the memory of facts and dates; for though science, whose chief seat is the understanding, may be continued by tradition, and delivered down from father to son for many generations, not only without loss, but with increase; it is otherwise with facts, and more so still with dates, which depending solely upon memory, cannot be so exactly preserved by tradition only. And accordingly, the sacred books of the Egyptians, so far as we can learn, contained nothing but facts, either of natural or civil history, and their dates; for it does not appear that their geometry, astronomy, or philosophy, were recorded there*. But *3dly*, One principal use of it is, what I have already hinted, to preserve learning against such a calamity as befell it in Italy, when

* Diodor. Siculus, who made use of these books in compiling his history, *lib.* 1. *sect.* 69. *edit. Wesseling.* does not speak of their containing any thing else but facts, *ibid. sect*, 44. And Plato, in the *Timæus*, *p.* 23. *edit. Serrani*, says, that all the memorable events that happened, whether in Egypt or other countries, of which they had information, were set down in those books.

Ch. 3. when the Pythagorean philosophers were massacred, or driven out of the country*; or against destruction of men and arts, by famine, pestilence, or inundations of barbarous nations, such as overspread Europe, and destroyed the Roman empire. And it is to the manuscripts that were saved in that general wreck of philosophy, and all science,

* This is a fact that is little known. It is not mentioned by any historian, so far as I know, that has come down to us, except Polybius, who speaks of it only in passing, *lib.* 2. *p.* 175; and the text of Polybius is there mutilated. But the fact cannot be doubted of: for it is related by Jamblichus, in his life of Pythagoras, with many circumstances from authors whom he quotes that are now lost. It was the greatest blow that ever learning got, next to the destruction of the Egyptian hierarchy; and it would have gone near to have extinguished learning altogether, if some of them who escaped the massacre, had not committed their learning to writing, lest philosophy, that best gift of the gods to men, as Plato says, should be totally lost; *Jamb. ubi supra, sect.* 253. Those writings were, for a long time, concealed in the families of the authors, being transmitted as a sacred deposit from father to son. But several of them at last came abroad, and were picked up by the philosophers of Greece, such as Plato and Aristotle; the last of whom, as I have had occasion to observe, published one of them under his own name, I mean the book of *Categories*, which he has made the foundation of his system of logic; and indeed it contains the principles of all science. In short, all the good philosophy we have now in Europe, is little more than fragments that had been saved out of this shipwreck of learning in Italy, one of the greatest events in the history of learning, though so little known.

science, that we owe all the learning we have at present in Europe. Ch. 3.

Having said thus much concerning the invention of letters, and the utility of them, I will proceed to follow them from Egypt to Greece; whither they were brought first by the Pelasgi, and afterwards by Cadmus, with some variation, no doubt, of the form. Whether there was any addition made in Egypt to the first invention of them, is, as I have said, a doubtful point. But it is certain that after they came to Greece, there was no addition made to them by the Greeks of any value. The original Egyptian letters were sixteen in number, viz. five vowels, six mutes simple and middle, four liquids, and the solitary letter ϲ. With these it is likely there came a mark of aspiration, or an *h*, such as we have in the Roman alphabet, and in some ancient Greek monuments. To these Palamedes added marks for the three aspirated consonants, and also for the double consonant ξ. Then came Simonides, who added two other characters for double consonants, viz. ψ and ζ, and likewise marks for two long vowels, viz. the long ε and the long ο.

But

Ch. 3. But these additions, I say, were no improvements, but rather corruptions of the alphabet. For with respect to the double letters, they are at best only an abridgement of the orthography: but I say further, that two of them are equivocal characters; for ξ stands either for κς or γς, and ψ either for πς or βς. And as to the aspirated letters, they too are no moae than a short-hand way of writing, such as that which is used for marking the aspiration of the vowels; and accordingly the Latins, and we too in Britain, mark our aspirations very well, both of vowels and consonants, by the original mark of aspiration, viz. the letter *h* *, without Palamedes's

* This is not, properly speaking, a letter, but a mark of aspiration; and accordingly was so used antiently by the Greeks, who wrote ΗΚΑΤΟΝ in place of ἑκατον, as it is now written. And the marks of the two spirits, they say, were taken from the division of the ancient mark of aspiration, the one half of it, with a bend towards the right hand, being used to denote the *spiritus asper*, and the other half, with a bend the other way, the *spiritus lenis*. And here again we may observe, that the antient manner of writing was more sensible; for they had only a mark for the *spiritus asper*, judging it unnecessary, as it really is, to have any mark at all for the *spiritus lenis*.

Palamedes's invention. And it may be observed, that this way of marking the aspiration, shews the nature of it better than Palamedes's characters: for they have probably led the grammarians into what I hold to be a mistake, that the aspiration belongs to consonants; whereas it belongs, as I have said, primarily to vowels and only consequentially to the consonants, by their being joined to aspirated vowels. Thus when I write *Cethegus* in Latin, it is evident that it is the vowel *e* that is aspirated; whereas, when I use Palamedes's character, and write κεθηγος, it may be thought, and is commonly thought, that the aspiration belongs principally to the consonant *t*. And as to Simonides's marks for the long ε and long ο, if he had carried the invention farther, and devised marks for all the long vowels, it might have been so far useful, that it would have saved writing; but as he did not carry it so far, he had much better have let it alone altogether, and then it is likely the old way of writing would have continued, of doubling the character when the vowel is long, of writing, Ch. 3.

Ch. 3. for example, *aa*, when the *a* was long*.

But though these additions, made by the Greeks to the Egyptian alphabet, were neither necessary nor useful; some corrections which they made upon their own orthography were certainly a great improvement. For the letter ε, among them, stood for three different sounds, the short ε, the long ε, and the diphthong ει, which was the name of the letter. The long ε they expressed, as I have just now said, by doubling the character; but it was certainly very blundering to make the letter stand for the name they happened to give it. They might as well have made *a* stand for the sound αλφα, or ζ for ζητα. In like manner the letter ο stood not only for both long and short ο, (which ambiguity was removed by writing it double), but also for the diphthong, ου, probably for the same reason that ε stood for ει, namely, because ου was the name they gave the letter.

Several

* This was the antient practice among the Latins, as appears from Quinctilian; and probably also among the Greeks. See what I say further of this subject, when I come to treat of accents.

Several other observations might be made upon the Greek alphabet, but enough has been said of the alphabet of a particular language; and I shall conclude this part of the analysis of language, after having made a few observations upon the Roman and English alphabet. Ch. 3.

The Roman alphabet was, as I have shown elsewhere, the antient Greek alphabet, probably more antient than that which Cadmus brought into Greece; and as I have said, it was no worse for wanting the additional letters invented by Palamedes and Simonides. But as the Latin was a dialect of the Æolic, and as the Æolic used very much the sound of the digamma, which resembled the sound of our *w*, the Romans had the same sound, but did not use the character, making the letter *u* and *v* (for both forms were used indiscriminately) stand both for the vowel and the digamma; for as to their letter *f*, it neither expressed the Greek φ, nor the Æolic digamma, but a sound different from either, and a very unpleasant one, as appears from the passage above quoted from Quinctilian, *lib.* 12. *cap.* 10. To supply this defect in the Latin

Ch. 3. Latin alphabet, Claudius, the Emperor, introduced the use of the Æolic digamma, marked like a Roman F reversed, which is still to be seen in some antient inscriptions, but went out of use after his death*.

As to our English alphabet, it is certainly very faulty. For the first letter has three sounds: *first*, the common sound of *a*; then the sound of the diphthong *au*; and *lastly*, the sound of the Greek *η*: and yet there is but one character to express all the three. Then the *i* supplies the double office, expressing both the genuine sound of that letter, and of the diphthong *ai*. *E*, in like manner, stands both for its own sound, and the sound of *i*; and *u* is sometimes the diphthong *eu*, and sometimes the plain vowel, or rather the diphthong

* See what Mr Foster has collected upon the subject of the digamma, pag. 122. of his Essay, to which may be added the passage I quoted above from Quinctilian, *lib.* 12. *cap.* 10.; and also what Mr Foster has observed from Mr Dawes, concerning the effect of this digamma, in making the preceding vowel long, as in the perfect tenses of the third and fourth Latin conjugation; for in the preterite *cupii* and *audii*, the first *i* is short, but by inserting the digamma betwixt them, it becomes long, as in *cupivi* and *audivi*.

diphthong *u*; for, as I observed, we have not in English the genuine sound of that vowel. Then, with respect to consonants, the *c* is an ambiguous character; for it is sometimes sounded hard as the *k*, and sometimes soft as the *s*; and the *t* is often sounded as *sh*. And in the combinations of consonants in syllables, we do not always give them the same sound; for the *th* in *thing* is a much stronger aspirate than in *then* or *though*.

CHAP. IV.

Of the antient accents.—That they were real notes of music, distinct from the quantity of the syllable.—What accent in English is?

I COME now to the analysis of the second part of the matter of language, of which I proposed to treat, viz. the *Prosody*. And here I am to speak of a thing so little understood in modern times, that some even deny the existence of it; I mean the *melody* of language, as the antients called it; which, Ch. 4.

as

Ch. 4. as we shall shew in the sequel, made a considerable part of the beauty of their composition. For the better understanding it, it will be necessary to go back to that higher genus which I mentioned in the beginning of this book, namely *sound*. For melody, as I have already observed, belongs not to language, as articulated voice, but as sound, being common to it with music.

Sound is defined by antient authors to be a percussion of the air, perceivable by the sense of hearing*. Now sound, simply without articulation, may be considered in a threefold view. For it is louder or softer;—it is higher or lower, as to musical modulation, or, in other words, is acuter or graver;—or, lastly, it is of shorter or longer duration. The first of these differences does not belong to the art of language, (except so far as concerns the pronunciation of syllables in English, of which I shall say more hereafter): for men speak, and make other noises, loud or soft, as occasions require, which are too many and various to be comprehended by rules.

* Ψοφος μεν εστι πληγη 'Αερος αισθητη, ακοη. *Ammon.* εις το περι ερμηνειας, *fol.* 25. See also *Euclid, sect. Can.* in initio.

rules. But the other two make part of the grammatical art, at least in the antient languages. Ch. 4.

The first of these, as I have said, is called *prosody*; a word which I observe is frequently applied very improperly to quantity*; for προσῳδία in Greek exactly answers to the Latin word *accentus*, and denotes that tune or melody which is annexed to, or accompanies speech†: and it is of the analysis of this melody that I am now to treat.

Like

* In the common Latin grammars, it is used to signify that part of grammar which treats both of quantity and accent; and it is so used even in the learned Vossius's grammar.

† This is the sense in which the word is constantly used by Dionysius the Halicarnassian, in his most accurate treatise of Composition, so often quoted, particularly in *sect.* 25. where he expressly distinguishes it from quantity; for speaking of the accidents of words, he mentions εκτασεις τε και συστολας, και προσῳδιας. The learned Theodorus Gaza, in his grammar, speaks the same language; Προσωδια εςι τασις ποια της φωνης εγγραμματου προς ευφωνιαν του ὁλου λογου; and then he proceeds to define τονος, as that of which the προσῳδια was composed And Demetrius Triclinius, an antient grammarian, gives the same *ratio nominis* that I have given; for speaking of the marks of accents and spirits, he adds, Ἃ δη και προσῳδιας ωνομασαν ὡς προς την ῳδην και την εκφωνησιν των συλλαβων συντελουσας. *Prefat. ad Aristophan.*

Ch. 4. Like every other melody it arises from a combination of sounds, and is resolveable into what is called φθογγος in Greek, and in English a *note*, which is defined by Aristoxenus, an antient writer upon music, to be "one stretch or extension of the voice*;" that is, as I understand it, a continuation of the voice in the same tone, without stop or interval, and without change.

A note may have all the three qualities of sound above mentioned: for it may be loud or soft; long or short; acute or grave. But it is of this last quality only that I am now to speak†.

And first it is apparent, that acuteness and gravity are relative qualities, as well as length and shortness: for it is impossible to conceive a sound either acute or grave, but in relation to another sound; and in general there is in music nothing absolute, but

* Φωνης ατασις επι μιαν τασιν. *Harmonic. lib.* 1. *p.* 15.

† Those who are entirely ignorant of music may imagine, that loud and acute, grave and soft, in sounds, are the same. But they are quite different; for the sound of a cannon is one of the gravest sounds that can be made, and at the same time one of the loudest.

but it is altogether a science of ratios and proportions. But the question is, What is it that makes this acuteness or gravity in sounds? And for solution of this question, we must go still a little higher than we have hitherto done, I mean, to an idea more general than even that of *sound*, viz. *motion*: for all sound is motion; and if all things were at rest, there would not, as Euclid says, be either sound or voice*. Ch. 4.

It is therefore evident, that acuteness or gravity in sounds must be certain modifications of the motion which produces them. And Aristotle has told us, that when the sound is acute, there is much motion in little time †. This is truly said, but shortly: it

* *Euclid. sect. Canonis, in initio.*

† *Aristotle De anima*, Lib. 2. where he treats of sound. Euclid has said the same thing, but at more length, in the beginning of his *sectio Canonis*. His words are, Των δε κινησεων αι μεν πυκνοτεραι εισι, αι δε αραιοτεραι· και αι μεν πυκνοτεραι οξυτερας ποιουσι τας φθογγας, αι δε αραιοτεραι βαρυτερας. Αναγκαιον δε τας μεν οξυτερας ειναι, οταν εκ πυκνοτερων και πλειονων συγκειται κινησεων· τας δε βαρυτερας (*lege* βαρυτερας) οταν εξ αραιοτερων και ελασσονων συγκειται κινησεων. From whence it appears, that Euclid knew in substance the doctrine of our modern philosophy concerning sounds, though I am persuaded he never made experiments such as that German philosopher made, who discovered that a string of such a length and such a thickness, and stretched by such a weight, made so many vibrations in a second.

Ch. 4. therefore needs to be explained; and the discoveries of our modern experimental philosophy have enabled us to do it.

For it is now found out, that the percussion of the air, by which the antients defined sound, is caused by the percussion of some elastic body, whose vibrations, thereby produced, being communicated to the air, and by the air propagated to the ear, produce the sensation of hearing. A string or wire, stretched, has been found the most proper subject for such experiments. If the vibrations of this string are greater or less, that is, occupy more or less space, then is the note louder or softer; if there are more or fewer vibrations in the same time, then is the note acuter or graver; and, lastly, if the string continues to vibrate for a greater or less time, without any sensible variation of the sound, then is the note longer or shorter: so that here we have the threefold division of sound above mentioned.

That there are all these differences in music, no man will deny who has only a natural ear, though he never was taught the art; and that two of them, at least, take place in language,

language, is as impossible to deny. The only question therefore is with respect to the third, viz. the distinction of acuteness and gravity, whether it applies to language. Nor was even this disputed till of late. But Mr Foster, in his essay above mentioned*, has made the matter so perfectly clear, that I will not say a word upon the subject. And indeed it appears to me, that nothing but absolute ignorance of the nature of the antient languages, or the most violent prejudice, can induce a man to be of another opinion. One reason, perhaps, that may have led some people into it, is the improper use above mentioned of the word *prosody*, by applying it to quantity, and not to accent. This, I imagine, has made Isaac Vossius, among others, believe, that quantity and accent were the same, or, at least, that the long syllable always was accented†. Another

Ch. 4.

* This essay did not fall into my hands till I had begun to write upon this subject, and had formed the opinion which I was glad to find so well supported by Mr Foster. His essay is indeed full of excellent grammatical learning, and has furnished me with several authorities, of which I have made use.

† The work of Isaac Vossius I refer to, is what he has

Ch. 4. other probably has been, that there is no accent, such as the Greek and Latin accents, in any modern language, as I shall afterwards shew. And, lastly, the impossibility for us, that are not accustomed to it, to sound those antient accents, has persuaded many people that it was as impossible for the antients to do it.

Taking it therefore for granted, that this antient prosody was, as the name imports, applicable to language, the next thing to be considered is, how it was applied. And we are informed, by the antient writers, that it was applied to syllables; that is to say, that different syllables of the same word were pronounced with tones different in acuteness and gravity, and sometimes the same syllable, as shall be afterwards more particularly explained.

But, in the *first* place, it is to be observed, that this syllabic tone is very different from the general tone of a language; for each language has a particular tone with which it is spoken.

has written, *De viribus rythmi, et cantu poëmatum*; a work written in such excellent Latin, that I read it with pleasure, though I could find no sense or matter in it of any value.

spoken. But this national tone, as it may be called, affects the whole tenor of the speech, not words only, and much less syllables. Ch. 4.

2dly, It is also to be distinguished from the tones of passion or sentiment, by which the feelings of the mind are expressed; for these belong to words or sentences, not to syllables.

And, *lastly*, It is likewise to be distinguished from the variation of loud and soft in discourse: for we may raise our voice in speaking, or sink it, without any variation of the tone. And in this way we may alter our voice, not only upon words and sentences, but upon syllables; which, as I shall shew afterwards, is what we call *accent* in English.

But the antient accents are real notes of music, or variations of the tone, by which the voice is raised higher, with respect to musical modulation, upon one syllable of a word, than upon another: and this syllable is said to have an acute accent, while all the rest of the syllables are pronounced with what is called a *grave accent*; that is, they are pronounced upon a level with the rest of the discourse, or in that key in which the

discourse

Ch. 4. discourse is taken up*. For it is an invariable rule of accenting, both in Greek and Latin, that only one syllable of a word, how many soever there be, has an acute accent; for it seems they thought, that the raising the tone upon more than one syllable of the word, would have made the pronounciation of common speech too various and complicated, and too like chanting.

There is a third accent in those languages, called the *circumflex*, which is composed of the other two. This happens when the tone is both raised and depressed upon the same syllable, which never can be but when the vowel is long; for a long vowel in Greek and Latin was sounded like two short vowels of the same kind; and it was so written, according

* That this is the true notion of a grave accent, is evident from a passage of Dionysius Thrax, in his short, but elegant treatise of grammar, published by Fabricius, in the 7th volume of his Greek library. He defines accent to be, Φωνης απηχησις εναρμονιου, η κατ' αναστασιν εν τη οξειαι, κατ' ομαλισμον εν τη βαρειαι, η κατα περιπλασιν εν τη περισπωμενη. So that the grave accent is the fundamental or ordinary level of the speech; and therefore the mark of it is never used, except upon the last syllable of a word; and then it denotes not the grave, but the acute accent. For what reason this strange practice has been introduced, I never could learn, nor do I see any reason for marking two accents, more than for marking two spirits.

according to the antient Latin orthography*. Such a syllable therefore might be considered as two syllables, upon one of which the tone was raised, and upon the other depressed†. And thus we see that those languages had, in this matter, all the variety that the nature of the thing will admit; for every syllable among them had either an acute accent, or a grave accent, or both. Ch. 4.

But how much was the tone of the voice to be elevated in sounding the acute accent? or was it left to the arbitrary will of every speaker, to raise his voice more or less, as he thought

* See what Mr Foster has very well said upon this subject, in his essay, page 38.; to which I will only add, that in some of the antient Roman monuments, particularly the laws of the Twelve Tables, instead of writing the character double for the long *i*, they wrote a great character thus, *I*. There is reason to think that the Greeks wrote in the same way, before they invented different characters to express some of their long vowels. Plato, in the Cratylus, page 282. if I understand him rightly, says, that they wrote two *epsilons* in place of the *eta*, and the figure of the *omega* is plainly the two *omicrons* joined together.

† In this way the circumflex accent is explained by Scaliger, *De causis linguae Latinae*, *lib.* 2. *cap.* 60.; and it is in this sense we are to understand the antient authors who speak of the circumflex, as being a *middle* between the acute and grave.

Ch. 4. thought proper? If that was the case, it is plain, that the antients, in speaking, must have often run into cant; for an elevation and fall of the voice, to a certain degree, will make a kind of singing. But neither, in this respect, was the Greek language defective; for in it the boundaries were fixed betwixt the melody of speech and musical modulation. This appears from a passage in Dionysius the Halicarnassian's treatise, upon composition, that I have so often quoted; which passage, if it had been rightly understood by those who have argued against the Greek accents, it is impossible, I think, that they could have been of that opinion; for it not only proves the existence of such accents, but explains most accurately the nature and measure of them. I will therefore give the passage rendered into English; but before I do that, I will, for the sake of those grammarians who know nothing of the principles of music, explain a little of the nature of musical tones; because I suspect it is the want of knowledge of these which has made Mr Foster's adversaries not give sufficient attention to this passage.

The Greeks used the same scale of mu-

sic

sic that we use, viz. the diatonic scale, which rises by certain intervals or degrees, from any given pitch of the voice, called, in the language of music, the *fundamental*, to that note which is known by the name of *octave*; and the degrees or intervals by which the voice rises to the octave, are measured by numbers. And as the rise is chiefly by what is called *tones*, the scale has from thence the name of *diatonic*. The interval of a tone is as 8 : 9, if it be a greater tone; or of 9 : 10, if it be a lesser tone: and there is a smaller interval still, called a *semitone*, which is as 15 : 16. By these intervals of tones, greater and lesser, and semitones, making all together seven notes, besides the fundamental, the voice rises in a natural and easy ascent to the octave above mentioned, which has that name from its order in the scale, being the *eighth* note, including the fundamental, to which it is in the ratio of 2 : 1. Ch. 4.

Of these seven notes all our music is composed, as all the words of our language are composed of the four and twenty elementary sounds. For though in music we go far above the eighth note, it is by the same intervals; so that all further progression upwards,

Ch. 4. wards, is but a repetition of the first seven notes, the octave serving always for a new fundamental. This way we proceed upwards to a second, third, or fourth octave, or as far as any voice or instrument will go*.

This scale, though it has been found convenient to divide it into the intervals above mentioned, yet is capable of being divided into intervals very much smaller. And accordingly, in some specieses of the ancient music, the scale was divided not only into tones and semitones, but likewise into third parts of tones, and even the fourth parts of tones, which last they called διεσις.— But in their diatonic scale, they proceeded, as we do, by tones and half-tones. This progress we mark by numbers 2, 3, 4, and so on, reckoning the fundamental always one. And in like manner the antients proceeded; but what we call a *fourth*, they called the διατεσσαρων; because it went through four

* It is a curious problem, How it comes to pass that the power of nature can go no farther in musical modulation than an octave? The fact is undoubtedly so; but I do not know that it ever has been demonstrated, though I think it might easily be so, if this were the proper place.

four degrees, including the fundamental, viz. two tones and a half above the fundamental. And the next note, which we call the *fifth*, consisting of three tones and a half above the fundamental, they for the same reason called διατεττε. And the octave, which goes through all the notes of the scale, they called πασαων. The other steps of the progress they marked by words, as we do, expressing their order. Thus the first degree above the fundamental they called διτονον, as we call it a *second*. Ch. 4.

This being premised, I come now to the passage before us, in which the Halicarnassian, after having laid it down, that the beauty of composition consists in the melody, rhythm, variety, and, lastly, what is proper or suitable to the subject; and after having told us, that the composition of words, even in prose, is a kind of music, differing from singing or instrumental music only in the quantity, that is, the more or less, not in quality or kind; and that words have their melody, rhythm, and other things above mentioned, as well as music; he proceeds to explain the melody of words as follows:

Ch. 4. "The melody of common speech," says he, "is measured nearly by one interval, that "namely which is commonly called the "διατεντε. Nor does it rise beyond three "tones and a half towards the acute, nor is it "let down further towards the grave. But "every word has not the same tone; for "some are sounded with an acute tone, some "with a grave, and some have both. Of "these last some have the acute and grave "blended together, in the same syllable, "which are called *circumflected syllables*; "others have them on different syllables, each "of which preserves its own proper accent, "whether grave or acute, distinct and sepa- "rate from that of any other. In the dissyl- "lables of this kind, the one is grave and "the other acute, and betwixt these there "can be no middle; but in words of many "syllables of whatever kind, there is but one "which is accented acute, while all the rest "are grave. This is the melody of speech; "but vocal and instrumental music use more "intervals, not the διατεντε only; for begin- "ning with the διαπασων, they go through "the διατεντε, the διατεσσαρων, the διατο- "νον, or (as it ought to be written) the

"διτονον, the ἡμιτονιον, and, as some think, even "the διεσις *." Ch. 4.

This passage not only shews, as I have said, that the Greek accents were really notes of music, but also gives us the measure of them, and further marks the difference betwixt the melody of speech and music: which he makes to consist in two things; *first*, That the melody of speech does not rise above a fifth, whereas music goes to an octave, or much higher; *2dly*, The degrees or intervals in music, either below or above the

* The passage is in the 11th section of the Treatise of Composition. It is too long to be here transcribed. There is no difficulty in it to those who understand the language and the subject; nor was it possible that the author could have used clearer words to express that the accents were musical tones. I shall only observe, that when he says ου αμην πασα γε ἡ λεξις, ἡ καθ' ἑν μοριον λογου ταττομενη, της αυτης λεγεται τασεως, the addition to the word λεξις, of the description of ἡ καθ' ἑν μοριον λογε ταττομενη, is only to remove the ambiguity of this word in Greek. For λεξις signifies either the whole style or composition, or a single word or part of speech, in which last sense it answers exactly to the Latin word *dictio*. In each of these senses I observe it used by the same author in the third section of the same treatise. I have therefore translated it simply by *word*, which in English is not ambiguous, without the addition that Mr Foster makes of "that is "placed in a sentence," pag. 142. which appears to me foreign to the sense of the author.

Ch. 4. the fifth, are exactly marked. But that was not the case in speech; for the voice did not rise exactly to a fifth on the acute accent, but near to it, (ωε εγγιςα), so as sometimes to be above it, and sometimes below it; and in falling to the grave, they did not pitch exactly upon the fourth, third, or any particular note below it. And this must necessarily have happened, as the voices of the speakers were of greater or less compass, or their ear more or less just.

But there is another difference betwixt the melody of speech and of music, observed by Aristoxenus *, and other antient writers upon music, That the melody of speech is συνεχης, or continued, while musical melody is διαςηματικος, or distinguished by intervals; by which is meant, that in speech the notes succeed one another so quickly, that the intervals can hardly be perceived; whereas the intervals in music are easily distinguishable, the different notes

* *Aristoxen. Harmonics, pag.* 9. in the Collection of Meibomius. See also Gaudentius, another writer on music, contained in the same collection. His words are, Οι μεν εν τη λογικη, καθ' ην αλληλοις διαλεγομεθα, φθογγοι συνεχεις ἑαυτοις τον τοπος τουτον διεξερχονται, ρυσει τινι πεπονθοτις παραπλησιον, επι το οξυ, και αναπαλιν, ουκ επι μιας ἱςαμενοι τασεως.

notes being more exactly marked, and the voice resting longer upon them. And therefore, says our author, the language of passion is more musical than common speech; because, when we are affected by passion, we generally dwell longer upon the same note. Ch. 4.

It appears therefore to be exactly just what the Halicarnassian says, that the melody of speech differs from musical modulation only in degree, not in kind *.

The

* The account I have here given of the antient music, is taken from the authors in the collection of Meibomius. As we are upon the subject of analysing language, it may not be improper to observe how wonderful the discovery was of this analysis of musical sounds, and of the application of numbers to measure the tones of a voice or instrument. I think it a greater discovery than even that of the analysis of speech into its elemental sounds; because there was there no application of numbers; and besides, that analysis itself appears to me more easy and obvious. The discovery is ascribed to Pythagoras, by those writers upon music, and the authors of his life, who tell a blundering story about his making experiments with a string, stretched by different weights. And it is said, he discovered that the tones were in the ratio of the weights, *caeteris paribus*; whereas the fact is, that they are as the square-roots of the weights. But the custom of Pythagoras's scholars was to ascribe to him as discoverer every thing he taught them. And we may as well suppose that his geometry, theology, and every

Ch. 4. The chief objection that I believe many people have to this account of the accents, is

every other ſcience, taught in the ſchool, was of his invention. The truth therefore, I believe, is, that he brought this ſcience of muſic with him from Egypt, along with other ſciences, (for that he was the firſt who taught it to the Greeks, and gave them the uſe and knowledge of the octave, which they had not before, I have not the leaſt doubt). Nor do I think ſuch a diſcovery could have been made, except in a country ſuch as Egypt, where there was a claſs of men ſet apart for the ſtudy of the ſciences. And beſides this advantage, a nation muſt have laſted a long time, and advanced far in other ſciences, before they could have made ſuch a diſcovery. Further, we know very well that muſic was very much practiſed, not only in their religious ceremonies, but, as Plato informs us, it was made a part of the education of their youth, and regulated by law. And he ſpeaks of pieces of muſic of their goddeſs Iſis many thouſand years old, but which were ſtill preſerved in his time. *See Plato de Legibus, lib. 2. p. 789. and 790. edit. Ficini.* Now I cannot conceive how they could have been preſerved for ſo great a number of years, with that religious exactneſs which Plato ſuppoſes, unleſs they were noted, or ſome way or other put in writing. And if they had a notation of muſic, as well as of ſpeech, it is evident that they muſt have made the analyſis of the one as well as of the other.

The antient art of muſic appears to me to be leſs known to the moderns, than any other antient art; and accordingly they have fallen into great miſtakes concerning it. I will venture to ſay, that we have not even an idea of their excellence in that art, becauſe we know nothing of two kinds of their muſic which were the moſt excellent;

is the impracticability of them. For how, Ch. 4.
will they say, is it possible that the voice

excellent: for we know nothing but the diatonic music, which they knew also; but it was among them the music only of the vulgar; whereas the other two kinds, viz. the *chromatic* and *enharmonic*, were the music of the learned, and the connoisseurs. Now the music of these two kinds, proceeded by intervals so small, as a third or fourth part of a tone, of which we have no practice, nor hardly an idea, except what we may get from an Æolus harp, or the music of the birds. And the later ancient writers upon music tell us, that those two kinds of music were much disused in their time, and that hardly any body could be found that was able to practise them. And Plutarch, in his treatise of Music, says, that even as early as his time, the enharmonic, which was the music most esteemed and practised of old, was quite neglected; the intervals of it not understood; and they even went so far as to deny that the division of the semitone, which they called διεσις, was perceptible by the sense, *edit. Froben. p.* 558. And there is a fragment preserved of Longinus, where, speaking of music, he applies to it this verse of Homer, κλεος οιον ακουομεν, ουδε τι ιδμεν: "We only hear the "fame of it, but know nothing of it."

Further, there are persons among us so ignorant, as to doubt, and even to deny, that the ancients knew and practised music in parts. The contrary of this may be proved by many passages in ancient authors. I will mention only two or three that I think have not been taken notice of. The first is from the *Sophista* of Plato, *pag.* 177. *edit. Fic.* where, speaking of letters, he says, some of them join together to make syllables, and some of them do not. Then he asks, to what art it belongs to know what will join or will not join with what? The answer is, to the grammatical art. Then follows, τι δε περι της των

οξεων

Ch. 4. should start at once up to a fifth, from one syllable of a word to another, and often

οξεων και βαρεων φθογγους; αρ' ουκ ούτως;—ὁ μεν τους συγκεραννυμενους τε και μη τεχνην εχων γιγνωσκειν, μουσικος· ὁ δε μη συνιεις, αμουσος. The meaning of which is, that as the grammarian knows what articulate sounds will mix together, and what will not; so the musician knows what notes of music will mix together, and what not. Now this mixture of sounds, like that of letters in a syllable, can be nothing else but what we call *harmony*. The next passage I shall mention is from Plutarch, in his *Quæstiones Platonicæ*, where he very particularly describes the way in which the acute and grave sounds mix together, and the effect which that mixture produces. The words are, 'οξυς μεν γαρ ὁ ταχυς γινεται, βαρυς δε ὁ βραδυς· διο και προτερον κινουσι την αισθησιν οἱ οξεις· ὁταν δε τουτοις ηδη μαραινομενοις και απολη γομενοις οἱ βραδεις επιβαλωσιν αρχομενοι, το κραθεν αυτων, δι' ὁμοιοπαθειαν, ἡδονην τῃ ακοῃ παρεσχεν, ἡν συμφωνιαν καλουσιν. Here we have harmony or symphony, as Plutarch calls it, and the effects of it upon the ear, very well described. For, if I am not much mistaken, it will be found by experience, that the acute strikes the ear first with a quick impulse, and that we do not perceive the mixture of the grave, till the acute begins to die away. The third passage I shall mention, is from Longinus, *De Sublimitate*, *sect.* 28. where, speaking of the figure called *periphrasis*, he says, it is, with respect to the proper expression, what the accompaniment in music is to the melody or air, as it is commonly called. The words are, ὡς γαρ εν μουσικῃ δια των παραφωνων καλουμενων ὁ κυριος φθογγος ἡδιων αποτελειται, ούτως ἡ περιφρασις πολλακις συμφθεγγεται τῃ κυριολογιᾳ, και εις κοσμον επιπολυ συνηχει. Here we have a concert described as exactly as is possible. The κυριος φθογγος is the proper expression for the air or melody, which is or ought to be predominant through the whole piece; and if one were to translate into Greek *accompaniment*, one could

ten upon the same syllable, and then be let down again as many degrees, and as suddenly? Ch. 4.

could not find a more proper word to express it than παραφωνία. And it may be observed, that in order to make out the simile, and apply the case of the periphrase to the concert, he uses the word συμχεῖ, which precisely denotes *consonance*. The last authority I shall mention, is from the above-mentioned treatise of Plutarch, concerning Music, where he gives the reason why the small intervals of the enharmonic were not practised in his time, namely, because they could not make a harmony which suited them, *pag.* 558. *edit. Froben.* When we join these authorities to those commonly quoted from Aristotle, *De mundo*, and Seneca, it makes the matter, in my apprehension, absolutely clear; and indeed the very definition they give of consonance, or *symphony*, as they call it, decides at once the question, συμφωνία δέ ἐστι, says Ælian the Platonic, quoted by Isaac Vossius in his treatise, *De viribus rythmi*, δυοῖν ἢ πλειόνων φθόγγων ὀξύτητι καὶ βαρύτητι διαφερόντων κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ πτῶσις καὶ κρᾶσις: than which the Greek language affords no words clearer to express what we call harmony, and to distinguish it from melody, or music by succession. To all these authorities may be added what our late travellers into the South Sea tell us, of the music of the New Zealanders in their concerts, which they say, to the best of their judgment, was in parts. This is a fact in which our travellers, though not learned in music, could hardly be mistaken. And if those barbarians have such music, how can we suppose that the Greeks and Romans had it not?

Let us not therefore believe, that the ancients were so ignorant of this fine art, as to know only music in succession, not in consonance. I believe, indeed, their harmony was not so complicated as ours, in which the air or melody is often lost; but was more simple, so that not only

Ch. 4. suddenly? But a very ordinary singer finds no difficulty in this; and I am persuaded that any man, who has the least ear or voice for music, could, by custom from his earliest youth, be brought to do it with the greatest ease even in common speech. Because therefore we have not a musical language, we ought not to conclude that the Greeks or Romans had none such. The Chinese, at this day, we are assured, have

only the air was preserved, but the words sung to it were distinctly heard. No body can doubt but that this was the case of the songs of the chorus in tragedy. And I am persuaded, that when Horace's odes were sung both to lyre and pipe, which he tells us was done, *Epod.* 9. the poetry was not for that lost. So that in the musical compositions of the ancients, there was joined together the force of melody, harmony, and poetry; and the more ancient the music was among them, the more simple it was. This Horace tell us of the music of the theatre:

Tibia, non ut nunc, orichalco juncta tubæque
Æmula; sed tenuis simplexque foramine pauco
Aspirare et adesse choris erat utilis, atque
Nondum spissa nimis complere sedilia flatu.

Ars Poët.

And Plutarch, in his treatise of Music, gives this simplicity as the characteristic of the ancient music. His words are, την γαρ ολιγοχορδιαν και την απλοτητα, και την σεμνοτητα της μουσικης παντελως αρχαιαν ειναι συμβαινειν. *Opuscula Moralia, pag.* 551. *edit. Frobenii.* Where we may observe the word ολιγοχορδια, which, as I understand it, denotes a simple harmony, or small accompaniment.

have a language of that kind; for they give different tones to their monosyllables, of which their language entirely consists, and by this difference of tone, they make the same word to signify nine or ten different things. So that it would appear they have a greater variety of accents than even the Greeks, insomuch that strangers among them think they are singing rather than speaking. Ch. 4.

Another objection is, That it is impossible to reconcile this accent with quantity, unless we were to lay the acute accent only on long syllables. And accordingly Isaac Vossius, in his treatise above quoted, *De viribus rhythmi*, maintains, that it is an error to lay it any where else, and that in this respect, the accentuation of our Greek books is altogether wrong. But it is he that is in an error, not the books, and a very shameful error for a learned man, proceeding from his not distinguishing accent and quantity: for in the sequel of the passage above quoted from the Halicarnassian, speaking of the violence which the musicians of his time offered to the prosody of the language, he gives an instance from a chorus in

Ch. 4. in the Orestes of Euripides, where, in the word αποπροβατε, instead of giving the acute tone to the syllable προ, (which undoubtedly is a short syllable), the musician who set it to music, or *fecit modos*, according to the Latin expression, brought it down to the fourth syllable of the word, sciz. -βα-; and this, by the way, is of itself evidence, if Dionysius had said no more, that the accent was a real tone of music. And besides, Vossius ought to have known, that in a Latin dissyllable there would, according to his rule, have been no acute accent at all, if the first syllable was short, because the Latins never acuted the last syllable. Now it is an invariable rule of accenting, that there is an acute accent somewhere upon every word, unless it be an enclitic, or used as an enclitic.

It is therefore most certain, that a short syllable will bear an acute accent, as well as a long; and the fact truly is, that the acute note, by its quick movement, as above explained, tends rather to shorten than lengthen the syllable. And accordingly, in some Latin words, when the syllable would be otherwise long by position, it is shortened by being acuted, as in *óptime*, *sérvitus*, *pérvelim*,

velim, *Pámphilus*, where the antepenult syl- Ch. 4.
lables being acuted, are thereby shortened where they would otherwise be long *. It is indeed true, that according to our method of pronunciation, (of which I shall say more afterwards), it is very difficult, if not impossible, for us to acute a syllable, without making it appear long to our ears; but we ought not from thence to infer, that it was impossible for the Greeks or Romans to do so. I am informed by a person whom I can believe †, that the learned among the Greeks do, at this day, in their pronunciation, make the distinction betwixt accent and quantity. It is certain that they both speak and write the ancient language; and it is not at all improbable that they may have likewise preserved the pronunciation of it, with the assistance of those accentual marks, which surely are not of modern invention

* This is an observation of Bishop *Hare*, quoted by Mr Foster in his essay, pag. 279. where there are other quotations upon the subject worth reading.

† Dr Turnbull, who was long in the East, and much among the Greeks, having married a Greek woman, and is a man of learning, as well as worth. He is now in Florida, with the colony of Greeks that he carried thither,

Ch. 4. invention *. And Sir John Cheke, who lived in the time of Henry VIII. says, in one of his letters †, that he, and some of his learned friends, spoke the Greek according to the ancient pronunciation, and particularly according to the ancient prosody, observing both accent and quantity.

I have only further to add, concerning the Greek accents, that as there is nothing in that language without art, that can be subjected to the rules of art, not even the

* They are said to have been invented by a famous grammarian, Aristophanes of Byzantium, keeper of the Alexandrian library under Ptolomy Philopater and Epiphanes, the first likewise, as it is supposed, that practised punctuation. Accentual marks, however, did not become of common use till about the seventh century, when we find them in manuscripts. It was certainly a useful invention for preserving the genuine pronunciation of the Greek language; I cannot however bestow such an eulogium upon the author of it as Mr Foster does, who says, that posterity has been more benefited by his discovery, than by the writings of any one profane author of antiquity, *pag.* 191. It does not appear that the marking of the accents was ever much practised among the Romans. Mr Foster says, he never saw but one Latin book that had the accents marked throughout, and that was *Grammaticæ quadrilinguis partitiones*, by *Johannes Drosæus. Paris*, 1544. I have seen another, viz. a Virgil in the possession of the Earl of Hopetoun; but I have forgot where or when it was printed.

† *Epistol. ad Episcop. Vinton.* p. 284.

the choice of their primitive words, accordingly to my hypothesis; so there are fixed rules for the accents, which are to be found in the Greek grammars, particularly in that of Theodorus Gaza, who treats it as a material part of the language, and not as a thing of no use, according to the opinion of some among us. I have already observed a great difference betwixt the Greek and Latin, in the matter of accenting; the Latins never putting an acute accent upon the last syllable, which the Greeks frequently did; so that the Romans were all βαρυτονοι, which gave to their discourse, and to themselves, the appearance of gravity, and even of haughtiness and austerity*. But at the same time it gave an uniformity and similarity to their accentuation, which made their language much less sweet and pleasant to the ear; and therefore, says Quinctilian, who makes this observation, when our poets would make sweet-flowing verse, they adorn it with Greek Ch. 6.

* *Olympiodorus in Aristot. μετεωρα, page* 27. The passage is quoted by Foster in his *Essay, page* 290.; and likewise another to the same purpose, from Gregory Thaumaturgus, *In laudatione Origenis.*

Ch. 4. names*, such was the effect in the judgement of Quinctilian of those accents, which modern critics condemn as corruptions of the language.

As to accents in English, Mr Foster, from a partiality, very excusable, to his country, and its language, would fain persuade us, that in English there are accents such as in Greek and Latin. But to me it is evident that there are none such; by which I mean that we have no accents upon syllables, which are musical tones, differing in acuteness or gravity. For though, no doubt, there are changes of voice in our speaking from acute to grave, and *vice versa*, of which a musician could mark the intervals, these changes are not upon syllables, but upon words or sentences. And they are the tones of passion or sentiment, which, as I observed, are to be distinguished from the accents we are speaking of. Nor should we confound with them either the general tone, which belongs to every language, or the particular provincial tone of the several dialects

* *Lib.* 2. *cap.* 10. See what Foster says further upon this subject, pag. 286.

lects of the same language. And there is another difference betwixt our accents and the antient, that ours neither are, nor can, by their nature, be subjected to any rule; whereas the antient, as we have seen, are governed by rules, and make part of their grammatical art. Ch. 4.

But what do we mean then when we speak so much of accent in English, and dispute whether a word is right or wrong accented? My answer is, That we have, no doubt, accents in English, and syllabical accents too: but they are of a quite different kind from the antient accents; for there is no change of the tone in them; but the voice is only raised more, so as to be louder upon one syllable than another. Our accents therefore fall under the first member of the division of sound, which I made in the beginning of this chapter, namely, the distinction of louder, and softer, or lower.

That there is truly no other difference is a matter of fact that must be determined by musicians. Now I appeal to them, whether they can perceive any difference of tone betwixt the accented and unaccented syllables of any word; and if there be none, then is the

Ch. 4. the music of our language in this respect nothing better than the music of a drum, in which we perceive no difference except that of louder or softer, according as the instrument is more or less forcibly struck.

This sort of accent is, if I am not much mistaken, a peculiarity which distinguishes our language from other languages of Europe, particularly the French, which has no such accents, at least none so strongly marked; and a British man, speaking French, if he is not a perfect master of the language, discovers his country as much by the emphasis he lays upon particular syllables, as by any other mark. And I am inclined to believe, that in the Latin, from which the French language is for the greater part derived, and likewise in the Greek, there was little or no accent such as ours; one thing at least is certain, that no antient grammarian speaks a word of it.

Of what use this accent is in our poetry, and that it is by it, and not by quantity, that our verse is made, I shall have occasion afterwards to shew.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Of rhythm in general, and the division of it into the rhythm of motion without sound, and the rhythm of sound.—Subdivision of the rhythm of sound into five different species.—Of that species of it which is called quantity *or* metre.—*Verse in English not made by quantity, but by what we call* accent.

I COME now to analyse the third and last thing I proposed to consider belonging to the sound of language, namely *quantity*. And, in treating of this, we must come back again to the general idea of *motion*, according to the antient method of treating matters of science, which was, to ascend to what is most general of the kind, and from thence to descend, marking the several subordinate specieses. And in this way the whole nature of the thing was explained in its utmost extent. In the preceding chapter, we have considered the effects of quicker or slower Ch. 5.

motion

Ch. 5. motion in the same time, the first producing what is called *acute* in sound, the other what is *grave*. We are now to consider the duration of motion, or its discontinuance, and the effects which these produce.

Hitherto we have only considered motion as acompanied with sound; but in order to investigate thoroughly the subject we are now upon, we must consider it in general, with or without sound. In this way considered, if the mind perceives any relation or analogy betwixt different motions, or parts of the same motion, in point of length or duration, then we have the idea of what is called *rhythm*. In this most general sense of the word, rhythm is said, by an antient writer upon music*, to be perceived by three senses; namely, the sight, as in dancing; the hearing, as in music; and the feeling, as in the beating of the pulse. In all such motions, perceived by one of other of those senses, if the mind discover any relation or analogy, there is *rhythm*. The last species of rhythm mentioned by this author, which falls under the sense of touch, does not, so far as I know, make the subject of any art or

* Aristides *in Music. lib.* 1. *p.* 31. *Meibom.*

or science. What we are to to say of rhythm therefore will be confined to the other two. Ch. 5.

When in any motion falling under the sense of sight, the mind perceives any relation of parts, the antients called this by the general term of *rhythm*, as belonging to motion in general, or they called it ρυθμος ψιλος, as being without sound; and if it was accompanied with movements or attitudes of the body, it was called ρυθμος σχηματιζομενος *. And this was the rhythm of dancing, an art of great estimation among the antients, being among them an art of imitation

* See Ariſtotle in the beginning of his *Poëtics*, where he tells us, that the imitative arts, of which he there speaks, viz. epic poetry, tragedy, comedy, the dithyrambic art, and the muſic of the flute and the harp, do all imitate by rhythm, by words, and by harmony; and these either aſunder, or mixt together.—Απασαι μεν ουν αυται τυχαι ποιουνται τω μιμεισθαι εν ρυθμω, και λογω, και αρμονια· τουτοις δε, η χωρις, η μιξυγμενοις. And a little after he says, that dancing imitates by rhythm only.—Αυτω δε τω ρυθμω μιμουνται, χωρις αρμονιας οι των ορχηστων. (perhaps παιδες has fallen out of the MS.)—και γαρ ουτοι δια των σχηματιζομενων ρυθμων μιμουνται και ηθη, και παθη, και πραξεις. This was the pantomime art, which, as I have obſerved elsewhere, was brought to ſuch perfection in the days of Auguſtus Cæsar, that not only the things mentioned by Ariſtotle, viz. manners, paſſions, and actions, but ſentiments of every kind, and whole theatrical pieces, were repreſented by it. See *vol. 1. pag.* 309.

Ch. 5. imitation, by which they represented characters, manners, and sentiments *. And this may suffice at present with respect to the rhythm of motion *without sound*, as it is the rhythm of motion *with sound* that is the subject of our present inquiry.

This rhythm is of two kinds; for it is either of sounds not articulated, which may be called *musical rhythm*, or it is of sounds articulated, and that is the rhythm of language. But before I come to speak of either more particularly, it will be proper to premise some things concerning the

* This rhythm of the movements of the body was measured by numbers, as much as the notes of music, as appears from the passage of Plato in the *Philebis*, *p.* 374. *edit. Ficini*; where speaking of grave and acute sounds in music, and their intervals, and the systems that are made of these intervals, he adds, Ἃ κατιδοντες οἱ προσθεν καρεδοσαν ἡμιν τοις ἑπομενοις εκεινοις καλειν αυτα ἈΡΜΟΝΙΑΣ. Ἐν τε ταις κινησεσιν αυ τυ σωματος ἑτερα τοιαυτα ενοντα καθη γιγνομενα, α δη δι' ἈΡΙΘΜΩΝ μετρηθεντα, δειν αυτα φασι ρυθμους και μετρα επονομζειν. From this passage it is evident, that they measured and marked by numbers, the ratios, which the several movements of the body had to one another in dancing, in the same manner as they measured the ratios of the several notes of music; and I am persuaded they had a notation for the one, as well as for the other. This is an antient art entirely lost; and I believe it is not generally known that it ever existed, at least I have not met with any critic or antiquarian that speaks of those movements of the body being so adjusted and commensurated to one another.

the rhythm of sound in general, which, Ch. 5.
though it be easily apprehended by the sense, is of some variety, and I think difficulty in the speculation; nor do I know any book, ancient or modern, in which it has been fully and scientifically treated.

And first, it is evident, that without some change of one kind or another in the sound, there could be no rhythm. For, in one continued sound of the same tenor, without interval, or distinction of parts, the ear can perceive no ratio or proportion, and therefore there is neither rhythm nor number*. In order therefore to know the nature of rhythm, when applied to sound, we must consider the several changes and modifications which sound admits.

The first and most sensible variation, is when the sound ceases altogether. This change is well known by the name of a *pause* or *stop*, whether in music or in speaking: and it admits of two variations; for it is dif-

* This is observed by Cicero: *Numerus autem in continuatione nullus est; distinctio, et æqualium et sæpe variorum intervallorum percussio, numerum conficit; quem in cadentibus guttis, quod intervallis distinguuntur, notare possumus, in amni præcipitante non possumus.* De Orat. lib. 3. cap. 48.

Ch. 5. ferent according to the length or shortness of the pauses, or according to the frequency of them. So that, belonging to this modification of sound, we have two species of rhythm, the one produced by the various lengths of the intervals, the other by the various distances or intermediate spaces betwixt those intervals. For if the mind perceives any ratio betwixt the lengths of the intervals themselves, or of the distances betwixt them, then it has the idea of rhythm; and accordingly this is a great part of the rhythm, or the music, as it may be called, of a drum. And it belongs not only to music and language, but to every kind of noise in which the mind can observe and compare any intervals, as in the instance which Cicero gives, in the passage above quoted, of the droppings of water.

These are the rhythms produced by cessation of sound; and we are next to consider those which arise from the changes of sound, without any cessation or interval, at least such as makes a pause, or is distinctly perceptible to the ear. For in every change, or different modification, of the sound, there is of necessity some interval. Thus, when a musician, playing upon an instrument, goes from

from one note to another, we are sure, from the change of the operation of the hand, that there must be some interval betwixt the two notes, that is, betwixt the motion which produced the first, and that which produces the last. And as different configurations and motions of the organs, are necessary for the enunciation of different syllables, there must, for the same reason, be necessarily an interval betwixt those syllables. But as neither of these intervals is distinctly perceptible to the ear, either in speaking, or playing on an instrument, they are accounted for nothing in this argument; and the sound of different notes of music joined together without a pause, and of syllables in speaking, and even of words, when they are pronounced quickly, and without any stop, is held to be continuous. Ch. 5.

The question then is, What changes continued sound admits of, and what are the rhythms thence arising? And there is one obvious change which very strongly strikes the sense, namely, that from louder to softer, or *vice versâ*. This proceeds from a stronger or weaker percusssion of the sonorous body, which produces greater vibrations o.

the

Ch. 5. the body, and consequently of the air. By greater vibrations, I mean those which occupy greater space in their courses and recourses. That there is a rhythm of this kind, is evident from the case of the drum, which besides the two rhythms of intervals above mentioned, has also this third rhythm, arising from the mixture of loud and soft, and these three together make its whole music.; for it has neither variation of tone nor length of sound.

There is a modification of sound something akin to this last mentioned, but carefully to be distinguished from it, which arises from the different number of vibrations in the same time produced by one percussion, according to which the sound is graver or acuter. This modification I have already treated of, under the article of *accent* or *prosody*, by which name it was known among the ancients, and by them carefully distinguished from rhythm, as a species of thing altogether different, though they have been confounded by modern writers.

The next variety in continued sound I shall observe, is that of quick and slow. For

as motion, which produces sound, is quicker or slower in the same time, so also is sound; and this variety of sound arises from the percussion, which, as I have said, produces it; for as the percussion is more or less frequent in the same time, the sound is quicker or slower. And this is evident to the sense: for if we make but one percussion upon the sonorous body, the sound dies away slowly; or if we repeat the percussions, but at intervals of some length, the sound continues, but is still slow; whereas, if we repeat them fast, it is both continued and quick. And here too we must likewise carefully distinguish betwixt the acuteness or gravity of the sound, and the quickness or slowness of it: for though in both cases there be more motion in the same time, it is the quicker and more frequent vibrations of the *body struck*, that make the note acute; whereas, in the other case, it is the more frequent motion of the *body striking*, that makes the sound quicker, without altering the tone of the sonorous body, whose vibrations continue still to be of the same number in the same time. And if the percussion is not stronger, they continue

Ch. 5. tinue to occupy the same space in their courses and recourses. And the only effect of the repeated percussion in that case, is to prevent them from growing lower as the sound decays. And hence proceeds a fourth species of rhythm. For, if the mind perceives any analogy betwixt the sounds in point of quickness and slowness; if, for example, it perceives the one sound to be equally quick with the other, or twice as quick, it has the idea of this kind of rhythm.

But the variety of nature does not stop even here; for there is one variety yet to be observed in continued sound, and which brings us directly to our subject. It is the variety of long and short; for as the same motion may be continued a shorter or longer time, so may the same sound. And that sound which continues any length of time, we call a *long sound*, and that which continues a short time, we call a *short sound*. And as this quality of sound depends entirely upon the time of its duration, it is commonly known by the name of *time*.

For explaining this quality of sound, and distinguishing it from the quality above mentioned of quick or slow, it is necessary

to

to observe, that when sound is produced by repeated percussions, which as they are more or less frequent, make it quicker or slower, it is not altogether *continuous*, as we have hitherto considered it, nor *one* sound, but several sounds, in which the ear, when attentive, perceives some distinction, though not sufficient to make what we call a *pause*, or *interval*. For when the musician repeats the same note by different percussions, and more still when he changes the note, the ear perceives that the sounds are distinct, and not one and the same. What is it then that makes this sameness or unity of sound to which the quality of long or short belongs? And I say it is *continued* motion producing the sound, not repeated percussions, as in the case of quick or slow sound. As, for example, when the fiddler, instead of repeating the percussion of the string with the bow (by which he only makes the music either quicker or slower, as the percussion is more or less frequently repeated), draws the bow across the string, with one continued and uninterrupted motion, still keeping his finger upon the string in the same position; or if the player upon the flute continues the same inspiration

Ch. 5.

Ch. 5. inspiration of the breath, with the same stops of the instrument, then it is one and the same note, which is either long or short, as the motion which produces it is continued longer or shorter time, without interruption or change.

That this is truly the nature of a long note in music, is a fact well known to musicians; for every one of them will tell you, that it is the *continued* motion of the hand in stringed instruments, and the *continued* inspiration of the breath in wind instruments, that makes a long note. And when, by the nature of the instrument, there can be no continued sound, but only repeated percussions of the strings, as in the case of the harpsichord, the notes are all of the same length, without the distinction of long or short; so that the only rhythm of this instrument, is the rhythm of intervals above explained, and of quick and slow. Nor has it what is properly called *time*, but its whole music is a jingle of sounds, differing in acuteness and gravity, and diversified by different pauses and stops, or different degrees of quickness or slowness.

This is the nature of long and short in

music. And as to language, when we continue the motion of the breath in the pronunciation of a vowel for shorter or longer time, we make the vowel long or short. When it is made long, it appears to be doubled in the pronunciation. Thus when we sound *a* long, we sound, as it were *aa*; and accordingly the antient Latins, as we shall see afterwards, expressed the long vowel by doubling the character. Ch. 5.

And this is the fifth and last species of rhythm. For if the mind perceive any ratio betwixt sounds with respect to their length or shortness, then it has the idea of this kind of rhythm, which, applied to all kinds of motions and sounds, may be called *time*; but applied particularly to language, was by the antient authors called by the name of the genus, *rhythm*; whereas, in modern authors, it is commonly distinguished by the name of *quantity*.

Thus I have endeavoured to explain the different kinds of rhythm belonging to sound, which I have made to be five; and it does not appear that the nature of the thing admits of any more. For all sound is produced by motion. Now all motion is either interrupted by pauses or intervals, or it is without such interruption.

Ch. 5. If it be interrupted, either the intervals are greater or less, or the distances betwixt the intervals are greater or less. And hence arise the two first kinds of rhythm I mentioned, belonging to the intervals of sound. Again, if the motion be not interrupted, then it is either more or less vehement; and hence arises the third rhythm I mentioned, of loud or soft in sound: or it consists of parts, which the ear distinguishes; and thence arises the fourth species of rhythm, that of quick or slow, according as the parts succeed one another quickly or slowly: or, lastly, the motion is altogether *continuous*, so that the ear distinguishes no parts in it, and then the sound is either long or short; which makes the fifth and last species of rhythm. All kinds of rhythm therefore belong either to the intervals of sound, or to the sound itself considered without intervals. Of the first kind are two specieses of rhythm, of the last three*.

Of

* Suidas, in his Lexicon, under the word ῥυθμος, after speaking of the rhythm of music, has these words, ὁ μεν ουν επι των αλλων ῥυθμος κατα το βραχυ και βραδυ χαρακτηριζεται. ὁ δε επι του προφορικου λογου, κατα το μακρον και βραχυ, ὁσπερ μονος και μετρον λεγεται· ουκ επι των ποιητικων δε λογων ταυτα θεωρειται, αλλα και επι των ῥητορικων. Upon which passage it may

Of these several kinds of rhythm, the two first, relating to pauses or stops, belong to language, as well as to music. They are however no part of the grammatical art, and therefore are not the subject of our present inquiry, but belong rather to another art, namely *rhetoric* *. The third kind, relating to loudness or softness, must be, as I have already said, by its nature, as various as the different occasions of speaking; and therefore it is not, so far as Ch. 5.

I

may be obſerved, 1*mo*, That there is no mention here at all of the rhythm of intervals, for this reaſon, no doubt, that the rhythm of this ſort was not reduced to any art. 2*dly*, With reſpect to the rhythm of ſound itſelf, there is, for the ſame reaſon, no mention of the rhythm of loud or ſoft; but the other two are mentioned, as being well known in muſic, and comprehended in the art, viz. ſhort or long, and quick or ſlow, or, in the language of modern muſic, *adagio* and *piano*. But with reſpect to language, or ſpeech, he mentions only one of theſe two, viz. long or ſhort, which alone made what is called μετρον, or *metre*.

* Under this head it is treated of by Cicero, *lib.* 3. *De Oratore*, cap. 44. where he ſays, That ſtops in the proper place belong to the art of ſpeaking, and diſtinguiſh an orator from a vulgar man. His words are, *Neque eſt ex multis res una quae magis oratorem ab imperito dicendi ignaroque diſtinguat, quam quod ille rudis incondite fundit quantum poteſt; et id quod dicit ſpiritu non arte determinat: orator autem ſic illigat ſententiam verbis, ut eam numero quodam complectatur et adſtricto et ſoluto.*

Ch. 5. I know, comprehended in any art. This is also the case of the fourth kind, arising from different degrees of quickness or slowness, at least so far as concerns language. So that it is only the last kind, relating to the length or duration of sound, which belongs to the grammatical art.

It is well known in music, as I have said, under the name of *time*. For as the idea of time arises from motion, so by time is motion of all kinds measured, and particularly the motion of music. I shall say nothing further of this musical rhythm, except to observe, that the antients were very accurate in it, as in every thing else; for they measured it by feet, as they did the rhythm of their language, and had dactyls and spondees, and the like, in their music, as well as in their poetry *.

As to this rhythm in language, we have the idea of it when we perceive any relation or analogy betwixt articulate sounds in

* See the antient writers upon muſic, collected by Meibomius. See alſo Quinctilian, *lib.* 1. *cap.* 10. where he tells the ſtory of Pythagoras, who allayed the violence of a young man, by cauſing the muſician *mutare modos in* SPONDAEUM.

in point of length or duration. This definition extends to all the sounds of a language, words and sentences, as well as syllables; but the grammatical art considers it only in syllables; and then it is expressed in English, as I have already said, by the name of *quantity* *, which is the proper subject of this chapter. It was measured among the ancients by what they called *feet*, which consisted of syllables two or more; and when the rhythm was thus measured, it took the name of μετρον or *metre*. Ch. 5.

The

* This property of the sound of language, though it be called in Engliſh by the general name of *quantity*, is only a part of the quantity of a language. Scaliger, in his very learned work, *De cauſis ling. Lat. lib. 2. cap. 52*, makes it but a third part; for, says he, the voice in language has three dimenſions, *length*, *breadth*, and *height*. And Priscian before him had said, *Vox, dum tangit auditum, tripartite dividitur, ſciz. altitudine, latitudine, longitudine. Habet quidem litera altitudinem in pronunciatione, latitudinem in ſpiritu, longitudinem in tempore.* The spirit, which these authors call the *breadth* of the sound, I have already explained, under the head of articulation; the height too I have given an account of, under the article of accent; and I ſhall only add here, that it is always expreſſed in Greek by the word τασις, though that be a general name, which might apply to any of the three dimenſions, and particularly to the length as well as to the height. The length is the subject we are now upon.

Ch. 5. The analysis of this kind of rhythm is into syllables, which are either long or short. And it was by the various combinations of these, that the rhythm of their language was formed, whether the looser rhythm of their prose, or the regular rhythm of their verse. But what at present we are concerned with, is the nature of their long and short syllables, which are the elements of this part of their language.

And it is here, as in accents, or notes of music, there is nothing absolute, but all is relative; for there is not, nor cannot be by nature, any fixed standard for the length or shortness of syllables. All therefore that art can do, is to ascertain the ratio that a long syllable has to a short. And this the grammarians have fixed to be as two to one. And thus all syllables in Greek and Latin, compared together, are either of equal length, or in the ratio of two to one. It is not however exactly true, that all short syllables are of equal length, or all long; but some short syllables are shorter than others likewise short, and some long syllables longer than others.

thers *. But in the metrical art, this difference is is not attended to, and all the short syllables are held to be equal to one another, and all the long †. Ch. 5.

The next thing to be considered is, What makes a syllable long or short? And it is either the vowel or the consonants which follow after the vowel. If the vowel be long, the syllable is necessarily long, whether any consonants follow after the vowel or not. If, on the other hand, the vowel be short, the syllable is short, unless two or more consonants follow, either in the same syllable, or in a subsequent syllable, which necessarily retard the pronunciation so much, as to make the syllable long; but it is not so long as if the vowel were long:

* This is observed by the Halicarnassian, in his excellent Treatise of Composition so often quoted; and he exemplifies it with respect to the short syllables by the words ὁδος, ῥοδος, τροπος, ςροφος, where the first syllable is short in them all, though in the second it be longer than in the first, in the third still longer, and in the fourth longest of all. And with respect to long syllables, he says, there can be no doubt that the vowel η, with three consonants before it, and one after it, as in the word σπλην, makes a longer syllable than when it is simply by itself. *sect.* 15.

† Ἐν δε τοις μετρικοις ειδεναι δεῖ ὁτι πασα βραχεια ιση, και πασα μακρα ιση. *Longin.* εν προλεγομενοις, *ad Hephaestionis Encheiridion.*

Ch. 5. long: and in some cases it is shortened, as when one of the two consonants following is a liquid; or though both be mute, it sometimes happens, that if the acute accent is put upon it, the syllable is shortened, as in the case of the word *optimè*, and some others, which I observed before. And so nice were the antients, that they distinguished by their pronunciation, whether the vowel in a syllable, long by position, was of itself long or short *.

The only thing, therefore, in this analysis that further remains to be considered, is, what it is that makes a vowel long or short. And I say, a vowel is long two ways; either by continuing the impulse of the breath double the time that is spent in the pronunciation of a short vowel, and so enunciating the vowel in the manner it was antiently written by the Latins †, as

I

* This observation I owe to Mr Foster, who, in his essay, p. 35. quotes a passage from Gellius, where he says, in the word *unctito*, the first vowel is pronounced long; whereas, in *dictito*, the first was pronounced short, though they are certainly both long by position.

† This was practised, says Quinctilian, *lib.* 1. *cap.* 7. down to the time of Accius, and even longer: *Usque ad Accium et ultra porrectas syllabas geminis vocalibus scripserunt.*

I have already observed, or by incorporating it with another vowel, and making it what is called a *diphthong*. If neither of these was done, it was a short vowel. Ch. 5.

Such is the nature of the Greek and Roman quantity; but I hold, that neither their quantity nor their accent, though they make their languages musical, and most pleasing to the ear, are essential to the nature of language. It cannot be denied I think, to be possible, that a language should be pronounced, without the syllables being distinguished by musical tones. And I have shewn, that this in fact is the case of the English, and, for any thing I know, of every other language in Europe. I think it must also be admitted to be possible at least, that a language may be pronounced so as to make all the syllables of an equal length; and the question is, How this matter stands with respect to the modern languages of Europe, and particularly the English?

There are some learned men, such as Mr Foster, who would willingly ascribe to the

ferunt. Thus, in place of *êmi*, they wrote *eemi*; in place of *êdi*, *eedi*; in place of *libo*, *leibo*; in place of *dico*, *deico*; in place of *cógo*, *coago*, &c. See Foster, *pag.* 39.

Ch. 5. English language every beauty to be found in the ancient Greek and Latin, and among others, their quantity; and they endeavour to make out, that our verse runs upon the same kind of feet, and almost as many in number, as the Greek and Latin verse. On the contrary, a French author *, in a dissertation published in the Memoirs of the Academy of *Belles Lettres*, Vol. 12. p. 91. concerning the comparative merit of the ancients and moderns in point of genius and learning, asserts, that there is no quantity at all in modern languages, and that their syllables are neither long nor short; and that therefore the verse, in such languages, is only made by the number of syllables, and the rhyme. Neither of these contending parties is, in my apprehension, right; but the truth, as it often happens in such cases, lies betwixt them.

And, in the *first* place, With respect to the English, I think it cannot be denied, that there are several syllables in it which are pronounced long: for we have diphthongs in our language, which, if they are fully sounded, are necessarily long in all languages.

* M. L'Abbe Gedoyn.

languages. Thus who can deny, that the diphthong *oa* is long in the word *coat*, and that the simple vowel *o* is short in the word *cot*, or *cottage*. The same is true of the diphthong *oi* and *oy* in the words *oil*, *boil*, *boy*, and the diphthong *ou* and *ow* in the words *hour*, *owl*, *bowl*, &c. We have also some single vowels that are pronounced sometimes like diphthongs, and make the syllable long. In this way the *o* is frequently pronounced, as in the words *Holy*, *Ghost*, &c. where the *o* is sounded as if it were the diphthong *oa*. In like manner, *u* is often sounded as if it were the diphthong *ou*; and *i* as if it were the diphthong *ai*; and *a* too as if it were the diphthong *au*. But I say, first, That suppose all such syllables were to be pronounced short, as is generally done by the common people in Scotland, it could not be said, that the language was essentially changed; though, I own, the beauty and variety of its pronunciation would be greatly impaired. And for proof of this I think it cannot be denied, that the English language spoken in this way would be understood by an Englishman, and is actually understood when spoken so by a Scotch peasant, though perhaps he might Ch. 5.

be

Ch. 5. be at a loss for some words. Whereas, if the Greek and Latin had been so spoken to an antient Greek or Roman, I am persuaded he would not have been able to make sense of it.

But, *2dly*, I say, That for one syllable in English that is thus long, there are at least twenty that are, as the Frenchman says, neither long nor short; that is, are all equally either long or short, as you please, without any perceptible difference among them. For the vowels among us, unless where they are used as diphthongs, have no fixed standard of quantity, nor are distinguished, as in Greek and Latin, into long and short; neither are they made long even by position, unless where there happens to be an accent upon the syllable, as in the word *subaltern*; where it is evident, that the syllable *al* ought to be long by position: but, nevertheless, as it is not accented, it is clearly pronounced very short. And such is the vehemence of our accents, that every syllable which follows the accented, is not only short, but almost lost in the pronunciation. And the accented syllable itself cannot be said to be long: for even the acute accent among the antients, as I observed before, has a tendency to shorten the

the syllable, and much more the rapidity with which our manner of accenting throws out the syllable. So that truly the accented syllable is not longer than the rest, but only louder, and pronounced with more violence. Ch. 5.

If this be truly the genius of the English language, the reason is plain, why we neither have, nor can have, verse made by quantity, such as the Greek and Latin: for by far the greater part of the syllables being all of an equal length, we cannot so mix long and short together as to make the rhythm of the antient poetry.

But what the Frenchman says in general of all the modern languages of Europe, that their verse is made only by rhyme, and the number of syllables, is not true of the English verse; for the accent is as necessary to our verse as the number of syllables; and as for rhyme, it is not necessary at all. And when I come to speak of our versification, I will endeavour to shew, that by the means of our peculiar manner of accenting, we make a better kind of verse, and of greater variety, than any other nation in Europe.

But, in the meantime, if the reader is not

Ch. 5. not convinced by what I have said of our verse being made by accent, and not by quantity, let him take any English verse, whether blank or rhyming, long or short, and let him make every accented syllable either long, such as some sylables which I have allowed to be so in the English language, or short, as he pleases, and try whether that will alter the measure of the verse, the syllables still continuing to be accented; and if it does not, that, I think, is domonstration, that it is not quantity, but accent, which makes our verse. Take, for example, the first verse of the *Paradise Lost*: "Of man's first disobedi-"ence and the fruit." Here the five accented syllables are, *man's*, *dis*, *be*, *and*, *fruit*. Now, take any or all of these, and alter them, with respect to quantity, as you please, and you will not injure the verse. Take, for example, the first, *man's*, and make it *moan's*, which is certainly a longer syllable, or make it *ma's*, which is a shorter syllable, and the verse is the same. Or take any of the unaccented syllables, and make them either longer or shorter, and there will be no change in the verse. Thus the unaccented syllable

first

first is certainly, according to the rules of antient quantity, longer than *dis*, the accented syllable; but make it shorter, and the verse will be the same. In like manner, the unaccented syllable *dience*, having a diphthong in it followed by two consonants, is certainly longer than the preceding accented syllable *be*; but make it as short as you please, and you will not hurt the verse. Ch. 5.

As to the French verse, what the French author says is certainly true. For the only thing that makes verse in French is the number of syllables and the rhyme: for ever this last is absolutely necessary, because they want our accents. And accordingly all their attempts in blank verse have been miserably unsuccessful.

My opinion, therefore, upon the whole, is, that there is a certain hardness and want of music in all the languages of Gothic or Celtic extraction, or that have a mixture of these in them, which makes them incapable of verse, such as by the flexible and musical genius of their language the Greeks and Romans were able to form.

Ch. 5. I will only add further upon this subject, that in treating of the antient rhythm, I have considered it as altogether different from their accents, that is, the melody of their language. So it is treated by all the antient authors; and particularly by the Halicarnassian, in his Treatise upon Composition, so often quoted. I therefore do not approve of the description which Mr. Foster in his Essay has given of the rhythm of the antient languages, as if it were a mixture of accent and quantity. In matters of science, the ideas of different things should be kept distinct, and expressed by different names: for, as I observed before, I am persuaded it was some such confusion in the use of the word *prosody* that contributed to lead men into the error concerning the antient accents.

CHAP. VI.

Continuation of the subject of quantity.—The Greek and Latin Verse not read by us according to quantity, but in the manner we accent our own verse.

BUT I say further, that not only we do not pronounce our own verse according to quantity, but not even the Greek and Latin, though it be admitted that their verse is made by quantity. This is observed by Mr Foster in his Essay, (*pag.* 361.) But I think the subject deserves to have something more said upon it. Ch. 6.

And, in the *first* place, If it be true, as I suppose, that we pronounce our own verse entirely by what we call accent, and not by quantity, there is nothing more natural, and indeed it is almost necessary, that we should pronounce the Greek and Latin in the same manner. And I would have Mr Foster, who admits that we do not pronounce the ancient verse according to quantity, consider

Ch. 6. by what other rule we pronounce it. He will not say it is by ancient accent, which he confesses is attended to by very few in practice, and rejected by many even in theory. It remains, therefore, that it can be pronounced only by what I call *English accent*; that is, by sounding one syllable of the word louder and stronger than the rest. Now I think it is impossible that we should pronounce the Greek and Latin verse in this way, if we did not so pronounce our own. And this to me is of itself demonstration of the truth of what I maintain, that our English verse is not made by quantity.

But it will be said, Is all the trouble then lost that we bestow in learning the quantity of the ancient languages? And is it possible to suppose, that those who reject the ancient accents, because they interfere as they think with quantity, do not themselves observe quantity in reading Greek and Latin? Or, if they observe it, how do they mark it otherwise than by making the syllables long or short? My answer is, That they mark it by accenting the words as we do in English. Thus, *e. g.* in pronouncing the first line of Virgil's Eclogues,

Tityre,

Tityre, tu patulæ recubans sub tegmine fagi, Ch. 6.

they mark the length of the first syllable of *Tityre*, by accenting it just as we accent the first syllable of this English verse,

Little tube, of mighty power,

or any other of those English verses that we may call *Trochaic*, if we are fond of giving ancient names to modern things.

That this is not a proper way of marking a long syllable, is evident. For, instead of making the syllable longer, we make it only louder and stronger; or if we make it in any degree longer, it is not by lengthening the vowel, which ought to be done in this case, but it is by position. For, by pronouncing the syllable so strongly, we do in effect double the consonant, and pronounce it as if it were written *Tittyre*. For, if we observe attentively, we shall find that the sound of the vowel is not altered in any respect, but the stress of the accent falls upon the consonant, which necessarily gives it that double sound. And to be convinced of this, let us write the long *i* in *Tityre*, as it was written anciently by the Romans, that is,

double,

Ch. 6. double, and pronounce it accordingly, and we shall see what a different sound it will make.

But supposing that the long syllable were thus properly marked, it is not sufficiently marked: for there are many long syllables that are not so distinguished. Nor is even this all: for there are many short syllables that have that mark, according to our method of reading ancient verse. For proof of both these propositions, I need only appeal to the same line of Virgil, where the syllable *tu*, though long, is not accented; and the following syllable *pa-*, though short, is accented. In like manner *-læ*, though long, is not accented; and the next syllable *re-*, though short, is accented.

If it be again asked, What long syllables then are marked by the accent? my answer is, Very few. And if it be further asked, What these few are? I say, The penult syllables of words of three or more syllables, and no other. This may appear a little paradoxical; but it is easily proved by induction. And, in the *first* place, With respect to monosyllables, though they may be accented, we cannot thereby tell whether they be long or short, because we accent them according

cording to their place in the verse, not according to their quantity. Nor do we distinguish, by our pronunciation, whether the vowel in them be long or short. Thus, in the above line of Virgil, the monosyllables *tu* and *sub* are both long; yet they are not accented. And though the vowel *u* in *tu* be long by its nature, and not by position, yet we do not distinguish it by our pronunciation. And in the following line, Ch. 6.

Nos patriam fugimus, et dulcia linquimus arva,

et is long, and yet not accented.

Again, if the word be a dissyllable, the rule in Latin, as Quinctilian tells us, is, that the accent is never put upon the last syllable. Now, though by accent he undoubtedly means what the ancients called *accent*, we have, in our practice, applied the rule to *our* accents; and accordingly we never accent the last syllable in Latin. Suppose, therefore, the last of a dissyllable is long, it is not accented; and the first syllable, whether long or short, is accented. So that the length of it is not distinguished by the accent.

And, *lastly*, If the word consist of three or more syllables, if the last be long, it cannot

Ch. 6. not be marked by the accent, for the reason just now given. If it consist of four syllables, and the first be long, it cannot be so marked neither; because no accent can be carried back beyond the third syllable. Again, if the third syllable be long, it will indeed be accented; but so it will also be, if it be short, and the penult likewise short. Therefore the length of it is not distinguished by the accent. The only possible case, therefore, remaining, is the penult being long; and then it is accented, and thereby distinguished from a short syllable; for if it be short, it is not accented.

Thus it appears, that we neither pronounce the ancient quantity as we should do; nor, if we did, do we thereby distinguish sufficiently the long syllables from the short.

The fact therefore truly is, that as we read the ancient languages, they have neither accent nor quantity; so that by our barbarous pronunciation, we strip them of all their native and genuine music, that is, their tones and rhythm, leaving them nothing in the place of it, but the music, if it may be so called, of a drum, which is all the music of our own language.

I do not however mean to discourage the study of the rules of ancient quantity. It is no doubt a part of the study of the language; and it is useful in practice, even with respect to the Latin, as many of their words of three or more syllables have the penult long; and it should be still more useful in the pronunciation of the Greek, as the genius of that language does not hinder us from accenting the last syllable, if it be long. But we ought not to flatter ourselves that we pronounce either Greek or Latin as we ought to do, or as the ancients pronounced it. For I am persuaded, what Scioppius says is true, that if Cicero were alive, he would hardly understand a word of a modern scholar speaking Latin, nor would such scholar understand Cicero's Latin any better than he would Arabic *. Ch. 6.

It is nevertheless true, what Mr Foster observes, that notwithstanding the injustice we do Greek and Latin poetry, in the pronunciation, it still pleases even our ear more than any modern poetry. It is a matter of some

* *Scioppius, De orthoepia.* See the passage quoted by Foster, *pag.* 369.

Ch. 6. some curiosity to know how this happens. And I believe it might be accounted for otherwise than from the prejudice that some people imagine we have in favour of the ancients; and a system of ancient prosody (I use the word in the common acceptation) might be given, according to which we actually read their poetry, very different indeed from the ancient prosody, but more agreeable to that of our own language. But such an inquiry would lead me too far from my present purpose. I will therefore here conclude my analysis of the material part of language, consisting of sounds articulated,—accented,—long, and short.

BOOK

BOOK III.

Of the COMPOSITION of LANGUAGE.

INTRODUCTION.

THE method in which I have proposed to treat this subject, has not been followed in any thing that I have seen written upon grammar. But it suits best what I chiefly propose in this part of my work, which is, to shew wherein the art of language consists. For a piece of art cannot be more thoroughly known, than by being first taken down, and each part of it shewn by itself, and then the whole put up again. The first part of this work we have already performed, having *analysed* language, considered both as significant of things, and as sound merely; and we now proceed to the *composition* of it, following the same method, and beginning with the *formal* part, or language considered as significant. Intr.

CHAPTER I.

Of syntax in general, and the three different kinds of it.—The difference betwixt languages, barbarous and civilized, ancient and modern, with respect to the use of these three kinds of syntax.

Ch. I. AS the analysis of the form of language is simply into words, so the composition of it is as simple, namely, into sentences, by which I mean such a combination of words as of itself forms a meaning. For this is the only composition of words that grammar has any thing to do with, larger combinations of them belonging to other arts and sciences.

It has been already observed, that any number of words, how great soever, of the clearest and most precise signification, thrown together without being some way connected, would convey to the mind no meaning, except that the speaker had such or such conception; but they would affirm or deny nothing, wish or command nothing,

thing, ask or inquire about nothing. Now a sentence must necessarily do one or other of these things. Ch. 1.

In order therefore, to make a sentence, the words that compose it must be some way or another connected together, so that the mind of the hearer may perceive their relation, and dependency upon one another. That part of grammar which teaches us to connect words so as to answer this purpose, is what is called *syntax*. It is the last part of grammar in the order of treating it; but, as Theodorus Gaza has well observed, is the first and principal, being that for which every other part of the art is intended. For the whole art is intended for the sake of speech, which cannot be, unless words be connected together. It likewise appears to be the most difficult part of the art; and therefore, as I observed before, was last invented, the barbarous languages being remarkably deficient in that article.

This great business of language appears to me to be performed in one or other of the three following ways: for either the connexion betwixt the words is expressed by the words themselves; or, *2dly*, It is expressed by some other word; or, *lastly*, It

is

Ch. 1. is expressed merely by the words standing together in the sentence.

As to the first, words, in the learned languages, indicate themselves their connections, by genders, numbers, and cases; and this in two different ways, either by concord or by regimen. Concord is when the words agree together in certain accidents, such as those above mentioned. Regimen is when they do not so agree, but the one, which is called the governing word, produces some alteration upon the other.

This kind of syntax, whereby the words themselves shew how they are to be connected, is by far the most artificial, particularly with respect to the cases; the relations expressed by which are, as I have shewn, very difficult to be explained, and comprehended in general definitions. I shall only add here, that as the great use of cases, as well as of genders and numbers, is for the purpose of syntax, what I have already said of these accidents of words, will make it unnecessary for me to say any thing further here upon the subject.

But suppose a language, of which the art is so imperfect that it has no cases at all, no genders

genders of substantives, neither genders nor numbers of adjectives, and very little expression of numbers, even in their verbs, which is the case of the English, and for the greater part of all the modern languages of Europe, in what manner are the words to be connected in such a language? It is evident it can only be in one or other, or both the two ways last mentioned, namely, either by separate words, or by juxtaposition of the words to be connected together; which last way, as we have elsewhere observed, is almost the only syntax of the barbarous languages; and as it is a great part of the syntax of the modern languages of Europe, so far at least it must be admitted, that these languages approach to barbarity. Ch. 1.

But, with respect even to the learned languages, let us suppose that the relations betwixt things are such, that they cannot be expressed conveniently by cases, or flections of the word of any kind; what is then to be done? In that case the relations are to be expressed by separate words, called *prepositions*, of which, as I have already explained the nature and use, and distinguished betwixt the relations expressed by cases, and those

Ch. 1. those expressed by prepositions, I will say no more of them at present.

Again, suppose the word is indeclinable, so that its connection with the other word cannot be marked by any change of it, which is the case of adverbs, conjunctions, and the prepositions themselves, then must even the learned languages of necessity submit to the barbarous syntax above mentioned, and connect the words together by juxtaposition. In this way adverbs in Greek and Latin are connected with the verbs or adjectives to which they belong, and in like manner prepositions and conjunctions.

And thus it appears from induction, that there can be no syntax but in one or other of the three ways above mentioned. And it also appears, how far art in this matter can go, and where it must necessarily stop.

The general rules of syntax, as well as of every other part of the grammatical art, and indeed of every art, must be founded in the nature of things. For, as the business of syntax is to connect words, which stand for ideas, and as ideas represent things, it is evident that words must be joined together according

according to the nature of the things they stand for. For this reason it is that in syntax, as well as in nature, the substance is joined with the accident, the action with the agent, or with the qualities and circumstances of the action, and both the action and agent with the subject of the action. But all this is so fully, accurately, and elegantly explained by Mr Harris*, that I will not say a word more upon the subject. Ch. 1.

The differences betwixt the ancient and modern syntax I have already noted; but it is very well worth while further to observe the difference thereby produced, betwixt ancient and modern composition. The difference which it makes with respect to sound, and the pleasure of the ear, I shall observe when I come to speak of the composition of the sounds of language. But, in the next chapter, I will observe what difference it makes in conveying the sense.

CHAP.

* *Hermes, book 2. cap. 3.*

CHAP. II.

The difference betwixt the arrangement of words in ancient and modern languages considered.—The most natural order of arrangement, whether the ancient or the modern.—The advantages of the ancient arrrangement in conveying the sense of the speaker.

Ch. 2. I Know it is the opinion of many, that the ancient composition, or arrangement of words in sentences, however pleasing it might be to the ear, was hurtful to the sense, as it distracted the attention, and hindered the mind from apprehending the sense so clearly and fully as it would otherwise do; that the modern arrangement was more natural, conveyed the meaning better, and was therefore on that account preferable. And I remember I heard one of those gentlemen go so far as to say, that it was impossible that Demosthenes's orations could have been understood, if the words had been spoken in the unnatural order in

in which we read them. This is a question of some curiosity; and as it enters pretty deep into the nature of language, the reader will not be displeased to see it examined at some length. Ch. 2.

And I will begin with considering what those gentlemen call the *natural order* of words in a sentence, and inquire for what reason the order we observe is dignified with that appellation.

In the arrangement of prepositions, adverbs, and conjunctions, to which I may add articles, there is little difference, as I have observed, betwixt the ancient languages and ours. It is therefore the arrangement of substantives, adjectives, verbs, and, in short, all the declinable parts of speech, that makes the chief difference. Now, substantives are either joined in syntax with adjectives, (under which I comprehend participles, as I do pronouns under substantives), or substantives are joined with substantives, or, lastly, they are joined with verbs; and in each of these ways, either by concord or by regimen. Under this threefold division, I think, every kind of combination of words in syntax may be included. And let us

Ch. 2. now examine what is the order of nature in all these combinations.

The first I mentioned was that of substantive with adjective, that is, of substance with quality. And, first, let them be joined in concord. In such a junction, one should think, the natural order was to place the substance first, and the quality or accident last; and yet the common arrangement in English is the direct contrary. For we say, *a good man*, not a *man good*: whereas in Latin, they say either *vir bonus*, or *bonus vir*; and the same in Greek. And the truth is, that the one or the other of them may be put first, if it happens to be principally in the view of the speaker. For though, in the order of nature, the substance is undoubtedly first, because it is that in which the accident exists, and without which it cannot exist; whereas the substance can exist without the accident; yet our thoughts do not always follow the order of nature. So that which is principal in nature, is sometimes but secondary in our consideration. And it is with respect to the arrangement of the words as it is with respect to the pronunciation of them: when we say,

a good man, we may lay the emphasis either upon *good* or *man*, according as the one or the other is principal in the discourse. And for the same reason, we might put the one or the other first in the arrangement, if custom permitted it: for there is nothing in the genius or grammar of the language to hinder it. And accordingly, if we add another quality to the substance, we may put the substance first: for we may say, *a man good and benevolent.* And we so arrange it when we make a proposition of it, as when we say, *The man is good.* But even in that instance, there is no reason why we should be confined to that mode of composition, and should not be allowed to say, even in common style, *Good is the man:* whereas such an expression would be tolerated only in poetry, though it be fully as clear as the other. Ch. 2.

As to the conjunction of substantive and adjective in regimen, we say, in common style, *desirous of glory, full of wine*; whereas the Latins say indifferently, *gloriæ cupidus*, or *cupidus gloriæ*; and *vini plenus*, or *plenus vini.* Now, in such combinations, it is not easy to determine abstractly which is principal; the person desiring a thing, or

Ch. 2. or the thing desired; the vessel containing, or the thing contained. But whichever of them appears from the tenor of the discourse to be principal in the mind of the speaker, and which, if he pronounce properly, he would lay an emphasis upon, should be first in the composition; and therefore the language should allow the speaker the same liberty that the Latin allows him, to place either of them first. This even the confined genius of our language will admit; for we may say with equal perspicuity, *of glory desirous*, or *of wine full*. But it is allowed only in poetry, for no other reason that I can imagine, but to make our prose composition still more stinted than it is by the genius of our language.

What I next mentioned was the construction of substantive with substantive. And, first, let us consider them in concord. And here, I think, even our use has not determined the natural order: For we say equally, *Achilles the hero*, and *the hero Achilles*; *Goliah the giant*, and *the giant Goliah*; *Wisdom the gift of God*, and *the gift of God wisdom*: so that here there appears to be no order more natural than another.

And

And as to substantive governing substantive, the common arrangement in English seems to be contrary to the natural order. For we say, *the bravery of Achilles*, putting the accident before the substance. But the truth is, in such cases, as I said before, there ought to be no order but what the speaker is pleased to make; and therefore he should have the liberty of arranging the words as he pleases. Ch. 2.

The last combination I mentioned was that of the verb with the substantive. And, first, let us consider them in concord, which is the case of the nominative with the verb. According to our English arrangement, the nominative, that is, the word expressing the agent, is always first. But it is by no means necessary that the agent should be always principal in the discourse: on the contrary, it very often happens that the action is principal. And indeed, according to the nature of things, the action may be often of much more consequence than the agent. It were therefore to be wished, that the genius of our language permitted us to put either of them in the place of honour that we chose. But this it does not permit, because we have

Ch. 2. have not cases whereby to distinguish the nominative, that is, the agent, from the subject of the action, which is commonly in the accusative case in Greek and Latin; but for the accusative we have no sign any more than for the nominative.

And this leads me to speak of the regimen of verbs. And the common arrangement in English is, that the substantive governed by the verb follows it. But there is no reason for this in the nature of the thing: for it may often happen, that by nature, as well as the intention of the speaker, the subject of the action is principal. But, as I said just now, the want of marks in English for the nominative and accusative cases, makes it necessary that they should be distinguished by their position; the one going before the verb, and the other following after it.

And here we may observe the great variety of the Latin and Greek composition, in the combination only of three words; I mean the verb, its nominative, and the word governed by the verb; as, for example, *Petrus amat Johannem*, can be arranged in five other different ways. For I can say, *Petrus Johannem amat*,—*Johannem*

hannem amat Petrus,—Johannem Petrus amat,—Amat Petrus Johannem,—and *Amat Johannem Petrus*; in all six. Whereas, in English, we can only say it in one way, *Peter loves John.* Ch. 2.

That this is owing to the reasons I mentioned, the want of a mark for the nominative and accusative cases, is evident from this, that where the substantive governed by the verb is in any oblique case, for which we have a mark, such as the genitive, dative, or ablative, there is no necessity for the word governed by the verb following after. Thus we say, *Fired with anger*, or, *With anger fired*;—*He behaved with courage*, or, *With courage he behaved*; though the last form of expression be more used in poetry than in prose; for what reason I do not know. Or, if the word governed be a pronoun, which has a distinction betwixt the nominative and accusative, it may likewise be put first. Thus Milton says, HIM *the Almighty power hurled headlong*, though even that way of speaking is not so common in prose.

Hitherto I have gone upon the supposition, that the first place in the arrangement of words was the place of honour; but the last

Ch. 2. last place may likewise be made the place of honour, as in speaking, more emphasis may be laid upon the last word than upon the first. Thus Horace says,

Quem virum aut heroa, lyrâ, vel aeri
Tibiâ, sumes celebrare, Clio?
Quem Deum?

On the other hand, Pindar says, Τινα θεον, τιν' ἡρωα, τινα δ' ανδρα κελαδησομεν; so here we have great authorities on both sides. And it may be said in favour of Horace's order, that it very often happens in the Latin arrangement, and not unfrequently in the Greek, that the verb, which is often the most significant word of the sentence, and always the hinge upon which it turns, is the last word in it. It should, therefore, as I said, be left to the speaker to place the words, as well as to lay the emphasis, where he thinks it will best convey his sense to the hearer. And the language which lays him under a restraint in that particular is defective. If the defect arises from some fault in the grammar and constitution of the language, there is no help for it; but it ought not to proceed from custom, and an ill taste of composition.

CHAP. III.

Objection to the antient composition answered, and shewn to be an advantage to that composition.—This illustrated by examples. The present fashionable composition altogether different from the antient.

IT may be objected, that in the simple compositions mentioned in the preceding chapter, the arrangement may be either way, without any injury to the sense or the perspicuity. But what shall we say to those artificial arrangements, by which the parts of speech that ought always to go together, are set often at a great distance from one another, as a verb from its nominative, or the word governed by it, or the adjective from its substantive; by which means the mind is kept in suspense, sometimes for a great while, and the words so jostled out of their natural order, that it requires often a great deal of pains and skill to restore them Ch. 3.

Ch. 3. to that order; and, in short, the sentence is made little better than a riddle.

The thing will be better understood by an example; and I will take one from the last stanza of an ode of Horace, which Milton has translated literally, and thereby indeed shewn very clearly, that the genius of the English language will not bear such an arrangement. But the question is, Whether the genius of the Latin be equally stinted? and whether there be any beauty or utility in ranging the words in so perverse an order, as those gentlemen would call it? The passage is as follows:

——Me tabulâ sacer
Votivâ paries indicat uvida
Suspendisse potenti
Vestimenta maris Deo.

Od. 5.

Now, according to those gentlemen, the natural and proper arrangement is that which a schoolboy learning Latin is ordered by his master to put the words in. As thus:— *Sacer paries indicat tabulâ votivâ me suspendisse uvida vestimenta potenti deo maris.*— If this be elegant and beautiful, then indeed the

the Greeks and Romans were in a great mistake when they studied a composition the very reverse of this. For we are not to imagine that it was the necessity of the verse, and not choice, that made them use such a composition. For, as shall be shewn afterwards, it is as common in their prose writings as in their verse. And indeed, it was one of the chief beauties of the Attic dialect, and which distinguished more, perhaps, than any thing else the Attic from the other Greek writers. This beauty the Romans, particularly in latter times, imitated very much; for not only Horace is full of it, but even in Virgil's eclogues, where one should have expected more simplicity of style, there is a great deal of it to be found. I shall give but one instance out of many:

Hinc tibi, quæ semper vicino ab limite sepes
Hyblæis apibus florem depasta salicti,
Sæpe levi somnum suadebit inire susurro.

Of this artificial composition in English I will give an example from Milton; it is from the speech of Satan in the beginning of the second book of *Paradise Lost*:

Me, tho' just right, and the fix'd laws of Heaven,
Did first ordain your leader, next free choice,

With

Ch. 3.

With what besides in council or in fight
Hath been atchiev'd of merit, yet this loss,
Thus far at least recover'd, hath much more
Establish'd in a safe unenvied throne, &c.

Here many objections may be made by the advocates for the natural order. In the first place, Milton has taken advantage of the pronoun *I* having an accusative, and has placed it at the head of the sentence, at a great distance from its verb *established*; so that we do not know what he would be at, till we come to the sixth line; and instead of saying plainly, and naturally, "That the loss "they had sustained had established him "much more firmly than ever in his throne," he has contrived to express it in the most perplexed way, throwing in betwixt the verb and the word it governs, which naturally ought to have followed it immediately, whole sentences concerning the laws of Heaven, the free choice of his subjects, the atchievements in battle and in council, and the recovery of their loss so far; and some of these are parentheses, such as, *with what besides*, &c. and, *thus far at least recovered*, which might both be left out in the reading, having no necessary connection with what goes before

fore and follows, and serving only to make the connection more remote betwixt the verb and the pronoun which it governs, and by consequence the composition more intricate. Ch. 3.

This, I think, is the opinion of those gentlemen fairly stated, and applied to one of the finest passages of our greatest poet, and which, according to my notions of style, is a perfect pattern of rhetorical composition, hardly to be equalled in English. The pronoun, that in the passage I quoted from Horace, and in this from Milton, is so far separated from its verb, and which is the great objection to the composition, is, I think in both passages, most properly placed in the beginning, because it is of himself that the person is speaking; and therefore the pronoun is naturally made the leading word. And what is thrown in betwixt in both passages, particularly in the English poet, is not idle words, but such as fill up the sense most properly, and give a solidity and compactness to the sentence, which it otherwise would not have. And as to the parentheses in the passage from Milton, it is well known to those who understand any thing of speaking,

Ch. 3. ing, that if parentheses be not too long, or too frequent, and be spoken with a proper variation of voice, they produce a wonderful effect, with respect both to the pleasure of the ear and to the sense, which is often thrown, or, as it were, darted in, with more force than it could be in any other way.

To be convinced of the truth of what I say, let this period be taken down in the manner that a schoolboy construes the passage of Horace above quoted. Suppose, for example, it were to be put into this form: "This loss, which we have so far recovered, hath established me in my throne more "firmly than the laws of Heaven, which "ordained me your leader, or than even "your own free choice, and all that I have "atchieved in council or in battle." Now, I ask any reader of taste or judgment, whether the period thus frittered down, does not lose one half of the strength and vigour of the expression, as well as of the beauty and pomp of sound? and whether there be not wanting in it, not only that roundness, which fills and pleases the ear so much of a popular assembly, but likewise that density of sense which makes such an impression, and which the

the critics praise so much in Demosthenes? Ch. 3.
In short, it appears to me, that by such a change, one of the most beautiful periods that ever was composed, by which Milton has deserved the praise which Cicero bestows upon poets, of studying the beauty of oratorial composition, though under the fetters of strict numbers*, is rendered flat and languid, losing not only its *oratorial numbers*, but enervated in its sense †.

And

* *Orator ad Brutum, cap.* 20. "Poëta est eo laudabilior, quod virtutes oratoris persequitur cum versu sit adstrictior."

† One may say of Milton thus *travesti* what he makes Beelzebub say of Satan: "If this be he—But, O! how changed how fallen!" from him who contends even with Demosthenes in strength, and beauty of composition; and, if the language could have supported him, Και νυ κεν η παρελασσεν, η αμφηριστον εθηκεν, *Hom. Il.* ψ *v.* 382. Demosthenes excelled, among other things, in the vehemence of altercation. Let any man of taste read the altercation betwixt Satan and Death, in the second book of Paradise Lost, and say, whether there be any thing of the kind better in Demosthenes. Demosthenes excels also in strength of reasoning, as well as in vehemence of contention. I will venture, in that respect too, to compare the dispute betwixt the Angel and Satan, when he was detected at the ear of Eve, in book 4. of Paradise Lost, or betwixt Samson and Dalilah, in Samson Agonistes, with any thing of that kind in the Greek orator. But it was only by imitating

Ch. 3.) And the reason why I think the sense is better conveyed by such composition is this: No sentence, proposition, or argument, can be thoroughly understood, unless it be altogether comprehended, and every part of it at once, in the view of the mind. For the most simple proposition cannot be understood, if we do not see at once and connect the terms of it. Nor can the conclusion of a syllogism be inferred, if the mind only recognises the premisses in parts, and does not see the propositions, and their connection, in one view. For one thing after another will not do in this matter; but the mind must perceive both the parts each by itself, and the whole together. The question then is, what kind of composition it is that contributes most to give the mind this complex view? whether that which breaks down

imitating Demosthenes that Milton could equal him.—And accordingly it is evident, that among the Greek orators, he was his particular study: and as he had practised the rhetorical manner so much in his religious and political disputes, it is no wonder that the speeches in the Paradise Lost are so admirable, and so much surpassing every thing of the kind we have in English.

down the sense, and makes a kind of pap of it, fit only to feed the minds of children, or that which gives it all at once, so interwoven and compounded, that the mind must needs perceive it altogether, or not at all? For the suspense which those gentlemen complain of, must necessarily have that effect, as it obliges the mind to carry along with it the whole sense, often to the very last word of the sentence: and if this be a principal word, as it often is, the suspense makes it strike the mind with double force. In short, there appears nothing more proper, than that what must be united in the mind, should be united in the composition; and whatever excites the mind to exert that uniting faculty, ought to be esteemed an advantage. Ch. 3.

It must be owned indeed, that to compose in this way is difficult; and that even to understand such compositions is not easy for persons not accustomed to them: but we ought to remember the Greek proverb, *That fine things are difficult*; and that for the same reason which makes this composition displease us, we ought to dislike the declensions and conjugations in Greek and Latin, and prefer our own lan-

Ch. 3. guage of indeclinable words, as being more easily learned. We ought also to consider, that the most difficult things become easy by use; and that by accustoming ourselves to this kind of composition, we exercise that best talent of the mind, the power of uniting, and seeing both the *one* and the *many*, both what is first and what is last, at once: whereas, if we require that every part of a sentence or argument should be stated to us by itself, like the steps of an algebraical analysis, the mind never will acquire any great degree of strength or vigour, but will continue in a state of infancy, requiring to have every thing minced down as it were for its tender stomach. To this weakness of readers, I observe, great indulgence has been shewn by some modern French and English authors, who have not only renounced the little variety of composition which their language admits, but have saved their readers the trouble of carrying their attention to a period of any length, and of thereby comprehending several different things in one view. For they compose (if it can be called composition) in short smart sentences, *vibrantes sententiolæ*, very

very pungent and forcible, as they think, but containing commonly only one thought, with perhaps another set in contrast to it. This is the fashionable cut of our age, by which we think we triumph over the great writers of antiquity, such as Plato, Demosthenes, and Cicero; and likewise our own old writers, such as Milton, whom I have heard treated by one of those fashionable gentlemen as a pedant. Ch. 3.

CHAP. IV.

Of the composition of Demosthenes.

THAT the patrons of this fashionable way of writing should be offended with the stile of Demosthenes, is no wonder, as it is directly opposite to what passes among them for best; but that they should imagine, either that the people of Athens did not understand him, or that his harangues were not written as they were spoken, is very extraordinary. For if he had not been understood, how could he have been so much admired by a people that Ch. 4.

Ch. 4. that were the farthest of any people in the world from being simple or ignorant? or how could his speeches have produced such surprising effects? And that the composition of them was such as we now read it, cannot be doubted by those who know that the orations of those great orators were all written, and committed to memory, before they were spoken; and that they studied the arrangement of the words, as much as the choice of them. And particularly, with respect to Demosthenes, Plutarch tells us, that having formed this artificial style, upon the model of Pericles, and other orators before his time, but not having learned enough of the art of pronunciation, nor got breath enough to be able to speak properly, those long periods of his, so full of various matter and argument, and therefore requiring variety of tones, as well as great power of voice, he was very ill received at first by the people, insomuch that he once ran out of the assembly with his head covered; but afterwards, having learned from a friend of his, that was a player, in what his defect lay, and having applied himself to the study of pronunciation, he became the most admired, and in reality

reality the greatest orator of antiquity: and among many other talents that he possessed, that in which he was most eminent was his composition; at least such was the judgement of his antagonist Æschines, who should best have known to what he himself owed his ruin *. And as to any perplexity or obscurity of the sense, which such an artificial composition as that of Demosthenes might be thought to produce, I think I am able to shew, that besides pleasing the ear so much, it conveyed the sense more forcibly than it can be conveyed by what we would call the *natural* order of the words. But as this would occasion a long digression, and such as could only be entertaining or instructive to the Greek scholar, I have thrown it into a dissertation at the end of this volume. Ch. 4.

And so much for the composition of words considered as significant into sentences, which, as I have said, is the only combination of significant sounds that grammar is concerned with. They are of different kinds, such as assertory, interrogative, optative, and imperative, which may

* Dionysius Hliacarn. Περὶ τῆς δεινότητος τῦ Δημοσθένους, p. 185. *edit. Sylburgii.* & *p.* 301. *edit. Oxford.*

Ch. 4. may be all reduced to two general heads, viz. a sentence of assertion, and a sentence of volition*. But it is sufficient for my purpose just to mention them, as it does not belong to grammar, but to other arts, to treat of the different kinds of sentences. I therefore proceed to the composition of language, considered as *sound* merely, following the same method that I did in treating of the analysis of it, and beginning with articulation.

CHAP. V.

Of the composition of the material part of language.—And, first, of the composition of articulate sounds.—The first kind of that composition is of letters into syllables.—What letters will compound with what.—The influence this composition has upon the sound of language.

Ch. 5. AS I divided the *analysis* of the material part of language into three heads, viz.

* Hermes, *pag.* 17. See also the very fine paſſage upon the subject, which he quotes from Ammonius, upon Ariſtotle's book of interpretation.

viz. articulation, accent, and quantity; so I divide the *composition* of it in the same manner; beginning with articulation. And the first composition of this kind, is of letters into syllables, which, after what I have said of letters, it is hoped will be easily understood. Ch. 5.

And first it is to be observed, that all letters will not compound in this way with all. The vowels indeed will not only mix with one another, as we have seen, forming what is called *diphthongs*; but they will compound in syllables with all the consonants, which are so called, because they sound in company with the vowels *. But this does not hold of the consonants, with respect to one another; for only some of them sound together in syllables, while others of them cannot associate in that way;

* This is an observation of Plato's, in the *Sophista*, *p.* 177. *edit. Ficini*; where he says, that some of the letters join with one another, and some will not; but the vowels, he observes, have this peculiar quality, that they go through all the rest, and are to them a kind of band or tie, without which they could not join together. They are therefore to be considered as the cement in the structure of language, of which the consonants are, as it were, the stones. And it is for this reason, as I have elsewhere observed, that consonants are considered as the principal parts of articulate sounds.

Ch. 5. way; the reason of which is, that the configuration of the mouth, and the action of its organs, is so different in the pronunciation of some of them, that they cannot be joined together in the same enunciation, nor without some rest or pause betwixt, so that there may be time to give a different configuration and action to the organs *; whereas, when the pronunciation is not so different, the sounds may be so run together as to incorporate in one syllable. And in this way five, or even six consonants may be joined in the same syllable, as in our English word *strength*; but in that case there can be no more than three before the vowel, and as many after.

The question then is, What consonants will incorporate with what? The consonants, as I have said, are either liquids or mutes; and besides these, there is the monadic letter, as it is called, *s*, which is, properly

* This is the reason given by the Halicarnassian, in his Treatise Of Compoſition, *ſect.* 22. where, in accounting why the letter π cannot be ſounded after ν in the same syllable after he had deſcribed the different manners of pronouncing theſe too letters, he adds, Ἐν δὴ τῷ μεταλαμβάνειν τὸ στόμα σχηματισμὸν ἑτέρου ἐξ ἑτέρου, μήτε συγγενῆ, μήτε παρόμοιον, ἐμπεριλαμβάνεται τις χρόνος.

properly speaking, neither mute nor liquid, but being nearer a liquid, is reckoned by many grammarians one of them. Of the four liquids, *l*, *m*, *n*, *r*, no two of them will join together in the same syllable in Greek. To this rule there is one exception; for in some few syllables μ and ν are sounded together as in μνησθευς and μναομαι. Neither is the letter *s*, when postponed to any of the liquids, sounded with them in the same enunciation, at least in Greek; but when prefixed it can be sounded with *l*, *m*, and *n*; for such is the variety in this matter, that some letters, when prefixed, will join with others in the same syllable, but not when postponed; and with respect to others, it is just the reverse, as we shall presently see. Ch. 5

As to the nine mutes, there are not any two of them associated together in the same syllable, so far as I remember, either in English or in Latin; for though, in the word *strength*, the *g* appears to mix with the aspirated *t*, it is hardly sounded in the pronounciation. But as the Greek is more various in its sound, than any other language, at least that I know, there are several of the mutes that mix together in that language.

Ch. 5. Thus π and τ being both *tenues*, associate together in the word $\pi\tau\epsilon\rho o\nu$, and the like; and for the same reason κ and τ incorporate, as in the word $\kappa\tau\alpha o\mu\alpha\iota$: but both only in a certain order; for the π and the κ must both be prefixed. B and δ also join together, but only in two words, so far as I remember, viz. $\beta\delta\alpha\lambda\lambda\omega$, $\beta\delta\epsilon\omega$, with their derivatives: And the reason is, that they are related, being both of the same class of mutes, that is, of the middle class betwixt the *tenues* and the aspirates; for as $\mathfrak{C}$ is the middle letter betwixt π and its aspirate, so is δ the middle betwixt τ and θ. As to the aspirate mutes, they do not at all mix together, either in English or Latin, so far as I can recollect; but in Greek the θ mixes both with the χ, as in the word $\chi\theta\omega\nu$, and with the φ, as in the word $\varphi\theta\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma$: but the φ and the χ do not at all incorporate together; for all which there are reasons, but it would be reckoned too minute and tedious if I should mention them. But with respect to the other mutes, the aspirates do not at all incorporate with them in the same syllable.

The proper mixture therefore of consonants in syllables, is of mutes with liquids, and

and the monadic letter, with this difference betwixt the liquids and that letter, that the liquids, in such composition, are always subjoined*, at least this holds universally in Greek; but in Latin, English, and other dialects of the Teutonic, the liquid after the vowel, is often prefixed, as in *amant*, *legunt*, *bold*, *bend*, &c. But the σ is indifferently either prefixed or subjoined to the mute in Greek, Latin, English, and other modern languages. Ch. 5.

In this manner I have shewn what consonants in syllables may be joined, or may not be joined with what. But of those that may be joined, all do not by their junction make the same pleasant sound. And a great part of the variety of the sound of a language, the pleasantness or harshness of it, the manliness or effeminacy, will depend upon the proper junction of letters in syllables, as well as upon the proper choice of the letters themselves. If therefore we suppose in a

* This is an observation of the Halicarnassian, in his treatise of Composition, so often quoted, *sect.* 22. where he says, ουδενος πεφυκε προταττεσθαι των αφωνων τα ημιφωνα: which however is not true, if we reckon as he does, the σ among the liquids; for it is prefixed to the mute in many syllables in Greek.

Ch. 5. a language, a very frequent use of a poor and slender-sounding vowel, such as the *i*, which is the case of the modern Greek; and if, at the same time, it be joined in the same syllable with consonants that do not run easily together; it is evident that the sound of such language must be very disagreeable. In our English, and other dialects of the Teutonic, there is not that perpetual *iōticism* which is in the modern Greek, and which makes the sound of that language resemble neighing. But the words are crowded with consonants, and they frequently end with mutes, and often with liquids prefixed to those mutes, which must have appeared a very harsh and uncouth sound to the antient Greeks, who never prefixed a liquid to a mute in the same syllable, nor ever terminated a word with a mute, nor even with either of the two liquids λ and μ, and but seldom with ς.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Of the composition of syllables into words, and of words into sentences.—The smoothness or roughness of a language depends upon such composition.—Deficiency of modern languages, and great excellency of the Greek in that particular.

THE next composition of articulate sounds is of syllables into words; as to which it is to be observed, that in order to make the sound of a language pleasant and flowing, the letter that concludes the preceding syllable should run easily into that which begins the next. If the preceding or subsequent letter be a vowel, there can be nothing harsh in pronouncing together the two syllables; or if they be both vowels that will only produce a gaping, or opening of the vowels upon one another, which in many cases is agreeable, because it expresses the nature of the thing signified, as in that famous line of Homer, Ch. 6.

'Ηιονες βοοωσι, &c.

But

Ch. 6. But the difficulty is when the first syllable ends, and the next begins with a consonant; for if the two consonants be of such a nature as not to run easily into one another, that makes the pronounciation of the two syllables unpleasant. The Greeks, when they came to form and polish their language, were very attentive to this; and I will give an example or two of it. The word κατεβαλε, by a syncope, they shortened into καταβαλε; but as the τ and β do not run well together, and accordingly are never joined in the same syllable, instead of καταβαλε they said καββαλε; and in like manner, and for the same reason, they said καππεσε instead of κατπεσε. N and χ being unsociable letters, and never meeting in the same syllable, at least when the ν precedes, if the ν end the first syllable, and the χ begin the next, the ν is changed into a γ, which is the correspondent middle letter of the aspirate χ, as in εγχειριδιον, and many others. And sometimes it is changed to μ in the end of a syllable, when the next syllable begins with a consonant with which μ makes a pleasant sound, as in the word εμβαλε, and many others. And sometimes a letter is inserted betwixt

betwixt it and the succeeding letter, to prevent the cacophony, as in the word ανδρες in place of ανερες or ανηρες, the ε being elided. Ch. 6

In this article our modern languages, particularly those of Gothic extraction, are not near so accurate; and for that reason, if there were no other, the sound of them is much more unpleasant than that of the Greek.

Further, to give a smooth pronounciation and a pleasant flow to a language, it is necessary that the greater part of the words should have a certain length; for the radical words must needs be short, otherwise there could not be derivatives and compounds, except they were of an enormous length. In this respect the modern dialects of the Teutonic are remarkably defective; for the words are commonly monosyllables, particularly in English. This necessarily makes a great many stops in the pronounciation of any sentence, which destroys the continuity and flow of speech, and makes it run like a shallow stream chafing among pebbles.

The next and last composition of this kind is of words with words into sentences. In order

Ch. 6. order to make this composition pleasant, the words should run into one another, so that there may be as little stop as possible betwixt them, and the whole joined, as if it were of one continued texture, and but one word*. This is done by making either the following word begin with a vowel, or, if that cannot be done, with a consonant that will associate with the consonant which terminates the preceding word, if it do not end in a vowel. When this is neglected, the composition becomes broken, harsh, and austere, as the Halicarnassian has shewn very evidently, in his fine criticism upon the composition of Pindar and Thucydides †. How defective, in this particular, our English, and other dialects of the Teutonic, are, must be evident to every attentive observer, most of our words beginning and ending with mutes or liquids that will not associate together, or with vowels, of which we cannot help the gaping upon one another.

Thus

* The Halicarnassian, speaking of this kind of composition, says, Συνειληφθαι αλληλοις αξιοι και συνυαφθαι παντα τα μορια της περιοδου, μι ς λεξεως οψιν αποτελουντα εις δυναμιν. *Sect.* 22.

† Περι συνθεσεως, *sect.* 22.

Thus from observations, which I am persuaded would at first sight appear, almost to every reader, minute and trifling, we are able to explain how one language comes to be more pleasant to the ear than another. It was in this way that the antient masters of art explained every thing, and made a science of criticism, even of that part of it which relates to the sound of language, and which, by many, is thought to be judged of only by sense and irrational feeling. We may then clearly see the reason why the Greek is a smoother and more agreeable language to the ear than the English, or any other of Gothic extraction; and why the Greeks, when they came to polish their language, threw off the old Hebrew termination in mutes, of which the Latins have retained so much, as I had occasion before to observe, and ended all their words in vowels or liquids; nor even all the liquids, as the Latins do, but only such of them as they thought of most pleasant sound. In this way we can account why, in place of the Latin *legit*, the Greeks say λεγει; and in place of *legunt*, λεγουτι or λεγεσι, with a ν added to it, when a vowel follows in the beginning Ch. 6.

Ch. 6. beginning of the next word, to prevent a disagreeable *hiatus* in the pronounciation. In short, the great difference, as appears to me, betwixt the Greek and its sister dialects, such as the Hebrew, Teutonic, and Celtic, is that the Greeks, a most ingenious people, and of a truly musical ear, cultivated and refined the mother-tongue, in sound as well as expression, while the other nations still kept it in the rude state in which they found it.

The extraordinary care and attention, which the Greeks bestowed upon the sound of their language, is a matter of curiosity to those who have studied this language; but as it does not belong to the history of language in general, I have thrown some observations upon that subject into a dissertation by itself, annexed to this volume. I will therefore here conclude what I had to say of the composition of articulate sounds, and proceed to the composition of the second part of the matter of language, viz. *accent*.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Of the composition of accents in the antient languages.—The variety of that composition in Greek.—Not so great in Latin.—The effect of it upon the style.

I HAVE given, in the preceding book, the analysis of this part of language, and explained the nature of it. I am now to shew the composition of it, and the effects which it must produce upon language. And though we have not the practice of the antient accents, any man who has the least knowledge of music must know the effect which the mixture of grave and acute tones must produce. We all know, that a monotony in speaking is disagreeable; but we have no other way of avoiding it, but by tones expressive of some sentiment or feeling. These the antients had as well as we, but they had besides syllabic tones, which we have not, and which must have made their language sound in our ears something like Ch. 7.

Ch. 7. like recitative; and if we were to hear it, perhaps some among us would call it *cant*. But the little variety of these syllabic tones, there being no more of them than a fifth and a fundamental, and the voice not resting upon them, but running them on without interruption, distinguished them sufficiently from music or cant *.

If indeed every word had been accented in the same way, and the voice had always risen to a fifth at equal intervals, there would have been an uniformity in their accents, which would have made them not very agreeable. And it was something of that uniformity which Quinctilian complains of in his own language, where all the words were so far accented in the same way, that none of them was acuted upon the last syllable. But the Greek language had all the variety in this respect that two accents could give; for the acute accent was laid indifferently upon any syllable of the word, if not beyond the antepenult, though always according to certain rules; for nothing in that language

* The Halicarnassian, speaking on this subject, says, that prose composition should be ευμελης, not εμμελης, as it should be ευρυθμος not ενρυθμος.—Περι συνθεσ. sect. 11. *in fine.*

language was without rule, that could, by its nature, be subjected to rule. Ch. 7.

The effect of these accents, properly diversified, upon their composition, must have been very great. I know well, that the mere modern reader will have no idea of this; and many, even of the learned, are unwilling to believe it. But the authority of the Halicarnassian upon the point is express and decisive. He says, "That rhetorical com-"position is a kind of music differing from "song or instrumental music, in the degree, "not in the kind. For, in this composition, "the words have melody, rhythm, variety, "or change, and what is proper or becom-"ing *. So that the ear in it, as well as in "music, is delighted with the melody, mov-"ed by the rhythm,—is fond of variety, "and desires, with all these, what is proper "and suitable. The difference therefore is "only of greater or less." And a little after this,

* Μουσικη γαρ τις ην και η των πολιτικων λογων επιςημη, τω ποσω διαλλαττουσα της εν ωδαις και οργανοις ουχι τω ποιω. Και γαρ εν ταυτη μελος εχουσιν αι λεξεις και ρυθμον και μεταβολην και πρεπον· ωςε και επι ταυτης η ακοη τερπεται μεν τοις μελεσιν, αγεται δε τοις ρυθμοις, ασπαζεται δε τας μεταβολας, ποθει δε επι παντων το οικειον. η δε διαλλαγη κατα το μαλλον και ηττον.—Περι συνθεσ. 11.

Ch. 7. this, speaking of the way of varying composition agreeably, he says, "That long and "short words, rough and smooth, should be "mixed, so that there should not be together "many words of few syllables, nor many "polysyllables; neither should words of the "*same tone* be beside one another, nor words "of the same quantity*." And in another passage † he says, "That in order to make "composition beautiful and pleasant, there "must be a noble melody, and a rhythm of "dignity." The last passage I shall mention is where he says ‡, That the best style is that which has the greatest variety; and among other varieties, he mentions, "dif-"ferent rhythms in different places, figures "of all kinds, and different tones of the "voice, (which made what they called *pro-*"*sody*), such as by their variety do not tire." And in what he has written upon the style of Demosthenes, the first distinguishing characteristic

* Μηδε δη ομοιοτονα παρ' ομοιοτονοις, μηδε ομοιοχρονα παρ' ομοιοχρονοις. *Ibid.* 12. *initio.*

† Μελος ευγενες—ρυθμος αξιωματικος. *Ibid.* 13.

‡ Και τασεις φωνης αι καλλιμεναι προσωδιαι διαφοραι, κλεπτουσαι τη ποικιλια τον κορον. *Ibid.* 19.

racteristic he mentions of his composition is the ἐμμελικά, or melody of it *. Ch. 7.

I have given these passages at some length, because they prove evidently, that the mixture of tones was a beauty in composition which the Greeks studied, though we have hardly an idea of it; and that those who deny the existence of such tones, take away a considerable part, both of the Greek grammar, and of the ornament of their composition; and may be really said to disfigure the language, doing all in their power to make it as harsh and barbarous, and as little favoured by the muses and graces, as the northern languages of Europe.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the composition of accents in English, and of English verse.

I HAVE said, and I think proved, that though in English we have some syllables longer than others, yet our verse is made, Ch. 8.

* Περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν Δημοσθένους, *p.* 192. 193. *Edit. Sylburg.*

Ch. 8. made, not by quantity, but by what we call *accent*; and I am now to shew in what manner it is so made. It may be thought, that according to the rules of method, I ought to have delayed this till I came to treat of poetry: but, according to my notion of that art, verse is not at all essential to it; but there may be excellent poetry, and I think I know some such, in prose; as, on the other hand, there may be verse without poetry. I therefore consider verse only as a species of style or composition; and, as I think, that it is made in English by a certain composition of accents, it belongs to the subject of which we are now treating.

Our English verse, though it be not formed by quantity, and therefore is essentially different from the antient verse, yet it may be considered as a species of rhythm. For rhythm, as we have seen, is a very general idea, comprehending every kind of motion in which the mind perceives any relation or analogy of parts, and is divided, as we have seen, into several speeieses. But we need here take notice only of two of them; that which is produced by the mixture of loud and soft sounds, and that

which arises from the distance or intervals betwixt such sounds. Of these two specieses of rhythm, if I am not mistaken, the music of a drum and the rhythm of our English verse is compounded. For there must be in it both louder and softer sounds; that is, accented and not accented syllables; and these must return at equal intervals, or such as have some other ratio to one another, otherwise there is no verse. Ch. 8.

To be convinced that this is the nature of our verse, a very little attention will be necessary: for we have no more to do but to repeat any verse in English, and we shall find, that without the alternate percussion of the accented and unaccented syllable, it would not be verse.

There is however something more required to complete the verse; and that is, a certain number of syllables: for if these alternate pulsations were to go on without any determined measure, they would not make verse. But these, with a certain number of syllables, are, I say, all that is required to make verse in English. We have indeed added *rhyme*, which is made by the last syllables of the number that makes the verse,

Ch. 8. being of the like sound. But it is no more than a barbarous ornament * of our verse, which came originally from the Arabs, who introduced it with their other arts into Europe. It was first used by the monks in their Latin verse, the only verse at that time known; and it was afterwards adopted into our vernacular verse, when we began to compose in our mother tongues. And indeed it appears to me to be necessary for verse in most of the other modern languages of Europe, and particularly the French.

But our accents, besides that they make our language capable of blank verse, I will undertake to shew, as I promised, give a beauty and variety to our verse, such as is not

* It was not unknown to the antients, and was reckoned among their figures of speech, under the name of ὁμοιοτηλευτον. It is used sometimes by Homer, when he has a mind to make his style very sweet and pleasant, as in the first simile of the Iliad, and the famous simile of the nightingale in the Odyssey: but it is rarely; and it can be shewn, that he has avoided it upon sundry occasions. It is therefore the constant use of it that is barbarous, especially in long and grave works. For if it were to be used only in song or in short light pieces of the Anacreontic kind, (which is the way that Milton has used it), it might pass for an ornament in our modern poetry, for want of better.

not to be found in that of any other language of Europe. And this, I hope, will bring me in favour again with my English reader; who would no doubt be much displeased with what I have said in general of our English versification, and particularly with the comparison I made of it to a drum. Ch. 8.

The English verse, then, besides that it requires not the jingle of like endings, and besides the variety that it admits of long and short verse, which it has in common with the versification of other languages in Europe, has this further variety from its accents, that it may have the loud stroke or percussion, either first or last. And according to this difference, we have two different kinds of verse in English; the one of which we may call *Iambic*, if we must needs liken our metre to the antient, and the other *Trochaic*. The first is formed when the strong *ictus* is last, and the weak first; or, in other words, when the unaccented syllable is first, and the accented last. Of this kind is our long verse, which we dignify with the name of *Hexameter*, or *Heroic*, such as that of Milton in the Paradise Lost*.

Ch. 8. Lost*. And I think it must be acknowledged, that the march of this verse is grave and

* It may be observed, that Milton uses a little freedom sometimes in the beginning of this verse, by making the first foot of it a Trochee instead of an Iambus; that is, beginning with an accented syllable; as in this verse:

"Daughter of God and man, accomplish'd Eve."

And he has been followed in this by later poets; Mr Pope particularly, as in this verse;

"Pleasures the sex, as children birds pursue."

It is an irregularity, if it may be called one, which gives a beautiful variety to the verse, by interrupting the monotony of the Iambics; and I wonder that it is not more used. But Milton, who has varied his versification, I think, more than any other of our poets, sometimes breaks the measure of the verse altogether; as in this line:

"Burnt after him to the bottomless pit."

Nor are we to imagine, that Milton did this through negligence, or as not knowing the nature of the verse he used; but it was to give a variety to his verse, and some relief to the ear, which might otherwise be tired with the constant repetition of the same measure. It is for this reason that we have, both in Homer and Virgil, irregularities of a like kind; such as Anapæsts in place of Dactyls, and Iambics or Trochaics in place of Spondees, which have been noted by the critics; and the effect they had upon the verse observed, either in making it empty, and as it were hollow, or tumid and big-bellied. And our Shakespeare, I observe, though not learned like Milton, and following only the dictates of nature, and an excellent genius, has, in some of the passionate parts of his plays, broken

and majestic, and well suited to heroic argument especially if it be not tagged with rhyme. Ch. 8.

It broken the measure of his verse, and, as the antient tragic poets were in use to do, made a kind of monody of it, in a different sort of verse. Of this kind is what he makes King Lear say, when he discovers his daughter Cordelia:

"Pray do not mock me:
"I am a very foolish fond old man,
"Fourscore and upwards;
"Not an hour more or less;
"And, to deal plainly,
"I fear I am not in my perfect mind."

It is to be observed, that in words of two or more syllables, the poet is not at liberty to alter the usual way of accenting the word. In monosyllables he has a greater liberty, but which he ought not to abuse by laying the accent upon insignificant monosyllables that will bear no emphasis, such as *a*, or *the*, or *to*, or *by*, &c. On the contrary, it is a great beauty of verse, when the monosyllable, on which the accent is thrown, is a word that not only will bear an emphasis, but requires it. So that the accent, which is the elevation of the voice upon one *syllable* of the word, and the emphasis, which is the same elevation upon a *word* of a sentence, in order to distinguish it from the rest, concur together. And this is one of the beauties of that celebrated distich of Mr Denham, in his *Cooper's Hill*, which Mr Dryden proposes as a problem to exercise the wits of the critics, to discover the reasons why it is so harmonious.

"Tho' deep, yet clear; tho' gentle, yet not dull;
"Strong, without rage; without o'erflowing, full."

whose

Ch. 8. It consists of ten syllables; and, if we please, we may divide it into feet of two syllables each, and call them Iambic; and in this way we shall have five feet in the line.

Out of this verse is made a shorter, by cutting off two syllables, so that it consists only of four Iambics. This is the verse which Dean Swift commonly uses; as in the

where the emphasis, as well as the accent, falls upon the the monosyllables *deep*, *clear*, *strong*, *rage*, and *full*. But this is not the only beauty of those lines. For, in the *first* place, There are the antitheses of *deep* and *clear*,—*gentle* and *dull*,—*strong* and *without rage*,—and *full*, *without o'erflowing*. 2*dly*, If these antitheses had been all expressed in the same manner, I should have thought there were too many of them, and that the composition was too uniform. But there is only a similarity in the two first of them; which being carried no farther, I think, is a beauty. And the expression of the two in the second line is different, not only from those in the first, but from one another. These are beauties of composition independent of the versification. But, *lastly*, There is a further beauty in the versification besides that already observed, namely, that the second line begins with a Trochee, that is, with an accented syllable, in place of an unaccented, with which the first line begins. This gives a flow to the second line very different from that of the first, and gives a beautiful variety to the whole, which otherwise the four antitheses, notwithstanding the change of expression, would render a little too uniform in the structure.

the ode to Stella on her birth day, beginning thus: Ch. 8.

Thou, Stella, wast no longer young,
When first for thee my lyre I strung.

It is of less gravity than the other, because it has not the same length of flow. But it is, I think, a pretty kind of verse, capable of being adapted both to grave and to light subjects; which last it suits very well, with the addition of those double and uncommon rhymes, which Butler and Swift have used with so much success; such as,

Pulpit drum ecclesiastic,
Beat with fist instead of a stick.

And,

His brawny back, and sides Herculean,
Support the star, and string cerulean.

This verse may be further shortened, by cutting off another foot, so that it shall consist only of three Iambics; as,

Tho' thou the waters warp,
Thy sting is not so sharp.

Or it may be still further curtailed, and reduced to two; as,

What

Ch. 8.

What place is here?
What scenes appear!

When thus shortened, it loses all its gravity, and becomes only fit for song or dance.

The other kind of verse is made by putting the accented syllable first, as in the song,

Before Porto Bello lying, &c.

And that this is the nature of the verse, is evident from this very line, where we are obliged, in order to make the verse run, to vary from the ordinary use of accenting the word *before*, by laying the accent on the first syllable instead of the last.

This kind of verse, as well as the other, may be agreeably varied by joining together long and short verses. Thus, in the song just now mentioned, to a verse of four trochaic feet, is joined a verse of three, with a residuary syllable or half-foot, as we may call it, in this manner:

Before Porto Bello lying
On the gently swelling flood.

Mr West, in his excellent translation of the *Iphigeneia* of Euripides, has shewn us,

that this kind will do in English without rhyme. In the fifth act of this play, Euripides has thought proper to change the measure of the verse, from Iambics to Trochaics, when he comes to describe the preparations for the sacrifice of Orestes. And he has introduced a conversation in this kind of verse, betwixt Iphigeneia and Thoas, which Mr West has rendered in English Trochaics, in the following manner. Ch. 8.

IPH. Know'st thou what should now be ordered?
THO. 'Tis thy office to prescribe.
IPH. Let them bind in chains the strangers.
THO. Canst thou fear they should escape?
IPH. Trust no Greek; Greece is perfidious.
THO. Slaves, depart, and bind the Greeks.
IPH. Having bound, conduct them hither, &c.

It is the best imitation of antient verse I have ever seen, and shews what can be done in our language without rhyme, not only in our long Iambic, but in other kinds of verse. I wonder that we have not seen more of the same kind, now that Mr West has set the example.

The nature of this verse is not so grave as that of our Iambic; and, like the antient Trochaics, it is fit for merriment and dancing

Ch. 8. cing *, especially when it is shortened by cutting off a foot or two; as,

Or where Hebrus wanders,
Rolling in meanders.

And,

Bending mountains,
Curling fountains.

But neither is this all the variety of which English verse is capable; for this mixture of accented and unaccented syllables may be still farther diversified, by making the interval betwixt the accented syllables double, and having twice the number of unaccented as of accented.

* The antients had a kind of verse, the measure of which was suited to dancing; and accordingly they danced to it. This kind of poetry they called ὑποθηκαι. Of this kind were many of Pindar's odes, as Plutarch informs us, in his treatise of Music; *Plutarch. Opuscul. edit. Froben. pag.* 550. Where he likewise tells us, that the measure of this verse was so much of the *saltant* kind, that it was immediately known and distinguished; for, says he, of a certain poet and musician, whom he calls *Xenodamus*, there is preserved to us a song, ασμα, ο εστι φανερως ὑποθηκη. And it appears, from a passage of Aristotle, *Poëtic. c.* 1. *in fine*, that the Dithyrambic poetry, and another kind, which he calls των νομων ποιησις, was all of that kind.

This

This kind of verse may be called *Anapæstic*, if we will still carry on the comparison betwixt our verse and the antient. An example of it we have in the two following lines: Ch. 8.

From the knaves, and the fools, and the fops of the time;
From the drudges in prose, and the triflers in rhyme.

Where we see the number of unaccented syllables is double the number of accented, the *ictus* of the verse falling always upon the third syllable, instead of the first or second, as in the Trochaic and Iambic verse.

This kind of verse admits of variety, as well as the other two; for, instead of twelve syllables, or four feet, as in the example I have given, it may consist only of eleven, as in the old song,

My time, O ye Muses! was happily spent,
When Phebe went with me where-ever I went.

Where the first foot is an Iambic, and all the rest Anapæsts. Or it may be varied in another way, by preserving the same number of syllables, making the first foot likewise

Ch. 8. wise an Iambic, and the same number of Anapæsts, but a residuary syllable over the last Anapæst; as in these lines,

If e'er in thy sight I found favour, Apollo,
Defend me from all the disasters that follow.

This verse is a graver measure than the Trochaic, as it begins with a softer sound, and has two of these in place of one loud. At the same time the *ictus* of it is more perceptible, by the interval being greater; and therefore it is a measure of spirit and movement. I do not know that it has ever been tried without rhyme: but I see no reason why a blank verse of this kind should not answer as well as the Trochaic blank verse.

Besides all these varieties, there are pauses in our English verse, particularly our blank verse, such as the sense requires, and which it is in our power to diversify as much as the same pauses in prose; so that we may give to our verse all the variety of prose composition in periods. This the antients esteemed a beauty, even in their verse*; and

* The Halicarnassian, in the 26th *sect.* of his treatise upon Composition, praises a poem for resembling, in its composition,

and it is much more so in ours, as it supplies the want of other beauties which they have. And it is one of the things which, in my opinion, gives a very great superiority to our verse over that of the French, who can have but one pause, at least in their long verse, and that is always made by the *cæsura* in the middle of it. Ch. 8.

The longest verse we commonly use, is of the kind I first mentioned, viz. the ten-syllable Iambic, or Hexameter, as we call it. But our language will bear a longer verse; for we may run out the Hexameter to twelve syllables, which is what we call an *Alexandrian line*, and which, in composition with other verses, has, I think, a very good effect. It is sometimes used in Hexameters; but it always concludes that kind of verse which is known by the name of the *stanza*. This is the greatest combination of verse that we have in English, consisting of no

composition, prose that is well composed: for, he says, it ought to have all the properties of good prose, and particularly it ought to have periods of different lengths, and different structures, and divided into members likewise of different lengths, and such as do not coincide with the verse, but cut it, and thereby conceal the measure, and make it sound like prose.

Ch. 8. no less than nine lines, of which eight are Hexameters, and the last, as I said, an Alexandrian. It has four lines that must rhyme together, viz. the 2d, 4th, 5th, and 7th; and the 1st rhymes with the 3d, and the 6th with the 8th and 9th. This so great variety of rhyme thus intermixed, makes the composition of the stanza very difficult: but, if well composed, it is, in my opinion, the finest of all English verse; for it has a great compass, and takes in a much greater variety of matter, than any other rhyming verse we have, without breaking it down into short sentences of ten syllables, as is now commonly done in our rhyming poetry. And the rhyme being so much varied and intermixed, has, I think, a better effect than in any other verse. Then it allows all the freedom of composition which was used of old both in our verse and prose. The poet therefore in the stanza may transpose and arrange words in a manner that would not be tolerated in any other kind of poetry. He is likewise indulged in the use of old words and phrases, which gives to the composition that rust of antiquity, which the Halicarnassian praises in the style of Plato;

and

and which, if not carried so far as to make the diction uncouth and obscure, is, I think, a great beauty. Further, he is exempted from the bondage imposed by modern custom of ending his line with a word of importance in the sentence, being at liberty to conclude even the stanza with any word that is proper, just as he would conclude a period in prose. Lastly, and which perhaps is the greatest privilege of all, he may make his style as simple as he pleases, or is proper for the subject. This too is an indulgence in favour of antiquity; for the style of our poetry of old was much more simple than it is now. Verse of this kind, if not first practised, was most practised by Spenser; who has been very successfully imitated, first by Mr Thomson, in his *Castle of Indolence*, the best, in my judgement, of all his works; and next by Dr Beattie, in his *Minstrel*, an author who is very well known, and justly celebrated, for his philosophical writings, as well as poetical compositions. Ch. 8.

The stanza, though it have a greater variety of rhymes than any other English verse, has very little variety of long and short verses; for all its verses are long and of equal length, except the last, which is long-

er

Ch. 8. er by two syllables than the rest. But the English versification admits of the mixture of long and short verses, and of Iambic and Trochaic, in almost infinite variety; so that in variety, as well as in other beauties, the English verse far exceeds that of any other modern nation in Europe. Of this excellency of the English versification, Mr Dryden has given us a noble specimen, in his ode on St Cecilia, where he has displayed the whole variety of English numbers; for we have there both Iambics and Trochaics, and verses of different lengths, from four syllables to ten; and the different measures are most admirably adapted to express different sentiments and passions.

And thus I hope I have shewn, that the English versification, though so much inferior to the antient, is far from being contemptible, and much superior to that of the French, or I believe of any other nation in Europe. And let not the reader be so much offended with the comparison of the drum: for that instrument, by the mixture of loud and soft, and the longer or shorter intervals betwixt, makes a music which produces a great effect; and it

would not be a bad eulogium of verse, to say, that it stirred the spirit like a drum *. Ch. 8.

CHAP. IX.

Continuation of the same subject.—The Latin verse, as we read it, not much different from the English.—The greater sweetness of the Latin verse, when so read, owing to the language, and not to the versification.

I WILL say further, in praise of our English verse, that the music of it is not very different from that of the Latin verse, as we read it. And what difference there Ch. 9.

* Since writing this, there has an author fallen into my hands, one John Mason who writes an essay on the power and harmony of prosaic numbers. This author has set to the music of the drum, some English verses, pag. 15.; and yet this same author, in another essay, on poetical numbers, would make us believe that our English verse is made by short and long syllables, though there be no such thing as short and long in the beating of a drum; and though he himself confesses, that what principally fixes the quantity in English numbers, is the accent; pag. 89. of the last mentioned treatise.

Ch. 9. is, arises more from the greater sweetness of the sound of the Latin language, than from the measure of the verse, according to our pronunciation: for, as I have shewn, we pronounce the Latin verse as we do our own, not by quantity, but by accent; so that all the music of Latin verse to our ears, is produced by a composition of accented and unaccented syllables, only mixed in a manner somewhat different from that used in English. For the intervals, we may observe, are greater and more various in the Latin heroic verse, which therefore consists of more syllables than our English verse of the same kind: for our Hexameter verse is only of ten syllables; whereas the Latin is commonly of fourteen or fifteen. But in shorter verse, such as the Sapphic, the measure may be brought to be almost exactly the same, with not only the same number of ictuses, or percussions of the accented syllables, but likewise the same number of syllables altogether. This a late author * has shewn, by a translation which he has given of the two

* John Herries, who has written a book that he intitles, *The Elements of Speech*, in which there are several good observations.

two following stanzas of an ode of Horace. Ch. 9.

Pone me pigris ubi nulla campis
Arbor æstivâ recreatur aurâ;
Quod latus mundi nebulæ, malusque
Jupiter urget;
Pone sub curru nimium propinqui
Solis, in terra domibus negata:
Dulce ridentem Lalagen amabo,
Dulce loquentem.

Place me in regions of eternal winter,
Where not a blossom to the breeze can open,
But dark'ning tempests closing all around me,
Chill the creation;
Place me where sunshine evermore me scorches,
Climes where no mortal builds his habitation:
Yet with my charmer fondly will I wander,
Fondly conversing.

Here we may observe, that not only the number of syllables and of percussions, is the same, but the intervals betwixt the corresponding percussions are equal, that is, there is the same number of unaccented syllables betwixt them. And this author has shewn, that even in the Latin long Hexameter verse, though the number of syllables be greater than in the English long

verse

Ch. 9. verse, yet the number of accents or percussions is the same; for there are always only five percussions in our heroic verse, and in Virgil's pastoral, beginning *Sicelides musæ*, there are no more in each of the first five lines.

What therefore makes the great difference betwixt our verse and the Latin, is, as I have said, the greater sweetness of the Latin language: for our language is harsh and disagreeable to the ear, by reason, first, of the number of consonants, and particularly mutes, with which the syllables are crowded; and, secondly, the great number of monosyllables, which makes the pronunciation of our language bounding and hopping as it were, and destroys entirely the *flumen orationis*, or that sweet flow which is so agreeable to the ear. This would happen in some degree, even if the monosyllables were such that they could easily join together in the enunciation, because there must be always some little stop betwixt the pronunciation of two words, otherwise they would not be two, but one. But it is still worse, when the one monosyllable ends with a consonant, and the following begins with another consonant,

consonant, which will not coalesce in the pronunciation with the first, but requires a position and action of the organs entirely different. This happens very frequently in English; and must of necessity entirely break and interrupt the continuity or flow of the speech. In some verses, where the sense requires frequent stops, this is no fault, but may be rather accounted a beauty; as in this verse of Milton, Ch. 2

Him first, him last, him midst, and without end,

or where it is intended to express something broken or discontinued, as in this other verse of Milton,

O'er bog, o'er steep, through rough, dense, smooth, or rare.

But of such words it is absolutely impossible, by the nature of things, to make sweet-flowing verse; and accordingly Milton, when he would give a sweetness or a flow to his verse, either compounds the words, or more commonly uses the foreign words which we have adopted into our language from the Greek or Latin. Of this kind are the lines,

Of

Ch. 9.

Of the eternal co-eternal beam;

or where he describes the gates of heaven opening,

——————— Heaven opened wide
Her ever-during gates, harmonious sound,
On golden hinges moving.———

Which may be contrasted with what he says of the opening of the infernal gates:

——— That on their hinges grate
Harsh thunder.———

where the words that express this harsh sound, are all Saxon, and indeed sufficiently harsh. And not only does he use Greek and Latin words, when he has a mind to smooth his numbers, but also Italian, as in that fine simile,

Thick as autumnal leaves that strow the brooks
Of Vallumbrosa, where the Etrurian shades
High over-arch'd embower.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

Of the composition of quantity, and of the numbers both of the ancient verse and prose.

I COME now to the last part of the composition of the sound of language of which I propose to treat, namely, the composition of its sounds considered as having quantity, or being long or short; and of this I will say but little, as I have shewn it not to be a common property of language, and particularly not belonging to the modern European languages, at least not to such a degree as to form their verse. Besides, the matter has been fully and accurately treated of by many learned authors. C. 10.

The analysis of this part of language is, as we have said, into long and short syllables; of which the first composition is into feet, consisting of at least two syllables *, and not more than three. This makes

* If there be but one syllable, there is neither foot nor rhythm; but every word that is not a monosyllable, has some rhythm; and consequently some feet. Πας ονομα,

C. 10. makes a division of feet into those of two syllables, and those of three. Of the first kind there are four feet, which are all the possible combinations of two long or short syllables together. Of the other kind there are eight, which are all the possible combinations of three short or long syllables; so that the whole number of simple feet are twelve *. Of these simple feet, as many more feet may be composed of four or more syllables, as you please; but they are all resolvable into the simple feet above mentioned, and therefore I think they are of little use.

Of feet the ancients composed their verse, which, as it was exactly measured, and had regular returns of the same feet, was called by the name of μετρον, or metre. And the particular kinds of verse were denominated,

και ρημα, και αλλο μορίον λεξεως, ὁτι μη μονοσυνθετον εστι, εν ρυθμῳ τινι λεγεται. *Dionys.* περι συνθ. *sect.* 17. For there necessarily must be a composition of two or more sounds to produce rhythm, which is defined by Aristides, a writer upon music, to be συστημα εν χρονων κατα τινα ταξιν συγκειμενων. Now the least system or composition that can be, is of two, and therefore a disyllable foot is the least part into which rhythm can be divided.

* All this is accurately and fully explained, in the excellent Treatise of Composition so often quoted, *sect.* 17.

nated by the number of feet they contained, as *Hexameters*, *Pentameters*, *Tetrameters*, *Trimeters*, and *Dimeters*. C. 10.

In this way they composed their verse; but even their prose was not without rhythm. But as the rhythm of it was not so exactly measured, though very much studied and laboured, it had not the name of metre. I do not wonder that many among us have not so much as the idea of those *numbers* of prose, when the Halicarnassian tells us, that in his time hardly any body practised them. And it would appear, from the pains he takes to prove that they had been practised in former times, that some people, even in his time, doubted of their existence. But he avers the fact to be, that all the great authors before him studied this part of their composition very much: which he proves, first, by the authority of Aristotle, who, in his books of Rhetoric, makes it an essential part of the rhetorical style, and mentions the particular feet most suitable to an oration; and, secondly, by passages which he quotes from Demosthenes, and which he is at great pains to shew were not the effect

C. 10. of chance *; and he observes, what an advantage the orator has over the poet, by being at liberty to mix his rhythms as he thinks proper, without being restricted to any certain rule or measure †. And if more authorities were wanting, Longinus, in his treatise of the Sublime, *sect.* 39. says that it looks like madness to dispute the effect of rhythm in rhetorical composition; and he quotes a passage from an oration of Demosthenes, where he says, the beauty and grandeur of the composition is produced by its running on Dactyl feet. And Cicero, speaking of the effect of numbers in an oration, says, that "who does not feel "it, does not deserve to be reckoned a "man ‡."

This last mentioned author has written, as he says himself ||, more fully upon the subject of oratorial numbers than any before him; and as he had practised the art so much, and with so great success, we must allow him to be a good judge of the effect of

* Περὶ συνθέσεως, *sect.* 25. † *Ibid.*

‡ *Quod qui non sentiunt, quas aures habeant, aut quid in his hominis simile sit, nescio. Orator ad M. Brutum, cap.* 50.

|| *Orator, cap.* 68.

of them, which he says is so great, *ut aliter in oratione nec impetus ullus nec vis esse possit* *. And he gives us one instance, where the whole assembly of the people of Rome were excited to acclamations of applause by one sentence so arranged as to please the ear by its numbers †; and in that and sundry other instances ‡, he has shewn, that by changing the arrangement, and consequently the numbers, you destroy the whole beauty of the composition. And not only has he given very particular directions about the numbers that are proper to be used in an oration, but he has given us a history of this branch of the art of composition. Thrasymachus, he says ‖, first invented the art. Gorgias also practised numbers very much in his compositions; but it was those chiefly which arose from the form and structure of the sentence, in which like things were referred to like, contrary to contrary, and words of the same form made to answer to one another **. But he says, those C. 10.

* *Orator, cap.* 68. † *Ibid. cap.* 63.

‡ *Ibid. cap.* 70. ‖ *Ibid.* 52.

** Of this kind of numbers, Cicero, in this book, gives

C. 10. those authors used numbers too much, an error which Gorgias corrected in himself, when he became old, as appears from a book that he addressed to Philip of Macedon, in which he says, that he was not so studious of numbers in his composition as formerly. After those, says our author, came Isocrates, who first appears to have taught the use of numbers in prose composition; but he used them more moderately than either Thrasymachus or Gorgias. From his school, as from the Trojan horse, issued a swarm of orators, and from that time the use of numbers in orations became common. But before, according to our author, they were not used in prose composition; nor do any of the ancient writers upon rhetoric mention them, and he particularly instances Herodotus and Thucydides, and all the writers of their times, who, he says, have no numbers, unless it be by accident *. But here the Halicarnassian

gives a famous example from his own oration, *pro Milone. Est enim hæc, Judices, non scripta sed nata lex; quam non didicimus, accepimus, legimus, verum ex natura ipsa arripuimus, hausimus, expressimus, ad quam non docti sed facti, non institui sed imbuti sumus.*

* *Orator, cap.* 55. *and* 65.

nassian differs from him; and I think with good reason: for although the numbers of Herodotus be very different from those of Demosthenes or Cicero, as certainly the numbers of historical composition ought to be very different from those of oratory; yet I think it is impossible to read Herodotus, without being convinced that so sweet a composition as his could not be without some study bestowed upon the pleasure of the ear, though it certainly was not his chief study; nor does there appear, in his work, any affectation of that sort, which is highly blameable even in an orator; for, as Cicero has well observed, the excess in this matter offends much more than too little *. And he very much blames those Asiatic orators, who threw in idle words, in order to fill up their numbers, and which therefore he calls *complementa numerorum* †. I therefore think that the Halicarnassian is in the right when he quotes Herodotus as an example C. 10.

* *Nimium quod est offendit vehementius quam id quod videtur parum. Orator, cap.* 53.

† *Ibid.* 69.

C. 10. ample of numerous composition in the historical kind. And as to Thucydides, his numbers indeed are very different from those of Herodotus, or of the orators. But that he has numbers, and those too studied, and not accidental, the Halicarnassian thinks indisputable; and accordingly he has shewn the particular numbers he made use of. And in general he appears to me to be in the right, when he avers it to be a fact, that all the great prose-writers of antiquity studied numbers in their composition. And not only did orators do so, and even historians, but likewise philosophers, particularly Plato, whose care in the arrangement of his words was such as would appear to us much too nice, and even frivolous; for the Halicarnassian tells us, that at his death there were found in his pocket-book two or three different arrangements of the first words in the beginning of his books of Polity. And this, no doubt, was one of the reasons, among others, why his scholar Aristotle said that his style was something betwixt verse and prose *.

And

* *Diog. Laërtius in vita Platonis.*

And there is a reason, I think, though the Halicarnassian has not given it, why rhythm should have been more studied by the more ancient writers of prose, than by those of latter times; and it is this, That the first writings in Greece, and I believe almost in every other nation, were in verse. It was very natural therefore, that when they first began to write in prose, they should not entirely forsake the numbers of the poets any more than their words. And accordingly, the Halicarnassian tells us, if I am not mistaken, that it was the imitation of Homer which made Herodotus write in a style so numerous, as well as so poetical, in other respects. C. 10.

It appears from what Cicero tells us *, that among the Romans likewise, as well as among the Halicarnassian's countrymen, there were who denied the existence of this oratorial rhythm. If so, it is no wonder that many among the moderns should not have the least idea of it. And indeed, if we have no true perception of the rhythm of the ancient verse, as I think I have clearly

* *Orator, cap.* 54.

C. 10. ly proved, it is evident that we can have as little of their prose numbers.

But we may judge of the effects that they must have had upon their learned ears, by the effect that the rhythm of music has upon ours; for in that respect, I apprehend there is no difference betwixt us and the ancients; now among them, even in music, rhythm was every thing *. It is true indeed, that there is not near so great a variety in the rhythm of language as in that of music; for there are but two times in language, the one double the other. But these two times, as we have seen, do by their combinations make twelve simple feet, besides other combinations that may be made of these: now even that is a rhythm, which properly employed, must produce a very great effect upon the hearers; so that from the reason of the thing, as well as from the authority of those great authors, we may be sure that the rhythm was a very material part of their compositions.

In English, as we have not quantity, it is impossible we can have that kind of rhythm

* It is a common saying among the writers upon music, Παν παρα τοις μουσικοις ὁ ῥυθμος.

rhythm in our prose, any more than in our verse; what therefore we have of numbers in our prose, must arise from our composition in periods of various lengths, consisting of various members, differing in number, and likewise in length. In this, our language admits of a considerable variety: and by concluding these periods, and their several members, aptly; and by the proper use of those figures of composition, such as the antithesis, and words of like form answering to one another, which, as Cicero observes, do of themselves give numbers to the style; it is, I think, impossible to deny but that we may give a beautiful variety to the cadence of our prose compositions; but of this I will say more when I come to treat of style. C. 10.

To conclude this subject, it appears from what has been said, that we cannot now judge of the power of ancient oratory, because we can only judge by reading their orations. Now what Æschines said to one who read Demosthenes's oration against him, and commended it very highly, will apply much more strongly here. "What "would you have thought," said he, "if "you had heard him speak it?" For the

C. 10. ancients certainly could read their own writings properly, which we cannot; nor from any thing of the kind that we hear among ourselves, can we form a proper judgment of the effect of an oration of Demosthenes first composed with the greatest art, and with all that variety in the composition, which every man of taste at this day must admire, and then pronounced with all the beauty of melody and rhythm, and all the expression that the action of the best player could give it: for this part of the art he had studied extremely, having found the want of it in his first public appearances, as I before observed. When we add to all this the dignity and spirit of the man, the true principles of that δεινότης, which is esteemed the distinguishing characteristic of his style, we need not wonder, that when it was known he was to speak, there was a concourse from all parts of Greece; and that his orations had the effect to excite to action and hazardous enterprize, a people so much sunk in pleasure and indolence, as the Athenians were at that time *,

But

* There is a French author that I have read, but whose

But there was another kind of composition among the Greeks, and which must have had still a greater effect upon the passions of men, because it united the powers of poetry, music, and dancing, i. e. motion performed to music, and expressive of passions and sentiments. The composition, I mean, is the poetry I mentioned before, of the Archestic or saltant kind, such as some of the odes of Pindar, and such as all the Dithyrambic poetry was, and another species mentioned by Aristotle in the beginning of his Poetics, which he calls νομοι, and such were some of the songs of the chorus in tragedy *, which, joined with its other beauties, made it, C. 10.

whose name I have forgot, who has expressed in a lively manner, the difference betwixt the eloquence of Demosthenes and that of Cicero. "When the Romans," says he, "heard Cicero, they cried out, *O le bel Orateur!* but when the Athenians heard Demosthenes, they called out, *Allons, battons Philippe.*" And the fact truly is, that when Cicero spoke, he was often clapped by his audience, that is, applauded in the manner we applaud players; whereas we hear of no such noisy applause given by the Athenians to Demosthenes; but in place of that, they were convinced, against their inclinations; and, shaking off their indolence, and love of pleasure, acted as he would have them.

* *Aristides*, lib. 1. p. 63.

C. 10. it, as it was represented in Athens, the most elegant and most refined entertainment that I believe ever was exhibited; and I can almost forgive the Athenians for expending their military treasure, and a considerable part of the revenue of their state, upon it.

CHAP. XI.

The conclusion of the subject.—The great excellency of the Greek language, compared with the modern languages of Europe.

C. 11. THUS I have gone through both the analysis and composition of language in all its parts; in doing which I have run the comparison all along betwixt the ancient and modern languages, thinking that I could not better shew the art of the one, than by contrasting it with the rudeness and imperfection of the other; nor recommend more to my readers (which is the principal design of this part of my work) the study of the ancient languages, and particularly the Greek, as from that study only they can learn the perfection

tion of an art so noble and useful, and of which the invention does so much honour to human nature. I have endeavoured to shew, that the expression of the Greek language is full and accurate, but without any redundancy of words;—that its flections save the multiplication of words unnecessarily, expressing all that can be conveniently expressed in that way, and nothing more;—that its radical words are as few in number as possible, and so framed as to answer admirably well the purposes both of flection and derivation;—that in the whole structure of the language, they have had a proper regard to the ear, as well as to the understanding, and have employed the whole power of elemental sounds, to make their language both soft and manly in the pronunciation; and to so perfect an articulation they have added melody and rhythm, by which they have given their language all the music that a language ought to have;—in short, that the system of the Greek language is complete in every part, in sound as well as sense; and that the art of it is so perfect, that every thing in it is subjected to rules that can by its nature be so subjected. On C. 11.

the

C. 11. the other hand, it appears, that the languages of northern extraction, and particularly the English, are composed almost altogether of hard inflexible words, monosyllables for the greater part, and crowded with consonants that do not easily coalesce in sound, and that these words are unskilfully tacked together by ill-favoured particles constantly recurring and fatiguing the ear, without either melody or rhythm to soften the harshness of so rude an articulation.

I am very sensible, that by what I have said here and elsewhere, of modern languages and modern arts, I shall give great offence to many readers. I know how predominant vanity is in this age, and that the vanity of the individual goes even to the age in which he lives. For if it be vilified or disparaged, he thinks it reflects dishonour upon him, as it tends to make his fancied superiority over his contemporaries not so great a praise as he had imagined. But I said in the beginning of this work, that I did not write for the *many*; and I hope there are even in this age a *few* learned and candid judges, (some I think I have the happiness of knowing), whose approbation alone I desire, and who, I am persuaded will not

not be offended with what I have said in praise of ancient, and censure of modern arts. They know, that other bad qualities excite hatred, or perhaps compassion, in men of great humanity; but that there is none which makes a man so contemptible in the eyes of men of sense as *vanity*. And they know, at the same time, that it is founded in ignorance; and that the only cure for it is good solid learning, (for a little superficial learning increases it), in *philosophy*, *history*, and *arts*. By *philosophy* we learn what the powers of human nature are, and to what a height it may be exalted; but it will teach us, at the same time, that man can never rise to his highest elevation without philosophy. *History* will inform him to what perfection men have actually arrived in other ages and nations of the world, and that the manners and institutions alone of a well-regulated state, have formed great men. But it will inform him likewise, that in a corrupt and degenerate nation, no man can rise above the manners of the age, except by the assistance of *philosophy*, to which alone we owe those shining lights which have illumined the darkest ages of the world, and cast a glory upon the most profligate and worthless C. 11.

C. 11. times*. And lastly, by the study of ancient *arts*, he will learn to know how much in those arts, the ancients excelled the moderns, and that it is only by the study of ancient arts that we can improve the modern, or judge truly of their merit. By such a course of study he will come to know the nature of man,—what he is,—what he has been,—and what he may be. And it is in this way, and this way only, that we can ever fulfil the precept of the Delphic god, *to know ourselves*. For it is only by knowledge of the species that we can know the individual; and a person is *vain*, not because he does not know himself, (for every man knows himself by the most certain of all knowledge, viz. consciousness), but because he does not know what is most excellent of the kind. A man, therefore, who has attained this prime knowledge, though he should be conscious of excelling every man of this age in every valuable accomplishment, he would not on that account

* It was to philosophy that the Romans owed, in their degenerate days, an Helvidius Priscus, a Thraseopetus, and the great and good emperor Marcus Aurelius; and it was not the manners of the state, but philosophy, that formed Epaminondas, the greatest man perhaps that ever Greece produced.

account have a high opinion of himself; and the chief praise he would bestow on himself would be, that though he was far short of what he should be, he was free of that contemptible quality, *vanity*; for such a man, though he might pass for *proud*, would be (as Swift has well distinguished) *too proud to be vain.*——But to return to our subject: C. 11.

I have now finished the grammatical part of this work, which I hope will at least serve to shew what I chiefly intended by it, that a language of art is indeed a work of great art. If I have otherwise failed in the execution of this work, through the want of knowledge of so many particular languages as may be necessary for such an undertaking, or through any other want, I think I may venture to say, that I have treated the subject according to a method which will take in, under one or other of its heads, every thing belonging to every language that ever existed.——I will conclude this volume with some observations upon the Chinese language, and that invented by Bishop Wilkins; after which I will endeavour to shew, that a language of art could not have grown out of

C. 11. popular use, but must have been the invention of men of genius and science.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Chinese language.—The most extraordinary language in the world.—Very imperfect, and the reason why it has continued so long in that state.—Probably came from Egypt through India.

C. 12. THE language of this people is very singular, nor do I believe that there is such another language at present to be found on the face of the earth. It cannot be called a language of art; nor is it entirely barbarous; but it participates of both, and may be said to be an intermediate stage betwixt the two. For it has so much of the language of art, that it does not use one word to express whole sentences, but has different words for different things: and with respect to the sound, it has not that peculiarity of all the barbarous languages, namely, very long words; but, on the contrary, all its words are monosyllables; a singularity which distinguishes it from all other languages, so far as

as I know, that are any where spoken. On the other hand, it so far resembles the barbarous languages, that it has neither composition, derivation, nor flection; and it is so much more barbarous than they, that it does not shew any thing like an attempt towards any of those great arts of language; whereas the barbarous languages, as we have seen, have some beginnings of all the three; so that, though they have not yet attained to art, they seem to be in the progress towards it. And that the Chinese have not the art of composition is the more surprising, for this reason, that in the characters which make their written language they have such composition. For example, the character by which they express *misfortune*, is composed of a character which signifies *house*, and another which denotes *fire*, because the greatest misfortune that can befall a man is to have his house on fire *. But with respect to the language that they speak, though they very often employ many words to express one thing, yet they do not run them together into C. 12.

* *Du Halde, tom. 2. p. 227.*

C. 12. to one word, making certain alterations upon them, that they may incorporate the better, as is practised in other languages, but preserve them entire and unchanged.

I have spoken elsewhere of the Chinese characters, and have shewn them to be no other than natural representations of things, but very much abridged, for more expeditious use, and compounded together, as we have seen, in order to express compounded ideas, with many marks of arbitrary institution to express things which cannot be represented by corporeal forms. And I will now proceed to give a short account of the nature of their language, taken from that great collection upon the subject of China, made by Du Halde.

And, in the first place, it must appear surprising, that, having nothing but monosyllables in their language, they should be able to express so many things as a life of great policy and refinement, such as theirs, requires to be expressed. For without the variety which the composition of syllables gives to our words, it would be impossible for us to express one half of the things which we have occasion to express. But, in the first place, they use several words, as

I have just now said, to denote one thing; and though they have not the art of composition, I am persuaded they pronounce them so as to distinguish them from other words, signifying different and detached things. And, secondly, they diversify their monosyllables so, by different tones which they give them, that the same word, differently accented, signifies sometimes ten or eleven different things *, which makes their language appear to strangers to be no better than sing-song †. It is in this way that they supply the poverty of their articulation, which indeed is very great; for besides their having no composition of syllables, they want the use of many letters that we have, particularly the letters *b*, *d*, *r*, *x*, *z* ‡. C. 12.

As they diversify the words so much by tones,

* Du Halde gives an example of this in the monosyllable *ro*, which, by different accents, and inflections of the voice, as he expresses it, is made to signify eleven different things, *vol. 2. pag.* 225.

† Du Halde denies this, and affirms, that the authors who say so are mistaken. *Ibid.* But I rather believe that he is mistaken, because I have heard several persons, who had been in the country, say the same.

‡ *Du Halde, ibid. pag.* 230.

C. 12. tones, one should imagine that this music of their language rose high, at least above the acute accent in Greek, which is no higher than a fifth. But if we can believe what Du Halde says of the fineness and delicacy of their tones so as to be hardly perceptible to a stranger *, we must suppose that they do not rise high, but only by small intervals, so that the music of their language must resemble somewhat the music of the birds, which is within a small compass, but nevertheless of great variety of notes. If this be so, the learning the Chinese language must be exceedingly difficult to a stranger, if he has not a good voice and ear for music, and much practice of it. The great difference therefore betwixt the Chinese and Greek accents, consists in this, that the Greeks had but two accents, the grave and acute, distinguished by a great interval, and that not very exactly marked. For the acute, though it never rose above a fifth higher than the grave, it did not always rise so high, but was sometimes pitched lower, according to the voice of the speaker; whereas the Chinese must have many more accents, consisting of much smaller

* *Ibid. pag.* 225.

smaller intervals, and therefore more exactly distinguished. So that it is evident the Chinese language must be much more musical than the Greek, and more musical than any language ought to be. But, as I have said, it is necessary to supply the defect of their articulation. C. 12.

For this purpose likewise they use quantity, and by lengthening or shortening the vowels of their words, make them signify different things. They do the same by giving their words different aspirations, and by sounding them with different degrees of softness or roughness *; and by these methods of diversifying their monosyllables, they make three hundred and thirty of them, says our author, serve all the purposes of language †, and these not much varied in their termination; for they all end either with a vowel, or with the consonant *n*, sometimes with the addition of the consonant *g* ‡.

With respect to the grammar of this language, as they have no flection, so that all their

* *Ibid. pag.* 225. † *Ibid. pag.* 224.

‡ *Ibid. pag.* 225.

C. 12. their words are indeclinable, their cases and tenses are all formed by particles. Genders they have none; and even the distinction of numbers, which is marked by some change of the word in languages that are otherwise exceedingly imperfect, is marked in the Chinese only by a particle *. They have no more than the three simple tenses, viz. the present, past, and future; and for want of different terminations, the same word stands either for the verb or the verbal substantive, the adjective or the substantive derived from it, according to its position in the sentence.

Thus it appears, that the Chinese language, whether we consider it as sound merely, or as sound significant, is exceedingly defective; yet, such as it is, it has been used by this people for three or four thousand years, and their written language, during that time has been so bulky and cumbersome, that it costs the labour of a life to attain to any competent knowledge of it.

I should be much surprised at this, if I believed, as some do, that the Chinese were

* *Ibid. p.* 234. *et seqq.*

were an ingenious and inventive people. C. 12.
But I am of the opinion of Dr Warburton, "that the Chinese are the least inventive "people upon earth *." And I require no other proof of it than their using, for such a length of time, a language and orthography so extremely defective. It convinces me that they cannot have made any considerable progress in philosophy. For it is philosophy that discovers the principles of all arts and sciences; and if the Chinese had been philosophers, such as the Egyptians were, they certainly would have applied their philosophy to find out, as the Egyptians did, the principles of those two most useful arts in life, speaking and writing.

But I have other proofs of their ignorance in philosophy. The oldest traveller into China that is commonly known, is Marco Paolo, the Venetian, who was in that country in the thirteenth century. But as he was no philosopher, nor a man of science, so far as appears, of any kind, we cannot expect from him any account of the philosophy and sciences of the Chinese, though he

* Divine Legat. book 4. sect. 4.

C. 12. tells us a great deal of their customs and political institutions, and relates a good number of curious facts. But four hundred years before, that is, in the ninth century, two Mahometan Arabians travelled into China; and we have their travels translated from Arabic into French by one Mr Renaudaut, with notes and observations very well worth reading *. In these travels there a great many curious facts of natural history, which shew that the authors were men of observation and curiosity. But what is to our present purpose is, that one of them, speaking of the Chinese learning, says expressly, that they had no science at all, and that even their religion and laws they had got from India †. He adds, that the Chinese knew a little of astronomy, but the Indians more; and that among the Indians, both medicine and philosophy were cultivated.

The opinion of this Arabian traveller, who lived at a time when the Arabians were far advanced in science and philosophy, appears to me more to be depended upon, than what we have heard of late from

* The Book is printed at *Paris* 1718.

† *Pag.* 45.

from the Jesuits, concerning the wonderful learning of the Chinese. For, as the French translator has observed, the account which the Jesuits themselves give of their knowledge of some of the sciences, shews that they have made very little progress in them. And our author quotes, upon this occasion, p. 342. what Father Martini says of their progress in the highest philosophy, and which may be said to contain the principles of all other philosophy, I mean *metaphysics*. "It is amazing," says that father, "that in all their writings, they say nothing "of the author of all things, and have not "so much as a name for him in their co-"pious language." And as to their skill in astronomy, of which we have heard so much, we may judge by the honours that were done to some Jesuits there, who were made presidents of their tribunal of mathematics, though in Europe they were not known for astronomers. And the fact is, according to Mr Renaudaut, that they were not able, without the assistance of the Jesuits, to calculate an eclipse with any tolerable exactness. And accordingly, in their astronomical tables, of the exactness of which some

C. 12.

of

C. 12. of the Jesuits boast so much, Cassini, one of the greatest astronomers of later times, has observed, that there are the grossest errors in their calculation of eclipses, and other conjunctions, *p.* 359. But what puts this matter out of all doubt, is what Du Halde, who was himself a Jesuit, tells us, that they know very little either of the theorems or problems of geometry; and when they resolve any problem, it is rather, he says, by induction than by principles *; that is, in other words, they cannot demonstrate: and accordingly, the French author above quoted, Mr Renaudaut, tells us, that when the Jesuits put Euclid into their hands, and explained to them the demonstrations, they admired them exceedingly, as things altogether new to them. If this be true, it is impossible that they can have made a science of astronomy.

The truth therefore seems to be, that though the Chinese excel in some mechanic arts; and though the populousness and extent of their country have obliged them to establish an exact police, and to study the rules of morality and good government, they are

* *Vol.* 3. *p.* 268.

are far from being men of science and philosophy. C. 12.

But how came they by their language, which, however imperfect, must be acknowledged to be very extraordinary, and like no other that is any where to be found? And the first question is, Whether they invented their language? And my opinion is, that though at some time or other they may have produced a barbarous jargon, such as is spoken by savages in the first state of barbarity, consisting of words, or rather cries, of great length, with very little articulation; yet I can hardly believe that a people so dull and uninventive, would have advanced even the first step towards a language of art, by shortening their words. For this was the first thing that men did when they began to speak by art, without which they could have had neither composition, derivation, nor flection, three things of absolute necessity in a language of art.

From whence, then, did the Chinese get those roots of language, (for so I call their monosyllables), if they were not of their own growth? And I think it is probable that they came from the same parent-country of learning from which Europe has derived

C. 12. rived all its arts, I mean Egypt. For, as I have observed in my first volume *, the Egyptians said that their Osiris over-ran all the east, with a great army, and penetrated as far as India, where he built cities, and introduced arts and civility. And with this Egyptian story, agreed not only the popular tradition among the Indians, but the opinion of their philosophers and wise men, who related, as Diodorus Siculus informs us †, that Bacchus, who was the same with Osiris, entered India with a great army, and tamed and civilized the people; and, among other arts, I think it is likely he also introduced his language. Thus, by the concurrent testimony of both countries, we can trace arts from Egypt into India; and from India, according to our Arabian travellers, the Chinese got their religion and laws, and we may presume likewise their language. And it will be a farther confirmation of this, if it be true what is maintained by a learned academician ‡, whom I knew in Paris, that the Chinese got their written characters from Egypt,

* Lib. 3. cap. 12. pag. 466.

† Lib. 3. ‡ M. de Guignes.

Egypt, being the natural representations of things curtailed and abridged, which the Egyptians used before they invented letters. At this time we may suppose that the Egyptians had proceeded no farther in the art of language, than to shorten, and perhaps articulate a little more their barbarous cries, but had not yet invented composition and derivation, and all that we call the analogy of language. In this rude state was language, as I conjecture, imported from Egypt to China, through the medium of India. And the Chinese being a dull uninventive people, have preserved it just as they got it, without improving or enlarging it by the grammatical art. And in like manner they have kept the written characters such as they originally were, without inventing an alphabet, as the Egyptians did. C. 12.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the philosophical language invented by Bishop Wilkins.

C. 13. YOU people of Europe that are so ingenious, said the North-American Indian to his missionary, has any one of you invented a language *? This Indian it seems had sagacity enough to perceive, what we have laboured so much to prove, the difficulty of the invention. The missionary, though a man of letters, did not, it is likely, know any thing of Bishop Wilkins's philosophical language; otherwise he would have been very glad to have answered the question in the affirmative, being desirous, no doubt, to give the Indian a very high opinion of us Europeans; a matter not easy among such of them as are best acquainted with us. The author of this wonderful invention was Dr *John Wilkins*, one of the first members of the Royal Society. He flourished about the middle

* Vol. 1. p. 392.

middle of last century *, a very learned age, when every branch of learning was cultivated, and among other things the nature of language was much studied. I have already had occasion to observe, that another member of this Society, Dr Wallis, invented that most ingenious art of teaching the dumb to speak, an invention that could not have been thought of except by a man who understood perfectly the mechanism at least of language. And that his knowledge went much deeper, is evident from the English grammar that he has published †. C. 13.

The gentleman I am now speaking of was a man of a singular genius, aspiring to things great and extraordinary. Not

 contented

* The Society gave a warrant for the printing of the book by an act bearing date 13th April 1668.

† Thus it appears, that the subject of which I am treating, as well as other branches of science, has been much indebted to the labours of this learned body. The history of the society, written by a member of it, Dr Sprat, is justly esteemed a standard for the English language. And if the public shall find any accuracy or correctness in the style of this work, it is in great part owing to the friendly admonitions and corrections of Sir John Pringle, who so worthily fills at present the chair of president in that Society.

C. 13. contented with the possession of his native element the earth, nor with the power of making himself, if he pleased, an inhabitant of the water, as much as an otter, or any other amphibious animal, he wanted to vindicate to man the dominion of another element, I mean the air, by teaching him to fly. Of kin, I think, to this attempt, though not so romantic, was his scheme of an universal philosophical language, both written and vocal. However impracticable the attempt may seem, or at least exceeding the abilities of a single man, which indeed the author seems to confess, it must be allowed that he was very well qualified for such an undertaking. For he was deeply learned in the antient philosophy, from which he had learned that greatest of all arts, as Cicero calls it *, and absolutely necessary for the execution of his project, by which we are taught to ascend to what is highest and most comprehensive of every kind, and from thence to descend through the several subordinate genera and specieses, dividing, subdividing,

* *Brut. sive de clar. Orat. cap.* 41. And a little before he says, it is *ars quæ docet rem universam tribuere in partes, latentem explicare definiendo*, &c.

dividing, and defining, with the greatest exactness *. This may be said to be the *art of arts*, since it is the art by which arts and sciences are made; and in the writings that have been published since the antient philosophy was out of fashion, there is nothing I desiderate so much as order and method, and a deduction of things from their first principles. How necessary this art was for the invention of a philosophical language, will appear from the account I am now to give of the language invented by Bishop Wilkins; for the understanding of which it will be necessary to recollect what has been said in the first part of this work, concerning ideas, and the philosophy of mind, with which the knowledge of all languages, but particularly C. 13.

* These are two different talents. For Socrates, says Ariſtotle, inveſtigated *generals* very well, but he was not ſo accurate in *dividing* the genus, when found, into its ſeveral ſpecieses. He himſelf excelled in both; and it appears to have been from the ſtudy of him, chiefly, that Bishop Wilkins acquired thoſe two great nerves of ſcience, definition and diviſion. And in the tables which he has compoſed for the purpoſe of framing his philoſophical language, there is more ſcience to be found than any where that I know in ſo ſmall a compaſs.

C. 13. larly of a philosophical language, must be intimately connected.

In the *first* place, we must remember, that all things in nature are reducible to certain classes, which are termed by logicians *genus* or *species*, according as they are higher or lower, containing or contained. To make this division and arrangement is the great business of *intellect*; and it is by this operation that we form our notions or ideas of every thing.

2do, It has also been observed, that it is in this way only that we have any knowledge or comprehension of any thing: for we know nothing *absolutely*, but only *relatively*, by knowing to what genus or species it belongs, that is to say, what it has in common with other things, and what different. Thus we know nothing of man, except that he is of the genus animal, and of a certain species of that genus, differing in certain things from other specieses of the same genus.

3tio, It is these notions, or ideas, as I call them, thus formed, by comparing things with one another, which, expressed by certain signs, audible or visible, make what we call language, spoken or written.

And

And if those signs are such as bear a reference to the class in which the thing is to be found, so that if we understand the sign, we have in effect the definition of the thing, then is the language truly a philosophical language, and such as must be universal among philosophers, who have arranged and distributed things into proper classes. It may also be said to be a *natural* language, as the Bishop calls it, since it follows the order of the human mind in forming the ideas of which language is the expression. C. 13.

4*to*, The difference betwixt such a language, and the common languages, is obvious. For the primitive words of those languages have no connection at all with the nature of things, or the classes to which they belong. And as to the derivatives, though they have a connection with the primitive word, it is not such a connection as philosophy requires, but often the reverse; as in the case of what they call *abstract nouns*, such as *bonitas* in Latin, or *goodness* in English, which are derived from the adjectives *bonus* or *good*; whereas, according to philosophical derivation, and the nature of things, the adjective denoting the

C. 13. the quality concrete, should have been derived from the noun denoting the quality abstract. Hence it comes, that the knowledge of things does not at all lead to the knowledge of words in such languages, any more than the knowledge of words leads to the knowledge of things. And as to the written characters of such languages, they only express the words, not the things. It is evident therefore that such languages are far from being philosophical; nor can any of them be ever universal, but each will be understood only by such as have made a particular study of it.

From these observations it appears, that in order to form this philosophical and universal language, we must find out a certain number of genera, to which all things in nature are reducible; and we must have a mark or sign for every thing, denoting under which of these genera it is ranked. And, secondly, As those genera must have under them a great number of subordinate specieses, that particular species to which the thing belongs must also be marked. And here must appear the extraordinary difficulty, both of the invention and use of such a language: for suppose

pose the genera, comprehending all things, reduced to a small number, such as would not be burdensome to the memory; and suppose them to be distinguished by marks which might become familiar by use; how is it possible to put into any order, or bring into any reasonable compass, the prodigious number of specieses that must be included under each genus, if the genera are of a high order; and if they are not, it is evident that they themselves must be of a number too bulky and unwieldy for the use of language. What I mean will be best explained by an example. Let us take the genus *animal*, which is none of the highest genera, that is, of those that are called *categories* or *predicaments*; yet it appears to comprehend under it an almost infinite number of specieses, many more, I am persuaded, than have yet been observed or discovered. The same may be said of *vegetables* and of *minerals*; and in general the number of specieses appear to be with respect to our capacities, as incomprehensible as the number of individuals. How then are such numbers to be arranged and expressed by marks to be easily learned and understood, C. 13.

C. 13. stood, without confusion or ambiguity, which is the case, as the Bishop says, of the marks invented by him?

Here the Peripatetic philosophy has helped out the Bishop a little: for according to that philosophy, every genus contains in it virtually certain *differences*, by which it is divided into its subordinate especieses. Thus, in the example given of *animal*, animals are divided, according to their internal principle, into *rational* and *irrational*;—according to the constitution of their bodies, into *sanguineous* and *exsanguineous*;—according to the structure of the different parts of their body, into *whole-footed* and *cloven-footed*, and the like;—according to their method of generation, into *viviparous* and *oviparous*;—and according to their food or diet, into *carnivorous* and *granivorous*. These differences, with respect to the genus, are called *diæretic* or *dividing*, because by them the genus is divided into its several especieses. And with respect to the especieses, they are called *specific*, because joined to the genus, they constitute the different especieses. Thus, in the example I have given of *animal*, that genus is divided by

rational, *irrational*, and the other differences above mentioned. And each of those differences, joined to the genus, constitutes so many different specieses, which are ranked under that difference. Thus, for example, under *rational* are to be ranked *man* and *angel*;—under *irrational*, all the several specieses of brutes;—under *whole-footed*, are comprehended the *horse*, *ass*, *mule*, *camel*, &c.;—under *cloven-footed* the *ox*, *sheep*, *goat*, &c. *. Now these differences of each genus may be reduced to number; and there is a way well known among the antients, under the name of the *Diæretic* method, or method of division, by which a genus was divided into its several differences, and the several specieses contained under those differences. Of this method we have fine examples in the *Sophista* and *Politicas* of Plato, and in Mr Harris's dialogue upon *Art*. C. 13.

Here then is a considerable step made

* The nature of *genus* and *species*, and the method of dividing a genus into its several species by *differences*, are most accurately explained by Porphyry, in his introduction to Aristotle's Logic, and by Ammonius in his Commentary upon it; which together, if diligently studied, are the best preparations for philosophy that is any where to be found.

C. 13. towards the formation of this universal language. For if the genera are reduced to a certain number not too great, and if the *differences* under each of these genera are likewise brought within a reasonable compass, there remains nothing to be done, but to find out, and rank under each of the differences, the several specieses belonging to it; so that if these likewise can be reduced to a moderate number, the business appears to be done.

For matters being thus prepared, one should think, that nothing was wanting but to find out marks or signs, whether written or vocal, for the several things; expressing first the genus to which the thing belongs, according to the order in which it stands, whether first, second, third, &c. then the *difference* by which the genus is divided, according to the same order of first, second, and third; and then the species under that difference, likewise in the same numerical order. But there still remains what is more difficult perhaps than any thing I have hitherto mentioned, viz. to express, first, the several circumstances and modes of existence, such as time, place, greater or less in degree, sex, number,

ber, &c.; and, secondly, the grammatical construction, or the connection of the ideas with one another; for, as I have taken occasion to observe more than once, any number of the clearest and most precise ideas would not form discourse, unless their connection, relation, and dependence upon one another, were marked. Supposing therefore a mark found out, expressing the genus,—the difference,—and under that difference the particular species to which the thing belongs; yet, if it be a verb, there must likewise be a mark found out to express the time of that verb, and likewise the mode or disposition of the human mind with respect to the action. If it be a noun, there must be a mark for its gender and its number, and also its cases, by which its connection with other nouns, or with verbs, is expressed; and there must be also marks for such connectives, as articles, pronouns, prepositions, and conjunctions; besides many other particulars, which are required to constitute that most difficult part of the grammatical art, called *syntax*. C. 13.

Nor is it in one kind of language only that these so great difficulties are to be got over;

C. 13. over: for in order to make the art complete, there must be two kinds of languages, one vocal or *effable*, as our author expresses it, the other *written*; and the *words* of the one, as well as the *characters* of the other, must express all the different things above mentioned.

Having said thus much in general, of the nature and requisites of this philosophical language, I come now to give some account of the one invented by the Bishop. The first thing he does is, to divide all things which may be the subjects of language, into certain classes, or genera, which he again subdivides by their several differences. After this manner things were divided by the antient philosophers into *ten* classes, called by them *categories* or *predicaments*, of which I have had occasion frequently to make mention in the course of this work; but our author has only made use of five of them, viz. *substance*, *quantity*, *quality*, *action*, and *relation*, which he has subdivided into several genera, as shall be afterwards shewn. But there are notions which are still more general than the categories, as I have had occasion elsewhere to explain; and he finds

finds a difference betwixt these general notions, viz. that some of them relate to *things*, others to *words*. Those which relate to things he calls *transcendental*; and among these he finds a *difference*, namely, that some of them are *absolute*, others *relative*. The first he calls *transcendentals general*. The relative he divides into two kinds: the one he calls *transcendentals mixt*, belonging to quantity, quality, whole, and part;—the other kind of relative transcendentals are *simple*, and proper to action, and which therefore he calls *transcendentals of relation of action*. Thus of things transcendental, he makes his three first genera, viz. *transcendentals general*,—*trancendentals of mixt relation*,—and *transcendentals of relation of action*. General notions relating to *words*, he comprehends under the name of *discourse*, and makes it his fourth genus *. C. 13.

Besides these *general* notions, there are two *special* things, which he considers to be above the categories, viz. the *creator*, and the *world* created by him; and of these he makes two other genera; so that he makes in all six genera of transcendentals,

* Essay towards a real character and philosophical language, part 2. chap. 1. *et seqq.*

C. 13. scendentals, besides the genera into which he subdivides the five categories above mentioned, amounting in all to thirty-four. The number therefore of his genera altogether is forty.

I will next endeavour to give the reader an idea of the specieses into which he divides his genera; beginning, as he does, with the transcendentals; which, as I have said, he divides into two kinds, one relating to things, the other to words. Those of things he has subdivided into general transcendentals,—transcendentals of relation mixt,—and transcendentals of relation of action; and these, as I have said, make his three first genera. In the first of these, viz. transcendentals general, he finds six *differences*, viz. genus itself, or *kind*, as he expresses it,—*cause*,—*diversity*,—*difference* relating to the end of action,—*difference* relating to the means,—and, lastly, *mode*. Under each of these differences he numbers several specieses: *e. g.* Under the first of them, viz. *genus*, he reckons first *being* and *nothing*; for in this way he couples his specieses, either on account of their *opposition*, as in this case, or on account of their *affinity*. The second species under this

this difference is *thing* and *appearance*. The third is *notion* and *fiction*, &c. In like manner he numbers the specieses under the second *difference*, viz. *cause*, reckoning *efficient* and *instrument* the first, *impulsive* and *cohibitive* the second, and so on through the other four *differences* of his first genus of transcendentals general. And in like manner he goes through the second genus, dividing it likewise by differences, and enumerating the several specieses under each difference; and in the same manner he goes through the third genus. Then he comes to general notions or transcendentals, as they may be called, relating to *words*, which he comprehends all under the name of *discourse*. This genus he divides by six differences, viz. *elements*,—*words*,—*complex grammatical notions* of speech,—*complex logical notions* of discourse,—*mixt notions of discourse* belonging both to grammar and logic,—and lastly, *modes of discourse*. And under each of these he enumerates several specieses *. And so much for *general transcendentals*, relating both to *things* and *words*. C. 13.

He next proceeds to the two special transcendentals,

* Ibid. part 2. ch. 1.

C. 13. scendentals, beginning with the *Creator*, or *God*, whose essence being simple and indivisible, does not admit of a division into specieses. The second is the *world*, or *universe*; which he divides into *spiritual*, or immaterial, and *corporeal*; under each of which he enumerates several specieses. And in this manner he goes through the first six genera of notions more general than the categories.

After this he proceeds to his five categories; which he subdivides, as I have said, into several subaltern genera, in all amounting to thirty-four. He begins with *substance*: the first *difference* of which he makes to be *inanimate*; which he distinguishes by the name of *element*, and makes it his seventh genus; of which he finds six *differences*, such as *fire*, *air*, *water*, *earth*, &c. And under each of these differences he enumerates several specieses.

He next proceeds to *substance animate*; which he divides into *vegetative* and *sensitive*. The vegetative again he subdivides into *imperfect*, such as minerals, (for he holds that minerals have a kind of growth or vegetation), and *perfect*, such as plants. The *imperfect vegetative* he subdivides into

stone, which is his 8th genus, and *metal*, which is his 9th. *Stone* he divides by six *differences*, which, as he tells us, is the usual number of differences that he finds under every genus; and under each of these differences he enumerates several *species*, which seldom exceed the number of nine under any one. *Metal*, which, as I have said, is his 9th genus, he divides only by four differences; and in like manner, under each difference, numbers the several species. C. 13.

Having thus gone through the *imperfect* vegetative, he comes to the *perfect*, or plant, which he says is a tribe so numerous and various, that he confesses he found a great deal of trouble in dividing and arranging it. He has however succeeded pretty well, at least so it appears to me, who am no botanist; for natural things run so much into one another, and the principles which constitute their essences, and discriminate them one from another, are so subtile and latent, that I hold it to be impossible to define and divide them so accurately as we can define and divide our own abstract notions. Plants he has divided into *herbs*, *shrubs*, and *trees*.

C. 13. The *herb* he defines to be a minute and tender plant; and he has arranged it according to its leaves, in which way considered, it makes his 10th *genus*;—according to its flower, which makes his 11th;—and according to its seed-vessels, which makes his 12th *genus*. Each of these *genera* he divides by a certain number of *differences*; and under each *difference* he ranges the several *specieses*. All other plants being woody, are larger and firmer than the herb; and he divides them into greater and lesser. The lesser he calls a *shrub*, which he says commonly grows up from the root in several stems, and this makes his 13th *genus*. The larger, growing up in one single stem, he calls *tree*, and makes it his 14th *genus*; and these two genera of plants he also divides by several *differences* *, and under each of the differences he ranges the several specieses.

Having thus exhausted the vegetable kingdom, he proceeds to the animal, or *sensitive*, as he calls it, being the second member of his division of animate substance. This kingdom he divides into *animals*, *sanguineous* and *exsanguineous*, that is, animals without

* Ibid. chap. 4. pag. 69.

out blood, and which therefore he considers as imperfect animals; and of these he makes his 15th *genus*, distinguishing it, like the others, by several differences, and ranging under each difference the several specieses belonging to it. The *sanguineous* animals he divides into three kinds, viz. *fish*, which makes his 16th genus; *bird*, which makes his 17th; and *beast*, which makes his 18th: and each of these genera he treats in the same manner as he has done the others. C. 13.

Having thus considered the general nature of vegetables and animals, he proceeds to consider the parts of both; some of which are *peculiar* to particular plants and animals, and constitute his 19th genus; others are *general*, and make the 20th: and these two genera are likewise distinguished and divided like all the rest.

In this manner he goes through the remaining four categories of *quantity*, *quality*, *action*, and *relation*, and by dividing and distinguishing them, forms the genera remaining to complete the number forty, all which he exhibits most distinctly in one general view upon a single page *.

It

* Part 2. ch. 1. p. 23.

C. 13. It would be too much to say, and much more than the author pretends to, that there is no error or inaccuracy in a plan which comprehends the whole of things; and that the many divisions, subdivisions, and distinctions, could not have been more properly made, or the definitions which accompany them, rendered more accurate and scientific. The author acknowledges the defects of his work, and says, what is very true, that "the defining of all kinds "of *things*, *notions*, and *words*, is too great "an undertaking for a single man, and "ought to be the work of a society." This he says was the case of an Italian vocabulary, which was the joint production of the famous academy de la Crusca, and not finished in less than forty years; and the Dictionary of the French academy, which began in 1639, was not, he says, then compleated *. And besides this difficulty of the work, there happened an accident in the execution of it, which one should have thought would have put a stop to it altogether; for, as the author tells us, in the same epistle dedicatory, all that was printed of it, excepting only two copies, and a great part of

* Epistle dedicatory.

of the unprinted original, was destroyed in the fire of London. All this notwithstanding, the work, such as it is, I think a most valuable work, shewing a most extensive knowledge in the author, both of nature and art, and a philosophical genius fitted to excel, not only in one branch of philosophy, but to comprehend the whole of things. I have said already, that there is more science in his tables than is to be found any where in so small a compass; and I have given some instances of his definitions and divisions. I will give one or two more, which, with what I have said of the general nature of the work, will, I hope, be sufficient to give the reader a pretty complete idea of it. C. 13.

I have already observed, that he reckons minerals a part of animated nature, because he says they appear to have growth and nutrition, and to be reproduced from certain seminal or spermatic parts of those of the same kind, which he says is proved, by mines in appearance totally exhausted, again renewing themselves*. And, if I am not mistaken, our latest discoveries agree with his philosophy

* Part 2. ch. 2, p. 54.

C. 13. phy. He therefore assigns minerals to the vegetable kingdom, and divides them into *stones* and *metals*. Stones, he says, are a kind of mineral, hard and friable, "to which "*earthy concretions* may be annexed by way "of affinity, being more soft and brittle, "and of a middle nature betwixt stones and "metals." Then he proceeds, according to his method, to give the difference of *stones* and of *earthy concretions*. "Stones," he says, "are either *vulgar*, and of *no price*,— "*middle priced*,—*precious*,—and these either "*less transparent*, or *more transparent**." Of *stones* therefore he makes those four *differences*: and of *earthy concretions* he makes two; *dissolveable*, and *not dissolveable*: and under each of these differences he ranks the several specieses in their order. Then he proceeds to *metals*; defining *metal* to be a mineral, for the most part of a hard consistence, close, ductile, and fusile. He divides it into *perfect* and *imperfect*. Of the perfect he makes two *differences*, viz. *natural*, which are produced in the earth, without the art of man, such as gold, silver, &c.; and *factitious*, which are made by the art of man, such as brass,

* Part 2. ch. 3 p. 61.

brass, pewter, and steel. The imperfect he divides into those which are *metalline substances by themselves*, and those which are only the *recrementitious parts*, as he calls them, of other metals, which are cast off in preparing them*. C. 13.

The other example I shall give, is of an idea more abstract; for it is taken from one of the categories, viz. *quantity*, which he divides into *magnitude*, *space*, *measure*. "Magnitude," he says, "is a word intended to signify all the notions of *continued quantity*; "to which may be joined, by way of affinity, the word EXTENSION; by which is "meant that kind of quantity whereby a "thing is said to have *partem extra partem*, "one part out of another, being the same "thing with the former, under another consideration†." Then, after having laid down, and gone through, according to his usual method, the several differences of magnitude, and the specieses under each of these differences, he proceeds to the second member of the division, viz. *space*. "This word," says

* Part 2. ch. 3. p. 65.
† Ibid. ch. 7. p. 181.

C. 13. says he, " according to the common use of " it, is a name importing the more general " notion of that wherein any thing is con- " tained or done, comprehending *time*, *place*, " *situation**." Then having gone through these three differences in like manner, he proceeds to the third member of the division, viz. *measure*, of which he speaks in this manner. " Those several *relations of quan-* " *tity*, whereby men use to judge of the mul- " titude or greatness of things, are styled by " the name of MEASURE, *dimension*, *mete*, " *survey*, *rule* ; to which the relative term " of PROPORTION, *portion*, *rate*, *tax*, *size*, " *scantling*, *pittance*, *share*, *dose*, *mess*, *sym-* " *metry*, *analogy*, *commensurate*, *dispense*, *al-* " *lot*, *adapt*, is of some affinity, signifying " an equality or similitude of the respects " that several things or quantities have to one " another. They are distinguishable into " such as respect either *multitude* 1.—*mag-* " *nitude* 2.—*gravity* 3.—*duration* 4.— " *which is either more generally considered* " 5.—or *as restrained to living creatures* 6."

Here we may observe his method of set- ting down, under each head, all the English words

* Part 2. ch. 7. p. 186.

words relative to it. And in this respect his work is a very good English vocabulary; and in order that we may find any word in it readily, he has subjoined to his work an alphabetical dictionary, in which all the words are referred to the several places in his tables where they are to be found. C. 13.

Our author having thus arranged and digested, into their proper places, the ideas expressed by words, it was necessary, as I have observed, to find out some method of connecting those ideas together, so as to form discourse. For the preceding part of the work is to be considered as nothing else but a *philosophical dictionary of* NOTIONS, (that was the word then in use in place of *ideas*, a word afterwards brought into fashion by Mr Locke) which, says our author, must be formed into complex propositions and discourses *; and this is to be done by the grammatical art. It was therefore necessary that he should compose a philosophical grammar, as well as a philosophical dictionary; and accordingly he has done so in the third part of his work. Such a grammar is

* Part 3. ch. 1. p. 297.

C. 13. one of the *desiderata* in learning mentioned by my Lord Bacon; and though our author, who is very modest and candid, mentions three other authors * who had written upon the subject, but whom I never saw nor heard of before, I am persuaded he is the first who has treated it properly. He also mentions some before him, who had made attempts towards a universal language †; but nevertheless I am convinced that his work, among other merits, has that of being original, and, so far as we know, the only one of the kind now existing; for those former works upon the subject are, I believe, no where to be found, and no other attempts have been made since his time.

He divides grammar very properly into three parts; one of which treats of the different kinds of words, and the various alterations they undergo by inflection, composition, and derivation. This part he calls

* Their names are Scotus, in his *Grammat. Speculativa*; Caramuel, in his *Grammat. Audax*; and Campanella, in his *Grammatica Philosophica*, part 3. ch. 1. pag. 297.

† He names three, *Beckerus*, *Athanasius Kircher*, and *Philip Labbè*, p. 452.

calls *etymology*. The second treats of the proper union or right construction of words into sentences; and this part is commonly known by the name of *syntax*. The third concerns the most convenient *marks* or *sounds* for the expression of such names or words, whether by writing, called *orthography*, or by speech, *orthoepy*. C. 13.

Upon this plan he gives us a grammar entirely new; for he appears to me to have been an original genius, who thought for himself upon every subject, but not like those pretended geniuses of our time, who set up for great writers and philosophers upon their own stock only, without any assistance from learning; for it is evident that he was very learned in philosophy, no less than in languages. But his grammar, however ingenious and philosophical it may be, appears to me to be only fitted for the use of his philosophical language; nor do I think that it could be applied to the improvement of any language spoken at present. What I think most curious in it, is that part of it which concerns orthography, and the power of the letters; a subject which he had studied very much, and had besides, as he tells us, the assistance of several learned men

of

C. 13. of his time, whom he names. I do not believe that the organs of speech, and their several operations, have been so accurately examined by any body, and whoever is curious upon this subject cannot resort to a better book for information. There we find all the articulate sounds that the human mouth is capable of uttering, so far as we know, arranged in a new order; new characters invented for such of them as characters had not been provided for, and the old characters confined to the expression of only one sound. For the English alphabet, as he has shewn, is defective, both in not having characters sufficient to express all its sounds, and in employing the same character to express more than one sound; and he has given us a specimen of the Lord's prayer, and of the creed in our alphabet thus corrected *. And, not contented with this amendment of the old alphabet, he has given us two alphabets altogether new: in one of which he has studied to give the letters a shape bearing some resemblance to the configuration of the organs in the pronunciation of

* Part 3. ch. 13. p. 373.

of them; so that they may deserve, as he says, the name of a *natural character* of the sounds they express *. C. 13.

All the Bishop's work, so far as I have hitherto given an account of it, is no more than a preparation for the *magnum opus*, the framing of this wonderful language; to which he proceeds in the fourth part of his work, beginning with the written language, or *real character*, as he calls it, because it expresses *things*, and not *sounds*, as the common characters do. And the reason he assigns for beginning with the character, is, that, though, in order of *time*, speech be prior to writing; yet, in the order of nature, there is no priority between them, but voice and sound may be as well assigned to figure, as figure to sound. "And I do the rather," says he, "begin with treating concerning a "common character or letter, because this "will conduce more to that great end of "facility, whereby, as I first proposed, men "are to be invited to the learning of it. "To proceed from the language to the "character, would require the learning of "both; which being of greater difficulty "than

* Ibid. ch. 14. p. 375.

C. 13. " than to learn one alone, is not therefore " so suitable to that intention of engaging " men by the facility of it. And because " men that do retain their several tongues, " may yet communicate, by a real character, " which shall be legible in all languages; " therefore I conceive it most proper to treat " of this in the first place, and shall afterwards " shew how this character may be made " effable in a distinct language." And there can be no doubt but that such a character would be of great use, serving the same purpose that the Chinese character does among many of the nations of the East, who communicate together by the means of that character, though they do not understand one another's language.

" All characters," says our author, " signify either *naturally*, or *by institution*. *Natural characters* are either the *pictures* of " things, or some other *symbolical* representations of them *." Then he goes on to tell us, that it were to be wished that characters could be found, bearing some resemblance to the things expressed by them; but though this he thinks might be done with

* Part 4. ch. 1. p. 385.

with respect to the general kinds of things, yet he judges it to be very difficult, if not impossible, to do it with respect to particular specieses. It were desireable also, he says, that the sounds of a language should have some resemblance to the things expressed by them, and by consequence to the written characters, if they were representations of the things. This he holds to be as difficult, or rather as impossible as the other. His language, therefore, both written and effable, is, like all other languages, of *institution* merely; nor has the one any natural connection with the other, any more than the sounds in other languages have with their alphabet. C. 13.

The characters of this universal language should, he says, have four properties. "1. "They should be most simple and easy for "the figure, to be described by one *ductus* "of the pen, or at the most by two. 2. "They must be sufficiently distinguishable "from one another to prevent mistake. 3. "They ought to be comely and graceful, for "the shape of them, to the eye. 4. They "should be methodical, those of the same "common nature having some kind of suit-"ableness and correspondence with one ano-"ther;

Ch. 3. "ther; all which qualifications would be "very advantageous, both for *understanding*, "*memory*, and *use*."

He begins with contriving marks for his forty genera: and these he has so contrived as to have all the properties he mentions; for they are as simple as possible, wonderfully varied, so as to be sufficiently distinguished, and yet resembling one another as much as they ought to do. For proof of this, I refer to the figures themselves *.

The next thing to be done is to mark the *differences* under each genus. This is done by affixing little lines at the left end of the character, forming, with the character, angles of different kinds, that is, *right obtuse*, or *acute*, above or below; each of these affixes, according to its position, denoting the first, second, third, &c. difference under the genus; for, as I have said, all the differences under each genus are numbered.

The third and last thing to be done, is to express the species under each difference. This

* Ibid. p. 387.

This is done by affixing the like marks to the other end of the character, denoting the specieses under each difference, as they are numbered in the tables. C. 13

In this manner are expressed all the several notions of things, which are the subject of language. But the most difficult part still remains, which is, to *connect* those *notions* together, so as to make of them what we call *discourse*. This the grammatical art, in ordinary languages, performs in many different ways; which may be all reduced to two general heads: first, variation of the word itself; secondly, by particles, or separate words, devised for the purpose of connection. The first of these our author has supplied by hooks or loops, adjected to either end of the character above or below, from which we learn whether the thing is to be considered as a noun, or an adjective, or an adverb, or whether it be taken in an active or passive sense, or in the plural or singular number. The other he supplies by marks denoting particles; and these marks are circular figures, dots, and little crooked lines or *virgulæ*, disposed in a certain manner. In this way he expresses the *copula* of

C. 13. propositions, by which he means the verb, and its various tenses and modes, pronouns, prepositions, interjections, conjunctions, and articles. This, one should think, would make a wonderful perplexity and embarrassment in his characters; and, no doubt, those small marks are more difficult to be learned and attended to than the greater marks for things; but he has contrived them so as to be as easy, both for memory and use, as is poss le.

This is the general plan of this written language, or *real character*; but as we cannot judge rightly of any machine, or of those *living machines* (according to the notions of certain philosophers) which we call *animals*, unless we see them move, so we should never have well understood this language of the Bishop, if he had not shewn us the practice of it in two examples, the Lord's prayer and the creed. And indeed, upon the diligent perusal of these, we not only understand the invention much better, but I think it is impossible not to admire it exceedingly; and the more attentively you consider it, the more you will be convinced that it is not so chimerical and impracticable as at first sight it

it appeared. I refer the reader therefore to the specimens themselves, wherein he will observe that the capital characters, expressing the principal ideas or notions of things, are large; whereas the characters expressing the accessories, or the connectives of the discourse, which he calls *particles*, are small: and he ought likewise to read the author's explications of the specimens, which are given with great accuracy, and propriety of expression; for besides the value of his matter, his style is one of the most correct in English, and is as elegant and copious as his subject requires. C. 13.

If he had been a man of less genius, and not so great enterprize in science, he would have contented himself with the invention of this universal written language: but he wanted to make it a language every way complete; and therefore he resolved to have it intelligible to the ears, as well as to the eyes. He has accordingly invented a philosophical language of sounds, which have no natural connection, as I observed, with the characters, or the nature of the things expressed by them, but the system of it is built upon the same foundation, namely, the arrangement of things into classes, and his new

invented

C. 13. invented grammatical art, for the purpose of connecting them together in discourse. His effable language therefore is no other than the expression of what is contained in his tables by letters and syllables, and for this purpose he has used the old alphabet, as corrected and amended by himself.

The requisites of this language he has given us in the following words. "1. The "words should be brief, not exceeding two "or three syllables, the particles consisting "but of one syllable. 2. They should be "plain, and facile to be taught and learned. "3. They should be sufficiently distinguish-"able from one another, to prevent mistake "and equivocalness; and withal significant "and copious, answerable to the conceipts "of our mind. 4. They should be eupho-"nical, of a pleasant graceful sound. 5. "They should be methodical, those of an "agreeable or opposite sense having some-"what correspondent in the sounds of "them*."

Proceeding upon this plan, he has expressed his several genera by such sounds as *ba*, *be*, *bi*, and *da*, *de*, *di*, *ga*, *ge*, *gi*, and the like, all

* Part 4. ch. 3. p. 414.

all compositions of vowels, with one or other of the best sounding consonants. The differences under each of these genera he expresses, by adding to the syllable denoting the genus, one of the following consonants, *b*, *d*, *g*, *p*, *t*, *c*, *z*, *s*, *n*, according to the order in which the differences are ranked in the tables under each genus, *b* expressing the first difference, *d* the second, and so on. The species he expresses, by putting after the consonant, which stands for the difference, one of the seven vowels, according to his alphabet; and if the number of specieses exceed the vowels, he uses diphthongs for the rest. C. 13.

I cannot illustrate this better than in his own words. "For instance," says he, "if "*de* signify *element*, then *deb* must signify "the first difference; which, according to "the tables, is *fire*: and *deba* will denote the "first species, which is *flame*. *Det* will be "the fifth difference under that genus, which "is *appearing meteor*; *deta* the first species, "viz. *rainbow*, *deta* the second, viz. *halo*.

"Thus, if *ti* signify the genus of *sensible* "*quality*, then *tid* must denote the second "difference,

C. 13. "difference, which comprehends colours; "and *tida* must signify the second species "under that difference, viz. *redness*; *tide* "the third species, which is *greenness**," &c.

Next he proceeds to shew how the grammatical variations of words are to be expressed. If the word is an adjective, says he, which, according to his method, is always derived from a substantive, the derivation is made by the change of the radical consonant into another consonant, or by adding a vowel to it. Thus if *da* signifies *God*, *dua* must signify *divine*; if *de* signifies *element*, then *due* must signify *elementary*; if *do* signifies *stone*, then *duo* must signify *stony*; and in like manner voices and numbers, and such like accidents of words, are formed †. As to the accessory words, or *particles*, as he calls them, he expresses them by simple vowels or diphthongs, or by some of those monosyllables not used for any of the genera or differences.

After having laid down the rules for this philosophical language, he proceeds to give us examples of it in the Lord's prayer and creed

* Ibid. p. 415. † Ibid. p. 417.

creed, with large explanations of them, referring to the rules he has laid down. He confesses that "his contrivance for this language, is not ordered, as to the facility and "pleasantness of the sound, to so good an "advantage as it might have been upon further consideration and practice; but as it "is, I think it may even in these respects "come into comparison with any of the "languages now known*." And for trial of this, he gives us the Lord's prayer in fifty different languages. C. 13.

He concludes his work with an appendix, wherein he compares his language with the Latin, which he says in these parts of the world supplies the place of a common language†. And in this comparison he is very severe, and I think not without reason, upon the Latin, observing many defects, redundancies, and anomalies, in the grammar of it. But he very wisely, in my opinion, abstains from the comparison of his language with the Greek; thinking, I suppose, that it would not gain so much by that comparison;

* Part 4. ch. 4. *in fine.*

† Ibid. ch. 6. *in initio.*

C. 13. son; for he elsewhere confesses that the Greek language is much more philosophical than the Latin*.

Thus I have endeavoured to explain this wonderful invention of the good bishop, by which he intended, as he says, to remedy the curse of the confusion of Babel. I know many of my readers will think that I have given a fuller account of it than was necessary or proper; but the book is little known, though I think it deserves to be very much known and admired. For, in my opinion, it does great honour to the society of which he was a member, and to the nation in general. There are, however, no doubt, many defects and inaccuracies in it, as the author himself acknowledges; but I am sure the old proverb will apply very well here, "It is easier to find "fault than to imitate or do better†." That one part at least of the project is practicable, I mean the forming of a new language of words according to rules of art, I have not the least doubt. In the languages already invented, there is a wonderful variety;

2 nor

* P. 353. † Μωμησασθαι τις μαλλον η μιμησασθαι.

nor is there any reason to think, that in them all the variety which the nature of the thing will admit, is exhausted. And in fact we know, that there is a language actually existing, which is formed, like our author's, upon principles of philosophy; I mean the language of the philosophers of India, called the *Sanscrit*: so that the only doubt is, whether a single man, in the course of a short life, is capable of framing such a language. As to the *real character*, there is, I think, more difficulty in the formation of it. And yet that there may be a language of characters, which are not the marks of sounds, but of things, the Chinese language is an irrefragable proof. And as that language appears to have been formed with very little assistance from philosophy or art, it cannot be doubted but that, with the assistance of philosophy, and the grammatical art, another and a better language of the same kind might be formed. C. 13.

With respect to the facility of learning the Bishop's language, he says, that there are but three thousand words in it, and I suppose as many characters; whereas, he reckons, in the Latin language, thirty thousand radicals, computing the several homonymies

C. 13. to be so many different words, and by a computation which he gives us from Varro, he makes the number of words altogether, with all their different variations by flection, to amount to about five millions. He therefore concludes, that his language is much easier to be learned than the Latin, in the proportion, as he says, of one to forty; and he does not doubt, but that a man of good capacity and memory, might, in one month's space, attain to a readiness of expressing his mind, either in the character or the language*.

CHAP.

* Conclusion of the book.

CHAP. XIV.

That a language of art must have been the work of men of art, and formed upon a regular plan.—The same art necessary to preserve language that is required to form it.—The want of such art the cause of the corruption of all languages.—The danger of the English being so corrupted.—Irregularities and imperfections of the Latin.

I Have all along, through the course of this work, supposed, that a language of art could not have been formed without art, and that it must have been the work of men of art, and superior abilities; and accordingly I have talked, in the style of Plato and other ancient writers, of the *artificers of language*, and *the lawgivers of words*. It may, however, be thought, that I make a great deal too much of this matter; and that though there be, no doubt, a great deal of art in language, yet it may have arisen by degrees from experience, observation, and C. 14.

vulgar

C. 14. vulgar use; and that in this way even a language of art may have been formed without any regular plan or system. If this be true, I think it must be true likewise, that all the other arts, liberal as well as mechanical, must have been invented in the same way; and that painting, music, architecture, must have been the work of the mere vulgar. The question therefore is general, and deserves to be considered with some attention.

And, in the *first* place, it is no doubt true, that the art of language, like every other art, must have arisen from experience: for, as Aristotle has said *, many experiences make art; and no art ever would have been formed, if men had not first begun with the practice; very rude and imperfect no doubt at first, but which was improved by degrees, and at last formed into an art. For we never should have had the art of architecture, if men had not begun with building huts and cabanes, such as we find among the barbarous nations; nor of painting, if there had not been a beginning by rude draughts, either in colours or carving, which we

* *Metaphys. lib.* 1. *cap.* 1.

we likewise find is practised among such nations; and if men had not first sung, or performed upon instruments, there certainly never would have been an art of music: And in like manner, if men had not first spoken, there never would have been an art of language; for it is certain that, in matters of art, men did not begin with the theory, but the practice; and the only question is, Whether, from the practice, a theory did not at last arise, without which the art could not have been formed? and whether such theory could have been the production of mere people? C. 14.

2dly, I think it is likewise evident, that the art of language could not have been formed at once, but there must have been a growth and progress in it as in other arts. For even after the general plan or system of any art was formed, there must have been many after inventions and additions made, before the art was completed; and accordingly, I have observed a progress of this kind in the Greek language.

2dly, It must not be thought that a grammar, or any system of the language, was written before the art was invented.

Whoever

C. 14. Whoever knows any thing of the history of arts, knows that they were invented and completed before they were reduced to writing. Thus the finest buildings of antiquity were reared before Vitruvius, or any other, so so far as I know, had written upon architecture. Painting was an art of the highest estimation, and practised with the greatest success by Zeuxis, Appelles, and Protogenes, though there does not appear to have been then a word written upon the subject. Who can doubt that the art of poetry was well known and practised before Aristotle wrote his book upon poetry? and that the art of rhetoric, in like manner, was perfectly understood before he or any other wrote upon the subject? And with respect to this matter of language, it is said, that Plato and Aristotle were the first who wrote upon the subject of grammar *, though it be certainly true, that the grammar of the Greek language was completed long before their time, and even as early as the days of Homer. And the fact truly is, that all the books that have been written upon the subject

* See Bishop Wilkin's philosophical language, book 1. ch. 5. p. 20. and the authorities he there quotes.

ject of any art, have been formed from the practice of that art already invented, not the art from the books. This is plainly the case of one of those books I mentioned, viz. Aristotle's Art of Poetry, which is clearly no more than a collection of observations upon the art, arising from the practice of Homer and the tragic poets. And I am persuaded there is nothing in that book, which was not known to every poet of that age, except the philosophical principles upon which Aristotle has founded the art. C. 14.

These things being premised, the question comes to this precise issue, Whether such a language as the Greek could have been formed by ordinary men employed in the common occupations of life, and without making language their particular study? or whether, for the framing such a language, men of more than ordinary genius were not required, and who had made a particular study of the nature both of words and of things?

And, in the *first* place, it is to be considered, that there is one thing absolutely required in every art, that it should have some plan or system; by which I mean, that

C. 14. that it should propose some end to be attained, and proceed in a certain method, and according to certain rules, for the attainment of that end *. The end of language, for example, is to express the conceptions of the human mind. For this purpose, the four things that I mentioned in the beginning of this volume are required, viz. That all the conceptions of the mind should be distinctly expressed. *2do*, That this should be done by as few words as possible. *3tio*, That the connection of those words with one another should be some way marked. And, *lastly*, That

* Art is defined by the Stoics to be Συστημα εκ καταλήψεων συγγεγυμνασμενων προς τι τελος ευχρηστον των εν τω βιω. And Quintilian defines it to be, *Poteſtas viâ* (i. e. *ordine*) *efficiens*. See Mr Harris's excellent treatise of Art, and the notes upon it, p. 260. It is therefore of the essence of art, that it should be a *ſyſtem*, and proceed according to rule and method. So that though experience be the mother of art, yet a man would be no better than an empiric, who had collected the greatest number of facts and observations on any art, if he had not digested them into a system, laying down principles, and drawing from thence consequences to the practice, and so forming that εξις μετα λογου αληθους ποιητικη. And if the art is to be carried the length of science, it must be founded on principles that are out of the art, and to be found only in philosophy. And it is in this way that I have endeavoured to connect grammar with philosophy.

That the sound of the language should be agreeable to the ear, and of easy utterance. For attaining these purposes, we have seen, in the course of this work, how many things were required. First, That a system of etymology was to be formed, by which the whole language was to be derived from certain primitive sounds or radical words. Then cases, genders, and numbers, were to be invented; which answered a double purpose, both of expressing different relations and other circumstances of things, and of connecting words together in syntax. Then tenses and moods of verbs were to be contrived, by which the circumstance of time, and the affections or dispositions of the human mind with respect to the action of the verb, were to be expressed. And, lastly, The elemental sounds of language must be so combined in syllables and words, and these syllables must be so varied in length and modulation, as to make the sound of the language sweet and musical, at the same time that it is strong and masculine. All this was to be done by certain rules: for such is the nature of art, that every thing belonging to it, which by its nature can C. 14.

C. 14. be subjected to rule, must be so subjected; for where there is no rule, there is no art. Now it is impossible that all this can be done, without that great work of science being first performed, I mean *analysis*; for language must have been analysed, both the formal and material part of it, before it could be formed into such a system as that of the Greek language. Now is it possible to believe, that all this could be done by men who never thought of language, but so far as it served the ordinary purposes of life? If we can believe this, we may also believe, not only that all the arts above mentioned were so invented, but likewise all the sciences; that geometry, for example, and astronomy, and even philosophy itself, would grow up among savages, as it were spontaneously, without care or culture. But the history of mankind, as well as the reason of the thing, contradicts this hypothesis: for we know, that the sciences took their rise in a country where there was an order of men set apart for the cultivation of them, having the necessaries of life supplied to them by the labour of others, and being relieved of all other cares but that of learning

ing and religion. This was the case in Egypt; and though in Greece there were no colleges of priests, as in Egypt; yet in the progress of society, it must necessarily happen, that some men will be relieved of the necessity of bodily labour, and enabled to live by the labour of others. Now it was by such men, in Greece, and in other countries, employing their leisure in the cultivation of arts and sciences, that language, and every other art and science was formed. C. 14.

At the same time I would not be understood to deny, that savages, living in such a state as that of Hurons, in which every man is obliged to provide for the necessities of life, and consequently has little time for speculations of any kind, would, from mere necessity, make some progress in the art of language, as well as in other necessary arts; for the same necessity that made men invent this method of communication by articulate sounds, would also make them contrive expedients for rendering the use of it as easy and convenient as possible. And accordingly we have seen, that among the Hurons, and other barbarous nations, there are some

C. 14. some beginnings of the art of language. But I deny that among any people, while they continue in that state, a regular system of a language could be formed.

There are perhaps readers who may think, that what I have said of the art of the Greek language is much exaggerated, and for the greater part an imagination of my own, particularly with respect to its system of etymology. But what will they say of the Sanscrit language above described*? of which all the words are derived from certain radical sounds, which have no determined signification of their own, according to certain rules of derivation, so fixed and established that any man who knows those rules, can never be at a loss for words in that language, but may form them readily as he needs them, and they will be perfectly understood by those who understand the language, though they had never heard them before. Must not such a language at least have been the invention of philosophers as well as grammarians? Or if any of my readers should doubt of the truth

* Part 2. book 1. ch. 16. p. 210. See also Dissertation on the Formation of the Greek language.

truth of this fact, for no other reason, that I can conceive, but because the person who relates it is a Jesuit, what will they say to the example of the Hebrew language? the words of which are all derived from roots formed of combinations of the several consonants in triads. Is it possible to suppose, that a language of so artificial a structure should have been the invention of men of no art or science? and yet the Greek is allowed, I believe, by every body who understands both, to be a language of much greater art. If we can believe all this, we may believe also, that Bishop Wilkins's philosophical language may have been invented by the people. C. 14.

But further, I say, that a language of art not only could not have been invented by the people, but that it cannot be preserved among them, without the particular care and attention of those men of art we call grammarians; whom we may despise as much as we please; but if there be not such a set of men in every country, to guard against the abuses and corruptions which popular use will necessarily introduce into every

C. 14. every language; and if the youth of rank and fortune in the country, are not carefully instructed by such men in the principles of grammar; the language of that country, however perfect it may have been originally, will very soon become unlearned and barbarous. It is chiefly by such neglect that all the present languages of Europe are become corrupt dialects of languages that were originally good; the French, Italian, Spanish, and modern Greek, of the Latin and Greek; the English, German, and other Teutonic dialects, of the Gothic. Nor is what remains of the Celtic, as I am informed, free of corruption.

——— *Sic omnia fatis*
In pejus ruere, et retro sublapsa referri.

Such is the fate of all human arts: for not being natural to man, but a kind of forced production of the soil, they must be preserved with the same care that is required to rear them; and if that is but a little remitted, down the stream we go to our natural state of ignorance and barbarity.

Non

Non aliter quam qui adverso vix flumine lembum C. 14.
Remigiis subigit, si brachia forte remisit,
Atque illum in præceps prono rapit alveus amni *.

Thus

* Though we of Britain boast of being a learned nation, I doubt the English language is not mended in our hands. Dr Lowth, in his excellent grammar, has collected a surprising number of barbarisms and solecisms that are to be found in our most admired authors, particularly of this century. The best authors may be guilty of inaccuracies of style through hurry and inattention; but such frequent and repeated blunders could not have proceeded but from absolute ignorance of the grammatical art. To be convinced of this, let us compare those authors with some of the great writers of antiquity, the rules of whose language we understand as well, perhaps better, than those of our own; and besides, the philosophy of language is now so well understood by the learned among us, that we know not only what a language is, but what it ought to be. Now let us try whether we can find in Plato, Aristotle, Demosthenes, or Cicero, such sins committed not only against the particular rules of their languages, but against the rules of general and philosophical grammar. Or if we are not learned enough to be able to make this comparison, let us compare them with some of the best writers of the last age, such as Bishop Wilkins's book upon philosophical language, with which, though it appear that Dr Lowth was acquainted, yet I observe none of his examples of solecisms are from him; nor do I remember any that he has quoted from an author of the same age, but who flourished a little later, I mean my Lord Shaftesbury, whom I have always admired,

C. 14. Thus I think I have proved, that a language of art must have been the work of men of art. But a difficulty will here occur: How can we suppose that the people of any country would receive a language from those few artists, and agree universally to give up that jargon, which, however rude and barbarous, they and their forefathers had been so long accustomed to speak? To this I answer, first, That the same thing must have happened with respect to the other arts, in which, as in language, the many must have submitted to be taught by the few; otherwise every art of life must have continued to be practised at this day as rudely and imperfectly as it was at first. And the reason why men should thus submit to be instructed,

admired, not only for the elegance and copiousness of his style, in both which he perhaps exceeds any English author, but for the purity of it; and as if fine writing belonged to his family, there is a relation of his in this age, Mr Harris, who is as correct in his style as he is elegant.

If then it be true, that language is declining, it is time that the patrons of learning among us should take the alarm; for they may be assured, that with the art of language, every other art and science will decline. It has always been so in every age and nation, and will always be so.

instructed, is sufficiently evident; for man being naturally a docile and an imitative animal, would be disposed to copy whatever he saw was better of the kind than what he had been in use to practise. And this would hold especially, if the new method was recommended by men of authority, such as we must suppose those inventors of the art of language to have been among a savage people. And accordingly I say, in the second place, That, in point of fact, there are examples of whole nations having given up their language in favour of a better one, recommended to them by their governors, or men of authority among them. This I believe was the case of the whole inhabitants of Greece, when the Pelasgi first came among them; as it undoubtedly was of the Athenians, who, as Herodotus tells us, changed their language for that of the Pelasgi, when they were in possession of Attica. And we are informed by Garcilasso de la Vega, that many of the barbarous nations in Peru, who submitted to the arms of the Incas, likewise received a language from them. C. 14.

When the new language is thus imported into a country by conquerors, the pro-

C. 14. gress of it would be quick; but it would be much slower when it was invented in the country itself, as it must have been at first in Egypt, or some other country; for the progress of the invention itself must have been slow, and the teaching it to the people still slower. For it is not likely that the people would receive it so readily from men of their own country, as from foreign conquerors, bringing in their arts, and changing the whole state of the country.

In framing the language of art, I am persuaded the artists would make use of the materials of the old jargon: for they certainly would use the elemental sounds that had already been invented; and to these they would add others, which, upon trial, they found the human mouth could pronounce. What vestiges of art they found in the old language, such as we have shewn are to be found in the most barbarous languages, they would follow, and improve upon. They would soon see the necessity of expressing things that have a likeness by words that also have a likeness, which can only be done by derivation and composition; and for this purpose they would find it absolutely necessary

necessary to abridge the immoderate length of the old words. They would discover, that time was a necessary adjunct of all actions. This would naturally lead them to express it by some variation of the word denoting action; that is, they would invent tenses. They would also discover, that an agent was necessary in every action, and they would find the division into three persons made to their hand. They would therefore naturally think of marking likewise this distinction of persons, by a variation of the verb; and there too they would find something already done, as I have observed before with respect to the Huron language*. And last of all they would find out the necessity of syntax, and of cases of nouns. C. 14.

This would, as I conjecture, be the progress of a language of art among the artists themselves; but the progress, as I have said, would be much slower among the people. For I believe such a language among them could hardly be established without government, civility, religion, music, and other arts, which therefore I imagine have all come along

* Vol. 1. pag. 374.

C. 14. long with this language. In short, I suppose that the people must have been tamed and civilized before they could be taught to speak according to rules of art.

Before I conclude, I will take notice of an objection that will naturally occur to my system of language being the work of art. It will be said, that popular use is the governing principle in languages,

Quem penes arbitrium est jus et norma loquendi,

as Horace says; and according to Quintilian, *Consuetudo est certissima loquendi magistra; utendumque plane sermone, ut nummo, cui publica forma est* *.

But to these authorities, I answer, *first*, That neither Horace nor Quintilian meant to deny that there was a great deal of art in language. But it is evident, from the context of both passages, that their meaning was, that when the rules of art and the reason of the thing were upon one side, and uniform custom upon the other, the last ought to prevail; which is saying no more, than that a man must not pretend to make a language for himself, any more than to coin

* *Lib.* 1. *cap.* 6. *initio.*

coin money for himself, to use Quintilian's comparison, but must speak like other men, as well as use the current coin. But, *2dly*, I say this observation applies much more strongly to the Latin, which we must suppose those authors had chiefly in view, than to the Greek, or any other pure unmixed language. What mixture the antient Pelasgic suffered when it was first imported into Latium, it is impossible I believe exactly to determine. Some authors, I know, think, that there is a great mixture in it of Oscan, and other barbarous dialects. But be that as it will, it is certain, that in later times it was brought much nearer to the Greek standard, by introducing not only a great many Greek words, but a great deal of the Greek analogy and declension of words. This makes the Latin analogy not so consistent with itself, and produces a great many more anomalies in that language than are to be found in Greek. I will give one or two examples, which occur to me, among others that might be found. *Aper*, the Latin word for a *boar*, instead of the genitive *aperis* or *apris*, according to the analogy of *pater* and *cicer*, C. 14.

C. 14. *cicer*, and many other words, has *apri*. Now the way I account for this anomaly, is from the Greek. I have little doubt but the Greeks antiently had the same word ακρε, the termination of which they softened, by adding -ος to it; and then by the syncope, they made it ακρος; and by the adjection of the κ in the beginning, they made the present word κακρος, the genitive of which is κακρος, from whence comes the Latin genitive *apri*, (leaving out the κ), as from ανεμος comes *animi*; and, by some strange accident, the word, with the addition of the κ, has come in Latin to signify a *goat*, and likewise follows the analogy of the Greek declension. This instance is given by Quintilian*. I will give another instance of the same kind, not mentioned by him. The Latin word *ager* forms its genitive in the same way as *aper* does; and it is *agri*, and not *ageris*, as another word very like it in sound, viz. *agger* has its genitive. Now the reason for this irregular genitive, I believe to be the same as in the former case, namely, that it is taken from the Greek genitive αγρου.

I

* Lib. 1. cap. 6.

I will only mention another instance, where the Latin analogy is irregular and imperfect, because they have adopted the Greek analogy only in part. The Greeks form the preter-perfect of verbs beginning with a consonant, by reduplication of that consonant with the vowel ε. This analogy the Latins have followed in some words: for from *cado* they form the preterite *cecidi*; from *pango*, or the old word *pago*, *pepigi*; and from *spondeo*, *spopondi*. But why not carry this analogy throughout, as the Greeks have done? Why not say, *lego*, *lelegi*; *pingo*, *pepinxi*? And the fact I apprehend to have been, that these reduplications were not antiently used in the language, and accordingly are not to be found, so far as I know, in any of the old monuments of Latin preserved to us; but were adopted about the time, when, as Plutarch observes, the Latins began to form their language upon the model of the Greek.

But though, in this manner, we may account for many irregularities in the Latin tongue, we cannot, I believe, render a reason for them all, particularly for those strange things they call *gerunds* and *supines*, about which

C. 14. which grammarians dispute so much, whether they be verbal nouns or parts of the verb *. And all I can see with certainty in the matter is, that they have nothing to do with any regular system of a language; and are altogether unnecessary, as we may see from the example of the Greek, which has none of them. There are many other irregularities and inconsistencies in the Latin language, which have been noted by Bishop Wilkins, in his most ingenious work upon a philosophical language †, which I have so often quoted. But, besides irregularities, there are capital defects in it, such as the want of an article, which even some languages that are called barbarous, such as the Gothic, have. They want also an active participle past, which makes that disjointed kind of composition, by an *ablative absolute*, as they call it, so very frequent in Latin; which has, besides this great imperfection, that it does not express who is the agent of the action of the verb with which

* See, upon this subject, *Sanctii Minerva*, with Perizonius's notes.

† Part 4. ch. 6.

which the ablative is joined. Thus, when we say in Latin, *Brutus, interfecto Cæsare, in Græciam profectus est*, it does not appear whether it was Brutus, or any other, that killed Cæsar. And there is another capital defect of the like kind, namely, the want of a present passive participle; and which, as I have already observed, is also wanting both in English and French. The defect is supplied in those languages, by a clumsy circumlocution, in which the form of the expression is changed, *e. g.* in place of τυπτομενος, we say, *while they are beating him*, and the French say, *pendant qu'on le bat.* In Latin they must supply it likewise by a circumlocution, as, *dum verberatur*; or by using the perfect participle of the same voice in place of it, as when Virgil says, *Ventosa per æquora* VECTI, i. e. πορευμενοι. We must therefore, I doubt, acknowledge, that the Latin language came off from the Greek stock before it was sufficiently cultivated and improved, and likewise that it has a mixture in it of the jargon of some of the barbarous nations in Italy, from whence it has derived those strange anomalies, which I think can be no otherwise accounted for. C. 14.

C. 14. At the same time we are not to believe that there are no irregularities in Greek. For it is impossible but that some abuses must have crept into an art which is constantly practised by men who do not understand it; and that such abuses should grow into inveterate custom, so that even the men of learning would be obliged to submit to them. But I am persuaded there are many fewer of them than are commonly imagined. We have, for example, in our common grammars, a long catalogue of irregular verbs; but these are nothing else but tenses regularly formed from themes that are obsolete; and they might as well call the second future and second aorist of every verb, irregular tenses. There are certain abbreviations, too, of certain forms of the verb, which are now in use, and which pass with superficial grammarians for the original forms. Thus τυπτῃ, the second person of τυπτομαι, is thought to be the irregular and original form of that person; and τυπτεσαι and τυπτεαι, are said to be a poetic or licentious use of the words in place of it; whereas τυπτεσαι is clearly the original word, which was first made τυπτ-σαι, by throwing out the σ, and then contracted into τυπτῃ; and in the same manner,

manner, from τυπτεμεναι, which is thought to be the infinitive only by poetic licence, but which is truly the original infinitive, according to the analogy of the language, was formed by syncope, τυπτεναι; by apocope, τυπτεμεν; and at last, by leaving out the μ, τυπτεεν; and by contraction, τυπτειν, the infinitive presently in use. C. 14.

As to the modern languages of Europe, and particularly the English, they are full of corruptions, arising from popular and unlearned use, both in the words and phrases; but to comment on these would be foreign to our present purpose.

CHAP. XV.

Conclusion of the second part.

I WILL conclude this part of my work, as I began it, with some general reflections upon human knowledge, and the rank which the grammarian ought to hold among men of letters. C. 15.

The subjects of human knowledge are all, either God and his works, or man and his works.

works. The first are the proper subject of philosophy; which naturally divides itself into three great branches. The subject of the first is God himself, and his nature and essence, so far as we can apprehend it; and this part of philosophy is called *theology*. The second part treats of the first principles and causes of things, I mean those which, in subordination to the great first cause, produce all this visible creation; and this part of philosophy is commonly known by the name of *metaphysics*. The third subject of philosophy is the visible world itself, and all that we call *natural productions*, the immediate causes of those productions, and the laws by which, in such productions, matter operates upon matter. That part of philosophy which treats of those things, is known by the name of *natural philosophy*.

These, I say, are the proper subjects of philosophy. For, with respect to man, considered in his natural state, he, as well as other animals, are the subject of that part of philosophy last mentioned. And as to his works, they are what we call the productions of art; and are commonly understood not to be the subject of philosophy. But not only

only other things are the subject of human art, but, as I have elsewhere observed, man himself has become the principal subject of his own art. Of the arts which have man for their subject, the principal are those by which he has been formed a rational and social creature: and these have been thought of such importance, that they have been made the subject even of philosophy; and have been divided into two branches. The one explains the rational faculties of man, their nature and operations; and this part of the philosophy of man is commonly known by the name of *logic*. The other considers man in his social and political state, explains the nature of that state, and of all the duties and offices arising from it. This was known among the ancients by the name of *politics*, or *political* philosophy; among us it is more commonly known by the name of *moral* philosophy. C. 15.

These are additions which man has made to philosophy, on account of the importance of the subjects to him. The other arts, as I have said, do not belong to philosophy. But there is a great difference among them as to their dignity and use; and the most excellent

C. 15. excellent among them, in my apprehension, and which therefore, next to philosophy, ought to possess the first rank, is the art of language; because language is the great instrument of rational and social life, without which man could never, in any great degree, have deserved either of these appellations. And I think it is near of kin to that branch of philosophy above mentioned we call *logic*; for the rational faculties of men could not have been carried any length, without those symbols of ideas which we call *words*. And accordingly it has always been acknowledged, that there is a great connection between logic and grammar, the same that there is betwixt the sign and the the thing signified by it.

The grammarian, therefore, if he be truly a master of the art, is the greatest of all artists, and the next in rank and dignity to the philosopher; and, if I am not much mistaken, I have shown, in the preceding part of this work, not only that the principles of this art are to be found in philosophy, which is the case of all arts, but that it is so intimately connected with philosophy that it is impossible to be a complete grammarian,

marian, without being a philosopher, at least C. 15.
without understanding the philosophy of the human mind.

Besides this connection with philosophy, it was, in ancient times, connected with the critical art; for the grammarian professed to teach men not only to speak and write properly, but to understand the poets, and other standard-books in the language *. And indeed the two professions appear to be necessarily connected: for as such books must be the standard of the language, how can we learn to speak or write well without understanding them? and this again cannot be without the knowledge of history and antiquities. It was not therefore without reason, that the profession of grammarian was of such high estimation in ancient times; and I must confess I think it no good sign, among others, of the present age, that it is now so little esteemed. To restore the grammarian to his ancient dignity, and at the same time to recommend the study of the ancient languages, was my chief design in this part of my work;

* *Quintil. Institt. Orator.*

C. 15. work; as I know certainly that the contempt of grammar, and the ancient languages, will be attended with the downfall of all the arts and sciences connected with language, and particularly of poetry and eloquence.

DIS-

DISSERTATION I.

Of the formation of the Greek Language.

SECTION I.

Sect. 1.

THAT the Greek is a language of very great art, and the work not only of grammarians, but philosophers, cannot, I think, be denied by any person who has thoroughly studied it, and is himself a grammarian and philosopher; or, if it were a point disputable, I think I have given many proofs of it in the preceding part of this volume. In this dissertation, I propose to give a further proof still of the art of this language, by shewing that it is all formed of a few radical sounds, which are to be considered as the *materia prima* of this language. I have already shewn, that there is a great deal of derivation in it, much more than is commonly imagined; and that the number of primitives is much less than is generally supposed*. I have further shown, that the radical words in this language, as in Hebrew, are verbs†. But I propose here to try, whether the etymology of this language cannot be carried still further; and whether even those verbs cannot be analysed into a few primitive sounds.

That the Greek was originally an Oriental language, brought by the Pelasgi into Greece, I think I have proved in the first volume of this work; but it is as certain that the Greeks made very great alterations upon it, in so much that in the days of Herodotus, the Pelasgic passed among them for a barbarous language. Now this altera-

* Part 2. book 1. cap. 15. † Ibid. p. 192.

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tion appears to have been principally in the termination of the words, and the analogy of the language, by which I mean the flection of the declinable words. The Oriental languages, and particularly the Hebrew, to which I am persuaded the Pelasgic was very near akin, terminates by far the greatest part of its words, and all its roots, in consonants; whereas the greatest part of the words in Greek, and all the roots, being verbs, terminate in a vowel. And this difference of termination did necessarily produce a great difference of flection; and, in consequence of that, a great difference likewise of roots and derivation. And accordingly the fact undoubtedly is, that the Orientals form the cases of their nouns, and the tenses of their verbs, in a manner very different from that practised by the Greeks; and the roots also of their languages are very different from the Greek roots.

There are at present in Greek two kinds of verbs; the one terminating in -ω, and the other in -μι: but it is evident, that these last verbs are derived from circumflex verbs in -ω; and that they were a variety in the form of their verbs introduced in later times, and no part of the original constitution of their language. Accordingly, in the most antient dialect of Greek, I mean the Latin, they are not to be found.

The verbs therefore, and by consequence the roots of the Greek language, did all terminate in -ω. And further, it appears to me, that in the original constitution of the language, there was always another vowel which preceded the final -ω in the

termination of the verbs. This vowel was one of the following five α, ε, ι, ο, υ; so that all the primitives in Greek, that is, the roots of the language, did originally terminate in one or other of the five duads αω, εω, ιω, οω, υω. And this vocal termination served the purpose of flection very much better than the termination of the old Pelasgic or Hebrew in consonants; for the vowels are of a nature much more ductile and flexible, and more easily change into one another, or into diphthongs, than the consonants do. Thus the final ω, in the flection of the verb, is changed into α, ει, η, ε, ο, υ; and the preceding vowels, or characteristical letters as they are called, above mentioned, do some of them run together, and coalesce into one sound with the final ω. This is the case of three of them, α, ε, ο; and in the formation of the *oblique* tenses (so I call all the other tenses, in contradistinction to the present, as all the other cases of nouns are called *oblique* cases with respect to the nominative) these three characteristical letters, by the changes they undergo, have a very great share. For the ε and ο are naturally changed into their correspondent long vowels η and ω; and the α also, by the genius of the language, admits a change into η. Accordingly we see those two vowels used interchangeably in the different dialects of Greek; and in general we may observe, that it is chiefly by the change of vowels that the difference of dialects in Greek is produced. For the consonants which principally distinguish words from one another, and may be called the bones and sinews

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Diss. I. sinews of a language, are not near so much altered in those dialects. The other two characteristical vowels, though they do not admit of a change into other vowels, as α does, yet have that distinction which is common to all vowels of long and short; a distinction which consonants have not, and which therefore is another reason why they are much less proper for the termination of declinable words than vowels.

It is therefore chiefly by the change of the two final vowels that all the variety of tenses in the Greek verb is formed; for though, in later times, the interposition of consonants betwixt those two letters, particularly of the σ and κ, was practised; it appears to me, that in more antient times the tenses were formed without either of these two consonants*. And

* The future, I believe, was originally, in Greek, the same with the present; and I am persuaded that the verb φιλω, for example, had at first no future, but what is now called the second future, viz. φιλῶ circumflected, or φιλεω, as the Ionians use it, in its original form. This old future, after the new future was invented, by the interposition of σ, and the change of the ε into the long vowel η, was continued in the language under the name of the second future. In the same manner τυπεω or τυπῶ was the old future of the original verb τυπω, and which became a second future, after the other future was invented. Likewise the future of the liquid verbs, such as νεμω and μενω, are evidently the old presents of these verbs contracted and circumflected; for their old presents were undoubtedly νεμεω and μενεω, as appears from their perfects still preserved. And there are at this day several verbs which make no distinction betwixt their future and present, such as ἑω, εὐομαι, φαγομαι, πιομαι, words probably of very antient use in the language. As

And not only do these duads serve the purpose of flection better than any other elemental sounds, but

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As to the past tenses, I mean the aorist and preter-perfect, they appear of old to have been formed by the change only of the final ω into α, without either σ or κ; and the only difference betwixt the two was, that the perfect had the reduplication in the beginning. As to the aorist, we have in Homer εχεα or ε, ευα, the aorist of the verb χεω or χευω; and we have εφιλαμην and εφαμην, or without the augment φαμην, being the aorists middle of the verbs φιλω and φω; and by a like analogy, αλευαμην is derived from the verb αλευω. And to these examples I think I may add the word εα, which is commonly said to be *Ionicè, poeticè*, or I don't know what else, for the imperfect of the verb ειμι. But I hold it to be the first aorist of the verb εω, which is confessedly the original word, and the archetype of ειμι. In this way it is naturally deduced, according to the analogy of the language; whereas it cannot be derived by any rule, that I know from ην, the present imperfect of the verb ειμι. As to the preter-perfect, we have in Homer γεγαα, the perfect, from the verb γαω; τετλαα, from τλαω; and βεβαως, and μεμαως, and εσταως, the participles, from βεβαα, μεμαα, and εσταα. All these, in our common grammars and dictionaries, are said to be contractions by poetic licence, or by the particular use of certain tribes of the Greeks, in place of τετληκα, γεγηκα, &c. But this I take to be no more than a fiction of those grammarians, who very absurdly, as I think, suppose that the language was at once formed, such as we have it, e. g. that from the theme τλαω, was immediately formed the perfect τετληκα; and that there was not a progress in language, as in other human arts.

This progress is singularly exemplified in the tense of which I am now speaking; for the first change they made in it was of the characteristical vowel either into a long vowel, or into a diphthong. Thus ε they changed into η, and in this way was formed the perfect τετυχηα, to be found in Homer, from the verb τυχεω, and the perfect τεθνηα, and the participle τεθνηως,

to

Diss. I. but also of derivation; for we may observe, that all the words derived from verbs, whether nouns, adjectives,

to be found in the Odyssey, *lib.* 15. v. 23. from the theme θνω, from whence the present word θνησκω; or they changed it into the diphthong ει, as in the word τιθνειωτις, which is undoubtedly from the same theme θνω. See upon this subject *Eustath. Comm. Odyss. pag.* 1700. *lin.* 30. And the next step was the insertion of the κ betwixt the two final vowels, to complete the perfect into the form in which we see it at present. Thus from τετυχηα, was formed τετυχηκα; from τετλαα, or τετληα, τετληκα, &c.

In a manner analogous to this was formed the present future, which, as I have said, was at first the same with the present; but in the progress of the language, they thought proper to distinguish it by the insertion of the σ betwixt the two final vowels of the circumflex verbs, sometimes changing the penult vowel into a long vowel, and sometimes not, as φιλεω has φιλησω in the future, but αρχω has αρξω. But it may be observed, that originally there appears to have been no change of the vowel; for in the oldest verbs, and such as we are assured are originals, there is no change of the vowel; such as εω, from whence εσομαι; ιω from which ισταντο; εω, and the like. And indeed it is most natural to think that this change of the vowel would come in process of time in the formation of the future, as we have seen it did in the formation of the perfect, from the instances above given of βεβαα, μεμαα, &c.

It may be further observed, that it would appear that anciently in the formation of the two past tenses, the aorist and the perfect, the κ was indiscriminately used. Of this I think there is a vestige in the verbs in -μι, τιθημι, διδωμι, and ιημι, which are from the roots θεω, δοω, ιω, and their aorists εθηκα, εδωκα, and ηκα. And it further appears, from the example of two of these, viz. τιθημι and ιημι, that the short vowel of the theme, instead of being changed into the corresponding long vowel, was changed into a diphthong; as τιθημι has its perfect τεθεικα, and ιημι, εικα, in the same manner as we have seen above, that from θνω was derived τεθνεικα. These

adjectives, or adverbs, are formed by addition to, or alteration of those duads. Sect. 1.

Thus it appears, that the five duads above mentioned, are essential parts of every root in the Greek language, being of necessary use in flection and derivation; and therefore I make them the radical and primitive sounds of the language, from which combined, with other vowels and with consonants, the whole language, in long order, and a wonderful progress of generation, is to be deduced.

It must, I think, be admitted, that this hypothesis is at least plausible; and that if the language was not in fact formed upon this system, it might have been so formed; and that no happier terminations

These things I have mentioned, to shew, that those characteristical letters of the future and past tenses, viz. σ and κ, were not constantly and uniformly used in the Greek language, in the formation of those tenses; but that by the original constitution of the language they appear to have been formed only by the change of the two final vowels of the theme, at least of the ω; for the other was not, nor is not yet, always changed. And as to the imperfect, it always was and still is formed by the change only of the final ω into ον; for as to the augment in the beginning, it is evident from Homer, that it was not antiently in use. The common lexicons and grammars indeed tell us, that it is omitted *Ionicè* or *poeticè*. But they, who know a little more of the language than what is contained in those books, understand no more by that expression, than that such was the antient use of the language, which the poets preserved longer than other writers: For the Muses, though they furnished the matter to the poets, never inspired them with a new language; and however they might adorn their style, and raise it, by figures, they never violated the rules of grammar that either were in use, or were remembered to have been in use, at the time they wrote.

Diss. E

terminations could have been found for the verbal roots of the language, than those five duads, serving so well for the purposes both of flection and derivation, and particularly of flection, which is a peculiar property of the Greek language, and what constitutes the chief difference betwixt it and its kindred languages of the East. It is not however enough that my system is such as might have been the system of the language, but it must be proved, that in fact it is so. This can only be done by induction; that is, by a multitude of examples of words that we are sure are so formed, from which we may reasonably infer, that all the rest were so formed, though we cannot now trace them up to their original.

But before I come to this, it is proper to observe, that although my argument does not require I should prove, that any of those five radical sounds either are, or ever were, roots of the language commonly so called; that is, words significant, from which other words of similar signification are derived; yet I am able to shew that four at least of the five are so. For ἀω, *spiro*, and ἁω, or ἑω, with a thick spirit, as the Greeks pronounced it, are words of common use; and there is a third, viz. ω, which, though it is not in use in the present indicative, is preserved in several other tenses; and even in that tense it is preserved in Latin, with a change common in that language, of the *i* into *e*: for that the verb truly is *io*, and not *eo*, is clear, not only from the other tenses, such as *ibam*, *ivi*, *ibo*, but from the other persons of

this

this very present tense, such as, *is*, *it*, *imus*; and the word ιος, signifying an *arrow*, much used by Homer, is allowed, by all etymologists, to come from this root. The duad εω is likewise a word unused, but it is acknowledged by all grammarians and etymologists to be a primitive word, and the parent of a very numerous family: for from thence is derived ειμι, *sum*; ιημι, *mitto*, according to the usual derivation of the verbs in -μι, from the pure verb εω (*vid. Ursini Grammat.*) and ιεμαι, *cupio*, which is likewise regularly formed from εω, as τιθεμαι is from θεω. And besides these, the words ἕζω, ἐννυιο, or ἐννυμι, *induo*, are, by all grammarians, deduced from this antient theme. The only remaining duad, is οω, or ωω, with the first vowel lengthened, which indeed is not a word in use, nor accounted by any grammarian, so far as I know, an antient root of the language. But we have the word οθω, (Homer uses οθομαι, in the middle voice), and we have also the verb ωθω, of which both the future ωσω, and the aorist ωσα, are to be found in Homer; now οθω or ωθω may be supposed to be formed from οω or ωω, by the interjection of the θ betwixt the two *o*'s in the same manner as πληθω is formed from πλεω, and many other Greek verbs in the same way. And ωον, in Latin *ovum*, will come from it in the common way that nouns come from verbs; and if it be true, that all the primitives in Greek are verbs, and all the nouns

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Diss. I. derivatives, as I think I have shewn it to be, it is impossible that ωϝ could be otherwise derived.

Thus it appears, that those duads, or at least four of them, are roots of the language in every sense of the word; and the only remaining question is, Whether or not all the other roots of the language be not those very roots combined with other letters both vowels, and consonants?

In the first place let us examine the composition with vowels. From αϝ the first of these roots is formed, by prefixing another α, another verb, ααϝω, *laeda*, used by Homer; by prefixing the ι, is formed ιαϝω, *sino*; and by prefixing the *i*, is formed the verb ιαω, or ιαομαι, as it is commonly used. And with the υ interposed betwixt the two vowels, comes the verb αυω, signifying to *make a sound* or *noise*, from which αυδαω and αυδαομαι, *loquor*. See *Etym. Magnum. in voce* αυδη. From the next duad ιω, is formed ιαω, ιημι, ιαμαι, by prefixing the Iota; and by the interjection of the υ, is formed the verb ιυω, *torreo*. From the root ιω is formed, by the addition of the α, an old word αιω, *audio*; from whence, in all probability, comes the word αισθανομαι, signifying the perception of that and every other sense, and by an easy transition, the cogitation of the mind also. In the same manner is formed, by prefixing the ο, the word οιω, *puto*, as it is used by Homer, or οιομαι, as it is now used.

But this kind of composition, with vowels only, could not go far, without making the language much

much too soft and vocal, besides that there is not variety enough in them to produce all the words of a language. The consonants therefore must have been called to aid, which, as I have had occasion to observe, make the most material parts of language, in so much that in the orthography of some of the Eastern nations, particularly the Arabians, the vowels are neglected to be written. From the combination of these duads of vowels with consonants, we shall see the whole Greek language flowing with an easy descent, and a most copious stream. Sect. I.

To be convinced of this, we need only go over all the consonants one by one, and by plain induction we shall see that the whole language is in this manner composed. I shall give but a few examples, beginning with the first consonant β, which, compounded with the first duad αω, produces βαω, *eo*, an old verb, used in some tenses by Homer, from which, in later times, was formed βαινω; prefixed to ω, it makes βεω or βηω; from which βαζω, a word preserved to us by Hesychius, signifying the same as φωνεω; prefixed to ιω, it makes βιω, (from whence the Latin *vivo*, and the Greek βιος), or βιοω, or βιωμι, *vivo*; prefixed to οω, it produces βοω, *pasco*, from which is formed βους, and the Latin *bos*, and another verb now in use, viz. βοσκω, by the interjection of the σ and κ, as from γνωω, γνωσκω is formed, and many others after the same manner; and lastly, compounded with υω, it produces βυω, *obturo*, *impleo*; from which βυθος, or βυσσος, *gurges*, *vorago*.

Sect. I. *vorago.* The next consonant is γ, from which, compounded with αω, is produced γαω, *gigno*, (a verb yet preserved in Homer; in the middle perfect γεγαα, from which γαια, *terra*,) then γαω, or γαω, *gaude*, as from πλεω, πληθω; γιω, from whence γινομαι, or γιγνομαι, *fio*; γοω, *lugeo*; γυω, from which γυον *membrum*. According to the same analogy, is formed by the adjection of the next consonant δ, δαω, or δαιω, *luceo*; δεω, *vinceo*; διω, from which διωκω, *sequor*; δοω, or διδωμι, *do*; and δυω, *subeo*.

I do not think it is necessary to go through all the other consonants in their order; but if any Greek scholar, who is acquainted with the old obsolete roots of the language, will take that trouble, I will venture to say, that he will see the whole language springing from those duad roots, in a manner that will surprise him, if has not made the observation before. But he must not wonder, if he do not find in every instance the immediate derivative; for, considering the many changes that must have been in this language during the very long time that it has lasted, many of the original words must necessarily be lost; and indeed the wonder is, that so many of them are preserved. But where the analogy is established by so many examples, we are at liberty to suppose roots, as I have done, in the case of ωον and γυον, and as may be done in many other instances with like probability. Thus though we cannot find at present the verb ζυω, as we do ζαω, ζεω, ζοω; yet we have

ζυμη,

ζυμα, *fermentum*, which, according to the common rule of derivation, must be from ζυω. In like manner, though we have not, ρυω, or ρυω, as we have ρυω, ρυω, and ρυω; yet we have χρυω, and χρυω, formed in the same way from those roots, as κτυπω is from τυπω, the archetype of τυπτω. Diss. I.

Hitherto I have only spoken of the composition of these primitives with a single consonant. But the propagation increases prodigiously, when we take into the play more consonants, and more vowels, either added to the beginning, or thrown into the middle, or both. Thus λυω, *solvo*, formed from the duad υω, by the addition of another consonant in the beginning, is made κλυω, and κλυμι, *audio*. ταω, an old Homeric word, signifying *capio*, from whence τε, in the imperative, by the addition of a ω in the beginning, made κταω, from whence κτωμαι, *possideo*. From φαω, an old root, signifying *occido*, (vid. *Etymol. Magn.*), is derived σφαζω, *occido*, by an addition of the consonant, to the beginning, and the interjection of the ζ; and from the same root, but signifying a different thing, viz. *to shine*, by throwing in another vowel, and the consonant ν, is formed another verb φαινω; and by the addition of another vowel still, the Homeric word αιανω is produced. In the same manner, from λαω, is formed first λαβω, and then λαμβανω; and after the same fashion is ἀνδανω, formed from the old root ἀδω. According to the same analogy, from αυω, is formed αυαινω, *sicco*, *arefacio*; from αχω, whence αχος, *dolor*,

Diff. I. *dolor*, is formed first ἄχω, then ἄχνω, and then ἄχνυμι, *doleo*. And in the same manner, from ἔρω, is ἔρνω, ἔρνυμι, and ἔρνυμι, *impetum facio*; in all which instances, and many more that might be given, it may be observed, that the consonants which are thrown in, are mostly liquids, such as μ, ν, ρ, by which the sound is made sweeter, at the same time that it is made fuller and more pompous. And in order to make it likewise strong and masculine, we see the aspirated consonants φ, χ, θ, are used; for it is the peculiar praise of the Greek language, that the sounds of it are equally mixed of the sweet and flowing, and of the strong and rough, so that it is suited to any kind of composition.

It may be also observed, that the Greeks not only swelled their words in the manner above described, but likewise by reduplications of syllables in the beginning, of which they appear to have been very fond. In this manner, from δάπτω, they formed δαιδάπτω; from μαίω; μαιμαίω; from φαίνω, πεμφαίνω; derivatives, not only of more beautiful sound than their primitives, but, if I understand them rightly, of greater emphasis and significancy. For the same reason they formed new verbs from the preter-perfect of other verbs. Thus from τλάω, τέτλημα, they formed τέτλημι, *tolero*; from whence the Homeric imperative τέτλαθι; from βέβηκα, the perfect of βαίνω, they formed βεβήκω; of which the third person singular is frequently used by Homer; and ought not to be mistaken, as it is by Dr Clarke,

Clarke, for the plu-perfect of the original verb: for it is no more the plu-perfect than πεπληγει, δεδηει, and τετρηχει are, which are all present tenses of derivative verbs of the same kind.

Sect. I.

I will here, in passing, give a caution to etymologists, that when they see words formed in the manner of λαμβανω, λανθανω, δαρδαπτω, μαρμαιρω, &c. they should not imagine that they are compound words, made up of two significant words, for they are truly no more than derivative words, according to the established analogy of the language.

In this genealogy of words, I have gone no farther than the verbs derived from the five duads compounded with other vowels and consonants; but I have not observed how these verbs beget not only other verbs, but also nouns, adjectives, and adverbs; and these again other verbs and other nouns, &c. in almost infinite progression. And in this way, from one of my roots, a prodigious tree of a family might be made, divided and subdivided into branches almost without number. Thus from the first of them, αω, is formed, without any consonant, αημι, αηρ, and their derivatives; ιαω, and its family; εαω, and αυω, and their families: then, with the consonants, it produces βαω, γαω, δαω, ζαω, καω, λαω, μαω, &c. and all their several families of prodigious number.

According to my system therefore of the language, the radical sounds of it are the five duads, so often mentioned, and which are likewise roots properly

Diss. 1. properly so called, that is, words significant, from which other words of similiar signification are derived. Of these, by prefixing another vowel, or any one consonant, are formed the other roots, which are all verbs; and from these, by the addition of other vowels, and other consonants, in the beginning, middle, or end, are formed other verbs, nouns, adjectives, adverbs, and in short all the words of the language. And in this way from those simple elements, or, as they may be called, seeds of the language, there is a wonderful growth of words, by which the language is not only raised to a greater pomp of sound, but enriched with more copiousness of expression, than any other language, at least that I know.

SECT. II.

Sect. 2. THE system of the Greek language that I have given in the preceding section, is so new, and so different from the common notions concerning this language, that I cannot expect it should be readily assented to by the learned, or that many objections will not be made to it. Such of these as occur to me, I am to state in this section, and answer as well as I can.

And, in the first place, it will be said, That those duads, which I call the roots of the language, are not roots at all; because they have either no signi-

fication, or none that is analagous to those words which I make the derivatives from them. Sect. 2.

To this I answer, *first*, That I have already obviated this objection, by giving those duads, not as roots properly so called, nor indeed as words, but only as primitive or radical sounds of the language; and that they are such, I think it is impossible to deny. For certainly the verbs ωω, ιαω, βαω, δαω, καω, βιω, διω, κιω, δυω, λυω, and the like, are primitives, and roots of the language properly so called; and from these, it is evident, that the whole words of the language may be derived according to the common rules of Greek derivation. Now, of all such roots, one or other of the five duads is certainly a most material part; being, in the first place, the greatest part; and, secondly, that upon which the inflection, and the formation of the tenses, depend. Now, when we see in all the radical words of a language, five combinations of vowels, predominating, and producing such effects with respect to flection and derivation, ought not the sounds of those letters to be distinguished from the other letters in the language, and called, by way of eminence, the primitive and elemental *sounds*, if not the radical *words* of the language?

But, *2do*, There are four of those duads at least that are words themselves, and undeniably radical words; and the fifth there is good reason to suppose was once a radical word, though it is not now to be found. Now it is possible that the artists who framed the system of the language, may

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have imagined some connection of one kind or another, betwixt those original verbs αω, ω, and the rest of them, and the other verbs formed from them, by the addition of a vowel or consonant; such as ναω, βιω, θαω, βιω, θω, and the rest of them. Upon such remote analogies and distant relations of things is formed, as we are told, the system of the Sanscrit language. This language, says our author *, is analysed into a small number of what he calls *primitive elements*. These elements, he says, may be considered as the *caput mortuum* of the language; for they are of no use by themselves, as they signify nothing, properly speaking, but only have a relation to some idea: and he gives an instance of one of these elemental sounds, viz. *kru*, which he says has a relation to the idea of *action*; but it is not a word, nor has any signification by itself, till it is someway affected or changed by what he calls the secondary elements, which make it a word, and give it a determinate signification. Thus of *kru*, is made *kar*, *kir*, *kri*, &c. which are all words of the language, having a determinate signification; and of these, by wonderful synthesis, the whole language is compounded. Now this may be supposed to be the system of the Greek language; with this difference only, that the primitive elements of the Greek form words themselves, having

* See *Pere du Pon's* account of the learning and language of the *Bramins*, published in vol. 26. of the *Lettres Edifiantes et curieuses*.

having a certain meaning, to which we may suppose all the various words formed from those primitive elements have some distant relation. Sect. 2.

And what favours this hypothesis is, that even such words as are allowed to be roots, have hardly any determinate signification. Thus φαω for example, as it appears from its derivatives φῶς, φαίνω, or φαινω, φημι, and σφαζω, must denote some very general idea, which is something analogous to *light*, to *speaking*, and to *killing*. Now if this be the case of those roots, or secondary elements, as they may be called, it is likely that it is much more so with respect to the primitive elements; and accordingly one of them, viz. ιω, is certainly of very indeterminate signification, as appears from its derivatives, ειμι, *sum*; ιημι, *mitto*; ιεμαι, *cupio*; ἐννυμι, *vestio*.

But whatever probability there may be of a resemblance in this respect betwixt the Bramin and Greek languages, which I think the more likely that I am persuaded both Indians and Greeks got their language, and all their other arts, from the some parent-county, viz. Egypt; yet I am not disposed to found a system of language upon such remote analogies; and therefore I rather incline to adhere to my hypothesis, that though these duads are themselves proper roots which have their derivatives; yet, with respect to the other words of the language, they are no more than radical elements, which, by the addition of one other

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ther element, become radical words, from which the whole language is derived.

Another objection that will naturally occur to my system is, That according to it all the radical words in Greek are verbs.

But to this I think I have already made a sufficient answer in the preceding volume, where I have shewn, *first*, in point of fact, That a great many nouns that are supposed to be primitives, are truly derivatives from verbs. *2do*, That there is the greatest reason to believe, that all the other words of the language are ultimately derived in the same manner, though we cannot in every instance trace them up to the original verb; because they may be all so derived, according to the common rules of derivation, which take place in the language. *3dly*, That there is a very good reason, from the nature of things, why verbs should be the original words of every language. *4thly*, That such is the scheme of derivation of the Hebrew language, betwixt which and the Greek there is such a connection, that we cannot presume them to be different in this fundamental point, however different they may be in termination, flection, and other accidents; to all which may be added, that if we can suppose the artificers of the Greek language to have formed a system of derivation, and to have been at pains to find out the most proper words for roots, they could not have found any so proper as verbs, because they are the most ductile and flexible

flexible part of speech, and, having so many different forms, admit of the greatest variety of derivation: for from every part of the verb, we may derive another word, having some signification analogous to that of the verb; and accordingly, as we have seen, the Greeks have derivatives almost from every tense, and sometimes from different persons of the same tense. Sect. 2.

Another objection that will occur is, That these radical verbs of the Greek tongue I make to be all verbs ending in ω, and all pure verbs, that is, with a vowel before the final ω.

And I believe the fact to be, that all the verbs in Greek were originally pure verbs. At present indeed there are three kinds of verbs in Greek, viz. the pure verbs, the barytons, and the verbs in -μι. That these three all existed together, and were in the original constitution of the language, we cannot suppose, unless we likewise suppose, at the same time, that so great a piece of art as the Greek language, was perfected at once, so as to admit of no after improvements or enlargements. Now it is impossible, I think, to deny, that the pure verbs are original in the language. And it is impossible to dispute that the verbs in -μι are derived from them, and were invented in later times, in order to make a greater variety of the forms of their verbs, and of their terminations and flections; and accordingly we see, that the most antient dialect of Greek, viz. the Latin, has no such verbs. The only question therefore is,

Diff. I. is, concerning the barytons. Now if we suppose them to be originals in the language, as well as the pure verbs, then have we two sets of original verbs formed at once; which is by no means likely, if we consider the progress that there is, and must have been, in this art of language, as well as in every other human art. And it will still appear more unlikely, if we consider the way in which the verbs in -μι, which undoubtedly are not of the original structure of the language, but an after addition, are formed. For they are derived from the pure verb, by changing the termination ω into ι, and inserting betwixt it and the preceding vowel, the consonant ν. Now is it not reasonable to think, and agreeable to the analogy of the language, that the barytons are formed in the same way, by inserting a consonant, one or more, betwixt the two vowels of the pure verb? That a whole race of them is so formed, it is impossible to deny, I mean all such of them as end in -σκω, as γιγνωσκω and βι-βασκω, which are formed in that way from γνω and βα: now it certainly makes the system of the language more uniform and consistent to suppose that they were all so formed. And the reason for their formation, is the same as for the formation of the verbs in -μι, namely, to give a greater variety of flection to their verbs; for they discovered that certain consonants, such as κ and σ, would coalesce very well in sound with the sigma, the characteristical letter of the future, and by changing

ging them into their correspondent aspirates, they made an agreeable variety in their perfects. Further, we see that the barytons themselves, generate other verbs in the same way. Thus it cannot be doubted, that the archetype of τυπτω, is τυπω. This is evident, not only from the second aorist ἐτυφον, which undoubtedly was the imperfect of the old verb, but also from the formation of the future and perfect, which makes it evident that the characteristical letter is π. Now from this old verb τυπω, is formed the new verb τυπτω, by inserting betwixt the two final letters the letter τ; and if so, is it not agreeable to the analogy of the language to suppose, that τυπω itself was formed by inserting a π betwixt the υ and ω of τυω? which may be presumed to have been the original verb. Sect. 2.

And my hypothesis is supported not only by this reasoning from analogy, but also from facts: for it is evident, that many of those verbs that are now barytons, were originally pure verbs; e. g. βαλλω, which is now a baryton, was formerly the pure verb βλω, as is evident from the future still in use, βλησομαι, and the preter-perfect βεβληκα. And the same is true of μαλλω, and θλω, and many others that might be mentioned: and ἐχω and φερω, though they have not those marks of being once pure verbs, they have another equally certain, which is that σχημι and φρημι are to be found in the antient poets, which must have been from σχω and φρω. The liquid verbs

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verbs too in νω and μω, appear to have been derived from pure verbs, as, *e. g.* νημω and μανω, are evidently from νημω and μανω, as appears both from their futures and perfects. Even the verb τυπτω above mentioned, appears to have been antiently τυπτω, from the second future of τυπτω which is τυπῶ circumflexed; now this second future is no other than the present of the old verb τυπτω *. For that the circumflected ω in this future is no other than the ω contracted, is evident from the Ionic use of the word, according to which it is τυπτω uncontracted, after the manner of the Ionians; and if there were any doubt in the matter, the antient verb τυπτω itself is preserved to us by Hesychius.

It may also be objected to my system, That I make the Greek language of a very gaping pronunciation, when I suppose the primitive sounds and the chief component parts of the language to be vowels standing open upon one another.

But the fact is, that such was the genius of the antient Greek, and that contractions are but of later use, when glib-speaking, that went trippingly off the tongue, came into fashion, instead of the full-mouthed high-sounding language that was formerly used. This antient use was preserved in the Ionic dialect, and in the old poets, particularly in Homer, who, in the very first line of his Iliad opens two vowels upon one another, viz. ε and α, which make a greater gap than any o-

* See Ursini Gram. Græc. pag. 163.

ther. And that he did this purposely, is evident; for instead of Πηληιαδυ, which he might have used, he says Πηληιαρεω Αχιληος, not without prejudice to his verse. Sect 2.

It may be further objected, That I make the system of the Greek language too regular and artificial, more so than any thing of popular use can be supposed to be.

This objection proceeds upon the supposition, that language is an art invented, as well as used, by the people. But is it possible to believe, that the Sanscrit language was invented by the people? or can we believe that the Hebrew, a much less perfect language than the Greek, was the invention of the vulgar that used it? or indeed can we believe, that any art whatever, of the least dignity or excellence, was ever brought to the least degree of perfection, merely by popular use, though in that way no doubt the first rude practices of every art began? But of this I have already said enough in the preceding volume.

Another objection may be made by those who have not sufficiently studied the nature of language, That I do not, by my system, give an account of all the words of the language; for the conjunctions, such as και and τε, and μεν and δε, and the prepositions, such as εκ, and the pronouns, such as εγω and συ, are neither roots nor derivatives, according to my system. The same objectors will also, no doubt, desire, that I should ac-

Diff. I. count for the interjections, and the names of numbers.

But the answer is, That although by far the greater part of things in a language of art are according to rule, some things must be arbitrary, and not governed by any rule. The nature of language, as we have shewn, absolutely requires, that some things should be denominated from others, so that every word of a language may not be independent and unconnected with every other; and it belongs to the art to determine what things shall be denominated from what. Substances, as has been shewn, are fitly denominated from their actions and operations. Qualities may be, and commonly are, denominated in the same way. Inferior actions may be denominated from the principal actions upon which they depend; and even the words expressing those *primary* actions, as I may call them, and which are held to be primitives, may be so contrived, as that the sounds of the letters shall have some similitude to the actions denoted by them, as I have endeavoured to shew. In this manner all the words of the language, both primitive and derivative, which denote things really existing in nature, may be formed according to rules of art. And it is of such words that a language is constituted: for conjunctions and prepositions are to be considered only as pegs and nails in the stucture of language, and are, properly speaking, no part of the structure; for they do not express any thing existing in nature, but

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but only the operations of our mind, in connecting together the several parts of discourse, and expressing the relations that we conceive betwixt things. Pronouns likewise are no more than an invention of ours to supply the place of nouns. Plato therefore, in his dialogue upon etymology, has not so much as mentioned conjunctions, prepositions, or pronouns, as not being proper subjects of etymology. They are therefore, I believe, in all languages, expressed by sounds merely arbitrary. And as to the names of numbers, Plato indeed mentions them, but says that they are words that cannot be derived from any other. For this he does not give any reason; but I take the reason to be, that men have used words to calculate, as they formerly used pebbles, and now use counters. And as to interjections, they are to be considered as no more than natural cries, expressive of passion, which cannot, by their nature, be derivatives from other words. And in this manner, I think we may account for some words of a language not being derivatives, nor formed according to rule.

But besides these, there are other words which cannot be reduced to any rule, and which Plato, in the Cratylus, has likewise given up; I mean foreign words, or rather words of the original language of the Greeks, which they preserved in the same state as when they got them from the East, without adjusting them to the new system they had formed of their language; such is the Phrygian word βαγ, signifying

Diff. 1. signifying *fire*, and Ασυ, the Athenian name for their city, which I had occasion to mention before, and the four other words of the same unusual termination; and I am persuaded that many others may be found that were used by the Greeks, but never naturalized in their language.

The only other objection that occurs to me is, That according to this system, I make the Greek language perfect and complete in itself, borrowing nothing from any other; whereas, in the former part of this work, I made it to be derived from the East, and the same originally with the Oriental languages.

The answer to this is, That however paradoxical it may seem, in certain respects both are true: for the artists that formed the Greek language out of the materials brought from the East, did so reform it, that it has the appearance of a language quite different from any of the Oriental dialects. This was brought about by a change of the termination and the flection; and in consequence of that, of the roots, and the whole system of derivation, all except that fundamental point of the roots being verbs. According to this plan, the roots became duads of vowels, either by themselves, or with a single consonant prefixed, instead of triads of consonants, as they are in Hebrew, with two vowels, but a consonant always last; so that the only similitude that remained betwixt these new roots and the old was, that both consisted of two syllables. But in compounding the words with those primitive duads

and

and consonants, they made use of such consonants as were used in the old language, (with such variations however as suited the nice Greek ear); and it is by this means that the Greek and the Oriental languages still preserve a resemblance to one another, by which they may be known to be of the same family; so that still the Greek may be said, without impropriety, to be a dialect of the East, and a stream from that great source of languages, but which is much further from the source than any other. Sect.

And thus I have endeavoured both to establish my system, and to answer the objections to it. After I had formed it, I was told that it was not entirely new, but that Hempsterhusius, the Dutch professor, had much the same thought, but he never published it, only communicated it to some of his scholars. I never could get any distinct account of his system, but only in general I have heard, that as he was a great Oriental, as well as Greek scholar, he made the Greek roots, like the Hebrew, to consist of triads. If those triads were such as I suppose them to be, consisting each of them of one or other of the five duads and a consonant prefixed, then there is very little difference betwixt Hempsterhusius and me; for, according to my system, by far the greatest part of the roots are such as Hempsterhusius made them. But I think his system defective in these two things: *first*, That he does not carry the analysis of the language far enough back, nor resolve it

Diff. I. it into its primitive elements, which are certainly the five duads. *2dly*, That he excludes from the number of the roots, the duads themselves, four of which are most certainly radical words of the language; and also the composition of them with other vowels, making such words as *aw*, *iw*, &c. which are likewise undoubtedly roots in the proper sense of the word. I therefore think it better to make the duads the primitive sounds of the language, and themselves roots likewise; and all the other roots to be formed, by prefixing either another vowel or a consonant to the original duads.

DIS-

DISSERT. II.

Of the Sound of the Greek Language.

IN the preceding dissertation, I have endeavoured to shew, that the artificers of the Greek language chose for the radical sounds of it, five duads of vowels, for the sake of the analogy, that is, the formation of cases and tenses; —of derivation;—and likewise for more agreeable sound. In this dissertation I propose to shew what further the Greeks have done to improve the sound of their language; as in this respect, as well as with respect to the formation of the language, the Greek differs very much from the Oriental languages, and those of Gothic and Celtic extraction.

The termination of the words of a language is, with respect to its sound, a very material part of it. Herodotus * very properly observes it as a peculiarity of the Persian language, that all the words of it terminate in *s*. And there is hardly any thing that distinguishes languages more than the difference of termination. The languages of the East, and the Gothic and Celtic, and their progeny, terminate almost all their words with consonants, and these, for the greater part mutes, and often aspirated; such terminations, especially if

* *Lib.* 1. *c.* 139. This, says our author, is a peculiarity, which escapes the Persians themselves, but not us Greeks.

Dif. II. if the following word begins, as it frequently happens, with a consonant that does not coalesce with them in the same sound, make those languages seem very harsh to ears accustomed to Greek or Latin, or even to the corruptions of the Latin, such as the French and Italian. On the other hand, the Greeks terminate all their words either in vowels, or with the liquid ν, sometimes in ς, but very rarely, according to the later use of the Greek language, and often in the monadic letter ρ; but never with a mute consonant, and far less with an aspirate. The great difference therefore that we find betwixt the Greek, and those other languages, one of which I am persuaded it originally was, is in the termination and the flection. This indeed makes so great a difference, that to those who are not critics in language, they appear to be altogether different: but when we can trace the Greek word up to its origin, we find that there is no difference but in the termination, and that the body of the word is filled up with the same consonants and vowels, as in the Hebrew, Gothic, or Celtic, with such alterations as the pleasure of the ear might require.

For the artificers of the Greek language, not only attended to the termination of their words, but they have taken care also, that in the middle they shall not be crouded with consonants, as is often the case of the languages of northern extraction, and particularly of the English, in which we find sometimes four consonants together, without distinction of the kind, whether they be such as run

easily into one another or not. But in Greek here are never above three together, without the nterposition of a vowel; and of these the first, or the last, or both, are always liquids, or the monadic letter σ; as in the words εσθλος, αιχρος, αοθμαι, λαμφθεις, &c. Diss. II.

I observed before, that the liquids do not unite with one another in the same syllable, with the exception only of the μ and ν in certain words. But those two just now mentioned do not admit either of the other two liquids λ and ρ next to themselves, even in the following syllable; at least this was a junction that offended the delicate Greek ear, though very common among us. In order therefore to prevent so disagreeable a sound, they threw in, betwixt the μ or ν and those other liquids, some other consonant such as δ, or τ, which are commonly interposed betwixt the ν and ρ, and the labials β, π, φ, which are usually interposed betwixt the μ and the ρ; and when the λ follows the ν, this last is left out, and the λ doubled, as in ελλειψις, for ενλειψις; ελλαμπω, for ενλαμπω.

The three lingual mutes admit no other consonants after them, in Greek, except the four liquids, λ, μ, ν, ρ; because any other consonants following those mutes, they thought, produced a disagreeable sound. It is for this reason, in the declension of such nouns as μονας, they do not say, in the dative plural, μοναδσι, which they ought to do according to the analogy, but μονασι; and in

Diff. II. the dative plural of τιρας, they say τιρσι, not τιρσι. And in like manner, in the conjugation of verbs, they say πλη in the future, from πλαω, not πλαυσω. I know that the double letter ζ, as it is commonly pronounced, is an exception to this rule, by making the σ follow the δ. But I say, upon the authority of the Halicarnassian, that this is a wrong pronunciation. For he has said expressly, that the composition of this letter is σδ, not δσ; nor do I see any reason for supposing, as certain critics do, that there is an error here in the manuscript with respect to this letter, any more than with respect to the other two double letters, and ψ.

If any of the aspirated is immediately followed or preceded by any of the *tenues* or *mediæ*, they must be aspirated likewise; as αιχθην, ερυφθην; and in general, the rule is, that the *tenues*, *mediæ*, and aspirated, follow immediately those of the same class only; as may be observed in the conjugation of the verbs; as, when they say λελειμμαι, for λελειγται. And in composition and derivation, the concourse of a *tenuis* with a *media* is avoided; as, in place of κατδυσαι they say καδδυσαι; in place of κατ- δυναμιν, καδδυναμιν, and in deriving ἑβδομος, and ογδοος, from ἑπτα, and οκτω, the *tenues* in the original are changed respectively into middles of the same organ. But with respect to aspirates, a contrary rule is followed, where they do not immediately follow one another, but are at some distance. For in that way two aspirates do not concur, but the one is changed

changed into its correspondent *tenuis*. Thus in the declension of nouns, from θριξ, they do not say θριχος, but τριχος; though in the dative plural they say θριξι, when there is no other aspirate following the θ. In like manner, they say σταφθην, from βαπτω not βαφθην; and they say τριφω, not θριφω, which appears to have been the original verb, from the future θριψω. Diff. II.

By an improvement which the Greeks in later times made upon the sound of their language, the σ is not tolerated after the ν in the same syllable. This is certainly the case at present; but that it was not always so, is evident from several of their words, both nouns and participles. *e. g.* They formerly said Αιανς; in place of Αιας, as is evident from the genitive Αιαντος, and the vocative Αιαν; and in like manner γιγας was undoubtedly of old γιγανς; and, if there were any doubt of the matter, the use of the Latin language, in which this termination is common, particularly in the participles of their verbs, makes the thing quit evident. Thus the Latins say *stans*, in place of the Greek participle στας, as it is now used; for it appears certain, that originally the Greek participal of this verb was the same with the Latin, and that the Greek participles ending in -ας, such as τιθεις, were formerly in -ις, as appears from the genitives τιθεντος, and στατος; and from thence comes the Latin participle in *-ens*.

This method of leaving out letters was practised by the Greeks, not only to make the sound of their language

Diff. II.

language softer, but also to make it more masculine. For this reason the vowel ι, as being a weak sounding letter, is very often left out in their words; as, *e. g.* the genitive of ανηρ, according to analogy, is ανηρος, as appears from the nominative plural still preserved to us in Homer; but in order to make the sound stronger, they strike out the ι. This makes it ανρος; but the delicate Greek ear not being able to bear the sound of the ρ after the ν, as I have already observed, they insert the δ betwixt them, and make it ανδρος. The Greek word for *ager* was, I doubt not, originally the same as in Latin; but adding to the termination in ρ the syllable ος, as they commonly did in order to soften it, they made it αγρος; and then, eliding the ι, they made the present word αγρος.

There are other examples of the syncope of the ι in the middle of words, one or two of which I shall mention, because they are not commonly observed. The root of the verb πιπτω is undoubtedly πετω, as is evident from the future πεσω, and aorist επεσα; from thence by reduplication is formed πεπετω, in the same manner as the verbs in μι are formed; and then, by leaving out the ε, is made πιπτω, the verb presently in use. In like manner, the original of the verb πιπτω is πιφω, as appears from the second aorist επιφον, from thence πιπφω, then by the syncope πιπτω; but then, as in Greek the π never follows the τ, on account of the harshness of the sound, these two letters are transposed, and so πιπτω is produced. And according to the same

same process, from γενω is formed γιγνομαι, from whence the Latin *gigno;* and in the same way, from μενω is derived μιμνω. Diss. II.

And not only did the Greek thus improve the sound of their language, by leaving out letters, but more still by the addition of letters, and even syllables, in the beginning, middle, and end of words. In the first way are formed the verbs in -μι; and according to the same analogy, some verbs which are not commonly observed, such as μαρμαιρω, from μαιρω, δαρδαπτω from δαπτω, and παμφαινω from φαινω, where there is not only the reduplication of the first syllable, but in the two first the letter ρ is inserted, and in the last the letter μ. How much the sound of these words is raised and swelled by the reduplication, and the addition of the new letter, it is needless to observe.

Of additions in the middle of the word there are many examples, such as from ἁδμ, ἁνδανω; from ληβω, or λαβω, λαμβανω; from πωλεω, πωλεσκω; and, in general, all those verbs in -σκω. In these instances not a single letter only is added, but in some of them four. In other cases only a single letter is used, as in the case of πιμπλημι, instead of πιπλημι, from πλεω; and in σκηπτρον, from σκηπτω, κατοπτρον from κατοπτομαι, where the ρ is thrown in; as in ανυδρος, and ανιππος, the ν is thrown in.

And in general it may be observed, that the letters which the Greeks commonly use for filling up the sound of their words, are the ν, the μ, the ϐ, the

Diff. II. the λ, and the ν, and very often the vowel α, as being of highest sound.

This way of enlarging words is, according to my scheme of the Greek language above mentioned, one of the two ways by which the whole language was formed, from compositions in duads of the vowel α and the other vowels, the ω being always last. For all the words, according to my notion, are formed, either by additions to the beginning of the original duad, or by the insertion of other letters betwixt the final and the preceding vowel.

As to their practice of adding to the end of their words, we have also many examples; as, of μα (which, I doubt not, was the antient Greek word as well as it is the Latin) they made μαθ, for the sake of the better sound; and of *legami*, or λαγον, they made λαγονι; and I am persuaded, in like manner, all the old words in Greek, which like the Latin words ended in β, or δ, or τ, or λ, had their termination softened, either by the addition of vowels, as in the two instances above mentioned, or of the syllable -ος, as we have seen in the example of words ending in ρ, which was as common a termination in the antient Greek as it is now in the Latin; and the common termination of μ among the Latins, was softened by the Greeks into ν.

It is by additions to the end, as well to the beginning, that the whole race of the verbs in -μι is formed; in which there is no change of the signification

cation of the original word, but only an addition of sound, and of flection. In the same way are formed the most of the derivatives of the Greek language; by which I mean such words as are derived from others, with some change of the signification of the root. Of these I have already spoken; and I will only add here, that we ought not in such derivatives to seek for composition, any more than in the Latin words *infimus*, and *meditullium*. Thus, *e. g.* it would be ridiculous to suppose, that the word ἔσχατος was compounded of ἐχω and τατος, and not a simple derivative from ἐχω, in the same manner as σοφιστης is from σοφος, and κυδαλιμος from κυδος. This, however, is an error which some etymologies of great name have fallen into, particularly Plato, in the Cratylus, who has given us several etymologies of that kind. One I remember that is exceedingly ridiculous. It is that of κακια, which is a noun derived in the common way from κακος; but Plato makes it a compound of κακος and the verb ιω. He might have made a compound of the same kind of the Latin term *malitia*. Of this sort is the etymology which the Roman lawyers give of *testamentum*, as being compounded of *testor*, or *testatio*, and *mens*, *quasi testatio mentis*; whereas in truth it is a verbal noun, derived from *testor*, in the same way as *ornamentum* is from *orno*, *honestamentum* from *honesto*, *condimentum* from *condio*, and a hundred others. Diff. III.

Besides all the ways above mentioned, by which

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which the Greeks improved the sound of their language, there is yet another known among grammarians by the name of *metathesis*, or transposition: for by transposing letters, they not only varied and softened the sounds of their language, but enlarged their stock of words. Thus they say ἀπαγλω, as well as ἀπλαγος, transposing the γ and the λ, tho' this last be the word formed by analogy from ἀπλαγησω. They say also θρασος, and, θαρσος; καρπος, and κραπος. By this rule ερδω is the same word with ρεζω; for if you transpose the ε and the ρ, and leave out the σ of the compound letter ζ, of ρεζω, you make ερδω; or, *vice versa*, by the same transposition of the ρ and ε, and by adding the σ, of ερδω, you make ρεζω. The future of which last verb suffers the transposition of the same letters; for they say ερξω as well as ρεξω. Another example of the same kind is in the verb ρεπω, from whence the Latin word *repo*, and our word *reptile*. Of this verb, by transposing the ε and ρ, they make another verb, viz. ερπω, from which the Latins have also formed another verb of the same signification with *repo*, viz. *serpo*, from whence *serpens*, and our word *serpent*. Another example, but not so obvious, and which therefore I only propose as the conjecture of some grammarians, is furnished by the verb θελω, the same as may be supposed with ελδω, the λ and the θ being transposed, and the θ being changed into the correspondent middle letter of the same organ. Many such transpositions are not to be traced in the Greek as it

now stands, but are to be found in its most antient dialect, the Latin. Thus *nervus* is the same word with νευρον, *rapax* with ἁρπαξ, *tener* with τειρω, and *forma* with μορφη. Diff. II.

After this manner, by transposing, changing, and taking away letters, the Greeks softened the sound of their language, or made it more strong and masculine; and by the addition of letters or syllables to the original words, they gave it a fullness and roundness, and raised it to a pomp of sound, that no language, so far as I know, ever equalled.

But the consequence, as Plato has well observed in the *Cratylus*, of this study of ornament, and the pleasure of the ear, is, that the words are so disguised, καλλωπισμω η μιγχλοπρεπειας ἑνεκα, that the originals of them are hardly to be known. Thus in ἀνδανω, or λαμβανω, it is not easy to find ἀΓω, or λαζω; and if we were not taught by our grammars, it would be more difficult to find θεω in τιθημι. This consideration should dispose us not to reject, hastily, etymologies that may seem at first to be very far-fetched, even in the same language; and much less ought we to do so, as I had occasion to observe before, when the language passes from one people to another; for undoubtedly the words of derivative languages must be at a greater distance from the roots, than the words of the same language.

Many more observations might be made upon a subject so copious; but these may suffice for the present; and I believe most of my readers will think them more than sufficient, and that I have

Diff. II. spent a great deal too much time upon what may be said to be no better than mere spelling. But men of curiosity and science will not be satisfied with knowing, what every man must know who has ears to hear, that the articulation of the Greek language (for we can hardly be said to know any thing more of the sound of it) is more copious, various, and high-sounding, as well as more pleasant, than that of any other language; but they will desire to know by what art it has been raised, from a few short roots, to such a pomp and flow of sound; and this cannot be otherwise explained, than by such observations as I have made, upon the power of letters, and the several methods of making the combinations of them pleasant to the ear, by adding, taking away, changing, or transposing. And however minute and trifling such things may seem, if they had not been known, and observed by the artificers of this wonderful language, it never would have been so much admired as it is by all men of learning and taste; for it is in art as it is in nature, *ex elementis omnia constant*, as Dr Clarke observes in the preface to his edition of Homer.

DIS-

DISSERT. III.

Of the Composition of the Antients; and particularly of that of Demosthenes.

STyle consists of two things; the choice of words, and the composition of these words. Of these two the last is esteemed by the antient masters of the writing-art to be of the greatest importance, being that which contributes the most both to the beauty and the variety of style: for it is by composition chiefly that different styles are distinguished; such as the poetical from the rhetorical;—both from the historical;—and this again from the epistolary or familiar. For the antients made all those different styles of the same words, only composed and arranged in a different manner. Dis. III.

The modern practitioners of the art appear to be of a different opinion; and accordingly they bestow their chief, or rather their only care, upon the choice of words; neglecting almost altogether the composition*; or, if they bestow any pains upon

* The Halicarnassian says the same thing of the moderns of his time, Περὶ συνθέσεως, *sec.* 4. where, after shewing, that it is composition chiefly which distinguishes poet from poet, and orator from orator, he adds, τοις μεν εν αρχαιοις ολιγη δειν πασι πολλη επιδοσι (f. επιτηδευσις) ην αυτη παρ, ὁ και καλα εστιν αυτων τα μετρα, και τα μελη, και οι λογοι· τοις δε μεταγενεστεροις ημεις,

Dis. III.

on that, it were better let alone, as it is directed by a wrong judgement and bad taste. When I speak of modern writers, I mean those of this age; not those of the last, such as Milton and Lord Clarendon, who, it is evident, did not neglect this principal part of style; but, on the contrary, by carefully attending to it, have attained to that reputation which they so justly deserve.

The want of the knowledge of this part of writing has necessarily produced this effect, that our authors, when they want to raise their style, or vary it ever so little from common idiom, not knowing how to do it by composition, are obliged to have recourse to metaphors or figures of different kinds, and to poetical or foreign words; all of which, in some kinds of writing, are improper. And hence it comes, that we have not different styles suited to different subjects; but there is among us but one style; and every author, upon every subject, affects to write what is called *fine language*, that is, a

ȣκετι, πλην ολιγων· χρονῳ δε ὑστερον πανταπασιν ημεληθη· και ȣδεις ᾳετο δειν αναγκαιον αυτο ειναι, ȣδε συμβαλλεσθαι τι τῳ καλλει των λογων. Τοιγαρȣν τοια υτας συνταξεις κατελιπον, οιας ȣδεις ὑπομενει μεχρι Κορωνιδος διελθειν. After this he gives a long catalogue of later authors who entirely neglected composition; and among these he names Polybius, an author as valuable for his matter, as he is despicable for his style. I have often regretted that some of those great masters of the Greek tongue, such as H. Stephen, who not only understood the language perfectly, but practised the writing of it, did not take the trouble to translate Polybius into Attic Greek, with a proper composition. Then he would have been one of the pleasantest, as well as most instructive of historians.

a motley mixture of the froth of rhetoric and the flowers of poetry. Dis. III.

Dionysius the Halicarnassian, an author whom I have made so much use of in this work, has written a most valuable treatise, which he has entitled, περὶ συνθέσεως, or, *Of Composition*; in which, though he has treated of composition only so far as it affects the ear, yet he has made it a chief beauty of style, and compared it to the rod of Minerva in Homer*, which could transform a prince and a hero into the appearance of an old decrepid beggar, or contrariwise. In like manner, says he, the noblest thoughts, even tho' the words be suitable, may be degraded by mean composition; and, on the contrary, low matter without any pomp or dignity of expression, may be raised as much as is proper, and made beautiful, by an agreeable arrangement of the words. Of this he has given us a remarkable example from that passage of the Odyssey, where Homer has introduced Ulysses and the swine-herd, sitting and conversing together; and where there is nothing grand or fine, either in the matter or words, but rather the contrary; yet, by the art of the composition, the verses are beautiful,

* Dionysius, *ibid.* The touch of this rod at one time made Ulysses appear

Ἠτοιχὼ λευγαλίῳ εναλίγκιον, ἠδὲ γέροντι.

And at another time

Μείζονα τ' εἰσιδέειν, καὶ πάσσονα. — —

Dis. III.

ful, and not below the dignity of heroic argument*.

——Tantum series juncturaque pollet;
Tantum de medio sumptis accedit honoris.

This kind of plain work is entirely out of fashion in our poetry for the reason I have mentioned, and but little used even in our prose, and every thing in

* The passage is in the beginning of book 16. of the *Odyssey*. It begins thus,

Τω δ' αυτ' εν κλισιης 'Οδυσευς και θειος υφορβος
'Εντυνον' αριστον αμ' ηοι, κειαμενω περ
'Εκπεμψαν τε νομηας αμ' αγρομενοισι συεσσι.

The whole passage is wonderfully pleasant and natural: and though it describe nothing but what is common, and belonging to vulgar life, πραγματια λιτα και βιωτικα, as our author expresses it; and though the images be what a modern critic would call *low*, no man of good understanding and taste, not entirely corrupted by modern manners, will say, that as Homer has expressed them, they are below heroic dignity. And whence, continues our author, does this come? from the choice of the words, or from the composition? From the choice of the words, nobody, as I think, will say; for all the words are of the meanest and lowest kind, such as any plowman, mariner, or mechanic would use. For proof of this, let us change the arrangement, and take down the verse, and then the diction will appear such as it truly is, without metaphor, figure, or ornament of any kind. It remains therefore that it must be the composition which gives the beauty to this passage, and makes it as pleasant and agreeable to the ear as any poetry. Of the same kind, says our author, I could give numberless examples from the same poet; but, says he, let this suffice. I will, however, add one, describing a thing as mean and low as can be, not to be filthy, I mean the putting on shoes, which he expresses in the following sweet-sounding line:

Ποσσι δ' υπαι λιπαροισι εδησατο καλα πεδιλα.

in both is embroidery and ornament. But the taste of Milton, and I may add of the age in which he wrote, was very different; for in him we have many passages, not only beautiful, but even sublime, without metaphor or figure, or any thing of what is called *fine language*. I will mention one or two of them. In the council of fallen angels, after Moloch had done speaking, he describes Belial rising up to speak in the following lines. Dis. III.

He [*Moloch*] ended frowning, and in look denounc'd
Desperate revenge, and battle dangerous
To less than Gods. On the other side up rose
Belial, in act more graceful and humane,
A fairer person lost not heaven. He seem'd
For dignity composed and high exploit:
But all was false and hollow, (tho' his tongue
Dropt manna, and could make the worse appear
The better reason, to perplex and dash
Maturest counsels); for his thoughts were low,
To vice industrious; but to nobler deeds
Timorous and slothful; yet he pleas'd the ear,
And in persuasive accents thus began.

No body of any taste or understanding will deny that this is a most beautiful passage; and yet in the whole of it there is not one metaphorical or figurative word. In what then does the beauty of it consist? I say in the justness of the thought, and propriety of the expression; and no less in the art of the composition. And, first, the versification

is

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most beautifully varied by pauses and different feet; and to give still greater variety, there are two verses, viz.

For dignity compos'd, and high exploit

and the last

And in persuasive accents thus began.

where there is no pause from the sense, nor any stop at all, except a little *cæsura* towards the middle, which this English verse requires, as well as the Latin hexameter. Then from the words,—"On "the other side up rose,"—all is one period variously divided into members of different lengths, and in such a manner that though it be of extraordinary length, it is perfectly clear, to those at least who are accustomed to such artificial composition*. There

* The beauty of joining composition in periods and oratorial numbers, with the harmony of poetry, I have before observed in this volume. It is a beauty that has not escaped the Halicarnassian. See Περι συνθεσεως, *sect.* 24.; where he gives a fine example, from Homer, of composition such as I praise in Milton. It is in the Odyssey, and begins thus,

Αυταρ ὁ εκ λιμενος προτεβη τρηχειαν αταρπον, &c.

where the Halicarnassian has taken pains to lead us, as it were, by the hand, and shew us how the period is divided into members of different lengths, and how these members cut the verse, sometimes into equal, and sometimes unequal parts: for the critical works of the Halicarnassian have this advantage above any other of the kind that I know, that the instruction they give is more particular, and

There is in it a prettylong parenthesis, which I have marked, but is not marked, so far as I know, in any edition of Milton, and perhaps never was observed before. The parenthesis I mean is after the words,—"But all was false and hollow;"—and in it he translates the Greek, τον ἡττονα λογον κρατ̃τονα ποιῶν, the impudent profession of Gorgias the sophist, which after his time was charged against all the sophists, and even the philosophers. This parenthesis comes down to the words,—"for his "thoughts were low,"— which can only connect with the words,—"But all was false and hollow;"— so that all betwixt is interjected, or what is called a parenthesis. This figure of composition, which is hardly ever used in common discourse, is much employed by the best writers of antiquity, in order to give a cast and colour to their style different from common idiom; and by Demosthenes particularly; and not only by the orators, but the poets. There is a remarkable instance of one in Virgil, longer than this of Milton, and which may serve as an apology of Milton to such readers as think he needs one. It is in the beginning of the Georgics, where, speaking of the place that Augustus Cæser was to have among the gods, he says,

Quicquid eris, (nam te nec sperent Tartara regem,
Nec tibi regnandi veniat tam dira cupido,

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and more fitted to the capacity of the young scholar, an advantage which I believe they would not have had, if the author had not practised teaching.

Dif. III.

Quamvis Elysios miretur Græcia campos,
Nec repetita sequi curet Proserpina matrem,
Da facilem cursum, et audacibus annue cœptis
Ignarosque viæ mecum miseratus agrestes
Ingredere, et votis jam nunc assuesce vocari.

I need not observe how beautifully Milton, in the speech of Belial, which follows the passage above quoted, changes the colour of the style, and gives it the rhetorical cast; preserving, however, still the simplicity of the diction, and making the rhetoric consist only in the figure of the composition. This will be obvious to every man who has formed his taste upon the study of the best authors. And I proceed to another example of the beauty of composition, without the least of what we call fine language, and with less still of art or variety than is to be observed in the preceding example. And I quote it the rather, that there is in it an allusion, which I think has not been observed, to a very fine passage of Plato. It is the beginning of book 8.

The angel ended, and in Adam's ear
So pleasing left his voice, that he a while
Thought him still speaking, still stood fixt to hear;
Then, as new-wak'd, thus gratefully replied.

The composition here, as well as the diction, is sweetly simple; the versification sufficiently varied by the pauses, and concluding, like the last passage,

sage, with a flowing line, without any pause, which makes it go off with a roundness and smoothness that is very agreeable. The allusion I mean is to a passage in the Protagoras of Plato, where Socrates describes the effect that Protagoras's discourse had upon him, in much the same terms that Milton has used to describe the effect of the angel's speech upon Adam *. Dis. III.

The passages I have quoted are beautiful and fine, but cannot be said to be great or sublime: but I will mention one or two, where there is the greatest sublimity, consisting altogether in the thought expressed in proper words, and with a suitable composition of those words. The first I shall mention is just in the beginning, where he opens the wonderful scene of his poem in the following lines.

Nine

* Πρωταγορας μεν τοσαυτα και τοιαυτα επιδειξαμενος, απεπαυσατο τυ λογυ· και εγω επι μεν πολυν χρονον κεκηλημενος, ετι προς αυτον εβλεπον, ὡς ερυντα τι; επιθυμων· επειδη δε ησθομην ὁτι τῳ οντι πεπαυμενος ειη, μογις πως εμαυτον ὡσπερει συναγειρας, ειπον. p. 228. *Edit. Ficini.* Milton, as his learning was extraordinary no less than his genius, abounds with such allusions and imitations, which are often at such a distance as to escape observation. For he almost never translates, and very seldom imitates so closely as he does this passage of Plato. *Homer* was his model for the plan and conduct of his poem, and for the descriptions, similes, and other ornaments of style; and I will venture to say, there is much more of Homer in his style than even in Virgil's, though Virgil has very often imitated closely, and even translated Homer. *Demosthenes*, as I have observed, book 3. ch. 3. was his model for the speeches; and it is not easy to say which of their manners he has best copied.

Dif. III. Nine times the space, that measures day and night
To mortal man, he with his horrid crew
Lay vanquish'd, rolling in the fiery gulph,
Confounded, though immortal, &c.

When Milton this begins to sound his trumpet, almost every other poet in English, compared with him, may be said,

Stridenti miserum stipulâ disperdere carmen,

Of the same kind is what he says, after his catalogue and description of the host of fallen angels:

———Thus far these beyond
Compare of mortal prowess, yet observ'd
Their dread commander: he, above the rest
In shape and gesture proudly eminent,
Stood like a tower: his form had yet not lost
All her original brightness, nor appear'd
Less then Archangel ruin'd, and th' excess
Of glory obscur'd. As when the sun new-risen
Looks through the horizontal misty air,
Shorn of his beams; or, from behind the moon
In dim eclipse, diastrous twilight sheds
On half the nations, and with fear of change
Perplexes monarchs: darken'd so, yet shone
Above them all, the Archangel.

Where, among other things, the reader may observe the noble simplicity of that expression,—

"Nor

"Nor appear'd less than archangel ruin'd" Dif. III.
—much like that in the passage above quoted,—
"Battle dangerous to less than gods:"—Expressions which the reader may be assured no man would have used who had not formed his taste upon the chastest and most correct models.

I should never have done, if I were to quote every passage of this kind in Milton; I will therefore have done with him, and return to the antient compoſition; from which, however, I hope the reader will not think that I have digressed far by what I have said of Milton's composition.

I have obſerved already*, what variety in Latin there is in the arrangement of only three words, *Petrus amat Johannem*. If the number of words is increased, the variety increases in proportion. Now setting aside the pleasure which this liberty of arrangements is able to give to the ear, by joining together words, which separated, and joined to other words, might produce a very unpleasant sound; (for it is with words, as with stones in a building, all are not fitted to join with all); setting aside also the pleasure which the antient rhythms and accents must necessarily have afforded to their learned ears, however little they may afford to ours, and which must have depended entirely upon the arrangement of the words: setting aside, I say, all these considerations, there is a pleasure in variety itself, which is predominant

* Above, p. 350. 351.

Dif. III. predominant in all the works of art, and without more or less of which no work of art can truly please. And indeed such is the beauty of antient composition in this respect, and such the tiresome sameness and dull uniformity of the modern, let us take what pains we will to vary it, that an ear accustomed to the variety of the antient can hardly endure it.

But is the pleasure of the ear all that is gained by antient composition? Was not the sense studied by them in the multiform structure of their language, as well as the sound? I think it was; and it is chiefly with a view to shew this, and to illustrate it by examples from Demosthenes, that I have written this dissertation, which I intend as an appendix to chapter 4th of the 3d book of this volume. It is, I think, a curious subject, and a view in which composition has not been considered by any author, so far as I know, antient or modern.

The two most famous authors of antiquity, for the beauty of their composition, are two of very different kinds, Plato and Demosthenes. The first of these studied words, and the elegance of style, more, I believe, than any philosopher that ever wrote; and whatever any man may think of the matter of his philosophy, (of which I own myself a very great admirer), he must confess, if he be a man of taste, that the dress he has put philosophy into, is the finest, and the most agreeable, it ever wore. For his Dialogues are truly poetical

poetical pieces, and very fine ones too; the style much ornamented, and as much varied, particularly by diversity of arrangement, as I think is possible. For there is nothing belonging to style which he studied more than composition; and they tell a famous story of him, that when he died, there was found in his tablets, or pocket-book, the beginning of his books of Polity, composed and arranged in different manners *. But nevertheless I do not think Plato's composition a perfect model for what I have chiefly in view, I mean the sense. For I must be allowed to think, that he has sometimes carried the liberty of composition, which his language allowed him, too far; and that studying to vary too much, probably for the sake of the ear, he has often obscured the sense, and made a style, which, as his scholar Aristotle said, was neither verse nor prose †, but hobbling betwixt the two. For though Greek and Latin prose admits of a great variety of composition, yet it has its bounds; and there is a composition in those languages, which every man of taste, and who has formed his ear by the study of the best authors, will tell you at once is not classical. Dif. III.

* This story is told of him by the Halicarnassian, περὶ συνθέσεως. sect. 23. The words of Plato are, as they stand at present, Κατέβην χθὲς εἰς Πειραιᾶ, μετὰ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ Ἀρίστωνος. One should think that is was of very little importance, how these few words were arranged; but Plato, it seems, judged otherwise; since at the age of eighty (for so old he was when he died) he employed himself in transposing them different ways.

† See Diogenes Laertius *in vitâ Platonis*.

Sect. III. classical. Such is the composition of Ammian Marcellinus, for example, which we readily perceive to be barbarous compared with that of Cicero, who, in this, as well as other respects, is, I think, undoubtedly the best writer among the Romans. There is nothing in which I think our modern writers of Latin fail more than in the arrangement; and I have seen several modern Latin compositions, where the words and phrases were all classical, but the order so perverse and unclassical, as not only to be very offensive to the ear, but almost unintelligible *.

There is one part of his works, particularly, in which I think Plato has used this licentiousness of composition more than in any other. It is in the *Sophista* and the *Politicus*, where he has introduced a stranger of Elea speaking a language that I cannot help thinking is strange; and I would desire the learned reader only to peruse the last sentence of the Politicus, to be convinced of the truth of what I say, where the sense is certainly obscured by the arrangement: and if there be any beauty in the numbers, it is such that my ear cannot perceive; but, on the contrary, the composition

* Of this kind are some books of science that have been written in this age, by men who, though very learned in their several sciences, had not studied the propriety and elegance of the Latin composition. There is particularly a work of Boerhaave, upon *fire*, which, though the words be all Latin, I cannot understand without reading it sometimes twice or thrice over.

sition appears to me loose, disjointed, and without any roundness, or agreeable flow*. Dis. III.

However much therefore I may admire Plato in other respects, there is, I think, a better model for composition; I mean Demosthenes, who is in this respect, as well as in many others, an acknowledged master, according to the judgement of the Halicarnassian, who has written a whole treatise upon the composition chiefly of Demosthenes†. And there are two reasons besides, which make me chuse him rather than any other. First, that he appears to me to have understood perfectly that great secret of writing, so little known in modern times, of making an *uncommon* style of *common* words. For Demosthenes's words are all the *verba forensia*, or common language of business, among the Athenians, without any poetical glossematic, or hard words, as we commonly call them,

* The sentence runs thus: Τουτο δη τελος ὑφασματος ευθυπλοκια ξυμπλακεν γιγνεσθαι φῶμεν πολιτικης πραξεως, το των ανδρειων και σωφρονων ανθρωπων ηθος οποταν ὁμοιοια και φιλια κοινον ξυναγαγωσα αυτῶν τον βιον ἡ βασιλικη τεχνη, παντων μεγαλοπρεπεστατον ὑφασματων και αριστον αποτελεσασα, ὡστε ειναι κοινον, τε̃ς τε αλλας εν ταις πολεσι παντας δουλους και ελευθερως αμπισχεσα, συνεχη τουτῳ τῳ πλεγματι, και καθοσον ευδαιμονι προσηκει γιγνεσθαι πολει, τουτο μηδαμη μηδεν ελλειπουσα, αρχη τε και επισατη. Here Plato αμετρητον ὁρμην λαβων, as Dionysius expresses it, (for it is not my judgement only of him, but likewise that of this great master, and of several others whom he quotes; see his epistle to Pompey), runs out to a great length, and obscures and perplexes every thing, not so much by the use of the trope of the web and garment, though in that way too, as the Halicarnassian observes, he often darkens his style, as from the strange disordered composition.

† It is intitled, Περι της δεινοτητος του Δημοσθενους.

Dis. III.

and with fewer epithets, metaphors, or tropes of any kind, than any style I know, which can be said to be raised or ornamented in the least degree. And secondly, Because he neither did nor could give himself the same liberties in composition that Plato did, considering that he spoke to the people; and therefore, though he has varied the structure of his language extremely, yet he was obliged to keep within certain bounds, not too far removed from popular use, for fear of not being well understood; and as his business was to move and persuade the people, he would certainly chuse that arrangement which was proper to convey his meaning the most forcibly. I have therefore thought him the fittest author from whom to draw those rules which I am now to present to the reader, of classical composition, in respect of the sense. For I think it is impossible to suppose, that in all that liberty of arrangement which the antient writers allowed themselves, they should have had no regard to the sense, which is certainly principal in every composition, but consulted only the pleasure of the ear.

And, in the first place, it is to be observed, that those long periods of Demosthenes, such, for example, as that famous one with which he begins the third Philippic, consisting of seven members, some of them very long, and containing parentheses interjected, could not have been spoken so as to be intelligible, much less to convey the meaning with force and emphasis, without the greatest art

art of pronounciation. For want of this art, Plutarch, in his life of Demosthenes, tells us, that he succeeded very ill at first; insomuch that he once ran out of the assembly with his head covered. For it would seem he composed periods that he was not able to pronounce; and it is very probable he would have renounced public speaking altogether, if a friend of his, who was a player, had not shewn him in what he was deficient, by making him repeat some verses of Euripides, and then repeating them after him, with so much more propriety and emphasis, that Demosthenes was amazed at the difference, and immediately applied himself to the study of pronunciation; in which he came at last to excel very much, and was so thoroughly convinced of the advantage of it, that, as the story goes, being asked, what was the first quality of an orator? he answered, *Action;* under which the antients included the action of the voice, or what we call *pronunciation*, as well as the action of the body, and of the face, or, as it is commonly expressed, the *look*. Being asked again, what the second was? he answered, *Action;* and being asked, what the third was? the answer was the same. Now, what is not well composed, can never be well pronounced; so that composition is by its nature in order before pronunciation. Nor could Demosthenes have excelled every body so much in pronunciation, if he had not first excelled them in composition. But by joining both excellencies together, he so filled and pleased the ears of the people,

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ple, as to draw them after him by a charm that was irresistible. For it is more by the ears than by the understanding, that the people are to be captivated; and if a man was to speak to them in that hopping, bounding way, in which Tacitus and his modern imitators write, without any roundness or fulness, he never would convince them, though he were to utter those oracles of wisdom which the admirers of Tacitus find in him.——But to come to particulars.

It is evident, that the sense of every word will be more distinguished, by its being placed in one part of the sentence rather than in another; and, as I have said, it is impossible to suppose but that the antient composers, in the great liberty of arrangement which the genius of their language admitted, would have a regard to this, and would place the principal word or words, such as there must be in every sentence, in that part of it where they would strike the hearer or reader most. That part I have determined to be the beginning or the end of the sentence, or of any member of it*. Those two places may be considered as the places of honour, which distinguish the words that are there put, while those that are thrown into the middle are less to be observed.

But is there no rule for determining to which of these two places what is principal should be allotted? Or if there be more than one principal thing,

* Vol. 2. book 3. c. 2.

thing, which of them ought to be put in the first place, which in the last? And I think there is a rule, and it appears to me to be this, *That whatever is antecedent in the reasoning or narrative, or most connected with what goes before, should be put first; what again is consequent in the reasoning or narrative, or most connected with what follows, should be put last.*

This therefore is the first rule, That the principal things should be put first or last in a sentence, or member of a sentence, according as they are antecedent or consequent, more or less connected with what goes before or follows: for being so placed, not only in writing, but still more in speaking, especially if they be pronounced with emphasis as they ought to be, they will attract the attention more, and better mark the connection and dependence of the other words upon them, than if they were in any other position.

I will now give an example of this rule, from the third Philippic, beginning with the fine period above mentioned; and which, in my judgement, is the finest of all his Philippics. It is of the deliberative kind, spoken upon occasion of the great progress of Philip's arms against certain Greek cities in Thrace and Thessaly, which he had subdued. This Demosthenes considers as making war against the Athenians, though without declaring it; and he advises them to make war in the same manner against Philip. Ye must not, says he, wait till Philip should declare himself openly your

Dis. III. your enemy; for he never will do that while ye sit tame and quiet, and are willing to be deceived. Then he mentions some small cities in those countries, which Philip had deceived and destroyed, without declaring war against them; after which he adds, ειτ' οιεσθε, οι μεν μηδεν αν αυτοι δυνηθεντων ποιησαι κακον, μη παθειν δε εφυλαξαντ' αν ισως, τουτους μεν εξαπαταν αιρεισθαι μαλλον η προλεγοντα βιαζεσθαι υμιν δε και πορρωτατω πολιμησειν, και ταυτα εως αν εκοντες εξαπατασθε; which may be this literally rendered. "And "do ye think, that, who could do him no harm, "but might possibly have been upon their guard, "and prevented any harm which he intended "them, those he would rather chuse to deceive, "than openly attack; yet against you would "declare open war, and this while ye were willing "to be deceived?" I will add a translation of what follows, that the scope of the reasoning may be the better understood. "It cannot be; for "he would be the most foolish of men, if ye, "submitting to be injured, and not blaming "him, but some among yourselves whom ye "threaten with trials and prosecutions, he should, "to put an end to the strife and contests a-"mong yourselves, bid you turn against him, "and so take from his hirelings here, those "pretences by which they retard your resolu-"tions, endeavouring to convince you that he "does not make war upon you. But is there, "in the name of the gods, any man of sense, "who will judge by words, and not by things,

"whether

" whether a person make war upon him, or be " at peace with him?"

The first sentence, which I gave in the original, is the example of my rule. There are here two things principal, and which therefore were to be distinguished by their places in the sentence, viz. the little cities of Thrace and Thessaly, and the Athenians. As he had been speaking just before of the first, and was from them to draw the consequencee to the Athenians, he sets them at the head of the first member of the period, ὁι μεν ὑδεν αν αυτον ἰδυνηθησαν ποιησαι κακον. Then in the other member of the period, when he comes to draw the inference with respect to the Athenians, he sets them likewise at the head of it,—ὑμιν δ' αν πορρωτατω πολεμησειν;—not at the end of it, because they are opposed to one another; and then the rule is, That they should occupy the same place, whether at the beginning or in the end.

The effect of this composition is not only to set what is principal in the sentence foremost to the view, but to give to the period the το συντεθον, as the Greek critics express it, and the το σφιγγωδες, by which the period is, as it were, knit and compacted together, so as to come with double force both on the ear and the understanding. To be convinced of this, let us take it down in the following manner, preserving both the same thought, and the same words: ειτ' οισθ' εξαπαταν μεν ἀιρεισθαι μαλλον η προλεγοντα βιαζεσθαι τινας, ὁι μεν ὑδεν αν αυτον ἰδυνηθησαν ποιησαι κακον, μη παθειν δ' εφυλαξαντ' αν ισως, ὑμας δε πορρωτατω δε

ὑμιν

Dis. III. ὑμεῖν πολεμήσειν. By this change the composition, instead of being nervous and spirited, becomes ὑπτιος and διαλελυμενος, that is, flat and loose or languid.

This is an instance of placing the principal word in the beginning of the period, or member of the period, to which it relates. I will now give an example or two of the last place being made the place of distinction. And this same third Philippic furnishes me one, where, speaking to the Athenians, he says, εἶτ' οὐκ αἰσχυνεσθε, εἰ μηδ' ἃ παθοιτ' ἄν, εἰ δυναιτ' ἐκεινος, παντα ποιησαι, καιρον ἐχοντες, οὐ τολμησετε; he is speaking of a fine opportunity the Athenians had to attack Philip; and he asks them, whether they were not ashamed, not to dare to do to *him* what he would certainly do to *them*, if he had the same opportunity? The sentiment is a common one, and the words in which it is expressed are likewise common; but the order and arrangement give it a beauty which every man of taste must acknowledge. The two principal things in it are the shame which the Athenians ought to feel, and the reason why they should be ashamed, viz. their want of courage, or not daring. The first of these is put at the head of the sentence, the other at the end of it, so that it is an instance of the rule in both respects.

It may be objected, That as to the verb here being last, it is the common place of it; so that on that account we are not to imagine that any particular emphasis lies upon it. But to this I

answer, *first*, That though such position of the verb be indeed very common in the Latin composition, it is not so frequent in the Greek; nor is it so placed by the best authors in that language, unless where it is really the principal word; for, as I shall observe afterwards, the Greek composition is, in this and other respects, more various than the Latin. But, *2dly*, I will give one or two examples, among many that might be given, where another kind of word is put in the end of the sentence, on account of its significancy. And the same third Philippic furnishes me one example, where Demosthenes, speaking of the Athenians, says, Και γαρ αν ἁπαντες δουλευειν δη που συγχωρησωσιν οἱ αλλοι· γε ὑπερ της ελευθεριας αγωνιστεον. "If all others should yield to "be slaves, you it behoves to struggle for free-"dom." Here the emphatical words are *others*, and *you* (the Athenians), the first of which concludes the first member of the sentence, and the other begins the next.

Dis. III.

Another example is in the following Philippic towards the beginning, where, speaking of the injustice of Philip, he says, Ὁτι δ' ουκ ενι ταυτης εκεινον επιχειν εκ λογου και δημηγοριας, ουδεις αγνοει δη που. "That we can-"not put a stop to his violence and injustice by "arguments and speech-making, every body must "know." Here the sentence concludes, not with the verb, but with an adverb of asseveration.

A third example I shall give, because it just

Dis. III. follows in the same Philippic. "If," says he, "any "one has any doubt of this, he may thus be as- "sured of it." Ἡμεις ουδαμου πωποτε, ὁπου περι των δικαιων ειπει, εδεησεν, ἡττηθημεν, ουδ' αδικειν εδοξαμεν, αλλα παντων πανταχου κρατουμεν, και περιεσμεν τῳ λογῳ αρ ουν δια ταυτα εκεινῳ φαυλως εχει τα' πραγματα, η τῃ πολει καλως; "Where-ever the dis- "pute was about what was just or right, we were "never found to be in the wrong, or convicted of "doing any thing that was unjust, but were al- "ways victorious in reason and argument; but "for this did he thrive the worse, or we the bet- "ter?" Here we see that the first member is concluded by the noun λογῳ, and the other by the adverb καλῶς, both emphatical words, upon which the whole argument turns.

My second rule is, *That if two words, which are separated by the grammatical construction, express things, which, for the greater perspicuity and emphasis, ought to be joined together in the sentence, the words should likewise stand next to one another; and* vice versa, *if the words, though joined by the grammatical construction, express things which ought to be separated in the sentence, as meriting a separate consideration, the words ought also to be separated.* This, it is evident, can very seldom be done in the modern languages, for want of genders, numbers, and cases; but in Greek and Latin, it may be done as often as we see occasion. I will give some instances of both being done with propriety.

And,

Dis. III.

And, first, as to words being joined together, which by the syntax are separated. There is an example in the oration, Περὶ Ἀλοννήσου, where, speaking of the absurdity of taking from pirates a place which they had violently possessed themselves of, and then pretending that it belonged to the taker, and not to the Athenians, the former proprietors, he expresses it thus, τὸν τόπον τοῦτον, ὃν ἦσαν οἱ λῃσαὶ τὸν ἑαυτῶν ἡμέτερον, τῶν τιμωρησαμένων τοὺς λῃστὰς γίγνεσθαι. "How "absurd a pretence," says he, "is it, that the place "where the pirates had settled themselves being "ours, should become the property of those who "punished the pirates?" Here we see, that in the Greek, though it cannot be expressed in the English, the words ἡμέτερον and τῶν τιμωρησαμένων τοὺς λῃστὰς, are fitly set beside one another, though they cannot be construed together; and in two distinguished places, the one concluding the first member of the period, and the other beginning the last, because the whole argument turns upon these two things.

Another example is to be found in the oration, Πρὸς τὴν Φιλίππου Ἐπιστολήν, where, speaking of the Macedonian power, as being weak in itself, and made still weaker by Philip, he has these words, Ἔτι δὲ αὐτὴν (viz. δύναμιν) ὑτὸς αὐτὸς τοῖς πολέμοις καὶ ταῖς στρατείαις καὶ πᾶσιν οἷς ἄν τις μέγαν εἶναι νομίσαι, σφαλερωτέραν ἀυτῷ πεποίηκε. Which may be thus translated: "This power he "himself, by his wars and expeditions, and all "other things by which one should have thought "it would have become great, has made more un-

"stable,

Dis. III. "stable, and less to be depended upon." Here the Macedonian power, and Philip, who had made it less, are fitly joined together as to the sense. And with respect to the sound, we may observe, that the αυτην and the αυτος, in the beginning of the period, make a similarity of sound; which our modern critics censure under the name of a *jingle*, but it is really an ornament of speech, when sparingly used, and not industriously sought; as it is often by Plato, but never by Demosthenes.

I will next proceed to give examples of words being divided in the composition, which are necessarily joined in the syntax; and this for the sake of the greater emphasis. And an example occurs in the third Olynthiac, where, calling the attention of the Athenians to the state of Philip's affairs, he says, Αξιον δε ενθυμηθηναι και λογισασθαι τα πραγματα εν ω καθεστηκε νυνι, τα του Φιλιππου. Here the affairs of Philip are mentioned with particular emphasis. For, first, it is said, how do affairs stand? Then, as if the question had been asked, What affairs do you mean? it is subjoined, the affairs of Philip. But this emphasis must necessarily be lost in English; for all we can make of the passage is to translate it thus: "It is worth your while to consider the "affairs of Philip, in what situation they now are."

Another example is to be found in the same Olynthiac, where, speaking of the Athenians, he says, και νυξησαμεν, ω ανδρες Αθηναιοι, Φιλιππον ημας,

και καταστησαμεν τηλικουτον, ηλικος ουδεις πω βασιλευς γεγονε Μακεδονιας. Here we see, that ηυξησαμεν and ημας, which are necessarily joined in the construction, are divided in the composition; the one of them being set at the head of the first member of the period, and the other at the end of the same member; by which there is an emphasis laid upon *we* (the Athenians) that would not have been so strong if the two words had been joined together in their natural order. But neither can we preserve this in English; for we must translate it thus: "It is "we, O men of Athens, who have raised Philip, "and made him such as no king of Macedon ever "was before."

Upon this passage, it may be further observed, that Φιλιππον and ημας are properly joined together, as the two things upon which the sentence turns. And the period concludes aptly with the word μακεδονιας, as the kingdom of Macedon, before the time of Philip, was of very little consideration, and the people so little esteemed, that, as Demosthenes says somewhere else, people did not care to purchase slaves from thence; and yet, says he, they are now become, by your sloth and timorousness, a powerful nation.

It often happens, that a principal word in the sentence is divided from another principal word with which it is connected, by something that is interjected betwixt; and yet it is proper, for the sake both of emphasis and of greater perspicuity, that

Dis. III. that the connection should be marked. And this I make my third rule; of which I will give one example among many, (for it is a common idiom among the Greek rhetoricians), from the oration above mentioned, Ηρος την Φιλιππου επιστολην, where, speaking of the toils and dangers that Philip had gone through to acquire what did not belong to him, he subjoins how shameful it is, Αθηναιους δε, οις πατριον εστι μηδενος υπακουειν, απαντων δε κρατειν εν τοις πολεμοις, τουτους δια μαλακιαν η ραθυμιαν εγκαταλιπειν τα τε των προγονων εργα και τα συμφεροντα της πατριδος. Here the word τουτους is altogether superfluous as to the construction, and a mere repetition; but such as gives great force and emphasis to the meaning. It may be thus rendered into English, preserving as much as possible the turn of the Greek: "The Athenians, the established "ed custom of whose country it is, handed down "to them from their ancestors, to yield obedience "to none, but to command all in war; is it not "shameful that *they* should, through effeminacy "and indolence, desert the place of their ances- "tors, and give up the interest of their country?" We commonly do this in English, by repeating the words with *I say*, or *to repeat it again*, or some such form of words; but it is much more cleverly done in Greek by the pronoun ουτος.

These are the rules which I have observed to be followed, in order to convey the sense with the greatest force and perspicuity, by the Greek writers, and particularly by Demosthenes, the greatest artificer

ficer of prose, I believe, that ever existed*. But it is evident, that they not only studied the sense, but likewise the pleasure of the ears, *quarum judicium est superbissimum*, as Cicero says; and we must suppose that the ears of the Athenians, accustomed to hear such fine speeches almost every day, were indeed very delicate and fastidious. It is in this way we are to account for many transpositions of words in the Attic writers, and particularly their orators, which appear to us very strange and unnatural †. And it was chiefly by this kind of composition, that the Attic writers were distinguished from others. And Dis. III.

* The greatest praise that perhaps ever was bestowed upon Demosthenes, is given him by Lucian in his *Jupiter Tragœdus*, where he makes Jupiter begin his speech, in the council of the gods, with a very pompous preamble, taken from the exordium of the first *Olynthiac* of Demosthenes. After going on in this high strain for two or three sentences, he stops all at once, and—" Here," says he, " Demosthenes fails me: I " must therefore tell you plainly for what purpose I called " you together." Then he goes on by a composition that is far from being vulgar or despicable, considered by itself; but compared with what goes before, is a higher eulogium upon the composition of Demosthenes, than any thing Lucian has said in a whole treatise that he has written in praise of Demosthenes.

† As in the oration against Midias, p. 370. *edit. Morel.* where, speaking of many people that had been condemned for less offences than those of which he accused Midias, he says, Πολλους αν ετερους εχοιμι λεγειν, ων οι μεν τεθνασιν, οι δε ητιμωμενοι δια πολλα τουτων εισιν ελαττω πραγματα, where the natural order of the last part of the sentence is, οι δ' ητιμωμενοι εισι δια πραγματα πολλω ελαττω τουτων. Again, in the oration against Aristocrates, p. 428, speaking of a general who had suffered some

Dis. III. And when it was carried too far, a writer was said to be *too Attic*. Thus Photius, in his *Bioliotheca*, commending the style of Diodorus Siculus, as plain, perspicuous, and proper for history; adds, that his composition was not too Attic*.

The Latin writers, as in other things, so in this, imitated the Attic authors; and it is from this imitation that they derived every thing that is beautiful, various, and high-sounding, in their composition, both in verse and prose. It is from these authors that Virgil learnt to make such verses as

Hinc tibi, quæ semper vicino ab limite sepes
Hyblæis apibus florem depasta salicti,
Sæpe levi somnum suadebit inire susurro.

Eclog. 1.

Ora modis Anchisiades pallentia miris.

Dives inaccessos ubi Solis filia lucos
Assiduo resonat cantu, tectisque superbis.

Urit.

some loss, which not only no body pretending to be a general would have suffered, but not any common man, he uses this structure of the words: Πραγμα επαθε τοιουτον ουχ' ὁτι ερατηγος αν ηγνοησε τις ειναι φωσκων αλλ' ουδ' ὁ τυχων ανθρωπος, where the natural order of the word is, ουχ ὁτι τις φασκων ειναι ερατηγος ηγνοησεν αν.

* Κεχρηται δε φρασει σαφει τε ουαι ακομψῳ και ἱστορια μαλιστα πρεπουσῃ και μητε τας, ὡς αν ειποι τις, λιαν ὑπερηττικισμενας η αρχαιοσροπους διωκων συνταξεις, μητε προς την καθωμαλισμενην νευων παντελως, αλλα πῳ μεσῳ των λογων χαρακτηρι χαιρων. *cap.* 70. where we may observe,

Urit odoratam nocturna in lumina cedrum, Diss. III
Arguto tenues percurrens pectine telas.

ÆNEID. 7.

Such transpositions do often occasion, to us at least, an ambiguity in the sense; one or two of which I have observed in Horace, who of all the Roman authors most diligently imitated the Greek. Speaking in praise of wine, he says*, *Tu lene tormentum ingenio admoves. Plerumque duro;* where the word *plerumque*, because it begins the line, is construed by all the commentators that I have seen, with *duro*, the following word; whereas the sense, I think, evidently requires that it should be joined with *admoves*, the word which concludes the preceding line; so that the order is, *Tu plerumque admoves lene tormentum ingenio duro.* For I do not imagine that Horace meant to say, that mens geniuses were for the greater part hard and inflexible; but that it was a *common* effect of wine, to soften the rigour of such dispositions, and make them more pliant. There is another mistaken construction of this word *plerumque* in the 34th ode of book I. where Horace says,

observe, that Photius contrasts the *Hyperattic* composition with the abject and vulgar, and is of opinion that the proper style for history lies betwixt those two extremes. I agree with him in the rule; but I differ a little from him in the application of it to Diodorus Siculus; for I think his style comes too near one of the extremes, viz: the vulgar. And indeed all that Photius says of it is, that it is not altogether vulgar and abject; μητε προς την καθωμαλισμενην γενων παντιλως.

* *Lib.* 3. *od.* 21.

Dis. III.

Namque Diespiter
Igni corusco nubila dividens
Plerumque, per purum tonantes
Egit equos volucremque currum.

Here the comma is generally put immediately after *dividens;* whereas it should be put after *plerumque;* so that *plerumque* is to be joined with *dividens*, and not with *egit;* and this the sense evidently requires. This is an observation which I find Dr Bentley has made before me, and some body whom he mentions had made it before him. Another example still more remarkable is in the ode * beginning,

Phœbus, volentem prælia me loqui,
Victas et urbes, increpuit, lyrâ;

where, as the ancient scholiast Porphyrion has well observed, *lyrâ* must not be joined with *increpuit*, the word next to it, but with a word at a distance from it, viz. *loqui*; and this way the sense is plain, and agreeable to other passages in the same poet, such as where he speaks of the *imbellis lyrâ*.

The best composer, and, I think, in every respect, the greatest writer, in prose, among the Romans, is Cicero, not only in the rhetorical way, but in the epistolary, philosophical, and critical; yet even he has not attained to all the beauty and variety of the Greek composition: whether it was the defect of the writer or of the language, I will not pretend

* *Lib.* 4. *od.* 15.

pretend to determine. He is, I think, inferior to Demosthenes in many respects, but particularly in he variety of his composition. That conclusion of the sentence with a verb, so much more frequent in Latin than in Greek, gives a sameness to the Latin composition, which is not a little disgusting to an ear accustomed to the variety of the Greek. In this way we may observe Cicero running on for many sentences together, more I think in his orations than in his other works; and there was one favourite clausule of his, which was observed in his own times to recur too often; I mean, the *esse videatur* *. It is true indeed, that the verb is very often a material word in a sentence with respect to the sense, and always with respect to the construction, being the hinge, as it were, upon which the whole syntax turns: it is therefore often intitled to a principal place, but not always; and where it is

* I do not however mean to say, that there is not a variety in Cicero's composition. But if we would be convinced how much more variety there is in the Greek, let us compare with him the author I have so often mentioned, Dionysius the Halicarnassian, who has practised not only the historical style, but also the rhetorical, in the speeches which he has inserted into his history; the critical or didactic, and likewise the epistolary, a very fine specimen of which we have in his introduction to his treatise of composition, which is addressed to two young men, the sons of one Rufus Melitus, his patron. There the composition is most beautifully varied, by different arrangements of the words, and different clausules of the sentences; and though it be not loose, or *elumbus*, as the Latins express it, yet it has nothing of the τὸ συνεστραμμένον, or *contortum*, of the oratorial style, and is upon the whole one of the sweetest pieces of composition I ever read.

Dis. III. is so intitled, it is not necessary that it should be so often thrown to the end as it is in Latin.

Thus I have endeavoured to explain how style may not only be varied, but made more emphatical and expressive, by the arrangement only of the words. It is this chiefly, in my opinion, that makes the difference betwixt classical and unclassical arrangemen ; a difference which every scholar, and who at the same time is a man of taste, immediately perceives; but no body hitherto, so far as I know, has attempted to explain wherein it consists. How style may be otherwise varied, and adorned by figures both of the sense and of the words, I will explain in the last part of my work, when I come to treat of style in general, and of the rhetorical in particular.

THE END OF PART II.

APPENDIX,

CONTAINING THE M. S.

ADDITIONS MADE ON THE AUTHOR'S COPY OF THIS VOLUME.

Note on page 25, line last.

De *B. G. Lib. 6. c.* 14. After relating that the Druids did not commit their philosophy to writing, though they had the use of Greek letters, he adds: "Id mihi duabus de causis instituisse videntur; quod neque in vulgum disciplinam efferri velint; neque eos qui discant, literis confisos, minus memoriae studere; quod fere plerisque accidit, ut, praesidio literarum, diligentiam in perdiscendo ac memoriam remittant." And to the same purpose, Quintilian; "Quanquam invenio apud Platonem, obstare memoriae usum literarum; viz. quod illa, quae scriptis reposuimus, velut custodire desinimus, et ipsa securitate dimittimus. Nec dubium est quin plurimum in hac parte valeat mentis intentio, et velut acies luminum a prospectu rerum, quas intuetur, non aversa." Lib. 11. cap. 2d. For the same reason, no doubt, did Lycurgus forbid his laws to be written.

Addition to page 59, *line* 10, *after the word* οὗτος.

When this pronoun is added to the name, the article is not used: Thus Demosthenes, in the oration against Olympiodorus, says, frequently οὗτος Ὀλυμπιόδωρος, or Ὀλυμπιόδωρος οὗτος, not ὁ Ὀλυμπιόδωρος οὗτος. This I think plainly shews that the article is added to the proper name, in order to distinguish the person from any other of the same name; so that if he be otherwise distinguished, as he is by the pronoun οὗτος, which points him out as present, the addition of the article becomes superfluous.

Addition to page 61, *line* 5, *after the word* epithet.

It sometimes happens that the Article is repeated, and not only put before the noun, but after it; and this, whether the noun be a proper name or an appellative. This is done for the sake of greater emphasis; and it has much the same effect as if the noun were repeated. When the Article is thus repeated after the noun, it is often put in place of the relative pronoun; and, as we do not use the Article in that way in English, it must be translated by the relative *who* or *which*.

Addition to page 75, *line* 3, *after the word* not.

From this want of the Article, there arises in Latin sometimes great obscurity, and even great difficulty to those who are Latin scholars only. As when Virgil says Saxa vocant Itali mediisque in fluctibus aras, where it may be either the Rocks that are called Altars, or the Altars that are called Rocks. When Livy says, (Lib. 7. cap. 2.) *Hister Tusco verbo Ludio vocabatur*, it does not appear, from that expression singly, whether *Ludio* was called *Hister* in the Tuscan language, or *Hister Ludio*; and it is impossible to translate into Latin

tin the expression of St John above mentioned, Και Θεος ην ὁ λογος without ambiguity. Farther, as both an infinitive and an adjective, as also a participle, are used by the Greeks with the article prefixed, in place of an abstract substantive, when the Latins use the same form of expression it is often obscure for want of the article; because we may not know certainly whether the verb, participle, or adjective, be used as such or as a noun. Thus when Horace says, "Scribendi recte sapere est principium et fons," this may puzzle the mere Latin scholar if he consider the sapere only as a *verb*, whereas the Greek scholar sees immediately that it means το φιλοσοφειν, or *sapientia*, which is the true Latin word for *philosophy*. I will give another example of the infinitive-being used in this way in Latin; it is from Livy, Lib. 7. cap. 30. Fuit quidem apud vos semper satis justa causa amicitiae, velle eum vobis amicum esse, qui vos appeteret; where if we understand *velle* substantively for το *velle*, the sense is clear, which otherwise is exceedingly obscure. As to adjectives or participles being used by the Latins for substantives, there is an example in Livy who uses this form of expression more I think than than any other Latin author. It is in the first book, cap. 53. where speaking of Tarquinius Superbus, he says, "Nec ut injustus in pace rex, ita dux belli pravus fuit; quin ea arte aequasset superiores reges, ni degeneratum in aliis huic quoque decori offecisset;" where, if you are not a Greek scholar, you do not know what to make of *degeneratum* in the construction of the sentence. But the Greek scholar will immediately think of prefixing the article το; and then the construction of the sentence, as well as the meaning, is perfectly clear. Again in book 3. cap. 72. where he gives an account of

of a very infamous decision of the Roman people, by which they adjudged to themselves a piece of land about which two neighbouring nations, who had chosen them for arbiters, were contending, he says. Nec abnuitur ita fuisse, si ad alios judices itum foret; nunc haud sane quicquam bona causae levatur dedecus judicii; where if you translate bona causae into Greek, and say τῳ ἀγαθῳ or τῳ δικαιῳ τῆς δικης, there is no difficulty in a passage which is otherwise inexplicable. Again, he says, "Diu non prelitatum tenuerat consulem, where the sense cannot be made out unless you understand diu non prelitatum as a substantive, which the prefixing the Greek article το would immediately show it to be.

Addition to page 147, *line* 18 *after the word* action.

The composition of tenses is in English as evident in the passive as in the active voice, being expressed by different words, not, as in Greek, by the flexion of one word. There is, however, in English this difference betwixt the compounded tenses in the passive and active voices; that some of them in the passive must be expressed not by auxiliary verbs only, but the assistance of prepositions must be taken. In this way the present and the imperfect of the indicative must be expressed, and also the present participle. Thus, for example, οἰκοδόμηται must be rendered in English, *it is in building*. The imperfect ᾠκοδόμητο, must be rendered in English, *was in building*, 1 Kings, Chap. 6. v. 7. and the participle οἰκοδομουμενον cannot be rendered otherwise than by *being in building*. The praeter-perfect passive ᾠκοδόμηται is very properly and simply expressed in English by *is built*, which very well denotes the composition

position of the *present* and *past* in that tense. It may be observed that we make a variation of the expression of this tense, when we would denote that it has been built some time; as, in the very expression I have used, instead of saying simply, *it is built*, we say *it has been built for some time; a year*, for example, or *ten years*. The expression of the plusquamperfect ᾠκοδόμητο, is also proper enough in English, *it was built*; and this too we also express in another way, for we say *it had been built*. And by this last expression we distinguish when we think it necessary, the plusquamperfect from the aorist ᾠκοδομήθη; for that must be rendered into English by *it was built*, not by *it is built*, *it has been built*, *or had been built*.

Addition to page 164, *line* 3*d from the bottom, after the word* cast.

Verbs are commonly divided by grammarians into *active*, *passive*, *neuter* and *deponent*. The *active* I rather call *transitive*, because the action of them passes to a subject different from the agent. The *neuter*, I think, is better expressed by the word *intransitive*, denoting that the action of the verb does not pass to any other subject, but rests with the agent. Such verbs commonly denote not a single action, as the active do, but a continuation of action, such as *vivo*, *cresco*, *ambulo*, *curro*; and some of them may be considered as denoting rest, such as *sedeo*, *jaceo*; or, to comprehend the signification of both of them in one word, they denote a state of a thing, whether of continued action or of rest. Verbs of this kind may be considered as substantive verbs, for they denote *existence*, with the addition

addition of certain circumstances of existence, which I call the State of the thing. As to passive and deponent verbs, their nature is sufficiently understood.

Addition to page 176, line 2d, after the word nicety.

I will give an example of a mistake as to the signification of a Greek preposition, from a very important passage in our translation of the New Testament. It is where St John, in the beginning of his gospel, lays down that fundamental dotcrine of christianity, I mean the doctrine of the Trinity. After having told us that the λογος, or Word, as we very improperly translate it, was God, he adds, και ὁ λογος ην προς τον Θεον, which we translate, *and the word was with God*, very improperly likewise, as I imagine; for the preposition denotes the relation of respect or reference to any thing, so that the thing referred to, that is the noun governed by the preposition, is *principal*. In this sense the word is used by all good Greek writers, of which I will give but one example from a Platonic philosopher of the later times, of great reputation; I mean Plotinus in his Remarks, as collected and digested by his scholar Porphyry: and the example is the more apposite that Plotinus is speaking of this very doctrine of the Trinity, and particularly of the second person of it, the λογος or νους, as it was called in the language of those philosophers. He says that this person proceeded from the fulness of the father, or principal divinity, and that this was the nature of his generation. Και το υπερ πληρεις αυτον πεποιηκεν αλλο, το δε γενομενον ως αυτο επεστραφη και επληρωθη. Then he adds, Και εγενετο προς αυτο βλεπον· και νους ὁτος και ἡ μεν προσκεινο, (l. προς εκεινο) ὑπαρξις αυτη το ον εποιησεν, ἡ δε, προς αυτο θεια, τον νουν. *Enn. 5. Lib. 2. c. 1.* Here we

we have the preposition πρὸς employed in its proper sense, to denote reference to another thing as principal; and I can have no doubt, that it is used by St John in the same sense, viz. to denote that though the Son was God, yet he was God dependent upon the Father. This dependence he expresses only by the preposition; whereas, the philosopher uses the word βλέπων, conceiving that by a kind of intuition he derived intelligence from the Father. And we may observe that the philosopher makes him also the τὸ ὄν, that is, containing virtually in himself all existence, every thing being produced by emanation from him. This too he derives from the father, for he is the τὸ ὄν by his στάσις, or position in the order of things, πρὸς ἑαυτόν; and this is perfectly consonant with the scripture doctrine, by which the Son is said to have made all things. Another example of this signification of πρὸς Aristotle furnishes, where he distinguishes the several significations of the word ὑγιεινὸς, which are all πρὸς ἓν, that is, πρὸς ὑγίειαν, for it denotes either the habit of health, what causes that habit, or what is a symptom of it.

Addition to page 179, *line* 6, *after the word* before.

It may be observed, that such a particle in any language as μὲν in Greek, assists a reader very much, because it lets him know that there is not to be an end of the sentence till he come to the correspondent particle δὲ, and therefore he is not, till then, to make a full stop or to lower his voice; whereas, in languages such as the English, where there are no such particles, even a good reader, if he have not read the passage before, and do not know what is to follow, may stop or let fall his voice very improperly.

Addition

Addition to page 181, *line* 2*d*, *after the word* writers.

And not only in English, but in Latin there is a great want of connecting particles, by which speech is not only made more flowing and pleasant to the ear, but the sense is more perfectly conveyed by preparing the mind of the reader for what is to follow, and calling his attention back to what is preceding. *The* μεν and *the* δε, as I have observed, cannot be expressed in any other language, not in Latin any more than in English. The δε is also often used by itself, without reference to any preceding μεν; and by this use of the δε the speech is connected, but not in the same manner as it is by the copulative και; for it only denotes a relation, but not a conjunction, such as is denoted by the copulative. Then there are γε and δα before observed, and μεν, ουν, τοινυν, τοιγαρουν, and several others, which have a signification and an emphasis in Greek, but cannot be expressed by any word in Latin. And there is one particle very much used in Greek, for the want of which there is an obscurity in some Latin expressions, such as I have observed for want of an article in that language. The particle I mean is αν, which, joined to certain tenses of a verb, and particularly the imperfect, expresses a contingency that would happen if some other thing happened. Now there is a passage in Livy, b. 21. c. 5. where he tells us that Hannibal resolved to make war upon the people of Saguntum, but, because by attacking them the Romans would undoubtedly be excited to arms, he began with a neighbouring people. This is expressed by Livy in the following manner: *Saguntinis inferre bellum statuit; quibus oppugnandis quia haud dubie Romana arma movebantur, in Uleadum fines prius induxit exercitum*; where

where *movebantur* is undoubtedly used in the sense of ἐκινοῦντό ἄν, that is, *would be moved*, not *were moved*, which the imperfect in Greek, without the particle ἄν, denotes. See a similar passage in Salust c. 14. *Tamen erat magistratis populi Romani, &c.*

Addition to note in page 289, *line* 12*th from the bottom, after the word* it.

See further, with respect to the decline of music in later times, two passages quoted from Simplicius and Porphyry, in Mr Harris's *Philosophical Arrangements*, p. 252.

Addition to note in page 291, *line* 14*th from the bottom, after the word* succession.

If more authorities were necessary in a case so clear, let any man read the 19th section of Aristotle's Problems, where he will find not only that the antients had the practise of harmony or *symphony*, as they called it, but had studied very much the theory of it; for there Aristotle proposes several questions concerning it, such as, Why the *octave* makes the most perfect symphony? Why a double *octave* is concord, but a double *fifth* or a double *fourth* is not? And to Aristotle's authority I will add that of his most learned Commentator Simplicius, who, in his Commentary upon the 3d book, De Coelo, p. 161, compares that union and incorporation of the four elements, by which one body is made, to that union and incorporation of the four different sounds in melody making but one sound.

Addition as a note in page 297, *at line* 8*th from the top, after the word* us.

The right placing of the accents in pronunciation was so material a part of the Greek language, that a man who misplaced an accent was said βαρβαρίζειν, *to speak barbarously*. This appears from a remarkable passage in the Scholia upon the oration of Demosthenes Περὶ στεφάνου. *p.* 143, *Edit. Morell.* where he tells us that Demosthenes, in asking the question of the judges, whether Æschines was the friend or the hireling (μισθωτὸς) of Alexander, barbarised on purpose, by laying the accent upon the last syllable instead of the first; upon which the people, as was natural enough, corrected him by repeating the word properly accented. This he took for an answer to his question; and, says he, "You hear, Æschines, what they say," ἀκούεις ἃ λέγουσι.

Addition to note page 303, *last line.*

And before that time, Roscius, who was so eminent in his art, that every man who excelled in any thing was said to be a Roscius in his way, was chiefly distinguished by the gracefulness of his action in pantomime representation. Ille corporis motu tantum amorem sibi conciliavit.—Cic. pro Archia Poeta, c. 8.

Addition to note page 304, *last line.*

I shall only further add, that these movements of the body, which were thus measured by numbers, as our

our notes of music are, were chiefly performed by the arms. Hence it is that Ovid gives this advice to a lady, that is desirous to shew herself to the greatest advantage,—*si vox est, canta; si mollia brachia, salta.*

Addition to page 312, *6th line from the bottom, after the word* slow, *delete* Nor has it what is properly called *time*, but its whole music is; and *insert*

By this I would not be understood to mean, that a note may not be let die away upon the harpsichord as well as upon other instruments; but that is not what I call a long note, which is only when the note continues invariably the same both as to tone and loudness or softness, and is continued for a longer time. Now the harpsichord has no such difference of notes, and therefore its whole music is but.....

Addition to page 312, *2d line from the bottom, after the word* slowness.

And besides it cannot swell a note, which I think is a great beauty in music, and a great part of its expression.

Addition as a note in page 321, 13*th line from the top, after the word* tones.

There is nothing more natural than that we should judge of language in general by the practice of the languages we know, and imagine that whatever is in use in these languages belongs to the nature of language, and

and is essential to it. For this reason, Cicero, knowing no languages but Greek and Latin, and observing that in them there was always one syllable sounded with an acute accent, or musical tone raised above the common level of speech, thought that this was dictated by Nature herself, who, says he, in order to modulate our speech, has put one acute accent, and no more than one, upon each word, and not further back than the antepenult. *Orator. c.* 18. Cicero therefore appears to have had no idea of a language such as ours, without syllabic tones; and I suppose he had as little notion of a language without long and short syllables in a determinate ratio to one another.

Addition to page 327, 11*th line from the bottom, after the word* accents.

In so much, that, as I before observed, it is a great fault, in speaking French, to accent one syllable more than another; for all the syllables must be pronounced upon a level The French language, therefore, in this respect is very singular, that it has neither quantity nor accent; nor do I know that there is any other language spoken at present whose pronunciation is of the same kind. From this quality of their language, it necessarily follows, that the French cannot have blank verse such as we and the Italians have.

Addition to page 335, 8*th line from the bottom, after the word* Arabic.

The Greek and Roman languages, but especially the Greek, when pronounced accurately, with all that variety

variety of tones and quantities, must have made a kind of music of which we have hardly an idea; especially in poetical composition, where the rhythm was regular and measured, not loose and irregular, as in the oratorial numbers. It was a great part of the business of the grammarian to teach boys to read verse in this musical way, which therefore is not improperly called Singing. Thus Macrobius, in his Saturnalia, speaks of boys singing the verses of Virgil, *Magistris praelegentibus*, (Lib. 1. Cap. 24.) or, as Horace expresses it, *dictantibus*. See also Juvenal. Satyr. 7. v. 154. and Polimetis, p. 288. We are told by the antient grammarians, that the custom was to read verse in a tone very different from prose.

Addition to page 342, *line* 14*th from the bottom, after the word* conjunctions.

Attention therefore must be given, even in Greek and Latin, to the placing of those indeclinable parts of speech in a sentence, otherwise confusion and ambiguity of sense will arise; and hence, as appears by a passage of Aristotle, a great part of the obscurity of the writings of Heraclitus the philosopher proceeded. This author begins one of his books, τε δε λογε τε ονπος αει αξυνετοι ανθρωποι γιγνονται. Now says Aristotle, *Rhetoricor. Lib.* 3. *c.* 5. we do not know whether the adverb αει is to be referred to ονπος, or to αξυνετοι. In order to remove this ambiguity, which makes a great difference of the sense, if he had intended to join αει with ονπος, he should have arranged the words thus, τε δε λογε τε αει ονπος αξυνετοι &c. or, if with αξυνετοι it should have been thus: τε δε λογε τε ονπος αξυνετοι αει ανθρωποι. In speaking indeed, by proper pronunciation the ambiguity will be removed; and in writing also by proper punctuation,

punctuation, as Aristotle has observed. But as this last is very commonly neglected, and I believe was always so in the ancient books, it is better to remove the ambiguity by the order of the words, when that can be done, as it almost always can in the learned languages.

Addition to page 511, *as a note before the word* Quintil.

Dionysius Thrax, as quoted by Sextus Empericus *adversus Mathematicos*, defines the grammatical art in this way, Γραμματικη εστιν εμπειρια των παρα ποιηταις τε και συγγραφευσι λεγομενων. A man therefore who could explain the poets, historians, and other standard books of the language, was called by the Greeks and Latins *grammaticus*, and it was among them a very honourable appellation; whereas that of *grammatista* was not so honourable, because he was not so learned in the art. This Suetonius has observed in his book, de Illustribus Grammaticis, c. 4. where, after observing that those who among the Greeks were called *grammatici*, were by the antient Latins called *literatores*, he adds, Sunt qui literatum a literatore distinguant, ut Graeci grammaticum a grammatista; et illum quidem absolute, hunc mediocriter doctum, existiment; quorum opinionem Orbilius etiam exemplis confirmat. See further what Sextus Empiricus has said upon the subject in the place above quoted, where he distinguishes very properly betwixt the different significations of the Greek word γραμμα.

Addition to page 537, *line* 4*th from the top, after the word* verse.

Demetrius Phalerius, in his treatise περι ἑρμηνειας, cap. 71. tells us that it is the vowels that make the music of

of language; and that those, who so studiously avoid the concourse of vowels, take away a great part of its melody: and upon this occasion he mentions a kind of music, the most ancient I believe in the world, and which appears to be coeval with language. It was a music used by the Egyptian priests, who praised their Gods by sounding only the vowels one after another, in place of pipe or harp.

Addition to page 542, *line last, after the word* duads.

To conclude this dissertation; There is one thing concerning the Greek language that I think is evident from it, and I am sure will not be disputed by any body who understands that language, That it is the most wonderful invention that ever was made by mortal man, as far at least as we know. The Shanscrit language may, according to the account that Father Pons gives of it, be as artificial, or more artificial than even the Greek; and even a barbarous language, (such as I hold all the European languages to be, compared with the Greek,) is a great piece of art. But, in the first place, in none of them is the art near so great; as they have not that variety of flexion and termination, by which cases and tenses are formed, nor even of articulation, which makes the Greek the most various, and at the same time the most high sounding language in the world: And, secondly, we cannot carry back the art of any other language so far, nor deduce it by a regular and orderly progression from a few elemental sounds; for all the other languages, that I know, seem to consist of the cries of savages, broken indeed, and distinguished by articulation, to which no doubt an art of language has been applied, so as to form out of them the

the several parts of speech, and to connect them together in discourse by a very lame and artificial syntax; whereas, according to Hempsterhusius's system and mine, the whole Greek language is derived from a few radical, vocal sounds, according to established rules of derivation and composition.

Addition to page 580, *line* 4*th from the bottom, after the word* are.

There is an example in the New Testament, where a repetition, such as this of the article, has a great emphasis, though it be not separated from the noun, as in the example from Demosthenes. It is this, το πνυμα το του Θου, which is something more than *the spirit of God*, and therefore is fitly translated by us, *the spirit, that is of God.*

Addition to note on page 584, *line* 5*th from the bottom, after the word* αν.

And in the oration περι παραπρεσβειας, p. 201. edit. Morelli, he has this strange arrangement, τινας αυτω των φθονειν συμπρεσβεων, instead of τινας αυτω φθονειν των συμπρεσβεων. Such strange arrangements are certainly not for the sake of the sense, but must have been intended for the pleasure of the ear; and they certainly produced a rhythm, or a melody, which pleased their ears, though we are not sensible of it.

END OF VOLUME SECOND